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TORONTO

HERODOTUS

THE SEVENTH, EIGHTH, & NINTH BOOKS

WITH

INTRODUCTION, TEXT, APPARATUS, COMMENTARY,
APPENDICES, INDICES, MAPS

BY

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CONTENTS

APPENDIX I

AUTHORITIES AND EVIDENCES, OTHER THAN HERODOTUS, FOR THE HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN WAR

SECTION	PAGE
1. The lost Persian archives and records	1
2. The lost Greek witnesses	4
3. The Poets : Aischylos, Pindar, Simonides, Timokreon, Aristophanes	8
4. Thucydides and the Periklean critique	17
5. Xenophon and Ktesias	21
6. Theopompos and Ephoros. The <i>Persai</i> of Timotheos	25
7. Isokrates	29
8. Demosthenes and Aischines : Lykurgos	34
9. Other Orators and Orations : Hypereides	41
10. The Philosophers : Plato, Aristotle. The <i>'Αθηναίων πολιτεία</i>	45
11. Transition to the Roman period : The <i>Parian Chronicle</i> , Polybios, Cicero	55
12. Literature under the Caesars : revival of historical interests	61
13. Universalists : Diodoros, Trogus	66
14. Biographers : Nepos, Plutarch. The <i>Moralia</i>	82
15. Topographers : Strabo, Pausanias	93
16. Rhetors : Dio Chrysostom, Aristeides	101
17. Lucian	108
18. Miscellanea : Arrian, Appian, Polyainos, Aelian, Athenaios	110
19. Christian and Byzantine writers	115
20. Conclusion	119

APPENDIX II

THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS

1. Threefold subject of the first part of the Seventh Book (cc. 1-130)	121
2. Causality of the war (cc. 1-19) : (a) real causes ; (b) problem of delay ; (c) inconsequent, fictitious, and historical elements in the story	122

SECTION	PAGE
3. The King's route, and the advance from Susa to Therme (seven stages)	126
4. Engineering feats and army-service (Roads, Bridges, Canal, Commissariat)	140
5. The <i>levée en masse</i> (Analysis, Navy, Army, Sources)	150
6. Objective and plan of the invasion	183

APPENDIX III

THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS

1. Character of the transitional passage (7. 128-137)	188
2. The Greek preparations (7. 138-178)	192
3. Condition and policy of Greek states, 490-481 B.C. : Sparta	194
4. Athens during the decade after Marathon	199
5. The Pan-Hellenic union against the Mede	217
6. The conduct of Argos, Krete, Sicily, Korkyra	224
7. The case of Delphi	229
8. Forces of the Confederacy, and prospects of success	237

APPENDIX IV

GENERAL STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR : THESSALY

1. Material conditions of the strategic problem from the Greek point of view	240
2. Chronological and geographical defects of the record	241
3. Four possible lines of defence : the Isthmos	242
4. The line of Plataia and Salamis	243
5. The line of Artemision and Thermopylai	245
6. The Thessalian question	247
7. Reasons for the abandonment of Thessaly	251
8. Subsequent conduct of the Thessalians	254
9. Strategic sequel of Salamis	255
10. The Persian strategy, and its inherent weakness	257

APPENDIX V

ARTEMISION-THERMOPYLAI

1. Strategic aspects of the line Artemision-Thermopylai	260
2. Character of the Herodotean tradition	261
3. Real causes of the failure at Thermopylai	269
4. Diaries of the Persian fleet and army	272
5. Reconstruction of the actual course of events	279
6. Immediate results	286

CONTENTS

ix

APPENDIX VI

SALAMIS

SECTION	PAGE
1. Strategic aspects of the battle of Salamis	287
2. Character of the records	289
3. The tactical problem (theories of Leake, Blakesley, Goodwin)	297
4. Extent of the difference between Aischylos and Herodotus	302
5. Solution of the tactical problem (the six traditional items in the account)	304
6. Verification of the proposed solution	315
7. Operations of the Persian army in connexion with Salamis	317
8. Failure of the Greeks to exploit their victory	324

APPENDIX VII

FROM SALAMIS TO SESTOS

1. Immediate strategic results of Salamis	326
2. Traditional synchronism of the battles of Plataia and Mykale: its significance	329
3. Operations of the Greek fleet after Salamis	329
4. The disappearance of Themistokles	331
5. Condition of the Greeks during the winter of 480-479 B.C.	334
6. Actual operations of the fleet in 479 B.C.	336

APPENDIX VIII

PLATAIA

1. General aspects of the campaign	342
2. Character of the Herodotean narrative (Chronology, Topography, Figures, Motivation)	345
3. Sources of the Herodotean narrative	358
4. Summary of the Herodotean narrative	364
5. Failure of the Herodotean narrative (twenty <i>crucis</i>)	367
6. The two fundamental problems	374
7. (A) The tactical positions occupied in succession by the Greek forces	375
8. (B) The actual battle, and the Greek victory	380
9. The plan and its author	385
10. Summary of the reconstructed narrative	388
11. Chief points in the reconstruction	392
12. Subsidiary authorities (Diodoros, Plutarch)	393

APPENDIX IX

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR

SECTION	PAGE
1. Three chronological problems presented by the subject	398
2. The period, or duration, of the war	399
3. The epoch of the war, or its reduction to the Christian era	399
4. Difficulty of determining the order of events within the period	401
5. Chronological resources of Herodotus	401
6. Synchronisms, consequences, and successions	404
7. Chief <i>cruces</i> and shortcomings	406
8. The supplementary authorities	408
9. The chronological perspective reconstructed	409
10. Kalendarial tables of the two years' war	411

INDICES

I. LECTIUM	415
II. VERBORUM	418
III. NOMINUM	438
IV. RERUM	445
V. AUCTORUM	458

MAPS

1. Route of Xerxes (with Mykale inset)	<i>To face Title</i>
2. Thessaly	<i>To face page 189</i>
3. Thermopylai	261
4. Salamis	287
5. Plataia	343
6. Central Greece	412

APPENDIX I

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§ 1. The lost Persian archives and records. § 2. The lost Greek witnesses. § 3. The Poets: Aischylos, Pindar, Simonides, Timokreon, Aristophanes. § 4. Thucydides and the Periklean critique. § 5. Xenophon and Ktesias. § 6. Theopompus and Ephoros. The *Persai* of Timotheos. § 7. Isokrates. § 8. Demosthenes and Aischines: Lykurgos. § 9. Other Orators and Orations: Hypereides. § 10. The Philosophers: Plato, Aristotle. The *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*. § 11. Transition to the Roman period: The *Parian Chronicle*, Polybios, Cicero. § 12. Literature under the Caesars: revival of historical interests. § 13. Universalists: Diodoros, Trogus. § 14. Biographers: Nepos, Plutarch. The *Moralia*. § 15. Topographers: Strabo, Pausanias. § 16. Rhetors: Dio Chrysostom, Aristeides. § 17. Lucian. § 18. Miscellanea: Arrian, Appian, Polyainos, Aelian, Athenaios. § 19. Christian and Byzantine writers. § 20. Conclusion.

§ 1. THE historian of the Persian war has to deplore his misfortune in having no sources from which to draw, save on the Greek side. In some of the Greek sources, if not in all, Persian authorities, Persian records, may to some extent, and with more or less of refraction, here and there shimmer through. Herodotus himself claims to reproduce Persian stories and statements.¹ Ktesias professed to have used the Royal Archives.² Greeks of Asia and Greeks of Europe during the fifth century, not a few, as exiles, subjects, soldiers, traders, ambassadors, adventurers, and so forth, came into contact with Medes, Persians, Egyptians,³ and other Orientals, and must often have compared notes with foreign friends or foes on the subject of the great war. The Greek traditions themselves will have been in part products of a dialectic between the two sides. Such a process may result in the denial, explicit or implicit, of a rival version; but the

¹ Cp. 1. 1-5, 95; 3. 1, 87, 89; Introduction, § 10.

² αἱ βασιλικαὶ διφθεραί, Diodor. 2. 32.
4. Cp. § 5 *infra*. Sir William Jones went too far in regarding these parchments as 'inventions' of the Knidian's "to give an air of authenticity to his

impertinent fables" (*Works*, 1807, v. 411); but it is not clear how far those mentioned by Diodoros recorded contemporary events.

³ Of whom Hdt. says 3. 2 εἰ γὰρ τινὲς καὶ ἄλλοι τὰ Περσέων νόμιμα ἐπιστάται καὶ Ἀγύπτιοι.

negative involves the positive, and the would-be destroyer is not seldom the unwilling preserver of an alternative argument or story. Such transfigured conservation is, however, a poor substitute for the native original. We miss with regret the Persian accounts of persons and events, which fill the Greek traditions; we miss too, if less consciously, much doubtless that has disappeared altogether in the one-sided record. Nor have we, in dealing with the last three Books of Herodotus, any eastern illustrations to compare with the monumental and epigraphic material available for a commentary on the first three Books. There is no inscription to control the narrative of Book 7 as the Behistun inscription controls the narrative of Book 3. The *Egyptian Logoi* in the second Book are amenable line by line to monumental, epigraphic, papyrological¹ appeal. The Oriental portions of the first Book can be compared with native evidences of one kind or another, even if Lydian and Median witnesses are hard to find. All that illuminates the earlier Books may be indirectly serviceable, as *Prolegomena*, to the subject proper of the last three Books, but the benefit is fragmentary and inferential. Nor is the lacuna filled by the later Persian literature. The Persian traditions of the middle age know nothing of the Greeks before the age of Alexander.² The wars of the fifth century are to these late authorities a blank. The early history of the Persian kings as told by the Persian poets and logographers, still recoverable, differs *toto caelo* from Medo-Persian history as narrated by Herodotus and the Greek writers. As history it appears almost worthless. There is no room for compromise between Persian and Greek authors in this matter; they are alternative. To prefer the Persian and to discard the Greek; to view the western dealings of Kyros, Kambyses, Dareios and Xerxes as figments of Greek imagination, and the story of the Persian war as an occidental romance, was no very critical proceeding even for a critic in the eighteenth century.³ The Greek traditions are contemporary with the persons and the events described: the whole subsequent history and development of Greece is a continuous verification of the main story told by Herodotus. A lack of interest, or a loss of evidence, or some other more positive motive operating on the late Persian authorities, led them to ignore

¹ Demotic papyri are (I understand from Mr. F. Ll. Griffith) likely to illustrate many items in the Herodotean account.

² "Nothing remains of genuine Persian history before the dynasty of Sa'sa'n except a few rustic traditions and fables, which furnished materials for the *Sháh-námeh*," Sir W. Jones, *Works*, iii. 108. This judgement may be over-severe: Sir W. Jones recognizes the identity of 'Cyrus' and 'Caikhosrau' (*ib.* p. 106); but the kind of defence of Persian

traditions attempted by De Gobineau (*Histoire des Perses*, 2 vv., Paris, 1869) does not come to much, and even he admits that "avant l'avènement de Cyrus, il est impossible de saisir un moment nettement déterminé dans l'existence des nations iraniennes," *op. c. i.* 338. Since that was written fresh evidences have transformed the account to be given of Kyros himself.

³ See the curious *Dissertation* prefixed to Richardson's Dictionary of *Persian, Arabic and English* (ed. 1829).

the historic transactions of the fifth century B.C. Their treatment of Alexander and his exploits might have suggested the absolutely uncritical and unscrupulous character of their historiography.¹ Fortunately these diversions of a lexicographer misled no Hellenist, and might still be of use in helping to set the *via media* of a reasoned criticism of Greek tradition somewhat towards the sceptical extreme, seeing what a margin of extravagance lies beyond. Even Grote was somewhat too easily satisfied in his retraction of the Herodotean story. The very additions to our apparatus made since Grote's work was published, while confirming the substance, confound the accidents of Persian and Graeco-Persian history, as told by Herodotus. The corpus of Achaimenid inscriptions² has made such criticism as that contained in Richardson's *Dissertation* now for ever impossible, but unfortunately throws little or no direct light upon the relations of Greeks and Persians during the fifth century B.C. The Persian records, official and perhaps poetic, which existed at that period, would supply, if still open to our inspection, many contrasts, corrections, and supplements to Greek history. They are gone, and beyond recovery. We can but mark here and there, in the better Greek accounts, an oriental trait, an oriental touch, due perhaps to a native source. We may partially console ourselves with the reflexion that, judging by Ktesias, who professed to draw upon the Royal Archives, the Persian accounts of dealings with the Greeks were anything but adequate or accurate. Yet if Photios did Ktesias justice, it is not so certain that Ktesias did justice, from this point of view, to his official authorities. He wrote with a purpose, and a bad purpose: he selected and excerpted to suit his purpose. We should like to be in a position to judge for ourselves how far the Persian archives of the fifth century B.C. might be taken to confirm and to correct the work of Herodotus. Nothing can console us for the lack of documents from the reign of Xerxes and his successors worthy of a place beside the cylinder of Kyros, the tablet of Nabonidos, the inscriptions of the first Dareios. But method to some extent supplies the place of evidence. Reading between the lines of our Greek authors, we can see for ourselves that the Greek question was not such an all-absorbing topic at Susa as was the Persian question at Athens, at Sparta, at Argos, at Thebes. Probably the Achaimenid kings—like the Arsacidae and the Sassanidae—were more constantly occupied in securing or extending their frontiers to the north and to the east, and in maintaining their supremacy over the

¹ According to the *Shāhnāmah* of Firdusi, Alexander was the son of a Makedonian princess and the Great King, and thus brother to the 'Dara' whom he overthrew, d'Herbelot, *Bibl. Orient.* (1697), p. 318. Richardson states the case somewhat differently, but apparently approves the Persian

account. According to Turner Macan, in his Preface to the first printed edition of the *Shāh Nāmah* (4 vols., Calcutta, 1829), 'Firdousee' makes Alexander a Christian! Was the mediaeval *Alexander-epos* influenced by this Oriental literature?

² *Records of the Past*, vol. ix. 65 ff.

Asiatic provinces and kingdoms, than in dreams of indefinite extension westwards.¹ But if so, this result was in part a product of the wars with Greece, and of the distinct and repeated failure of the Great King to effect a permanent lodgement in Europe. The diplomatic passages of the fourth century, and the Alexandrine history itself, are proofs positive of the importance of the antecedent relations between Persia and Hellas. Of those relations at the time there were doubtless sufficiently copious records on the Persian side, and now nothing can compensate us for the loss of them—least of all the bold achievements of oriental fabulists and poets, at a later time, when Greece had long been eclipsed by Rome, when the creed of Zoroaster had waned before the Christian Church, or withered under the Mohammedan conquest, and the representatives of the ancient worshippers of Ahuramazda sought and found in the fabulous glories of the primitive ages a consolation for their lost religion and their changed estate.²

From their records, *on n'en saurait tirer autre chose . . . que le sentiment de certaines réalités évanouies*:³ in other words, they deserve no weight, in comparison with Herodotus and the Greek writers, as authorities for historic events, nor, I would venture to add, do they deserve much weight, in comparison with the elder parts of the *Avesta*, to say nothing of the monuments, when the question is one of creed, cult, and other institutions of the Persian prime.

§ 2. The loss of Persian records is not the only disaster which the historian of the fifth century has to deplore: a whole literature of Greek authorities has likewise perished, or is but dimly reflected in the extant remains. That Herodotus himself was not the first Greek writer to deal, from one standpoint or another, with the persons and events of the Persian war, his own work bears witness.⁴ It is hardly likely that the last three Books have fully incorporated, or exploited, all the available material antecedent to their composition. The lost *Phoinissai* of Phrynichos⁵ might present contrasts with the Herodotean story as frappant as the contrast presented by Aischylos in the *Persai*. The epos of Choirilos can no longer be reckoned among the sources of

¹ "The ancient annals of the Persians are entirely employed in commemorating their numerous wars with the Turanians beyond the Jihun," Richardson, *op. c.* p. xl.

² The mediaeval authorities in Persia, starting practically with Firdusi (c. 940–1020 A.D.), recognized four dynasties preceding the Mohammedan conquest (636 A.D.): I. Peishdadian, lasting 2441 years; II. Kianian, from Kikobad to Dara (or rather to Alexander), lasting 732 years; III. Ashkanian (d'Herbelot), or 'Confederacy of Kings' (T. Macan), lasting 200 years; IV. Sassanian, lasting 501 years. These dates are perhaps

approximate. The latter part of the second period and dynasty obviously corresponds to the Achaimenid régime, but though some of the persons are perhaps recognizable, especially Kyros and Alexander, the facts are wildly fabulous. It is not altogether amiss that Isfendiyar-Mardonios quite eclipses Ardeshyr - Bahman - Xerxes, but his 'Seven Labours' have no relation to historic possibilities, and as father of Bahman he is merged in Dareios I.

³ De Gobineau, ii. 152.

⁴ For ref. cp. Introduction, § 10.

⁵ Plutarch, *Themist.* 5; Nauck, *Tr. Gr. Fr.* p. 559.

Herodotus;¹ but it might serve, if recoverable, as no bad commentary and contrast. Though the *Memoirs* of Dikaïos are but an hypothesis,² the *Hypomnemata*³ of Ion once existed, and would surely have furnished material, of one kind or another, to the full record of the Persian war. References in the extant remains of the literature of the fifth century suggest that the complete works of authors still represented would have enriched our materials with multitudinous points, and still more, perhaps, the works of authors that are clean perished. Dionysios of Miletos is little more than a name, but his works must have covered the ground of the last three Books of Herodotus, and possibly more.⁴ The Περσικά of Charon of Lampsakos contained references to the expedition of Mardonios, and to the flight of Themistokles, and plainly could not have been silent on the invasion of Xerxes.⁵ The complete and authentic legacy of Hekataios could add nothing to the mere story of the Persian war, and is probably more fully represented in the work of Herodotus than is that of any other author; but a whole Hellanikos might supply a valuable supplement.⁶ Others of the writers named, or referred to, by Dionysios of Halikarnassos could not but illustrate the same theme.⁷ In all such cases either Herodotus himself, or later extant authors, may preserve something of the lost

¹ As by Niebuhr, *Lectures on Anc. Hist.* i. 321. Choirilos of Samos was in the train of Lysander after the Peloponnesian war (Plutarch, *Lys.* 18 τῶν δὲ ποιητῶν Χοιρίλον μὲν ἀεὶ περὶ αὐτὸν εἶχεν ὡς κοσμήσοντα τὰς πράξεις διὰ ποιητικῆς), and died at the court of Archelaos (c. Ol. 95 ?); cp. Suidas *sub n.* The Lexicographer may have confused the Samian with another poet of the same name, but is probably right in representing the poet as indebted to the historian for his subject. Bergk, *Gr. Lit.* ii. 480, credits the connexion between Herodotus, Panyasis, and Choirilos, whose epos, if recoverable, would thus take early rank among the *testimonia* to the Herodotean *Logoi*. The fragments may be found in G. Kinkel's *Epicorum Gr. Frag.* vol. i. (Teubner) (but now cp. D. Müller, "Choirilos von Samos, eine poetische Quelle Herodots" in *Klio*, vii. 1907, 29 ff.).

² Cp. Introduction, § 10.

³ Or Ἐπιδημίαι, cp. Athen. 603 E. On Ion's relation to Kimon, Plutarch, *Kim.* 9, 16. The Chian poet was well known in Athens, cp. Aristoph. *Peace*, 835, where he died probably a little before the Peace of Nikias, Bergk, *Gr. Lit.* iii. 604.

⁴ Suidas, Διονύσιος Μιλήσιος, ιστορικός. Τὰ μετὰ Δαρείον ἐν βιβλίοις εἰ, περιήγησιν οἰκουμένης, Περσικά Ἰάδιδι δια-

λέκτω κτλ. Dionysios too has been confounded with later namesakes, but the Περσικά or τὰ μετὰ Δαρείον Περσικά were perhaps genuine. Mueller, *F.H.G.* iv. 653, proposes to read τὰ μέχρι Δαρείου, unnecessarily; cp. *F.H.G.* ii. 5 ff., Schwartz *ap.* Pauly-Wissowa, v. i. 933, and especially C. F. Lehmann (*Beiträge z. alt. Gesch.* ii. (1902) p. 338), who suggests that the Περσικά dealt with the earlier history, and τὰ μετὰ Δαρείον with the early years of Xerxes; cp. also Introduction, § 10.

⁵ For the Frags. cp. *F.H.G.* i. 32 ff., especially *Fr.* 4, 5. Suidas ascribes to him Περσικά and Ἑλληνικά, and the reference to the flight of Themistokles occurred apparently in the latter.

⁶ Cp. Introduction, § 10.

⁷ *De Thucyd.* 5 (ed. Hudson, ii. 224) ἀρχαῖοι μὲν οὖν συγγραφείς πολλοὶ καὶ κατὰ πολλοὺς τόπους ἐγένοντο πρὸ τοῦ Πελοποννησιακοῦ πολέμου. Among them, besides Hekataios of Miletos and Charon of Lampsakos, he names Eugeon of Samos, Deiochos of Prokonnesos, Eudemos of Paros, Demokles of Pygela, Akusilas of Argos, Melesagoras of Chalkedon, adding as all but contemporaries of Thucydides, Hellanikos of Lesbos, Damastes of Sigeion, Xenomedes of Chios, Xanthos the Lydian. (Hellanikos is cited by Plutarch, *Mor.* 869, against Hdt.)

inheritance; and the lost writers subsequent to Herodotus will often, like those still extant, have owed much to the Halikarnassian: but not everything. They were no mere epitomators; they pretended to an independent authority. From the point of view of pure literature we may have saved the best, and forfeited but the second best; but the better literature is not always the better history.

In another department the ruin has been even more complete. Of the mass of inscriptions, of the multitudinous monuments of one kind and another, all over the Greek world, which once commemorated the persons and events of the Persian war, what a mere remnant still survives! True, Herodotus himself and the later authors, Pausanias the Periegete above all, may enable us to compile a fairly full inventory of the major monuments once in existence; but how poor a substitute this, for the potential wealth of archaeological and epigraphic evidences formerly in being!¹ The excavations at Delos

¹ Hdt. mentions some three dozen objects, of one kind and another, possibly extant in his generation, and connected with the Persian war. For the inventory see Introduction, § 10, where they are given among the actual or potential sources of his records. The compilation of an exhaustive list of all remains, monuments, works of art, offerings, inscriptions, and so forth, connected with the Persian war, has apparently not yet been attempted: the following may serve as a stop-gap.

(1) *Actual spoils*: a vast quantity must once have been in existence. Pausan. 1. 27. 1 mentions the corselet of Masistios (cp. Hdt. 9. 22. 10) and the spurious dagger of Mardonios (note *l.c.*). According to one story the timbers of the Persian ships were used in the construction of the Odeion at Athens (cp. note to 9. 82). Our explorers have not yet discovered the spot on the Artemisian strand, which preserved traces of the cremation of the corpses and wrecks, Plutarch, *Them.* 8. (2) *Trophies* on every battle-field doubtless were erected: that for Salamis in Salamis, Paus. 1. 36. 1; at Plataia the trophy was fifteen stades distant from the city, 9. 2. 6. According to Plutarch, *Arist.* 20, the Lakedaimonians and Athenians had erected trophies separately. (The trophy at Marathon was of white marble, Paus. 1. 32. 4. This memorial, like all the other Marathonian monuments, except at Delphi, must have been erected after the war with Xerxes: trophy of Athene Pronoia at Delphi, Diodor. 11. 14. 4.) (3) *Graves and tombs* (the Soros at Mara-

thon, Paus. 1. 29. 4): of Corinthians in Salamis, Plut. *Mor.* 870; of Lakedaimonians, Athenians, Hellenes at Plataia, Paus. 9. 2. 5; of Megarians at Megara, 1. 43. 2. Of individuals: Pausanias and Leonidas (!) at Sparta, 3. 14. 1; Eurybiades, 3. 16. 6; of Adeimantos the Corinthian, Plut. *Mor.* 870; a tomb, or kenotaph, of Aristides at Phaleron, Plut. *Arist.* 27; a tomb, or kenotaph, of Themistokles near Peiraeus, Plut. *Them.* 32. This monument was in form of an altar. (4) *Altars*: the most celebrated that of Zeus Eleutherios at Plataia, Plut. *Arist.* 20, Paus. 9. 2. 5; one of Helios Eleutherios at Troizen, Paus. 2. 31. 5; and an altar of Peace (after Eurymedon, or more probably after 445 B.C.), Plut. *Kim.* 13 (cp. Hdt. 7. 178). (5) *Temples*: as of Artemis Proseōa at Artemision, erected by the Athenians, Plut. *Them.* 8; of Athene Areia at Plataia, Plut. *Arist.* 20, Paus. 9. 4. 1 (that this temple was erected "out of the spoils of Marathon" is due to the Athenian legend of that battle); of Artemis Aristobule, in Melite, by Themistokles, Plut. *Them.* 22; of Eukleia <Artemis of Good Report?> a pseudo-Marathonism, Paus. 1. 14. 4; of Nike, Paus. 1. 22. 4—Pausanias does not definitely connect with the Persian wars, but cp. E. Gardner, *Anc. Athens*, pp. 375 f.; of Athene in Aigina (Collignon, *Hist. de Sculp. Gr.* i. 287), or rather, of Aphaia (cp. A. Furtwängler, *Aegina, das Heiligtum der Aphaia*, 2 vv., 4to, München, 1906, or the same author's brochure *Die Aegineten*, *ibid.*); and the shrine of Maron and Alpheios at Sparta,

and Delphi, at Olympia and at Athens, do not leave much hope of

Paus. 3. 12. 9. (6) *Buildings* of less religious import, such as the Odeion (but see above), the Eleutherios Stoa at Athens (E. Gardner, *A. A.* p. 387), the great Stoa at Sparta, Paus. 3. 11. 3. (Why should M. Hauvette, *Hérodote, etc.* p. viii., class that with 'apocryphal monuments'?) The Athenian treasury at Delphi may really have been a dedication from Marathon, Paus. 10. 11. 4. (Had the Athenians any separate dedication in Delphi from the spoil of the Great Persian War?) (7) *Anathemata*: offerings of various kinds, the group of Gods, Heroes and Miltiades at Delphi, Paus. 10. 10. 1, was no doubt connected with Marathon, as were some of the gilt shields on the temple at Delphi, 10. 19. 4, but the dates of dedication are questionable; the pan-Hellenic offering still extant, in part (cp. notes to 8. 82, 9. 81), Paus. 10. 13. 5; an ox dedicated by the Plataians, and another by the Karystians, were to be seen at Delphi, Paus. 10. 15. 1, 16. 6; a private Athenian, one Kallias, had dedicated a horse, 10. 18. 1. (That the bull on the Athenian Akropolis, dedicated by the Areiopagos, was connected with the Persian war E. Curtius conjectured, cp. Frazer, *Pausan.* ii. 296: was the bronze tripod supported by a group of Persians in the Olympieion, Paus. 1. 18. 8, unconnected therewith?) The bronze palm-tree and gilt Athene, at Delphi, were dedicated by Athens from the spoils of the Kimonian victory at the Eurymedon, Paus. 10. 15. 4. There were offerings in Korinth, as by Diodoros, and a celebrated one from the Korinthian women, Plut. *Mor.* 870. (8) *Statues* may for convenience be classed separately. The principal were (a) of Gods: the colossal Zeus at Olympia, Paus. 5. 23. 1, 10. 14. 3; Apollo at Delphi, 10. 14. 3; Athene on the Akropolis, 1. 23. 1; the Epidaurian Apollo at Delphi, 10. 15. 1; Artemis the Saviour at Megara, 1. 40. 2; Zeus Eleutherios at Plataia, 9. 2. 5; Athene Areia at Plataia (by Pheidias!), 9. 4. 1; and the Nemesis of Pheidias or Agorakritos at Rhamnûs (1. 33. 3, cp. Overbeck, *Schriftg.* 834 ff.). No doubt there were hosts of other votive statues (e.g. the Aiginetan pediments?). (b) Of Men: in Athens, of Miltiades, Themistokles, Paus. 1. 18. 3; of Xanthippos, 1. 25. 1; of Themistokles, Plut. *Them.* 22; of Kallias, 'who concluded the Peace,' 1.

8. 2, cp. Hdt. 7. 151; at Plataia, of Arimnestos (*sic*), who had commanded the Plataians at Plataia ('and previously at Marathon'!), 9. 4. 2, cp. Hdt. 9. 64, 72; at Delphi, of Skyllis (*sic*) and his daughter, 10. 19. 2, cp. Hdt. 8. 8; at Troizen, of the Athenian refugees, women and children, 2. 31. 7, cp. Hdt. 8. 41; at Sparta, of Pausanias the Regent (2), Paus. 3. 17. 7, etc. (9) *Monuments* might include the *Stelai* on the strand of Artemision, Plut. *Them.* 22, and sepulchral monuments such as the Kenotaph of the Korinthians at the Isthmos, Plut. *Mor.* 870, the monument of Themistokles in the market-place of Magnesia, Plut. *Them.* 22, if, indeed, that was not the genuine tomb: here too might be found room for the *Damareteia*, Diod. 11. 26. 3 (cp. B. Head, *Hist. Num.* p. 151), indirectly commemorative of the victory at Himera. (10) *Vases*: the celebrated and so-called *Dareios-vase* (Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, i. 408 ff., Tafel vi.), though of an unusual type, is not quite unique, cp. *op. cit.*, but serves, of course, to illustrate a spirit, not to report a fact. (11) *Paintings*, more directly illustrative of the war, once existed, the most celebrated the Battle of Marathon in the Poikile Stoa, Paus. 1. 15. 4 (cp. Hdt. *IV.*—*VZ.* ii. 227 ff.); the figure of Salamis at Olympia, Paus. 5. 11. 2; the pictures in the temple of Athene at Plataia, Plut. *Arist.* 20, and those in the Telesterion of the Lykomidai in Phlya, Plut. *Them.* 1. (Whether these paintings were purely of mythical subjects is not clear; they can hardly in any case have been as illustrative of the war as the great picture of Mandrokles in the Samian Heraion, Hdt. 4. 88.) (12) *Inscriptions*.—Most, if not all, of the material witnesses above illustrated will have borne inscriptions. The only extant inscriptions are the Delphian List (Hicks² 19), the epitaph on the Korinthians in Salamis (Hicks² 18), the restored epitaph on the Megarians (Hicks² 17), the dedication on the Athenian treasury at Delphi (Hicks² 13). Among notable inscriptions added by our literary authorities are to be found the Olympian List, Paus. 5. 23. 1; the inscription on the altar at Plataia, Plut. *Arist.* 19, *Mor.* 872; and the six inscriptions bearing on the Korinthian question quoted by Plutarch, *Mor.* 870, 872.

any further great finds in this department: perhaps Ionia may still have revelations in store; otherwise, there seems more chance of unearthing evidences of the earlier stages of Hellenic history, than of discovering more of those fifth-century monuments, which were all along for the most part aboveboard, and thereby exposed to the destructive action of man and of nature. But here too we are not quite without consolation.

In one sense, indeed, the grandest monument of the Persian war was, and is, Athens itself, risen and rebuilt from its ashes. Her citizens in the days of Perikles might well have anticipated the motto: *si monumentum quaeris, circumspice!* The walls of Themistokles, though designed perhaps as much against the Spartan as against the Persian, embraced an enlarged circuit; the restored fortifications of the Akropolis still attest, on the north side, the stress under which the builders worked at first, and on the south the wealth and leisure of a more peaceful day, in the finer and more deliberate work defrayed by Kimon out of the spoils of the Eurymedon. The little temple of Athene Nike may perhaps betray, in its decoration, a more than Periklean solicitude for the revived memories of the Medic wars. The whole surface of the Akropolis has revealed not merely the wealth and science and art of Athens, as head of League or Empire, but the character and extent of the culture destroyed by the Persian invasion. Olympia has now nothing, and Delphi comparatively little, to show, which can be directly connected with the Persian war; but all the buildings and monumental remains in Athens, dating from the fifth century, bear eloquent even if indirect witness to the great crisis of the Persian war, and the contrast between the city before and thereafter. The architectural and archaeological history of the town, its walls, its fortifications, its temples, and so much of its art as remains to this day, divides itself with inevitable precision into the eras before and after the Persian war. The crisis found Athens (one might almost say) of tufa and left it on the way to become marble: found it archaic and left it immortal.

§ 3. Sources from the Persian side failing, and much of the early evidence on the Greek side, particularly material evidence, being lost, we are thrown back upon the remains of the literature. The poets claim the first word, and at their head Simonides and Aischylos, primary sources after their kind, and superior in time to the text of Herodotus itself. The historian may, indeed, as above shown,¹ have derived materials for his story from their works. In such cases his testimony adds nothing to the strength of theirs. To Pindar, to Timokreon of Rhodes, Herodotus will have owed nothing directly in his history of the war, nor can we extract much matter of fact from them. The military or political point is here of less import than the spiritual complement. These writers, even the Boiotian, reflect feelings

¹ Introduction, § 10.

from a contemporary world; they supply facts in the ethical and psychical order, valuable as affecting our judgement of tradition. Somewhat later fall the references in Aristophanes: the element of contrast, the conscious antithesis between Now and Then, the idealization of the days of yore, affect his views of the Persian war. But, in common with the other poets above named, Aristophanes helps to preserve for us the note of reality, the immediate reference to life, the direct reflexion of feelings, still vividly occupied with the persons and events of the Persian war.

But, though the poets are, as it happens, in their present form, rather aids to our imaginative appreciation than witnesses to the actual incidents of the war, privilege has already been claimed in regard to AISCXYLOS, and in a minor degree Simonides. The *Persai* must be reckoned a serious and independent source for the story of the war, and in particular for the action and manœuvres that culminated at Salamis. Composed within an octave of the events,¹ by one who had himself been witness and agent,² and presented forthwith to a public which had in person manned the fleet and stood shoulder to shoulder on the battle-field, the play, describing or dramatizing these recent and vivid experiences, could not with impunity defy the historic or critical Muse: certain bounds were set to poetic licence and to patriotic fancy, and the residuum of implicit or explicit fact is not inconsiderable. The scene is, indeed, laid at Susa; thus the poet obtains a perspective from space, which he has sacrificed in time, and observes the new realism without loss of classic dignity. The *dramatis personae* are all Persians, or foreigners,³ nor is any Greek so much as named in the course of the drama. Thus the patriot avoids invidious comparisons, and secures a fair hearing for the piece. The piece is no party pamphlet. Themistokles is not celebrated at the expense of Aristides, nor is Aristides exalted above Themistokles. The Athenian is not serving a local patriotism: 'the sons of the Hellenes'⁴ are all, with him, good men and true, and no scorn, no scandal, distils from his pen. Nor are the Persians mere objects of enmity, or marks for triumphant revenge. The Chorus of Susan Elders is as sage as any Greek Chorus need be: the Protagonist's wails⁵ are not meant to be ludicrous, unless we are to laugh at the Sophokleian Philoktetes. The therapeutic power of Pity and of Fear acts through the religious lesson involved in the Persian's pride and

¹ It was acted for the first time ἐπὶ Μένωνος, Ol. 76. 4, 473-2 B.C.; cp. Clinton, *Fasti* ii.³ 39. Probably it is Aischylos' oldest extant drama, notwithstanding Aristoph. *Frogs* 1026 f.

² γενναῖον δὲ αὐτὸν φάσι καὶ μετασχεῖν τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχης σὺν τῷ ἀδελφῷ Κυνεγεύῳ, τῆς τε ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίας σὺν τῷ νεωτάτῳ τῶν ἀδελφῶν Ἀμεινίᾳ καὶ τῆς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς πεζομαχίας. The

Life, § 4, from the Medicean ms.; cp. Wecklein's ed. 1891, p. 3.

³ Chorus of Elders, Atossa, Messenger, Shade of Dareios, Xerxes.

⁴ l. 402.

⁵ 909-1075. The *Persai* was certainly not the 'satiric' drama in the tetralogy: Phineus, *Persai*, Glaukos, Prometheus; cp. *Hypothesis*.

discomfiture, as exhibited in the drama. It was a great though not unprecedented¹ effort for a Greek dramatist to spiritualize the world of the present under the heroic conditions demanded by the tragic stage. It was a poetic triumph to succeed in that attempt, without dropping the mask, and allowing the features of the politician and the partisan to show. Any patent disregard of notorious facts would have made the result ridiculous in the eyes of Athens and of Hellas; and thus, with due regard to the poetic and dramatic hypothesis of the work, the *Persai* of Aischylos must be accounted an authentic source of real knowledge. But its object was not history, nor was it written 'in order that the deeds wrought by Greeks and Barbarians, and the war waged between them, might be had in everlasting remembrance.' It is not a history, nor even an historical poem, but a drama, a morality, with historical and still living characters on the stage. It has neither the merits nor the defects of an historical essay in contemporary politics; it supplies rather a standard than constituent materials to the historical reconstruction. What every Greek, or Athenian, knew, or might have known, if recited at all, must needs have verisimilitude; what hardly any Greek could check, was open to the poet's free will. We may be sure that the size and numbers of the invading host were not understated²; but we need not suppose that the names of the Persian captains or grandees³ were drawn from official records. We may be sure that the major events of the campaign are placed in their true sequence, irrespective of the order in which they are mentioned in the poem. We may be sure that the description of the battle of Salamis is consistent with Attic topography, and probably consistent with itself, and with the real course of the action; here, if anywhere, should Aischylos and

¹ Γλαῦκος ἐν τοῖς περὶ Αἰσχύλου μύθων ἐκ τῶν Φοινισσῶν φησι Φρυγίχον τοὺς Πέρσας παραπεισθῆναι, *ibid.* The *Phoinissai* was produced with Themistokles as Choragos in 476 B.C.; cp. Plutarch, *Them.* 5, and Clinton, *Fasti*, ad ann. (There had been the still earlier case, Hdt. 6. 21.)

² The number of Greek ships is given as 300, that of the Persian as 1000, or as 1207, ll. 339 ff.; cp. Hdt. 7. 89.

³ There are three lists of captains, or grandees, in the *Persai*: (A) in the *Parodos*, containing seventeen names; (B) in the Messenger's speech (302-330), containing nineteen names; (C) in the *Kommos* (907-end), containing twenty-six names. Of the names six may be regarded as common to A and B, three to ABC, two to AB, two to BC. The total number of distinct names is thus forty-nine. The names stand in no relation to the Herodotean list of ἀρχοντες,

or Myriarchs, thirty in number. This discord is not due to the fact that the ἀρχοντες are officers of the Land-Army, while the *Persai* is concerned with the Fleet and Salamis, for it is obvious that Chorus, Messenger, and King have in mind myriarchs and chiliarchs, as well as captains of ships and admirals: one indeed of the lost leaders was myriarch of 30,000 cavalry (314 f.)! There are not more than six names common to these lists and the lists in Hdt. (Ἀριόμαρδος, Ἀρσάμης, Ἀρταφρένης, Σισάμνης, Σπέννεσις, Φερηνδάτης; but Μαρδόνιος and Μασίστης may be added), and a few of the names in Aischylos appear elsewhere in Hdt. (e.g. Ἀρτεμβάρης, Μεγαβάρης, Φαρνοῦχος, not to say Μέμφις and Ψάμμις). Hdt. does not furnish a list of the naval captains; but we can hardly flatter ourselves that we possess in the Aischylean lists any trustworthy material wherewith to cover that omission.

Herodotus be at variance, it is not the poet must give way.¹ We can easily allow room for exaggeration or borrowing in the record of the retreat of Xerxes,² where the actual facts were already remote from observation, and the dramatic hypothesis made it difficult for the poet otherwise to utilize, or point, the moral of later disasters. The *mise en scène* set the poet free to represent transactions in Susa according to his pleasure, or the dramatic necessities;³ we shall not mistrust the account of Salamis because the poet takes liberties with the *Realien* of the Persian court,⁴ nor discount the reference to Plataia because it is put into the mouth of the Ghost of Dareios.⁵

PINDAR was strictly contemporary with the Persian wars, and his works are eminently representative of the genius and *êthos* of his age and nation. If the contribution they afford to our knowledge of the war, its circumstance and heroes, is slender and disappointing, this defect may be due less to the fact that the poet was a Boiotian, and so committed on the wrong side, than to the loss of the greater portion of his poetic achievement. Had we in possession all the seventeen books, or volumes, into which antiquity distributed his remains,⁶ we might find a larger part of Pindar's work to illustrate our subject. The *Epinikia*, by which he is now in the main represented, celebrated victories of peace, eminently characteristic no doubt of Hellenic civilization, but having as little to do directly with Salamis and Plataia as the playing-fields of England with Trafalgar or Waterloo. Yet in one or two cases even the *Epinikia* throw a reflected light upon the subject of the war. Just as the seventh Pythian ode illuminates the position of the Alkmaionidai in Athens about the date of the battle of Marathon,⁷ so the last Isthmian, especially in its opening, reflects the state of Thebes and the natural depression of 'the Theban eagle,' not long after the battle of Plataia.⁸ It was in an *Epinikion* that Pindar volunteered to sing the praises of the Athenians for Salamis, or of the Spartans for Plataia,⁹ as in another he refers in no obscure terms to the Aiginetan *Aristeia* at Salamis.¹⁰ Somewhere Pindar had celebrated the crossing of the Hellespont by the Persians,

¹ Cp. Appendix VI. § 4.

² ll. 482-514.

³ e.g. the immediate return of Xerxes to Susa.

⁴ The situation, for example, in the *Kommos* is purely theatrical, and not merely unhistorical, but impossible.

⁵ ll. 805-820.

⁶ Bergk, *P.L.G.* i. 4 367, and the *Lives* (Christ ed. mai. (1896), p. c ff.).

⁷ Cp. *Hdt.* IV.-VI. ii. 176.

⁸ *Isth.* 8 (7); the precise dates of the *Epinikion* itself, and of the pankratiast victories therein reported, are in some doubt, but it is agreed that the poem was composed within a year or two of the battle of Plataia; cp. especially J. B.

Bury, *Isth. Odes* (1892) p. 134, note; also *Isth.* 3. 34, and Bury, *Class. Rev.* 1905, p. 10.

⁹ *Pyth.* 1. 75 ff. ἀρέομαι | παρ μὲν Σαλαμῖνος Ἀθηναίων χάριν | μισθόν, ἐν Σπάρτῃ δ' ἐρέων πρὸ Κιθαιρώνος μάχαν, | ταῖσι Μήδαιοι κάμον ἀγκυλότοξοι κτλ. A reference to Himera follows immediately. (The Ode is in honour of Hieron, 'of Aitna,' and also refers to his victory over the Etruscans and Carthaginians off Cumae, 474 B.C.)

¹⁰ *Isth.* 5 (4). 48 ff. καὶ νῦν ἐν Ἀρεῖ μαρτυρήσαι κεν πόλις Ἀλάντος ὀρθωθεῖσα ναύταις | ἐν πολυφθόρῳ Σαλαμῖς Διὸς θυβρῶ, | ἀναρίθμων ἀνδρῶν χαλαζᾶεντι φόνῳ.

perhaps not merely in a passing allusion to the war.¹ Can he have written an *Enkomion* for Alexander of Makedon,² and have made no reference to that prince's real or supposed services to Hellas in the war with the Barbarian? Was it not that poem, above all, which moved 'the great Emathian conqueror' to spare the poet's house, when all the rest of Thebes was razed to the ground?³ Was not the Aiginetan *Prosodion* εἰς Ἀφαίαν⁴ written for the dedication of the temple, built probably out of the spoils of the war,⁵ and would it not have been rich in allusions to the heroism of the Aiginetan sailors and hoplites? Fragments survive of the *Dithyramb*, in which Pindar glorified the victories of the Athenians from Artemision to Eion:⁶ who can say how much of the same kind has been lost? Even in view of the references, just given, it is hard to believe that Pindar's sympathies were with the dominant party in his native state; if ever any poet had a proper vocation to sing the praises of liberty and the higher life, the very essentials of Hellenic culture, was it not Pindar?⁷ Was he, indeed, so little employed therein, as the meagre evidence just surveyed would seem to suggest?

Far other was the fortune of SIMONIDES of Keos,⁸ whose name is more intimately associated with the victories of the Hellenes over 'the Barbarian' than that of any other poet. Unfortunately, the works of this master of sepulchral elegy and votive epigram have come down to us but as second or third-hand citations in other writers, and in many cases the authenticity of the citation is doubtful, or indefensible.⁹ There was, perhaps, no battle of the wars from Marathon to the Eurymedon, or even to the Peace, which was not commemorated in elegies that might pass as worthy of Simonides; while on countless offerings in all the great centres of Hellas his style was recognizable, and surely enhanced the value of the gift. Simonides wrote a lyric poem on Artemision, and from the same poem, or a cognate one, Diodoros quotes a eulogy on the heroes of Thermopylai.¹⁰ And he wrote elegies on the battles of Salamis and Plataia.¹¹ The inscriptions on the *Stelai* at Thermopylai were from his pen,¹² as were

¹ *Fr.* 189 πανδαμει (τὰν δέματο Hermann) τοὶ μὲν ὑπὲρ πόντιον Ἑλλας πόρον ἰρόν. The metre is the same as in the *Parodos* of the *Persai*: whether Pindar copied Aischylos (Bergk), or Aischylos copied Pindar (Christ), is doubtful.

² Bergk, *Christ*, *Fr.* 120 f. (ὁλβίων ὁμόνυμοι Δαρδανιδῶν, | παῖ Θρασύμηδες Ἀμύντα).

³ Arrian, *Anab.* 1. 9. 10.

⁴ *Fr.* 89, cp. Pausan. 2. 30. 3 (and Hdt. 3. 59 as amended by Kurz).

⁵ Cp. note 1 p. 6 *supra*.

⁶ *Fr.* 76-78. Plutarch quotes 77 no less than four times: *Them.* 8, *Mor.* 350, 552, 867. ὅθι παῖδες Ἀθηναίων ἐβάλλοντο

φαεννάν | κρηπιδ' ἐλευθερίας (sc. Artemision).

⁷ Cp. even in *Isth.* 8. 15 ἡτὰ δ' ἐστὶ βροτοῖς σὺν γ' ἐλευθερία καὶ τά.

⁸ Bergk, *P.L.G.* iii. 4 382-535.

⁹ Cp. A. Hauvette, *de l'authenticité des Epigrammes de Simonide*, Paris, 1896.

¹⁰ Bergk *l.c.* Diodor. 11. 11. 6 (eight or nine lines).

¹¹ Bergk iii. 423-425, *Fr.* 83-85.

¹² Bergk, *Fr.* 91-94. There were five inscribed *Stelai* according to Strabo 425, who quotes one in addition to the three preserved by Hdt. 7. 223. Cp. Bergk, *Fr.* 99, 100.

the elegies on the tombs at Plataia,¹ and the tombs in Salamis bore epitaphs of his making.² The lines which guarantee the presence of the Megarians at Artemision, Salamis, Plataia, and Mykale, are still—by an unique chance—extant on marble, though not on the original slab;³ and the ascription of the epigram in whole or in part to Simonides has some authority. Simonides composed the dedication on the Altar of Zeus at Plataia,⁴ and that which once adorned the golden tripod at Delphi, and which has survived in spite of the Spartan erasure.⁵ He had celebrated also the victory of Himera in the west;⁶ but he can hardly have lived to witness the last victory of Kimon in Kypros;⁷ yet even if for the quatrain on the Attic arrows dedicated to Athene⁸ we have only the authority of the *Anthology*, shall we greatly err in accepting the Simonidean authorship? And albeit Timokreon of Rhodes survived the Keian poet, none but Simonides will have written and bequeathed to the Rhodian the jocosely crushing epitaph,⁹ the gravest libel in which is only too fully justified by what remains of the Rhodian's own words.

The maledictions of TIMOKREON¹⁰ are, nevertheless, among the most precious fragments of the early fifth-century literature which good fortune has allowed to reach us, for the simple reason that they demonstrate how soon, to wit immediately after the crowning victory, the spirits of envy, malice, evil-speaking, lying, and slander were let loose, and at once set to work to destroy the great reputations which had been made in the war. Timokreon is, in short, one of our chief benefactors, not of good will, but of the reverse. The glimpse of his malignity sets us thinking what a world of such stuff must once, and that early, have existed; we wonder now the less if Herodotus, with all the good will he possessed, has taken up something of that kind into his composition, upon the principle that what is being said, or has been said, should be repeated, however malignant and improbable it may be.¹¹ The notion that the traces of malignity in the Herodotean history of the war all date from a comparatively late stage in the evolution of tradition is curiously naïve in itself, and is refuted by the evidence of Timokreon. Within ten years of the battles of Salamis, of Plataia, and Mykale, the three Greek leaders

¹ Pausan. 9. 2. 5, Bergk, *Fr.* 101–103.

² As for the Corinthians, evidence which Dio Chrys. and Plutarch justly quote against the scandal in Hdt. 8. 94, cp. Bergk, *Fr.* 96, 97.

³ Bergk, *Fr.* 107, Hicks² 17, who recognizes the first couplet as genuine Simonides. If neither Pausanias nor Plutarch mention or quote this epigram, the reason may be that it was illegible, until 'restored' by Helladios, "probably as late as the fourth century A.D."

⁴ Plutarch, *Aristeid.* 19, *Mor.* 873; cp. Bergk, *Fr.* 140.

⁵ Thuc. 1. 132. 2; cp. Bergk 138.

⁶ Bergk 141, especially v. 4: *Δαμαρέρτου χρυσού, τὰς δεκάτας δεκάταν.*

⁷ Bergk 142.

⁸ Bergk 143.

⁹ Bergk 169 *πολλὰ φαγὼν καὶ πολλὰ πῶν καὶ πολλὰ κάκ' εἰπὼν | ἀνθρώπους κείμαι Τιμοκρέων Ῥόδιος.*

¹⁰ Bergk, *P.L.G.* iii.⁴ 536–541.

¹¹ 7. 152 *ἐγὼ δὲ ὀφείλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα κτλ.*

and commanders whose names were most intimately associated with those victories were fallen and discredited¹: the ungrateful process of discounting their services and blackening their names had been inaugurated even before their fall. But the critical perusal of the Herodotean record tends to prove that the spirit of mutual suspicion, detraction, and jealousy had not been quite completely laid to rest, even during the period of successful co-operation and comparative harmony between states, parties, and persons.² The mysteriously omitted chapter on the *Aristeia* of Plataia³ might have shown an outbreak of jealousy on the field of victory before the dead were buried, or the spoils divided. The generous pan-Hellenism breathed in the *Persai* of Aischylos attests the magnanimity of the poet, and perhaps a moment of more cordial approximation between Sparta and Athens,⁴ but neither covers all elements in the living tradition and discussion of the day, nor even fully photographs the mind, or double-mindedness, of Hellas in the recent struggles and very hour of victory. The remains of Timokreon may at least serve to show how the thing struck an interested and cynical contemporary.⁵

With ARISTOPHANES we pass from the writers whom Herodotus may have used to the writers who used or may have used Herodotus, and Aristophanes may be set here with the good poets rather than with Thucydides his contemporary, because he too was a poet, because genius counts in this case rather than chronology, and *êthos* entitles

¹ Themistokles, Pausanias, Leotychidas.

² Cf. the strife over the question of *Hegemonia* (Hdt. 8. 3); the 'neutrality' of Argos (7. 148-151); the barely composed quarrel between Aigina and Athens (7. 145); the nascent quarrel between Athens and Korinth, which doubtless dates from the naval law of Themistokles; the ambiguity in the attitude of Delphi; the Medism of most of the Amphiktyonic nations; to say nothing of exiles, rivals, cross purposes and divided interests on the king's side; and we have enough to convince us that the roots of much of the *maliguitas* in the traditions of the Persian war go right back to the very generation of the war itself.

³ Cp. Plutarch, *Arist.* 20; Hdt. 9. 71.

⁴ Themistokles had just been sacrificed to the resentment of Sparta a year before; for the date of his ostrakism cp. Busolt III. i. 112. Among its causes should not be overlooked the growing aversion of Themistokles to the policy of Kimon, the endless war with Persia, and the fettering friendship with Sparta. Themistokles had thwarted Sparta already

again and again, notably in regard to the refortification of Athens, and the manipulation of the Amphiktyonic League. Sparta's hostility to him dates long before his residence in Argos.

⁵ The recovered poems of BAKCHYLIDES might have been expected to yield some material for the history of the Persian war, but it is not so. The prime editor has well said: "The poems connected with Athens (x., xvii., xviii., xix.) would appear, in the case of the last three at least, to have been written subsequent to the Persian wars; for, though there is no direct allusion to these or any other political events, the tone in which Athens is addressed seems to imply that she has already attained that eminent position which was due to the battle of Salamis and the formation of the confederacy of Delos."—F. G. Kenyon, *The Poems of Bacchylides*, 1897, p. ix. The distinct reference in the poems of THEOGNIS to the deliverance of Megara in the Persian war (l. 775), like the address to Simonides (l. 1349), only show that the work is composite and parts of it falsely ascribed to the elder Megarian poet.

Aristophanes with all his vagaries to be associated with Pindar, Aischylos, Simonides. On the subject of the Persian wars Aristophanes is, indeed, archaic, as compared with Thucydides, and even in comparison with old Aischylos himself. His ideal of Athens lies before the time not merely of Perikles but even of Kimon. He does not harp much on the Persian wars; but if he must refer to them, the first rather than the second war takes his fancy, and the *Marathonomachai* are his heroes, the nautical mob his laughing-stock.¹ True, as compared with the Demagogues of his own day, a Themistokles is of glorious and immortal memory;² but there is only one express reference to the battle of Salamis, in the extant plays, and that is broad farce.³ True, a late and perhaps dialectically laughable passage celebrates, with comic fervour, the defence of Artemision and Thermopylai⁴; but the most remarkable passage on the Persian wars at large,⁵ though it gains its chief point from the Xerxeian occupation of Athens, reported almost in the words of Herodotus,⁶ yet plainly refers the Greek success to the battle of Marathon,⁷ and makes no clear reference to the actual engagements of the second war: though the subsequent Athenian acquisitions in Asia are implied in the context.⁸ The battles of Plataia and Mykale are never cited by Aristophanes, and the one reference to Aristeides,⁹ in which he is classed with Miltiades, may be chiefly due to his prominence at Marathon.¹⁰ If Aristophanes refers to the *Persai* of Aischylos¹¹ it is merely as a date in that poet's literary biography. The names of Leonidas¹² and Artemisia¹³ might have been current in Athens in any case, but may with Aristophanes be of the nature of literary allusions, like some others,¹⁴ due to the recent circulation of the work of Herodotus. Aristophanes, in fact, lives in a world where, for the most part, the name of the Mede is no longer 'a terror to hear,'¹⁵ and the breeches, or bags, of the Mede are merely a jest to

¹ Cp. *Hdt.* IV.-VI. ii. 182 ff. (Appendix X. § 16).

² Themistokles is five times named in the *Knights* (424 B.C.) to the disparagement of Kleon (ll. 84, 812, 813, 818, 884). It looks as if Kleon had been advocating an alliance with Argos, and quoting the authority of Themistokles therefor.

³ *Knights* 785 κᾶτα καθίζου μαλακῶς, ἵνα μὴ τρίβῃς τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι. Marathon has been mentioned, in much grander terms, just four lines earlier.

⁴ *Lysist.* (411 B.C.) 1247-1265.

⁵ *Wasps* (422 B.C.) 1076-1100.

⁶ ἡνίκ' ἦλθ' ὁ βάρβαρος, | τῷ καπνῷ τύφων ἄπασαν τὴν πόλιν καὶ πυρπολῶν: cp. *Hdt.* 8. 50. ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τοξευμάτων οὐκ ἦν ἰδεῖν τὸν οὐρανόν: cp. *Hdt.* 7. 226.

⁷ ll. 1081-5, without actually naming the spot.

⁸ l. 1098 τοιγαροῦν πολλὰς πόλεις Μῆδων ἐλόντες κτλ.

⁹ *Knights* 1325.

¹⁰ Cp. Plutarch, *Arist.* 5.

¹¹ *Frogs* (405 B.C.) 1026.

¹² *Lys.* 1254.

¹³ *Lys.* 675.

¹⁴ *Birds* (414 B.C.) 278 εἴτα πῶς ἀνευ καμήλου Μῆδος ὦν εἰσέπτω; The reference in *Wasps* 12, Μῆδος τις . . . νυστακτῆς ὕπνος, is obscure; if Μῆδος means 'fearful' then it is purely jocular, as who should say, 'a fearsome barbarous sleep invaded me!'; but is not the stress on the antecedent word (ἐπεστρατεύσατο), the closing words being rather παρά προσδοκίαν?

¹⁵ *Hdt.* 6. 112.

beholders.¹ Persia is now chiefly notorious for its luxuries: life in Ekbatana is 'all jam';² Athenian embassies go to and from Susa, and suck thereout no small advantage;³ Pseudartabas, the King's Eye, is a farcical figure in the Athenian Assembly,⁴ and the charge of 'Medism' is an anachronism.⁵ In all this Aristophanes adds nothing to our actual knowledge of the war; but just on one point he makes a valuable addition to Herodotus, in suggesting that there had been a financial levy on the citizens during the war, akin to, but not identical with, the later income-tax.⁶ In fact, Aristophanes is of value as marking a stage, perhaps also a decline, in the spirit of tradition, but he supplies little of material contents to the subject in hand. He is no flatterer of the maritime mob, no admirer of its victories. He is a lover of the soil, not of the sea. He could never have advocated the war of revenge, the *epiplous* to Kypros, or the march to Susa. Though no friend to Perikles, on two points he is almost a Periklean: he would drop anti-Medism, and he could hardly praise Sparta. But in his heart of hearts Aristophanes was a 'little Attiker,' and would cheerfully have seen combined the domestic policy of a Kimon with the pacific phase of the Periklean foreign policy. The exact place of the 'Empire' in the programme of Aristophanes is not, indeed, well defined; he might perhaps have been willing to adopt in a sense of his own the motto: *l'empire, c'est la paix*. But, like a true lover of culture, his preference was inevitably for the antique. The vulgarity of the new men is what mainly strikes him.⁷ It is a common fault to take Aristophanes too seriously as a politician, or even as a moralist; he is above all a poet and a wit, with a vivid eye for the situation of the hour. There is not much in all that to lead him into the details of the Persian war: with Marathon to glorify, he could wellnigh ignore Salamis, the triumph of the naval and knavish mob, and turn his back on Plataia, the chief glory of Sparta. To the great Persian war, then, he is, though for different reasons, but one degree less indifferent than the Periklean Thucydides himself. What is true of Aristophanes may be allowed to hold good of the authors of the Old Comedy in general. In vain we ransack their remains for events, or names, or spots of local colour, wherewith to enrich the story of the campaigns of Xerxes and Mardonios. If preserved in fuller degree the Comedians would chiefly avail to represent, directly and indirectly, the *milieu* through which those memories and records were regarded, by the bulk of the upper classes in Athens, during the Periklean and sub-Periklean age. But these poets were not themselves true Perikleans. For the better expression

¹ *Wasps* 1087 εἶτα δ' εἰδόμεσθα θυννάζοντες εἰς τοὺς θυλάκους.

² *Knights* 1089 ἐν Ἐκβατάνοις δικάσεις, λείχων ἐπίπαστα.

³ *Acharn.* (425 B.C.) 65 ff.

⁴ *Acharn.* 91 ff.

⁵ *Knights* 478, *Peace* (421 B.C.) 108, *Thesmoph.* (411 B.C. ?) 337, 365.

⁶ *Lysistr.* 654 τὸν ἔρανον τὸν λεγόμενον παππῶν ἐκ τῶν Μηδικῶν.

⁷ *Knights* 191, etc.

of the Periklean attitude, in its maturity, towards the most glorious chapter in the history of Athens, we must turn to the great master, whose immortal work—perhaps an all too successful vindication of Perikles and his polity—has dominated men's conceptions of the history of the fifth century ever since.

§ 4. THUCYDIDES, the most austere of Attic historians, has one strong feeling in common with Aristophanes, the lightest of Attic poets, a hearty contempt for the popular leaders who succeeded Perikles: but here their agreement ends. With the poet dislike extends to the policy of the Demagogues, with the historian it is mainly concentrated on their persons. Moreover Thucydides, in contrast with Aristophanes, has a thorough admiration for Perikles, for the Periklean policy and the Periklean régime, and undertakes to prove that the war between Sparta and Athens, the history of which he proposed to write, was of all wars the grandest, the most inevitable, and the most interesting.¹ A war it undoubtedly was, for which the main responsibility rested on Perikles. The gay comedian, who disliked the war, expressed his views of that responsibility, after his own fashion, in the famous parody on the *Proem* of Herodotus²: the grave historian, who canonised Perikles, reviewed the whole past history of Greece, the Persian war included, in a false perspective.³ Perikles had never been closely identified with the Medie war in any of its phases.⁴ He had made his political début in opposition to the man whose twofold idea in foreign policy was war *à outrance* with the Persian empire and peace at all costs with Sparta, as the necessary complement thereto.⁵ Perikles was early identified with the invasion of the sphere of Spartan influence, with the approximation to Argos, with the abandonment of the endless feud against Persia, in short, so to speak, with the three principal clauses in the testament of Themistokles to his not too grateful

¹ 1. 1. 1 μέγαν τε . . . καὶ ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων. Cp. 1. 21. 2. Its inevitable character is proved by the analysis of its causes and antecedents. The Persian war not comparable to it, 1. 23. 1.

² Aristoph. *Acharn.* 524 ff.

³ Thuc. 1. 2-19. Thucydides considers Minos and Agamemnon good Hellenes, but he has a very inadequate conception of the power and civilization of the Aigaian in Minoan and Mykenian times, to say nothing of more recent days of rival leagues, of colonizations, tyrants, and so forth.

⁴ I regard the κοινὸν ψήφισμα, recorded by Plutarch *Perikl.* 17, as a very early item in the Periklean record. It belongs to the first stage of his political career, after the battle of the Eurymedon, but

before the actual breach with Sparta. It assumes the time to be come for treating the Persian question as settled. It was not a success. 'The great expedition to Egypt' (Thuc. 1. 110. 4) can hardly have been undertaken in opposition to Perikles, but he himself remained at home. He may have commanded a squadron operating at some time in Asiatic waters (Plut. *Kim.* 13, cp. Duncker viii. 247), but nothing came of it, and he was still a merely secondary figure in politics.

⁵ Besides those two ideas Kimon must have had two others: the firm maintenance of the Maritime Symmachy, and the preservation of the πάτριος πολιτεία at home. The prosecution of Kimon by Perikles may be dated 463 B.C., *Abh. π.* 27. 1; cp. Busolt III. i. 245.

country. The new policy carried a new estimate of the relative values of Medism and anti-Medism, Lakonism and anti-Lakonism, as means to the glorification of Athens. The new calculus of values reacted upon men's estimate of Greek history and Greek relations with Persia. For Thucydides the distinction between Hellenism and Barbarism is merely one of degree.¹ There is no 'eternal' or essential conflict between East and West. The most profound antithesis in history is to be seen in the typical struggle between Athens and Sparta—the Athens of Perikles, progressive, critical, adventurous, cultured, and the ignorant, stay-at-home, churlish, unchangeable Sparta.² Thucydides holds no brief for democracy; he judges monarchy, whether of fact or of form, not unkindly. He writes as though a Peisistratid restoration might have been no great offence³: was not the Perikleian régime itself of that nature?⁴ Viewed from this standpoint the chief interest of the Persian war was that it had necessitated and justified the Athenian Empire, for which Perikles was prepared to find a fresh *raison d'être* without wasting men and treasure in endless warfare with the Mede.⁵ With such a shift in the centre of gravity it is no wonder if the work of Thucydides offers at first sight so immense a contrast to the work of Herodotus, and that, perhaps, in the very effort to displace it. Yet in spite, or in consequence, of that effort Thucydides makes, in at least two particulars, a more valuable contribution to the right estimate of the Persian wars than any other extant writer between Herodotus and Plutarch. In the first place, Thucydides duly appraises the relative significance of the first and of the second war, and does justice to the part played by the fleet in the liberation of Hellas.⁶ In the second place, Thucydides corrects the malignant legend about Themistokles, and writes the first of that long series of *Rettungen*, which the malice of contemporaries has continued to require of

¹ The distinction between 'Hellene' and 'Barbarian' is post-Homeric, 1. 3. 3; cp. cc. 5, 6, especially the conclusion: *πολλὰ δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλα τις ἀποδείξειε τὸ παλαιὸν Ἑλληνικὸν ὁμοιότροπα τῷ νῦν βαρβαρικῷ διατρώμενον*. Thucydides himself had Thracian blood in his veins.

² Cp. especially the two celebrated contrasts between Athens and Sparta in the Korinthian speech (i. 68–71) and the Funeral Oration (2. 35–46).

³ 6. 54–59.

⁴ *ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή* 2. 65. 9. The whole chapter contains the apotheosis of the policy and administration of Perikles, and was plainly written in whole, or part, after the fall of Athens, and subsequently to the commendation of the moderate democracy in 8. 97. 2—

I assume the authenticity of the eighth Book—which is not, if rightly regarded, inconsistent therewith.

⁵ *τὸν Μῆδον ἐχθρόν ἔχοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκτήσαντο* (Hermokrates) 6. 17. 7; *δικαίως τὸν Μ. καταλύσαντες ἀρχομεν* 5. 89. 1 (an argument they waive, cp. 6. 83. 2); *ἀνθ' ὧν* (the 'Medism' of the Ionians) *ἄξιό τε ὄντες ἅμα ἀρχομεν ὅτι τε κτλ.* (Euphemos) 6. 82. 4, 83. 1; Perikles puts it frankly on the basis of self-interest, 2. 63. 2; cp. 1. 75. 3 (a Perikleian ambassador!).

⁶ Salamis on the whole is the battle of the war on which Thucydides dwells with least reluctance, 1. 18. 2, 1. 73. 4, especially 1. 92. 3, and generally the emphasis laid on the naval service, e.g. 1. 73. 5.

succeeding generations.¹ The first of these services not merely supplies a protest against the Athenian exaggerations in the fifth century B.C., but serves to condemn in anticipation the still wilder excesses of the Marathonian legend in after days.² In the second case it was not merely current Attic tradition, nor merely allied scandal, we may well believe, which Thucydides applied himself to correct: the work of Herodotus, his great exemplar and opposite, had subsumed too much of that tradition and that scandal, and challenged correction: it was here, if anywhere, that the Periklean writer was bound to intervene, with something like a new redaction, and a final judgement. Nor is it merely in these two particulars that the work of Thucydides makes a valuable contribution to the materials for the history of the Persian war. The facts and the causalities of the war, as well as its sequelae, are familiar to Thucydides, and utilised by him for his own purposes; and it is not merely to the work of Herodotus that he owes his knowledge of the facts,³ much less his rationale of the history.

¹ 1. 14. 3, 93. 7, 74. 2, 137. 3.

² Cp. *Hdt. IV.-VI.* Appendix X.

³ That Thucydides was acquainted with the work of Hdt. is a moral certainty, attested, apart from general probability, by four kinds of evidence. (i.) The fact that Thucydides goes out of his way to carry on the record of Greek history, just from the point where Hdt. drops it. One might almost as well argue that Xenophon wrote *Hellenics* Bks. 1, 2 in ignorance of Thuc. 8 as that Thuc. wrote the history of the *ἐκλειπὲς χωρίον* (1. 97. 2) without reference to the work of Hdt. (ii.) The many passages in which Thuc. corrects and supplements Hdt., of which four examples must here suffice: (a) 1. 126 (Kylonian *ἄγος*), cp. Hdt. 5. 71; (b) 6. 54-59 (Peisistratidai), cp. Hdt. 5. 55-65; (c) 6. 4 (origin of Zankle-Messene), cp. Hdt. 7. 164; (d) 1. 20 (Πισανάρης λόχος), cp. Hdt. 9. 53. (iii.) The references made by Thuc. to his predecessors (i. 21, 97), implying a complete acquaintance with all existing literature. (iv.) The conscious and obvious contrast between the work of Thucydides and that of Hdt., and I would venture to add the obvious debt of Thuc. to Hdt. direct and indirect.

The brief summaries of the war as a whole, 1. 23. 1 (the four battles), 1. 18. 1, 2 (the whole war), conform to Hdt., and so generally; e.g. 1. 73. 5 (retreat of Xerxes, *τῷ πλεόνι τοῦ στρατοῦ*). In a certain number of cases Thuc. supplements Hdt. (1) 1. 89. 3 (description of Athens as left by the barbarians).

There are not less than six references to the evacuation of Athens and Attica by the Athenians, proving the impression made on tradition by that flitting (1. 18. 2, Thuc. himself; 73. 4, 74. 2, Ath. orator at Sparta, who adds that the Athenians themselves destroyed their own property; 1. 144. 4, Perikles; 6. 82. 4, Euphemos. In 2. 16. 1 Thuc. for his own purposes makes more of the removal of the country-folk into the city in 431 B.C.). (2) The story of the destruction of Plataia is rich in allusions and adds to Hdt., e.g. the 'dynasty' which ruled Thebes in 480 B.C. (3. 62. 3), the *σπονδαί* of Pausanias, which guaranteed inviolability to Plataia (3. 68. 1), and so forth; cp. Thuc. 2. 71, 3. 52-68. (3) The Athenian siege of Sestos, in company with allies Ionian and Hellespontine (1. 89. 2). (4) Spartan opposition to the refortification of Athens in the winter 479-8 B.C. (1. 90 f.). (5) The whole presentation of Themistokles and his policy, including the letter, 1. 137. (6) The account of Pausanias, including his inscription on the tripod. (7) The ships at Salamis, 1. 14. 3. The rationale of the Greek victory, as presented by Thuc., is naturally different from that in Hdt. The following passages are specially significant: (1) 6. 33. 5 (Hermokrates); (2) 1. 69. 5 (Korinthian); (3) 1. 144. 4 (Perikles: *γνώμη τε πλεόνι ἢ τύχη καὶ τόλμη μείζονι ἢ δυνάμει*); (4) 1. 73. 4 (Athenian view of the importance of Salamis to the Peloponnese); (5) 1. 74. 2 (Athenian view of Peloponnesian policy). Thuc. in what he says of

Among his inexhaustible merits is to be accounted the fact that Thucydides furnishes a valuable commentary and appendix to the stories of Herodotus; and the commentary is no whit the less valuable if it betray upon closer examination some subtle inconsistencies. Thucydides depreciates the importance of all Greek history and experience down to the archonship of Pythodoros; yet he must needs write the last chapter of the Persian war. Thucydides condemns the methods and style of his predecessors; yet he feels compelled at every turn to emulate the historian of the Persian war. His attempt to depress the work of Herodotus is neither good art nor good nature, nor has it ever for long been successful; but the spirit which dictated it is intelligible as the product of a time when the intervention of Persia had been welcomed again and again in Hellenic affairs, when Athens, that had so lightly risen from the Persian conflagration, was locked in a death-struggle with her quondam yoke-fellow in Greece, to be saved in the end from total destruction only by the mutual jealousies of her Greek enemies. Undoubtedly the work of Thucydides represents far better than the work of Herodotus the atmosphere and interests of the latter half of the fifth century B.C., a period when the Greek states were chiefly concerned in their own development each at the other's expense, and the record of the common effort, for the repulse of the foreign and common foe, must have seemed like a faint echo from an archaic world. But the point of view natural to a Greek, and even to an Athenian, during the last quarter of the fifth century, was not destined to be normal or abiding. Two tendencies co-operated to break it down, the exhaustion of the city-state, which was accomplished in the first half of the fourth century, and the expansion of Hellas, under Makedonian auspices, which quickly ensued. The Thucydidean standpoint itself became an anachronism, and statesmen like Epameinondas or Demosthenes, who looked for the enemy still within, or only just beyond, the border, play the part, however inevitably or heroically, of mere Intransigents or Reactionaries. With the revival of the pan-Hellenic ideal, best attested in the pages of Isokrates, with the renewed cry for the conquest of Asia, the literary and traditional interest in the Persian wars of yore, never indeed quite defunct, likewise revived and rose. The fulgurous work of Thucydides may ever be regarded as the last word of a period, which closed in doom and disaster over the State that had justly been described by Herodotus as the Saviour and by Thucydides as the School of Hellas. The bare fact that Athens never again could achieve effective sovereignty or purpose in war and politics led her citizens to cherish all the more fondly the memory of her former titles to fame—an occupation for which the more zest and opportunity were found, as the Thucydidean

Themistokles seems rather to endorse the Periklean formula. (*Nunc dimittis*, a remarkable article in the *Times*, August

31, 1905, applies the observation of Hermokrates to the case of Russia's war with Japan.)

formula, with a difference, worked itself into practice, and the sovran city of Themistokles and Perikles blossomed, or sank, into a cosmopolitan university of sophists and rhetoricians. It is now all that process, in its manifestations and effects on the tradition of the Persian war, that has to be traced down the literature of the fourth and ensuing centuries.

§ 5. XENOPHON meets us on the threshold of the fourth century, and his works reflect more completely than those of any other writer events of the first half of that century, and contemporary changes in politics and *êthos* throughout the Greek world. Xenophon witnessed the rise of Sparta to an imperial position, and recorded the overthrow of her marine power by the Persian fleet under an Athenian admiral,¹ and the ruin of her land power² by that state whose Medism had well-nigh cost Greece its liberties in 479 B.C. Xenophon lived through a time when the policy recommended of old to Mardonios by the Thebans was applied successfully to the Greek states by Persian emissaries³; a time when Persian intervention in Hellenic affairs was a familiar idea, and pan-Hellenic peace came down as an act of grace from 'the King.'⁴ What could the name of Salamis signify in the ears of a generation of Athenians that owed the rebuilding of the Long Walls and the refortification of the Peiraeus to Persian gold and Phoenician workmen?⁵ What reproach could attach to Medism at a time when Greek embassies competed for audience at Susa,⁶ and the Thebans could claim precedence on the score of their loyalty to the King at the time of the great invasion⁷? During the fourth century the history of the wars of liberation was almost a dead letter in the city-states of the peninsula, so far as practical politics were concerned; and the historian of its earlier half has little occasion to assume, or to excite, the interest of his readers in the subject.⁸ And yet Xenophon himself had taken part in that premier *Anabasis*, which, albeit only a domestic matter from the Persian point of view, had opened the eyes of all intelligent Greeks to the vulnerability of the Persian power; and the hazardous yet brilliantly executed retreat of the Ten Thousand had been cheered at a critical moment by the trophies

¹ At Knidos, 394 B.C., *Hell.* 4. 3. 10-12.

² At Leuktra, 371 B.C., *Hell.* 6. 4. 2-15.

³ Timokrates the Rhodian, *Hell.* 3. 5. 1 (395 B.C.). Cp. Hdt. 9. 2.

⁴ *Hell.* 5. 1. 30, Peace of Antalkidas, 387 B.C. Cp. 6. 5. 1.

⁵ 393 B.C., *Hell.* 4. 8. 7-12.

⁶ *Hell.* 7. 1. 33 ff. (367 B.C.). But the charge of Medism was used to ruin Ismenias, *Hell.* 5. 2. 35.

⁷ 7. 1. 34 είχε γὰρ λέγειν καὶ ὅτι μόνοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων βασιλεῖ συνεμάχοντο ἐν Πλαταιαῖς (note μόνοι).

⁸ After Leuktra there was an approximation between Athens and Sparta;

appeal was made to the memories of the Persian war: *Hell.* 6. 5. 34 ὑπομνήσκοντες μὲν ὡς τὸν βάρβαρον κοινῇ ἀπemaχέσαντο κτλ. Cp. 43 εἰ ποτε πάλιν ἔλθοι τῇ Ἑλλάδι κίνδυνος ὑπὸ βαρβάρων, τίσιν ἂν μᾶλλον πιστεύσαιτε ἢ Λακεδαιμονίοις; τίνας δ' ἂν μᾶλλον παραστάτας ἦδιον τούτων ποιήσαισθε, ὧν γε καὶ οἱ ταχθέντες ἐν Θερμοπύλαις ἅπαντες εἴλοντο μαχόμενοι ἀποθανεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶντες ἐπισφéréσθαι τὸν βάρβαρον τῇ Ἑλλάδι; from the speech of Kleiteles the Korinthian at Athens in 369 B.C. (note ἅπαντες). The talk about this time of 'betithing' Thebes, *Hell.* 6. 3. 20, 6. 5. 35 (cp. Hdt. 7. 132), is a reminiscence of the Persian war.

of Marathon,¹ and the memory of Salamis and of Plataia.² Xenophon's ideal hero seemed for a while not unlikely to realize that Asiatic empire which Aristagoras of Miletos was reported to have offered to Kleomenes of Sparta a century before.³ For Xenophon's public Jason of Pherai dramatically points the moral of these experiences in the maxim that *it was easier to conquer the Persian empire than (to unite) the Greek states*.⁴ Yet Xenophon, the writer, does not pursue that theme nor advocate that cause. The failure of Agesilaos may have convinced him that no Greek would succeed where his hero, through no fault of his own, had failed. The monarchical idea hovers before the mind of Xenophon,⁵ but he is still too much a Republican, and a Greek, to anticipate the rise and expansion of the Makedonian power. His attitude towards Thebes is based not on its former crimes against Hellas, but on its present hostility to Sparta. Thus preoccupied by contemporary history and politics, Xenophon adds very little directly to our knowledge of the Persian war. So far as the memories and old associations of that period could act upon contemporary Greece, he probably indicates with sufficient truth the place they held in the public mind. Indirectly his works may be of some further service to the student of Herodotus.⁶ On two particulars—the institutions of the Spartan state,⁷ and the ethnography, geography, and government of the Asianic provinces⁸—Xenophon must be reckoned a good authority, and they are both important elements in a right understanding and critique of the Herodotean *Logoi*. In both cases alike the presumption is that, apart from obvious changes, what holds good for the time of Xenophon holds good for the time of Herodotus.

¹ *Anab.* 3. 2. 11 ff. This passage is especially important as giving the earliest evidence for the annual sacrifice to the Agrotera of 500 kids as a composition for the vow made before Marathon. (But is § 12 genuine?)

² *Ib.* 13 *ἔπειτα δὲ Ξέρξης ὕστερον ἀγείρας τὴν ἀναριθμητὸν στρατιὰν ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τότε ἐνίκων οἱ ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι τοὺς τοῦτων προγόνους καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν.* None of the battles is actually localized by name. Strictly speaking these references, if correctly reported, would date from the close of the fifth century B.C. (Oct. 23, 401; cp. H. G. Dakyns, *Wks. of X.* i. 154).

³ *Hell.* 4. 2. 3 *ὅων τιμῶν καὶ ὅων ἐλπίδων ἀπεσπερείτο* κτλ. of Agesilaos, when recalled from Asia in 394 B.C. Cf. Hdt. 5. 49 *παρέχον δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας πάσης ἀρχεὺν εὐπετέως* (an anachronism for 498 B.C.).

⁴ *Hell.* 6. 1. 12 *ὃν ἐγὼ ὑπήκοον ποιήσασθαι ἔτι εὐκατεργαστότερον ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι ἢ τὴν Ἑλλάδα.*

⁵ In the *Κύρου παιδεία*, the *Ἀγησίλαος*, the *Ἰέρων*.

⁶ Xenophon makes only two distinct additions to our knowledge: (1) the position enjoyed by Demaratos and his posterity in Asia, *ἀντὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδα συστρατείας* *Hell.* 3. 1. 6, to wit, the government of Teuthrania, Halisarna, Pergamon; (2) the palace built by Xerxes at Kelainai, *Anab.* 1. 2. 9 *ἐνταῦθα Ξέρξης, δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡττηθεὶς τῇ μάχῃ ἀπεχώρει, λέγεται οἰκοδομῆσαι ταῦτά τε τὰ βασίλεια καὶ τὴν Κελαινῶν ἀκρόπολιν.* The doubt implied in *λέγεται* might cover the whole statement, or merely one or more of its elements (date, person, circumstances, amount of building). The statement, *Hell.* 4. 2. 8, that Agesilaos returned from Asia *τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδόν, ἥνπερ βασιλεὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευεν* is interesting, but adds nothing to our knowledge of the route.

⁷ Not merely in the *Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτεία* but in the *Ἑλληνικά passim*.

⁸ Principally in the *Anabasis* and *Hellenica*.

Xenophon is a partisan of Sparta's; but his partisanship, while it leads him to be unjust to Thebes and its two great men, does not extend to the misrepresentation of Spartan institutions—of which he has a fuller knowledge than any which Herodotus could pretend to—nor does it even betray him into an oblivion of Sparta's crimes.¹ The movements of Xenophon in Asia are much clearer and better ascertained than the problematic journeys of Herodotus on that continent; and the conditions of the Persian provinces as described for the times of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos, of Tithraustes and Ariaioi, are applicable, without much revision, to the days of Artaphernes and Artabazos. Other indirect gain may accrue from the juxtaposition of the two authors.² Of direct reference to Herodotus little or nothing is to be found in Xenophon; yet, were it not hard to believe that 'the Attic bee,' who recoiled from the crabbed obscurity of Thucydides upon the simpler exponents of old Ionic prose, owed nothing to the greatest exemplar of the narrative style, pure and simple? Were it rash to surmise that Xenophon's belief in the Divine nemesis, the God in History, claims kinship with the piety of Herodotus, its most obvious literary precedent?⁴ Or could Xenophon, in fine, be acquainted with the works of Ktesias, and know nothing of the work of Herodotus?

KTESIAS of Knidos is named and cited by his contemporary Xenophon in such a way as to imply that he had written at least some account of his experiences in the East before the Athenian exile composed his own *Anabasis*.⁵ Other evidences confirm and amplify

¹ e.g. the acquittal of Sphodrias, *Hell.* 5. 4. 24 (καὶ πολλοῖς ἔδοξεν αὐτῇ δὴ ἀδικώτατα ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἢ δίκῃ κριθῆναι). Cp. 5. 4. 1.

² e.g. (1) the explanation of the strategic importance of Kithairon (*Hell.* 5. 4. 36 εἰ μὴ τις προκαταλήψοιτο τὸν Κιθαιρῶνα οὐ ῥάδιον ἔσται εἰς τὰς Θήβας ἐμβαλεῖν) and the description of the Passes (*ib.* §§ 14–18) as bearing on the campaign of 479 B.C.; (2) utterances and illustrations on the question of ἡγεμονία (e.g. *Hell.* 3. 4. 27, reasons for the unification of command by land and sea; 7. 1. 1 ff., the discussion in 369 B.C. at Athens, on the division of command between Athens and Sparta, etc.).

³ *Hell.* 6. 2. 34 μὴ μέμψεσθαι τὴν δίκην need not be a reminiscence of *Hdt.* 8. 106. The δεκατευθῆναι in *Hell.* 6. 3. 20, 6. 5. 35 may be quite independent of *Hdt.* 7. 132. The reply of the Delphic god, *Hell.* 6. 4. 30 ὅτι αὐτῷ μελήσει, is not verbally identical with the response in *Hdt.* 8. 36. The ἀναριθμητος στρατιά in *Anab.* 3. 2. 13 might recall *Hdt.* 9. 79. The camels brought by Agesilaos

into Greece (*Hell.* 3. 4. 24) have nothing to say to the camels of Xerxes. I do not pretend to have sorted the vocabulary of Xenophon, but a good many words are common to it and the Herodotean.

⁴ Cp. *Hell.* 5. 4. 1 πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἂν τις ἔχοι καὶ ἄλλα λέγειν καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικά, ὥς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν ἀσεβοῦντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων ἀμελοῦσι. κτλ. : 6. 4. 23 καὶ ὁ θεὸς δέ, ὥς ἔοικε, πολλάκις χαίρει τοὺς μὲν μικροὺς μεγάλους ποιῶν, τοὺς δὲ μεγάλους μικροὺς : 7. 5. 13 περιεγέγραπτο γάρ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ μέχρι δσον νίκη ἐδέδοτο αὐτοῖς. These are thoroughly Herodotean sentiments.

⁵ *Anab.* 1. 8. 26 ff. σὺν τούτοις δὲ ὦν (sc. ὁ Κύρος) καθορᾷ βασιλεία καὶ τὸ ἀμφ' ἐκείνον στίφος· καὶ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἠνέσχετο, ἀλλ' εἰπὼν, τὸν ἄνδρα ὁρῶ, ἔτο ἐπ' αὐτὸν καὶ παλεῖ κατὰ τὸ στέρνον καὶ τιτρώσκει διὰ τοῦ θώρακος, ὥς φησι Κτησίας ὁ ἰατρός καὶ ἰᾶσθαι αὐτὸς τὸ τρωμά φησι. . . ὅπόσοι μὲν τῶν ἀμφὶ βασιλεία ἀπέθνησκον Κτησίας λέγει· παρ' ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἦν κτλ. (at the battle of Kunaxa 401 B.C.; Plutarch, *Artax.* 8, alone preserves for us the name).

this indication.¹ The Asklepiad² of Knidos was undoubtedly attached for years to the Persian court, and availed himself of his position to compose a work, or more than one work, on Oriental history, geography, and cognate matters.³ Ktesias appears in writing to have made express reference to the work of Herodotus by name.⁴ The Knidian author thus comes into court as the first professed witness to the existence and popularity of the Halikarnassian's work. Although his witness does not reach us quite in proper form, yet it is of sufficient bulk and authenticity (as in the previous case of Simonides) to be here placed and considered in its chronological position. Our actual knowledge of the works of the physician of Knidos is confined to the late and scanty Epitome in the *Bibliotheca* of Photios, and to such fragments or specimens as have been disinterred from the works of Diodoros, Nikolas, Strabo, Plutarch, Athenaios and others, his successors. The whole truth about Ktesias we shall never know. What degree of animus excited him against Herodotus, and what its motive, who can say? Did the ambition of the Knidian to castigate the Halikarnassian proceed from the spirit of local rivalry, or from the love of truth for truth's sake? That Ktesias enjoyed unique opportunities for ascertaining the official Persian view of the wars with the Greeks is indubitable:⁵ whether he made the best use of his opportunities is another question. Doubtless he will have caught Herodotus tripping here and there amid the relics of the prae-Persian empires; though even in this region we might elect, in not a few cases, to err with Herodotus: for, though Ktesias might give us a native version, Herodotus might be no further from the truth. For what concerned events of his own age, where there could, indeed, be no clash with Herodotus, Ktesias must, of course, count as a primary authority. On the geography and institutions of the Persian empire the complete Ktesias would, no doubt, be a very valuable supplement to Herodotus and the existing sources; but as concerns Persian

¹ Diodor. 2. 32. 4 Κτησίας δὲ ὁ Κνίδιος τοῖς μὲν χρόνοις ὑπῆρξε κατὰ τὴν Κύρου στρατείαν ἐπὶ Ἀρταξέρξην τὸν ἀδελφόν, γενόμενος δὲ αἰχμάλωτος, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀναληφθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως, ἑπτακαίδεκα ἔτη διετέλεσε τιμώμενος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κτλ. Cp. 14. 46. 6, which shows that Ktesias carried his Persian history down to the year 398 B.C. Cp. Strabo 656; Plutarch, *Artax.* 1, 6, 13; Suidas *sub n.*; Photios, *Biblioth.* 72 (ed. Bekker, 1824, p. 35).

² Galen, p. 731; Kühn. p. 652, ed. Basil (Baehr, p. 362).

³ Besides the *Persica*, Photios, 73, gives an epitome of a work on India (*Indica*). Other works are quoted by ancient authorities, viz. a *Periplus* of Asia, a

work *On the tributes of Asia*, and treatises on *Mountains* and on *Rivers*; cp. Ktesias, ed. Baehr, 1824, §§ 1, 6, ed. Gilmore, 1888, pp. 3 f. Baehr would add a work on medicine, on the strength of the citation in Galen.

⁴ Photius, *Epit.* 1 σχεδὸν ἐν ἅπασιν ἀντικείμενα Ἡροδότῳ ἱστορῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψεύστην αὐτὸν ἀποκαλῶν ἐν πολλοῖς, καὶ λογοποιὸν ἀποκαλῶν.

⁵ Diod. *l.c.* οὗτος οὖν φησιν ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν διφθερῶν . . . συνταξάμενος τὴν ἱστορίαν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐξενεγκεῖν. Photios *l.c.* φησὶ δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν πλείονων ἃ ἱστορεῖ αὐτόπτην γενόμενον ἢ παρ' αὐτῶν Περσῶν, ἐνθα τὸ ὄρᾶν μὴ ἐνεχώρει, αὐτήκοον καταστάντα, οὕτω τὴν ἱστορίαν συγγράψαι.

history from Kyros to Xerxes,¹ to have exchanged Herodotus for Ktesias would have been a Diomedean bargain. Particularly in what concerns the great invasion of Greece (481-478 B.C.), to judge by what remains of him,² Ktesias may, perhaps, furnish a name, a fact or two, in supplement, but can hardly ever have been right against Herodotus on the main theme.³ On two points at least he must be adjudged egregiously in the wrong. Ktesias has placed the battle of Plataia before the battle of Salamis, an absolutely fatuous *Hysteron Proteron*:⁴ Ktesias has recorded a successful assault, by the Persians, on Delphi, and the sack of the temple—a fable, disproved by the material evidences, and far less tolerable, as it stands, than the equally fabulous alternative in Herodotus.⁵ If in all that Ktesias had Persian documents and evidence before him, then so much the worse for such evidence. Clearly now the chief value of Ktesias is the indirect evidence he affords of the importance attached to the work of Herodotus, even early in the fourth century, and also, perhaps, of the revival of an interest in the memories of the Persian war, consequent on the growing conviction that the empire of Asia was within the reach of a united Greece.

§ 6. With Ktesias and Xenophon there passed away the last of the historians who could have claimed anything like primitive authority in relation to the stories of the Persian war. Xenophon, better employed in recounting the experiences and events of his own life-time, had no special reason for an excursus into the field preoccupied by Herodotus; while Ktesias, tempted by his access to special sources, invaded that area only to jeopardize the character of a primary authority, which he rightly possessed for his own period. To these great writers, who still in a sense retain the qualities of the authors of the fifth century, historians of a new type succeeded: men whose

¹ This period was comprised in Books 7-13. Cp. *Fragg.* ed. Mueller (Didot, pp. 59-67); Gilmore, pp. 120-159.

² *Persica* §§ 19-27 corresponds to Hdt. Bks. 7-8.

³ (a) His figures are moderate, especially on the Greek side (cp. Appendices II., III., etc.), but even here he apparently thought that the only defenders at Thermopylai were the 300 Spartans, and he gives Pausanias at Plataia only the forces which he should have given to Leonidas at Thermopylai. 120,000 is given as the number of the army of Mardonios. (b) Many names he has in common with Hdt. In addition, Kalliades and Timaphernes of Trachis, Hegias of Ephesos, Matakas the eunuch, look like real persons. (c) Ktesias adds two items to the account of Salamis, which look sound, (1) the

Herakleion as marking the spot where Xerxes was constructing the mole, (2) the Kretan archers obtained by the Athenians. (Was Aristeides sent to conduct them? Cp. Hdt. 8. 79.)

⁴ Disproved by Aischyl. *Pers.* 805 ff., by Hdt., and by Ktesias himself, who supplies no adequate finale to the invasion.

⁵ Hdt. 8. 35-39. According to Ktesias, Mardonios, after the battle of Plataia, at which he had been wounded, was despatched by Xerxes to sack the oracle at Delphi, and there met his end in a hailstorm. The king's purpose was, however, subsequently carried out by Matakas in a fresh expedition despatched from Asia. It looks as though in the Royal Records the account of the invasion of Greece ended with some such fable.

works depended for their existence on the works of their literary predecessors, and very slightly, if at all, upon a still living tradition. The age was becoming a learned age. Learned men begin to write, after a fashion, in a purely historical interest, and from historical sources. History, as distinguished from mere logography on the one hand, and from personal or contemporary experience on the other, is born. Under the circumstances there were, perhaps, but two main courses open to such writers: they might epitomize, or they might reproduce, with improvements dictated by the canons of the new generation, the works of their predecessors. In regard to the story of the Persian war, the one alternative was adopted by Theopompos, the other was marked by the achievement of Ephoros. Unfortunately, our knowledge in the cases of these two great historical writers of the fourth century is even more completely dependent upon critical inference and reconstruction, combined with the literary history in later authorities, than in the case of Ktesias, for no professed epitome of the work of either historian has come down to us. With THEOPOMPOS,¹ indeed, we are the less concerned for the present, owing to the nature of his principal works,² albeit his subject will have brought him again and again into contact with the acts, the scenes, and some of the personages of Herodotean story. His appreciation of Herodotus as a writer may not have been high, but he at least paid him the compliment of beginning his own historiography by making an epitome of the Herodotean work.³ Judging by the qualities generally ascribed to the *Philippika* of Theopompos, we might be tempted to regret that, in relation to the Persian wars, the Chian had not exchanged tasks with Ephoros of Kyme, and thus perhaps enriched the subject with a more critical deposit.⁴ The weight and measure of EPHOROS have nowadays, in the process of sifting our all too scanty materials, been pretty well ascertained.⁵ Ephoros was neither soldier, statesman, nor

¹ Not born before 380 B.C., survived Alexander, and was with Ptolemy in Egypt near the end of the century; cp. A. Schaefer, *Abriss der Quellenkunde* i.³ 58 f.

² For the Fragments see Müller, *F.H.G.* i. 278-333 (upwards of 300). His historical works comprised *Ἑλληνικά* in twelve Books, carrying on Greek history from the end of the work of Thucydides to the battle of Knidos (Diodor. 13. 42. 5), *Φιλιππικά* in fifty-eight Books, i.e. Makedonian history (with digressions) from the accession of Philip, or from the foundation of Philippi onwards (Diodor. 16. 3. 8). For the purposes of this history Theopompos was a strictly contemporaneous authority.

³ Suidas *sub n.* ἐγράψεν ἐπιτομὴν τῶν Ἡροδότου ἱστοριῶν ἐν βιβλίοις β'. This

is, however, the only authority, except the four or five late citations, *F.H.G.* i. 278. Müller, however, accepts the Epitome as a genuine work; cp. *op. c.* p. lxviii. I have shown above that such a work would not have been *res a Theopompi actate et ingenio aliena* (Voss).

⁴ The historical character of Theopompos (*ἐπιφανέστατος πάντων τῶν ἱσοκράτους μαθητῶν*) stands high with Dionys. Hal. *Ep. ad Pomp.* c. 6 (Usener, p. 63, Roberts 120 ff.). Polybios had found fault with him, 8. 11 f. He was censorious, cp. Plutarch, *Lys.* 30, and anti-Athenian, Athenaios 254 B, but a lover of truth, *ib.* 85 A. Cp. further *op.* A. Schaefer, *op. c.*, and especially F. Blass, *Att. Beredsamkeit* ii. (1892) 414 ff.

⁵ Müller, *F.H.G.* i. lvii. ff. 234-277;

even traveller: he was an historian by profession. He wrote, or rather he rewrote, history to please an educated public, and his work exhibited the results of the application to tradition, whether oral or written, of the sophistry and stylism of Isokrates his master.¹ That his work had merits seems proved not merely by its immediate popularity but by its long-lived authority. Those merits can be to some extent discerned in the fragments disinterred from his successors,² in the works of his imitators,³ in the utterances of his admirers and critics.⁴ The *Histories* of Ephoros covered a large space, and a long time, after a new fashion.⁵ His work was the first of its kind.⁶ It digested a vast amount of previous literature, general and special in character;⁷ it presented a homogeneous result, a continuous record, with some pretensions to historical science, and no slight expenditure of literary art. But the art was rhetorical, the science was sophistic, and neither the sophistry nor the rhetoric was the best of its kind. Politics, at least for a time, may profit by such devices; natural science has a permanent court of appeal, wherein to purge itself from mere fancy and fallacy; but history is neither practical, like politics, nor verifiable, like science; and once evidence has been swept away and afterthought installed in the place of autopsy, the case is deeply prejudiced, and often but blank ignorance or alternative possibilities result from the belated critical inquiry. Ephoros probably did as much as any one man ever did to corrupt history in the name of

Schaefer, *op. c.* § 28, pp. 48 ff.; Blass, *op. c.* ii. 427 ff.; Busolt, *Gr. G.* i.² (1893) 155 ff., ii.² (1895) 622 ff.; Wachsmuth, *Einleitung* (1895), pp. 498 ff.

¹ Diodor. 4. 1. 3 Ἐφορος μὲν γὰρ ὁ Κυμαῖος, Ἰσοκράτους ὦν μαθήτης κτλ. He wrote the history of Greeks from the return of the Herakleidae to the siege of Perinthos (341 B.C.) in twenty-nine Books; each Book had an introduction, and was complete in itself; cp. Diod. 5. 1. 4 τῶν γὰρ βιβλίων ἐκάστην πεποίηκε περιέχειν κατὰ γένος τὰς πράξεις: 16. 76. 5 βιβλίου γέγραφε τριάκοντα, προοίμιον ἐκάστη προθεῖς. His son Demophilos added the thirtieth Book, embracing the history of the Sacred War; cp. Diodor. 16. 14. 3, *F.H.G.* i. 274. Non-Hellenic nations came in for notice from their relations with the Greeks. The subject matter of the several Books has been to some extent established, but not completely throughout. As he computes the period from the return of the Herakleids to the passage of the Hellespont by Alexander in 334 B.C. as 735 years, he may have intended to bring his history down to this date, or possibly to the appointment of Alex-

ander as Generalissimo for the Persian war.

² *F.H.G.* i. 234 ff. gives 157 fragments from the *Histories*; of these Nos. 2, 3, 19, 29, 47, 53, 54, 64, 67, 70, 107, 117, show Ephoros to advantage.

³ Especially Diodoros and Trogus Pompeius.

⁴ Polybios was one of his chief admirers; cp. 12. 28. 10 ὁ γὰρ Ἐφορος παρ' ὅλην τὴν πραγματείαν θαυμάσιος ὢν καὶ κατὰ τὴν φράσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χειρισμὸν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν λημμάτων, δεινότητός ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς παρεκβάσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀφ' αὐτοῦ γνωμολογίαις κτλ. In 12. 23 Polybios defends him from the criticism of Timaios; but he also passes an unfavourable judgement on his accounts of land-battles, 12. 25 g τῶν μὲν κατὰ θάλατταν ἔργων ἐπὶ ποσὸν ὑπόνοιαν ἐσχηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ τῶν δὲ κατὰ γῆν ἀγῶνων ἀπειρος εἶναι τελέως. Strabo makes much of him; cp. 422 (*Eph. Fr.* 70) and *passim*.

⁵ Cp. note 1 *supra*.

⁶ Polyb. 5. 33. 2 Ἐφορον, τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μόνον ἐπιβεβλημένον τὸ καθόλου γράφειν.

⁷ Wachsmuth, *l.c.*, to whom I am much indebted in what follows.

history. He was superior to a merely chronological ordering of events, but he was incapable of grasping the deeper causes of historical phenomena. He formulated a difference between myth and truth, but he did not scruple to adorn his narrative with fictitious incidents and speeches. He found a large portion of his field preoccupied by greater men than himself; he borrowed their work freely and made it his own by omissions, combinations, additions, and various stylistic devices. Some of his maxims were good,¹ but his methods were not equal to his maxims. The methods of Ephoros, and the material brought together by Ephoros, dominated thenceforward, for the period covered by his labours, the history of Greece as reproduced in the later writers open still to our inspection. The account given by Ephoros of the great Persian war was apparently little more than the Herodotean story (perhaps from the *Epitome* of Theopompos), rendered explicit, coherent, rational, and complete, by inference, by combinations, by afterthought, by sheer invention, by all the resources of the Isokratean school, perhaps further enlarged or limited by the idiosyncrasy which Ephoros himself brought to his task.² But the 'little more' was here, too, 'worlds away.' As a result the Ephorean version of the story, in whole or part, constituted almost an alternative to the Herodotean. Yet two considerations will always operate to obtain for the alternative a hearing: first, the possibility that Ephoros had recourse to other sources, no longer open to us;³ and secondly, the certainty that in reconstructing the tradition of the Persian wars, according to his lights, he was only doing in the fourth century before Christ what we ourselves are doing, according to ours, in the twentieth century after Christ. But, as the Ephorean version is known to us chiefly from its reproduction by the writers of the Roman period, we may conveniently postpone the further consideration of its elements, and give precedence here to the extant writers of the fourth century, whose works in some cases exhibit, so to speak, the moulds to which the Ephorean version owed its form, and in others may be found to suggest that the Ephorean version was hardly published before it established its authority,⁴ an authority destined to be of secular duration.⁵ Those writers naturally fall into two groups, the Orators and the Philosophers, for Poets, with one notable exception,

¹ e.g. *Fr.* 2, 3 (the latter = Polyb. 12. 27. 7 *εἰ δυνατόν ἦν αὐτοῖς* (sc. rerum scriptores) *παρεῖναι πᾶσι τοῖς πράγμασι, ταύτην δὲ διαφέρειν πολὺ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν.*

² Signs of partisanship, Atticism, anti-Lakonism are put down by Wachsmuth less to Ephoros himself than to his sources; but he recognizes a 'local patriotism' in the prominence given to Aiolians and Kyme.

³ The only actual sources recognized by Busolt ii.² 624 are Aischylos (the

Persai) and Ktesias. Why not, for example, Simonides too? Where did Diodoros get his quotation 11. 11. 6?

⁴ Aristotle, in the *Politics*, and the author of the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*, seem to have used Ephoros; see § 10 below.

⁵ Plutarch, on his own account, quotes Ephoros freely, and satirically notices (*Mor.* 514) that to have read "two or three Books" of his was all the excuse some bores had for their garrulity.

are absent, or silent, in this Choir. The exception is practically but of recent creation. A poem, alas! not quite complete, on *The Persians*, the work of Timotheos of Miletos, has arisen, like so much of the lost literature of antiquity, from a grave in Egypt.¹ The poem was largely concerned with a description of the battle of Salamis,² but unfortunately the description is ideal, typical,³ obscure,⁴ unhistorical,⁵ adding nothing to our knowledge of the battle, however much it may enrich our concept of Greek letters, however well it may inaugurate the spirit of the age. The exact occasion of the poem remains uncertain. The glorification of Salamis can hardly be conceived except as a compliment to Athens, and the appeal to the memory of the great deliverance seems to herald the cry for the invasion of Asia by an united Greece, which was the ideal policy of pan-Hellenism in the fourth century B.C. If in a poem on Salamis the poet says a good word for Sparta too, that is in keeping with his purpose, of holding up as an example to the present the great deeds in the war of liberation. The contrast might suggest that the way of salvation for the Greek states, amid their mutual destruction, lay in a common undertaking directed against the Barbarian.⁶

§ 7. Among the Orators ISOKRATES fairly claims the first place, not mainly on chronological grounds,⁷ nor even as the founder of a school, and as master of Ephoros, but because he advocated that pan-Hellenic policy which could not but revive, in its own interest, the traditions of the Persian war, and because his extant remains are especially rich in references to those traditions. There are three clear notes in the pan-Hellenic chord as struck by Isokrates: three leading ideas merge in one policy. (a) He everywhere assumes and proclaims the absolute dualism of Europe and Asia,⁸ the inveterate hostility of

¹ For the previously known Fragments of Timotheos cp. Bergk, *P.L.G.* iii.⁴ 619-626, including three from the *Πέρσαι*. For the recovered portion, the edition by U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Leipzig, 1903.

² The name Salamis does not actually occur, but the references to the crossing of the Hellespont justify the identification.

³ *Nicht die bestimmte Seeschlacht wird geschildert, sondern die typische*, von W.-M. op. c. 58.

⁴ *Kein Themistokles, kein Aristides, weder Salamis noch Psyttaleia genannt, überhaupt kein Eigenname*, ib. 61.

⁵ The description takes no account of the differences in ships, in tactics, weapons, etc., between the poet's own time and the day of Salamis, ib. 59. Fire-arrows make their appearance: Hdt. records their use by the Persians against the Akropolis, but not by the Greeks against the king's fleet, 8. 52.

⁶ There are some elements in the poem not obviously in keeping with such a purpose, and von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff suggests that Timotheos first produced it at a pan-Ionic gathering at Mykale, c. 398-96 B.C., with a distinctly political purpose, in favour of Sparta and her oligarchic partisans in Miletos and Ionia. He candidly admits the oddity of a poem conceived in such a tone, making the victory of Salamis its theme (*es ist wahrlich seltsam, dass das Dokument dieser Stimmung von dem Siege handelt, an den Athen den Ioniern und den Peloponnesiern die Freiheit erkämpft hatte*, op. c. 64); but he does not explain it.

⁷ His life extended from 436 to 338 B.C., but "for us he lives and thinks and feels almost exclusively in the years 380-38 B.C.," R. C. Jebb, *Attic Orators*, ii. 2.

⁸ The antithesis between Europe and Asia is a constant formula, cp. 4. 90, 10. 51, 12. 47, etc. Cp. Hdt. 1. 4.

Hellene and Barbarian,¹ the measureless inferiority of Persia to Greece.² (b) He constantly preaches union to the Greek states, with a view to carrying war into Asia,³ enriching themselves at the expense of the Barbarian,⁴ putting an end to the power of Persia.⁵ (c) He indicates Athens as the natural and proper leader in such an undertaking, as the state with the strongest claim to the Hegemony;⁶ but failing Athens, he appeals to Sparta;⁷ failing the republics, he will go to king or to tyrant⁸ with the same demand, to head the holy war of revenge and advantage.⁹ With this programme to push, Isokrates naturally makes mention of the former wars of glorious memory. But these references leave a good deal to be desired in the historical interest. They are generally in vague terms and anything but precise.¹⁰ Though Isokrates advocates action against Asia, his victorious precedents are found in Europe. Marathon,¹¹ Artemision,¹² Thermopylai,¹³ Salamis,¹⁴

¹ Hellenes and Barbarians are φύσει πολέμιοι, 12. 163; cp. 4. 158 φύσει πολεμικῶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχομεν. 5. 42 τίς γὰρ ἂν ὑπερβολὴ γένοιτο τῆς ἐχθρας τῆς πρὸς Ἑρξην τοῖς Ἑλλήσι γενομένης; recalls Hdt. 7. 11.

² Greeks are to Barbarians as men to animals, 19. 23. Evagoras worked a miracle in that ἐκ βαρβάρων μὲν Ἑλλήνας ἐποίησεν, 9. 66. Barbarians should be mere Helots and Perioikoi for Hellenes, 4. 131. Cp. *Er.* 3. 5.

³ 5. 9 εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν τὸν πόλεμον ἐξεργεῖν: cp. *Er.* 3. 2, 9. 11.

⁴ 4. 133 τὴν Ἀσίαν καρποῦσθαι. *ib.* 135 κοινῇ τὴν Ἀσίαν πορθεῖν. 5. 130 τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους ἀφελέσθαι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν εὐδαιμονίαν. 5. 132 αἰσχρὸν περιορᾶν τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀμεινον πράττουσαν τῆς Εὐρώπης.

⁵ 5. 120 μάλιστα μὲν . . . ὅλην τὴν βασιλείαν ἀνελεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, χώραν ὅτι πλείστην ἀφορίσασθαι καὶ διαλαβεῖν, ὡς λέγουσί τινες, ἀπὸ Κιλικίας μέχρι Σινώπης (i.e. the portion occupied by Greek colonies).

⁶ Athens is the ἄστυ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 15. 299, 16. 27. Sparta deserved well of Greece in the Persian war, but her deserts were not to be compared to those of Athens, 4. 73; cp. 12. 62, 189. While Athens had the Hegemony the Persian's army was not allowed to cross the Halys, nor his ships to come west of Phaselis, 7. 80, 12. 59; cp. 5. 59, 8. 30.

⁷ *Or.* 6.

⁸ Cp. the *Philippos* (*Or.* 5), the *Archidamos* (*Or.* 6). Jason of Pherai had promised, 5. 119; Dionysios, 'the tyrant,' was willing, 6. 82.

⁹ 5. 125 ὑπὲρ ὧν κακῶς ἐπάθομεν ἀμύνεσθαι. 4. 133 ἐξὸν ἀδεῶς πολλὰ κεκτήσθαι.

¹⁰ Besides passing references there are two great passages dealing at length with the Persian war: 4. (*Panegy.*) 85-99; 12. (*Panath.*) 49-52 (92, 187).

¹¹ Cp. my *Hdt.* IV.-VI. ii. 193 ff. (*App.* X. § 21).

¹² 4. 90 οἱ δ' ἡμέτεροι πατέρες ἐπ' Ἀρτεμίσιον, ἐξήκοντα τριῆρεις πληρώσαντες πρὸς ἅπαν τὸ τῶν πολεμίων ναυτικόν . . . οἱ δ' ἡμέτεροι τὰς μὲν πρόπλους ἐνίκησαν, ἐπειδὴ δ' ἤκουσαν τῆς παρόδου τοὺς πολέμιους κρατοῦντας, οἰκάδε καταπλεύσαντες κτλ. The disappearance of all other ships, and the reduction of the Athenian vessels to sixty, are not Herodotean.

¹³ 4. 90 Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἰς Θερμοπύλας πρὸς τὸ πεζόν, χιλιούς αὐτῶν ἐπιλέξαντες, καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὀλίγους παραλαβόντες, ὡς ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς κωλύοντες αὐτοὺς περαιτέρω προελθεῖν . . . οἱ μὲν διεφθάρησαν καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς νικῶντες τοῖς σώμασιν ἀπέπικον, οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε θέμις εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἡττήθησαν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ αὐτῶν φυγεῖν ἤξιωσεν. 5. 148 καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων μᾶλλον ἀγανταὶ τὴν ἡτταν τὴν ἐν Θερμοπύλαις ἢ τὰς ἄλλας νίκας. Cp. 6. 93 (not named), 100 (1000 Lakedaimonians against 700,000 barbarians; their end beyond all praise). 12. 187 (περὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς τῆς Σπαρτιάταις ἐν Θερμοπύλαις γενομένης—a disaster more glorious than a victory over other Hellenes). Isokrates lends no support to the theory of a 'devotio'; also, he gives no details (except numbers).

¹⁴ Salamis is only once named, 5. 147. The battle is referred to, 12. 49, 50, very clearly, and taken for granted in 6. 93-96.

Plataia,¹ are the battles he cites; Mykale, and the subsequent victories on Asiatic soil, or in Asiatic waters, he ignores. Though he refers in exaggerated yet vague terms to the Peace, elsewhere known as the Peace of Kallias,² he never mentions Kimon by name: the history of the war ends for him practically with the work of Herodotus. The Orator's knowledge is probably in part derived from the work of Herodotus,³ but he is not confined or tied down thereto. He employed other sources, however, to very little purpose, for he adds very little to our knowledge. His terminology is interesting, as compared, for example, with that of Thucydides: the war with him is always the Persian war,⁴ the Medes retire into the background.⁵ He confirms, if borrowing direct or indirect is confirmation, many material items in the Herodotean record: the Hellespontine bridge,⁶ the Athos canal,⁷ the Isthmian wall,⁸ the chief events. His estimate of numbers is probably based on Herodotus;⁹ but whole episodes are missing, and there is a plentiful lack of details.¹⁰ The alteration of emphasis, the new stress laid on certain points, are especially significant. The evacuation of city and land by the Athenians—an event which

¹ 12. 92 ἀ τοίνυν περὶ Πλαταιέας ἔπραξαν, ἀποπὸς ἀν εἶην, εἰ ταῦτ' εἰρηκῶς (sc. περὶ τῆς ὁμότητος καὶ χαλεπότητος τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων) ἐκείνων μὴ μνησθεῖν. ὦν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ στρατοπεδευσάμενοι μεθ' ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων καὶ παραταξάμενοι τοῖς πολεμοῖσι καὶ θυσάμενοι τοῖς θεοῖς τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἰδρυμένοις οὐ μόνον ἡλευθέρωσαμεν (sic) τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς μεθ' ἡμῶν ὄντας ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας γενέσθαι μετ' ἐκείνων, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπράξαμεν Πλαταιέας λαβόντες μόνους Βοιωτῶν συναγωνιστάς κτλ. There is a reference in the *Plataikos* (14) 57–8 (where Plataia is treated mainly as an Athenian victory), but none in the *Archidamos*.

² 4. 118, 7. 80, 12. 59, Phaselis and the Halys as the western termini of the king's arms.

³ Cp. 4. 94, Xerxes hopes to capture Peloponnese by help of Athenian navy; 4. 52, 91, 8. 42, Athenians as the saviours of Hellas, etc.

⁴ ὁ Περσικὸς πόλεμος, 6. 42, 8. 88, 12. 49, 14. 57, 15. 233. ὁ π. ὁ πρὸς Ξέρξην, 12. 71, 161; cp. 4. 71, 5. 42. 4. 68 ἐπιφανέστατος μὲν οὖν τῶν πολέμων ὁ Περσικὸς γέγονεν (O Thucydides!). τὰ Περσικά, 7. 75, 8. 37, 90.

⁵ The conquest of the Medes by Kyros and the Persians is mentioned 9. 37. This fact Isokrates might have had of Hdt., but the precision of language is perhaps due to writers like Xenophon and Ktesias, and to the constant practice of diplomacy. 'Medism' is mentioned

as a capital offence, 4. 157; even nowadays a curse is pronounced on any citizen who proposes a mission to the 'Persians.' (Aristophanes and Thucydides are less nice in the use of the terms.)

⁶ 4. 89 τὸν μὲν Ἑλλησποντον ζεύξας.

⁷ 4. 89 τὸν δ' Ἀθῶ διωρύξας (an exaggeration for τὴν δ' Ἀκτὴν).

⁸ 4. 93.

⁹ On the Greek side he diminishes Hdt.'s figures: the Athenians sent only sixty ships to Artemision, the Spartans only ten to Salamis (12. 49), but there the Athenians outnumbered all the other Greek contingents put together. The 1000 Lakedaimonians for Thermopylai are already in Hdt. *implicite*, cp. note 7. 202. On the Persian side the figures are more obviously Herodotean; 4. 117 gives the fleet as 1200, 12. 49 gives it as 1300, both figures obviously related to Hdt. (and Aischylos). The five millions in 12. 49 come from Hdt. 7. 186. The figure 700,000 (6. 100, 12. 49) for the μάχιμοι (Hdt.'s word) may have been got by dropping the words καὶ ἑκατόν in Hdt. 7. 60, 184.

¹⁰ The attack on Delphi, the battle of Mykale, the siege of Sestos nowhere occur, and no battle is described in any detail. Names are rare. Eurybiades is mentioned (to his discredit) 12. 49, but not Leonidas, Pausanias, Leotychidas, much less Alexander, Mardonios, etc.

Thucydides treated so cavalierly, and Herodotus was content to record in simple terms—comes up for ample rhetorical emblazonment.¹ The *Aristeia* are claimed for Athens from first to last, by a fiction at Salamis, an absurdity at Plataia.² Themistokles is the hero of the war: in this respect the *Rettung* by Thucydides, the diminished horror of Medism, and the re-adjustment of the perspective, due to mere lapse of time, have brought justice to the memory of the 'Liberator of Hellas.'³ There, are, perhaps, but three concrete items which Isokrates supplies to the actual story of the war, and those, moreover, not above suspicion or dispute: (1) the curse on Medizers;⁴ (2) the indefensibility of Athens in 480 B.C.;⁵ (3) the vow of the Ionians not to rebuild the holy places destroyed by the Barbarian, as an eternal witness against his impiety.⁶ The first point hardly touches the history of the war itself, though it attests the impression left on the minds of the Athenians, especially perhaps by the connexion between Medism and a tyrannic restoration. The third point is of dubious authenticity, and in its Isokratean form tends by anticipation to discredit the similar vow when recorded of the Hellenes.⁷ The second point could hardly have been anything more with Isokrates than with ourselves, namely, a legitimate and correct inference from the history of Athens previous to the war, and during the war itself. In all this, then, there is practically nothing new or valuable, for the historian of the war, to be got from the pages of Isokrates. His value and interest for us lie elsewhere. Isokrates displays the patriotic revival of interest in the Persian wars during the first half of the fourth century, ere yet the rise of Makedon had taken all heart out of the cry for a war by Athens and Sparta against the Asiatic barbarians.⁸ Isokrates attests the patriotic revolt against the shameful

¹ ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθερίας, 5. 147; 6. 43, 83; 8. 43; 12. 50; 15. 233.

² 4. 72, 7. 75, 8. 76, 12. 189 ἐν ᾧ (sc. τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ πρὸς Ξέρξην) πλεόν διήνεγκαν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς κινδύνοις ἢ κείνοι τῶν ἄλλων.

³ 15. 307 τίς δ' ἦν ὁ μετ' ἐκείνων (sc. Miltiades) τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἐλευθερώσας καὶ τοὺς προγόνους ἐπὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τὴν δυναστείαν, ἣν ἔσχον, προαγαγών, ἔτι δὲ τὴν φύσιν τὴν τοῦ Πειραεὺς κατιδὼν καὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀκόντων Λακεδαιμονίων τῇ πόλει περιβαλὼν; 12. 51 Θ. τὸν ὁμολογουμένως ἅπασιν αἴτιον εἶναι δόξαντα καὶ τοῦ τὴν ναυμαχίαν γενέσθαι κατὰ τρόπον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ κατορθωθέντων. 15. 233 Θ. ἡγεμὼν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ Περσικῷ γενόμενος. In 4. 154 his reception by the Persians is referred to, without reprobation. Aristides is only once named, 8. 75, and then in a breath with Themistokles and Miltiades as far better men than the later Demagogues.

⁴ 4. 157 ἐν δὲ ταῖς συλλόγοις ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀράς ποιοῦνται, πρὶν ἄλλο τι χρηματίζειν, εἴ τις ἐπικηρυκεύεται Πέρσαις τῶν πολιτῶν.

⁵ 12. 50 οἱ δὲ πατέρες ἡμῶν ἀνάστατοι γεγεννημένοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐκλελοιπότες διὰ τὸ μὴ τετελεχίσθαι κατ' ἐκείνων τὸν χρόνον κτλ.

⁶ 4. 155 f. τί δ' οὐκ ἐχθρόν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, οἳ καὶ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἔδη καὶ τοὺς νεῶς συλᾶν ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ καὶ κατακτείναν ἐτόλμησαν; διὸ καὶ τοὺς Ἴωνας ἀξίον ἐπαίνειν, ὅτι τῶν ἐμπρησθέντων ἱερῶν ἐπηράσαντ' εἰ τινας κινήσειαν ἢ πάλιν εἰς τὰρχαῖα καταστήσαι βουληθεῖεν, οὐκ ἀποροῦντες πόθεν ἐπισκευάσωσιν, ἀλλ' ἔν' ὑπόμνημα τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις ἡ τῆς τῶν βαρβάρων ἀσεβείας. Was this item first produced by one of the Ionian writers?

⁷ Cp. p. 40, and p. 100 note 2 *infra*.

⁸ Isokrates had been anticipated in his Propaganda by Gorgias; cp. Fr. 1 *Orat. Att.* (Baier-Sauppe) ii. 129 ὁ δὲ Ὀλυμπικὸς λόγος ὑπὲρ τοῦ μεγίστου αὐτῷ

peace of Antalkidas, and against the position assigned to the Great King in purely Hellenic affairs.¹ Isokrates implies a new public, sick of the miserable memories of the Peloponnesian war, and ripe for a return to the happier moments of Herodotean story. Isokrates prepares the retraction of that story by his own disciples, whether in an historical or a political interest. But from his own point of view the appeal of Isokrates was not destined to be a success. It suffered from an inherent defect: it was superseded by an external accident. The pan-Hellenism of Isokrates lacked a practical finish, a political goal. The war to which he evoked the Hellenes was to be a war of revenge, of spoliation, but without further and higher aims.² It could not be otherwise, for his crusade was preached to the city-republics of Greece in the first instance, and nothing but a monarchy could replace the Persian throne, or govern the Persian empire.³

Isokrates overlooked the difference between a defensive war and a war which should carry the Greeks into Asia: victory in the one case was possible to a republic or a league of republics, success in the other only possible to the military genius of a single leader. Isokrates could at most have looked forward to a fresh Peace with Persia upon the old terms, real or supposed. The inner purpose of the summons of Isokrates was, to do him justice, not war with the king, but peace among the Greeks. The war with Persia was to be again, as it had been of old, a means to a pan-Hellenic union, which could have been only, as of old, evanescent. Even so much was not realized. The ideal of Isokrates failed, as all ideals fail which aim at revivals, restorations, of the past: history will not repeat itself. He omitted to reckon with the unforeseen, that is, the accidental, which was also the obvious. The peace of Greece resulted from the Makedonian conquest, which indeed merely suppressed or smothered rivalry and bloodshed between cities and between factions, and not from pan-Hellenic movements or ideals. But Greece, reduced to the peace of impotence, set Makedon free to realize, and more than realize, the ambitions of Isokrates; and the process of events proved, not for the first nor for the last time, that the world-history provides a better solution of the world-problem than is dreamt of in the philosophy of political doctrinaires.

(Gorgias) ἐπολιτεύθη· στασιάζουσιν γὰρ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὁρῶν ὁμονομίας ξύμβουλος αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τρέπων ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ πείθων ἅθλα ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ὅπλων μὴ τὰς ἀλλήλων πόλεις, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων χώραν. F. Blass, *Att. Beredsamkeit* i.² (1887) 58 f. dates the speech Ol. 97, 392 B.C. (Oncken and Keil had placed it in the fifth century.)

¹ Isokrates does not name Antalkidas, but he frequently refers to the Peace of 387 B.C. as a disgrace, 4. 115 ff., 175 ff.; 12. 106 τοιαύτην ἐποιήσαντο τὴν εἰρήνην,

ἥς οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπιδείξειεν οὐτ' αἰσχίῳ πώποτε γενομένην κτλ. When it serves his turn he is less opprobrious, 8. 16, 68.

² Cp. notes 3, 4, 5, p. 30 *supra*.

³ Isokrates knew that the Greeks were intolerant of monarchy: 5. 107 οὐκ εἰθισμένους ὑπομένειν τὰς μοναρχίας: he knew the dangers that attended monarchy in Greece, *ib.* 108. But he overlooked, apparently, the connexion between monarchy and big warfare, and that with Jason of Pherai, the Dionysioi, Philip under his eyes.

§ 8. If Isokrates focusses the pan-Hellenic ideal, which served, for half a century, as a protest against the domestic and internecine warfare of the Greek city-states, DEMOSTHENES, of the remaining orators, best serves to document the more practical question, which was coming to a head of flame about the middle of the fourth century.¹ Demosthenes was no disciple of Isokrates²; in almost every respect the younger politician contrasts with the elder doctrinaire. True, Demosthenes too would fain have seen Athens at the head of a united Hellas, but with a view not to an offensive war against Persia, but to a defensive war against Makedon. The objective of Demosthenes was near, was practical, and was brought to the test. His policy failed, not from any proper inconsistency, but because the penetration of Hellas by Makedon in the fourth century was an infinitely more feasible movement than the invasion of Hellas by the Persians had been at any time. Makedon was at hand; the Makedonian soldiery was armed and trained in the best traditions of Greece itself, raised to a higher power. Makedonian policy had the simplicity and self-consistency which only a monarchical state can achieve; and the Makedonian monarchy represented still the feudal kingdom of the heroic age, reinforced by the statecraft of six centuries. It was hardly even an accident that Greece in its decadence was confronted in succession by two Makedonian leaders of extraordinary ability. Athenian orators might declaim against Philip and Alexander as "Barbarians"; the Dorians of the *Kathodos* had been rude warriors, led by unlettered chieftains, but the court of Pella had long enjoyed relations with the centres of Hellenic culture, and been the resort of Hellenic poets and professors: it was not so much a civilization as merely the form of government which now distinguished Makedonian and Hellene. On the other side the city-states were hastening to decay. The mutual rivalries, which Isokrates wished in vain to dissolve in a common hostility to Asia, had exhausted the miniature republics of Greece. Athens never recovered from the Peloponnesian war. Sparta collapsed at Leuktra.³ The might of Thebes was buried in the grave of Epameinondas.⁴ Money had a new, or at least a manifold multiplied, power in politics; statesmen were venal, as at Rome during the century preceding the fall of the Republic.⁵ Moral

¹ The Athenian occupation of Thermopylai took place in 352 B.C. The first *Philippic* was delivered in 351 B.C. The battle of Chaironeia was fought 338 B.C.

² Cp. Plutarch, *Mor.* 844, *Life of Dem.* 5. The majority, with more probability, regarded Isaios as his master.

³ *μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπῆνεγκεν ἡ πόλις κτλ.*, Aristot. *Pol.* 2. 9. 16 = 1270 a.

⁴ *τῷ γὰρ Ἐπαμεινώνδου σώματι συνέθαψε τὴν δυνάμιν τῶν Θηβαίων ὁ καιρὸς*, Demades, § 14. The metaphor is un-

fortunately almost an oratorical commonplace; cp. [Lys.] 2. 60, Lykurg. 50.

⁵ *Philippus omnia castella expugnari posse dicebat in quae modo asellus onustus auro posset ascendere*, Cicero *ad Att.* 1. 16. 12; cp. Plutarch, *Mor.* 178. The fate of Philokrates is a conspicuous illustration; the mutual recriminations of Aischines and Demosthenes show what could be believed; the missions of Timokrates, and others, what was expected. The adventure of

enthusiasm had declined upon social and domestic topics: the contrasts of wealth and poverty, the cult of the individual, the rights of women and of slaves.¹ The good man was no longer a good citizen. Public burdens were evaded; military service was left to professionals and adventurers; the mob was demoralized by freedom and flattery. Yet Athens was not wholly without a prophet. In the welter of corruption Demosthenes stands up, a far grander and more truly tragic hero than Cicero amid the ruins of the Roman Republic. Demosthenes recalled the frivolous freemen of his day to the virtues of their fathers. He praised famous men of old in the vain hope of reinvigorating their degenerate offspring. He stood not for one order in the state against the state, but for Athens in Hellas, and for Hellas against Makedon. His foe, if not a barbarian, was at least a foreigner. His watchword was not Conquest and Empire, but Defence and Liberty. On his work and his wisdom the biographer has one verdict to pass, the historian another: let philosophy harmonize them, if it can. His policy was a failure, yet his every utterance was a success. He roused Athens, at last, to a great effort; he reformed her finances, he restored her army, he reconciled her with Thebes, he set the allied forces in the field, he barred for one glorious moment at Chaironeia the advance of the Makedonian. The moral force and constancy of Demosthenes make his failure splendid. But his end was less glorious: happier his memory had he fallen, where he fought, in the ranks at Chaironeia. He clung to the forfeit cause of so-called Freedom with a desperate consistency, in which too probably the personal factor counted over much. He would have welcomed the triumph of the utter barbarian over the Makedonian, if so be Athens might still pretend to a liberty which she had long ceased to deserve. He had little sense of the generosity of the victor, or sympathy for the champion of Europe, or foresight of the mission of Makedon, or insight into the signs of the times. As Cicero Caesar, so Demosthenes survived Alexander, only to exult, like Cicero, in the extinction of a too generous opposite, and to fall a victim to his own consistent hatreds, and the not unnatural resentment of Alexander's heirs.²

It is hardly, then, from Demosthenes that we could expect much direct light upon the antiquated war with Persia. He has no prejudice against the Persian as such. His first public speech is a veiled protest against the chimerical idea of undertaking a war against the Persian king.³ For him the barbarian foe of Hellas and Athens resides

Harpalos has left a smudge even on the fair name of Demosthenes. For Rome cp. Sallust, *Jug.* 8, 13, 15, 20, 29, 31, 33, 35, 80, etc.

¹ Aristophanes and the New Comedy, the imperfect Sokratists, Plato and Aristotle all attest, in their several ways, the decline of political interests, of public life, of citizenship.

² He had, of course, a moment of late triumph in his recall (like Aristeides before him; cp. *Or.* 26. 6) from Aigina, quickly turned to woe by the failure of the Lamian campaign (like Cicero's *Io, Triumphe* (*Phil.* 14), by the failure of the campaign round Mutina).

³ *περὶ συμμοριῶν*, *Or.* 14, delivered in 354 B.C. on the report of a projected

in Pella. He hoped to see Greece quit of the Makedonian by means of the Persian. He is practically prepared to medize, up to a certain point: he will receive and use Persian gold, not to stir up strife among the Greek states, but to unite them against Makedon.¹ He thinks Konon's rebuilding of the walls, by means of Persian gold and Phoenician labour, more creditable than their original erection by Themistokles!² He could have little hopes of Sparta, the old yoke-fellow of Athens in the Persian war.³ He had no prejudice against the Thebans, who would defy Philip and Alexander, even though they had 'betrayed' Hellas to Persia in the days of yore.⁴ Demosthenes had no special interest in the old wars with Persia, except as furnishing examples to be employed against Makedon, or the Makedonian partisans in Athens.⁵ For the mere story Demosthenes appears to inherit a Periklean indifference, a Thucydidean disdain.⁶ Nowhere does he acknowledge or betray any debt to Herodotus. There is but one item which looks like an Herodotean reminiscence, the embassy of Alexander to Athens, and that is inaccurately remembered.⁷ His nominal blunders, as Kimon for Miltiades,⁸ Perdikkas for Alexander,⁹ do not inspire us with confidence to accept from him Kyrtilos in place of Lykidas as the name of the Athenian traitor in 479.¹⁰ Demosthenes is more instructive on the memorials of the war,¹¹ which belong in a sense to the history of the *Pentekontaëteris*, and on the events of that history itself,¹² than on

invasion of Greece by Artaxerxes Ochus. The orator uses the opportunity, however, to exhort Athens to put her house in order.

¹ Aischines 3. 238, Deinarchos 1. 10, 18, Diodor. 17. 4. 8 πολλά γὰρ χρήματά φασιν αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι παρὰ Περσῶν ἵνα πολιτεύηται κατὰ Μακεδόνων κτλ.

² Or. 20. 71 ff. (c. *Lept.* 354 B.C.); cp. Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 12.

³ Plutarch, *Kimon* 16 *ad f.*

⁴ 14. 33 f. εἰ τοίνυν τις οἶεται Θηβαίους ἔσεσθαι μετ' ἐκείνου (sc. τοῦ βαρβάρου) κτλ. ἐγὼ τοίνυν οἶμαι τοσοῦτον ἀπέχειν Θηβαίους τοῦ μετ' ἐκείνου ποτ' ἂν ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὥστε πολλῶν ἂν χρημάτων, εἰ ἔχοιεν δοῦναι, πρίασθαι γενέσθαι τινὰ αὐτοῖς καιρὸν δι' οὗ τὰς προτέρας ἀναλύσονται πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀμαρτίας.

⁵ 14. 30 ὥς μὲν τοὺς ἐπιόντας ἐκείνων ἀμυνόμεθα, οἱ Μαραθῶνι καὶ Σαλαμῶνι τῶν προγόνων αὐτοῦ μάλιστα ἂν εἰδείν. But this is in 354 B.C., before the Makedonian question has become acute; cp. p. 34 note 1 *supra*.

⁶ Cp. Or. 6. 11, his perfunctory apology for the omission of a recital of the deriding deeds ἃ πάντες αἰεὶ γλίσχονται λέγειν, ἀξίως δ' οὐδεὶς εἰπεῖν δεδύνηται, διόπερ καὶ γὰρ παραλείψω δικαίως with the words

of Perikles *ap.* Thuc. 2. 36. 4 τὰ μὲν κατὰ πολέμους ἔργα, οἷς ἕκαστα ἐκτῆθη, ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ ἢ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν βάρβαρον ἢ Ἕλληνα πολέμιον ἐπιόντα προθύμως ἡμυνάμεθα, μακρογορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος εἰάσω. This Periklean reserve was, perhaps, necessitated by the economy of the Thucydidean work, the ἐκβολή (1. 98-117) supplying the omission; but for the real attitude of Thucydides cp. § 4 *supra*.

⁷ *ibid.* τοὺς μὲν ὑμετέρους προγόνους ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρχεῖν Ἑλλήνων ὥστ' αὐτοὺς ὑπακούειν βασιλεῖ, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀνασχομένους τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, ἤνικ' ἦλθεν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ τούτων πρόγονος περὶ τούτων κήρυξ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐκλιπεῖν προελομένους κτλ. The Orator evidently dates the mission before Salamis.

⁸ Or. 23. 205.

⁹ 23. 200. The same mistake occurs in †Or. 13. 24.

¹⁰ 18. 204; cp. Hdt. 9. 5 and note *ad l.c.*

¹¹ The sword of Mardonios 24. 129 (cp. note to Hdt. 9. 22), the walls of Themistokles 20. 71, the great Athena 19. 272 (the Poikile Stoa and the Delphian tripod are in †59. 94-96).

¹² The mission of Arthmios of Zeleia

the Persian war proper. The building of the walls and the origin of the Athenian alliance and empire he may have taken from Thucydides; but the record of the mission of Arthemios and his attainder, the account of the Peace of Kallias, are true oratorical deposit; and the notices of the sword of Mardonios, of the great Athena, are his own. Even the heroes of the war are oftenest mentioned for services or characteristics subsequent to the war. Aristeides is the model of a good statesman; but it is his assessment of the tributes and the modesty of his mansion alone which are specified to his credit.¹ Themistokles is "the most illustrious man of his time"²—the Thucydidean *Rettung* has had its effect—and he is described as the author of the evacuation of the city,³ and as "the victor of Salamis,"⁴ only to be robbed of this title a moment later.⁵ His building of the walls, and his subsequent pride and its punishment, had sharper lessons for Demosthenes.⁶ In the extant and authentic orations none other of the heroes of the war with Xerxes is mentioned, no, nor even that monarch himself.⁷ The events, or battles, of the war with Asia fare no better. The great battles are enumerated in the celebrated adjuration which was provoked by Aischines, and was intended to crush him;⁸ but Salamis alone comes in for any detailed notice,⁹ and the notices add nothing to our knowledge of the event, though the tribute to Themistokles, and the emphasis laid upon the evacuation of land and city, have, as already

9. 41–46, 19. 271–72. The Peace of Kallias 19. 273, which here appears in a more extensive form than in Isokrates. The fall of Pausanias (ὁ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεὺς) and the remarkable proceedings of the Plataians against the Lakedaimonians before the Amphiktyonic court occur in †59. 97, 98.

¹ In 3. 21 he is coupled with Nikias, Perikles, and the Demosthenes of Thucydidean story, as a sample of the good old times; in 3. 26 with Miltiades, for the simplicity of his private establishment. (So too Themistokles and Miltiades, 23. 207.) In 23. 209 he appears as the assessor of the tributes. The only passage which might bear directly on Hdt. is in †Or. 26. 6 (Aigina as his residence in exile, cp. Hdt. 8. 79).

² 20. 71 ὁ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀπάντων ἀνδρῶν ἐνδοξότατος.

³ 18. 204. By a characteristic inaccuracy Demosthenes ascribes his election as Strategos to his carrying this measure. In 6. 10 the evacuation of Athens is mentioned without reference to Themistokles.

⁴ 23. 196 τὸν τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν νικήσαντα.

⁵ 23. 198 οὐδ' ἔστιν οὐδεὶς ὅστις ἀν εἴποι τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν Θεμιστοκλέους,

ἀλλ' Ἀθηναίων. There was some reason for the difference between the fourth and fifth century fashion in such matters: in the fifth century the Athenians fought their own battles, in the fourth they hired others to fight for them. Cp. also †13. 21, 22.

⁶ 23. 205 ἐκεῖνοι Θεμιστοκλέα λαβόντες μείζον αὐτῶν ἀξιούντα φρονεῖν ἐξήλασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ μηδισμὸν κατέγνωσαν. For the walls 20. 71 ff.

⁷ Xerxes, Leonidas, Pausanias are named in what would be the most remarkable passage in Demosthenes on the Persian wars, if only it were authentic: †59. (c. *Neaer.*) 94–98. It contains the astounding blunder that half the Plataians died with Leonidas at Thermopylai; it describes Pausanias as 'king' of the Lakedaimonians (cp. Hdt. 9. 76, note); it makes the Plataians prosecute the Lakedaimonians before the Amphiktyonic court for the elegy on the Delphian tripod. For the notices of Alexander see p. 38 note 1 below.

⁸ 18. 208 μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παραταξαμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπ' Ἀρτεμισίω.

⁹ Cp. notes 4, 5, 8 above, and 5 p. 36.

seen, a value of their own. Perhaps the only precise item which Demosthenes contributes to the history of the war is the destruction, real or supposed, of the fugitives from Plataia, by the Makedonian king, Alexander, for which the orator hardly thanks him.¹ Yet the variants and the blunders of Demosthenes are evidential, not merely of his own indifference to the subject, but also of the existence of sources and traditions, probably Athenian, in the fourth century, other than the Herodotean work.

AISCHINES might, from his opposition and hostility to Demosthenes, be expected to furnish a contrast too in his utterances on the Persian question, but the contrast is not a very strong one. Possibly, if more remained of the literary and oratorical efforts of Aischines, references to the Persian wars of old might be more copious; but the three extant orations² add nothing to the traditional deposit, so far as the story in Herodotus goes. Aischines as a Makedonian partisan is, indeed, personally above the slightest suspicion of an intrigue with the Persian;³ he can, with a good conscience, use the case of Arthmios of Zeleia as a precedent against Demosthenes,⁴ and invoke the memories of the Persian war to discredit Demosthenes and his compact with the Barbarian.⁵ But, for the most part, Aischines uses the names and events of the Persian war in a conventional manner;⁶ and his best contribution to the actual evidences falls into the history of the *Pentekontaëteris*,⁷ to which also belongs, strictly speaking, his most elaborate historical reference, a borrowed patch, riddled with errors.⁸ But the conventional use of the heroic names and events of the Persian war is itself not without significance for the state of the traditions in the fourth century. Themistokles is before all the hero of the war, and no touch or hint of prejudice occurs to mar his fame.⁹ Aristides

¹ Demosthenes substitutes, indeed, the name of Perdikkas (Thucydidean pre-occupation?) as the Makedonian king who overwhelmed the remnant of the Persians from Plataia: 23. 200 Περδίκκα τῷ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ βαρβάρου ποτ' ἐπιστρατεῖαν βασιλεύοντι Μακεδονίας τοὺς ἀναχωροῦντας ἐκ Πλαταιῶν τῶν βαρβάρων διαφθείραντι καὶ τέλειον τάπύχημα ποιήσαντι τῷ βασιλεῖ. The same mistake occurs in †13. 24. The correct name is given in Philip's Letter †12. 20 f., as also the scene of the butchery 'Amphipolis,' and the golden Alexander at Delphi, from the spoil; cp. p. 37 note 7 *supra*.

² (1) *c. Timarch.* (2) *De falsa legat.* (3) *c. Otesiph.* The *Epistles* are generally regarded as spurious.

³ Cp. †*Ep.* 11. 3. The idea of his going to the Persian king is absurd, but the further statement is true in character: καίτοι τὰ Περσῶν με καὶ Μήδων οὐδεὶς ἔφη ποτὲ φρονεῖν καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα Δημοσθένους.

⁴ 3. 258 (where the phrase ἐξεκέρυξαν . . . ἐξ ἀπάσης ἧς Ἀθηναῖοι ἄρχουσιν shows that the incident cannot belong to the Herodotean period of the Persian war).

⁵ § 259 Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι τελευτήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς τάφους τοὺς τῶν προγόνων οὐκ ἂν οἴεσθε στενάξαι, εἰ ὁ μετὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ὁμολογῶν τοῖς Ἕλλησι ἀντιπράττειν στεφανωθήσεται; For Μαραθῶνι we might have expected Σαλαμῖνι. By Ἕλλησι must be meant Makedonians.

⁶ 2. 75, 172; 3. 132, 181.

⁷ 3. 183–185, a passage which supplies the epigrams on the Hermai erected after the Strymonian campaign. (The Picture of Marathon is mentioned § 186.)

⁸ 2. 172 ff. This passage is apparently based on Andokides; cp. Andokides 3. 5. Also Aisch. 1. 125.

⁹ 1. 25, coupled with Perikles and Aristides: 2. 9, with Alkibiades οὗ πλείστον τῶν Ἑλλήνων δόξῃ διήνεγκαν: 3. 181 with Miltiades and Aristides

too is a name to conjure with; but he is remembered for his assessment of the tribute,¹ for his justice, or righteousness,² not for any special service in the Persian war. The battle of Artemision is once named,³ Plataia twice,⁴ Salamis some three or four times⁵: this *crescendo* on the names of Themistokles and Salamis represents the common sense of Athenian historians; the gradual appropriation of Plataia by Athenian glory-seekers is almost more significant. No Spartan, no Persian, is named by Aischines, but in one remarkable passage, the orator, pointing the contrast between the position of the Persian king in the past and in the present, to the greater glory of Makedon, uses phraseology which might go back, directly or indirectly, to the pages of Herodotus.⁶ We are but imperfectly informed on the state of Athens during Alexander's campaigns in Asia, but apparently the destruction of Thebes had made so deep an impression upon her nearer neighbour that any active co-operation with the Persian was left to the remoter and less assailable Sparta.⁷ The time in Athens was largely occupied by the long-drawn struggle between Aischines and Demosthenes, a purely personal issue, which ended in the vindication of Demosthenes and the voluntary withdrawal of his bitter foe into exile. From his retreat in Asia, Aischines will have had news of the Harpalian affair, and have witnessed the fall of his hated rival. As he apparently survived the death of Alexander, he will have digested, with what grace he could, the triumphant recall of Demosthenes, and have received, without regret, the subsequent news of his miserable end. It was hardly with reflexions upon the Persian wars of old that Aischines consoled his expatriation; and the rate at which Alexander had made history during his adventurous reign of three lustres may well have cast those old memories for a while into the shade.

LYKURGOS, of one party and policy with Demosthenes, performed prodigies in the reorganization of the finances of Athens, making thereby possible the desperate attempt to realize the foreign policy of his friend. But as an orator Lykurgos offers a greater contrast to Demosthenes than Aischines, and betrays some of the literary merits, or defects, of the Isokratean school. His sole surviving oration, a forensic speech for the prosecution of one Leokrates, on the charge of having abandoned, or betrayed, his country, after Chaironeia, smells of the lamp, and contains incidentally more ancient history than the whole extant corpus of Aischines. There are, in

again, and as Strategos at Salamis. (The *Epistles* imitate, cp. 3. 2; 7. 2, 3; 11. 7. The phrase in 3. 2 *ὅ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθερώσας* is remarkable.)

¹ 2. 23 *ὅ τοὺς φόρους τάξας τοῖς Ἑλλησι*: cp. 3. 258.

² 1. 25 *ὁ δίκαιος ἐπικαλούμενος*: cp. 2. 23, 3. 181.

³ 2. 75. ⁴ 2. 75; 3. 259.

⁵ 2. 75 (*bis*); 2. 172; 3. 181.

⁶ 3. 132 *οὐχ ὁ μὲν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεὺς, ὁ τὸν Ἀθῶν διορύξας, ὁ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, ὁ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας αἰτῶν, ὁ πολλῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς γράφειν ὅτι δεσπότης ἐστὶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀφ' ἡλίου ἀνιόντος μέχρι δυομένου, νῦν οὐ περὶ τοῦ κύριος εἶναι διαγωνίζεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη περὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος σωτηρίας*;

⁷ It did not come to much; cp. Arrian, *Anab.* 2. 13. 4-6.

fact, in relation to the Persian war three elaborate passages, each of which places important episodes of the war in a novel light, making very distinct addenda to the tradition, or to the interpretation of the facts. There are also, as it happens, three minor or passing references, likewise of interest in connexion with the war. These six items invite careful examination.

(1) Anticipating that the defence would seek a justification of quitting the city and land at the hour of peril in the historic precedent supplied by the war with Xerxes, Lykurgos comes to discuss, or at least to appraise, that incident.¹ The orator's reply is hardly in itself adequate,² but incidentally he contributes two or three gems to the setting of Salamis. Eteonikos (*sic*) the Lakedaimonian, Adeimantos the Korinthian, and the Aiginetan contingent were about to fly under cover of night, but our ancestors compelled them to remain in Salamis and fight, and so won a double victory, over their allies as well as over the enemy.³ Here perhaps the most important note is the emphasis laid on the victory of the Athenians over the Peloponnesians, though its point is blunted by a rhetorical turn, which leaves it doubtful whether the Peloponnesians acquiesced in the ruse which defeated them. The aggressive war on Asia, the double victory at the Eurymedon, are treated as the natural sequel to Salamis, and the celebrated Treaty of Peace, imposing limits on the movements of the king's fleet, and securing autonomy for the Greeks in Asia, is regarded as the complement to "the Trophy of Salamis."⁴ (2) Lykurgos is the first of our authorities to record an Oath as taken by the Greeks before Plataia, including the vow to betithe all the cities which had joined the Barbarian, and to leave the temples burnt or destroyed by the Barbarian in ruins as an everlasting memorial of his impiety.⁵ The historic character of this oath is very small. It is admittedly moulded on an Athenian precedent. It conflicts with the Herodotean account. It comprises two items which, even if both subjects of vow or agreement, may have belonged to different occasions. It is elsewhere repeated in variant forms.⁶ But whatever its historical value,

¹ §§ 68-74.

² The obvious reply would be that the Athenians quitted Athens and Attica for Salamis in the Persian war under an order of state: Leokrates had run away to Rhodes after Chaironeia on his own authority. The cases are so disparate that the introduction of Salamis looks like a bit of learning designed to gratify the orator's taste and to stimulate the patriotism of the jury.

³ § 70 ἐγκαταλείπομενοι δὲ οἱ πρόγονοι ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων βία καὶ τοὺς ἔλλους ἡλευθέρωσαν, ἀναγκάσαντες ἐν Σαλαμῖνι μετὰ αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους ναυμαχεῖν. μόνον δὲ ἀμφοτέρων περιγε-

γόνασιν, καὶ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων, ὡς ἑκατέρων προσήκε, τοὺς μὲν εὐεργετοῦντες, τοὺς δὲ μαχόμενοι νικῶντες.

⁴ § 73 τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς νίκης, οὐ τὸ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τρόπαιον ἀγαπήσαντες ἔστησαν ἀλλ' . . . συνθήκας ἐποιήσαντο μακρῷ μὲν πλοίῳ μὴ πλείν ἐντὸς Κυνέων καὶ Φασήλιδος, τοὺς δ' Ἑλλήνας αὐτονομίους εἶναι, μὴ μόνον τοὺς τὴν Εὐρώπην ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας.

⁵ § 80 ταύτην πίστιν ἔδοσαν αὐτοῖς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς πάντες οἱ Ἕλληνες ὅτε ἐμελλον παραταξάμενοι μάχεσθαι πρὸς τὴν Ξέρξου δύναμιν κτλ.

⁶ Cp. p. 32 notes 6, 7 *supra*.

in the first instance, it is undoubtedly illustrative of the trend of Attic tradition, or rather, perhaps, afterthought, in the fourth century. (3) This characteristic is even more fully documented in the third case, which illustrates in the clearest way that comparison and antithesis between the battles of Thermopylai and Marathon which in the dialectic of tradition may so powerfully have affected the legend of each.¹ Thus, in relation to the three great battles of the great Persian war, Lykurgos makes distinct addition to our materials, not indeed for discovering the facts, but at least for appreciating the growth of the story. The absence of proper names, or the error, prepares us to find his contributed details of minor worth. Thus (4) with him too Pausanias, the betrayer of Hellas to Persia, is 'king.'² (5) Without naming Themistokles he notes it as an illustrious service to furnish the fatherland with a circuit of walls.³ (6) The last item to be mentioned, for sheer confusion and inaccuracy, deserves the prize. Lykurgos has apparently confounded the story of the lapidation of Lykidas with the story of the mission of Alexander to Athens, the one originally recorded by Herodotus just after the other. Lykurgos relates the execution by the Council, with its own hands, of the anonymous traitor in Salamis; and in proof of their love of the fatherland adduces the fact that the Athenians nearly stoned to death Alexander, though previously a friend of theirs, because he came from Xerxes (*sic*) to demand earth and water.⁴ If this last record be argued to possess independent existence, yet the silence of Herodotus, the improbability of the outrage in itself to the person of the friendly king-ambassador, and the subsequent relations of Alexander and the Athenians, proclaim its falsity. In fine, Lykurgos makes a valuable contribution to the legend of the Persian wars, without much enriching the history. He was evidently a student of past instances and illustrations; if he accomplishes so much for our purpose in the course of one forensic speech, what may we not have lost by the disappearance of the fifteen speeches, or more, accredited to him in antiquity, some of them on public occasions, which might have justified an extensive use of his methods of appeal to antiquity?

§ 9. The other orators, as well later as earlier, make for the most

¹ §§ 108f. τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἔργων ἀμφοτέροις ἦν κατεργασμένα. Our ancestors defeated the barbarians, who first invaded Attica, proving thereby that courage is superior to wealth, and valour to numbers. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ' ἐν Θερμοπύλαις παραταξάμενοι ταῖς μὲν τύχαις οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐχρήσαντο, τῇ δ' ἀνδρείᾳ πᾶν πάντων διήνεγκαν. τοιγαροῦν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἥρσις μαρτύρια ἔστιν ἰδεῖν κτλ. He quotes the epitaphs, for Thermopylai and for Marathon.

² § 128 Πανσανίαν γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα κτλ. Like a good Athenian he mentions his

betrayal of Greece, but not his victory at Plataia. Cp. p. 37 note 7 *supra*.

³ § 139. This may have been meant as a compliment to Demosthenes.

⁴ Cp. § 71 οὕτω γοῦν ἐφίλουν τὴν πατρίδα πάντες, ὥστε τὸν παρὰ Ξέρξου πρεσβεύτην Ἀλέξανδρον, φίλον ὄντα αὐτοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ ᾔτησε, μικροῦ δεῖν κατέλευσαν. § 122 ἄξιον τοίνυν ἀκοῦσαι καὶ τοῦ περὶ τοῦ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τελευτήσαντος γενομένου ψηφίσματος, δὴ ἡ βουλὴ, ὅτι λόγῳ μόνῳ ἐνεχέειρε προδιδόναι τὴν πόλιν, περιελομένη τοὺς στεφάνους αὐτοχείρι ἀπέκτεινεν.

part little or no further contribution to the subject. ANTIPHON, indeed, lies outside the period and the present interest, nor is there any reference in his extant works or fragments to the Persian wars.¹ ISAIOS, notwithstanding the purely private or forensic nature of his speeches, has an occasional reference to the public events and personages of his own time,² but never a word on Themistokles, Aristides, Marathon or Salamis. ANDOKIDES is more fertile ground, but grows only weeds.³ He supplies Aischines, as above shown,⁴ with a very marvellous muddle on the history of the *Pentekontaëteris*; in another wild passage he mixes up the memories of the first and the second Persian wars, naming Marathon, in his pure Atticism, where he should have named Salamis and Plataia.⁵ These vagaries do not dispose us favourably towards his assertion that the Athenians stole the ashes of Themistokles from Magnesia, and dissipated them.⁶ It reduces the tomb in Attica and the tomb in Asia alike to kenotaphs. Plutarch naturally demurs. We should hardly be content to rationalize on the supposition that the Athenians did indeed repossess themselves of the mortal remains of the "Liberator of Hellas," and interred them at Munichia! There is nothing further in Andokides to detain the student of the Persian wars.⁷ At the other end of the oratorical period DEMADES⁸ and DEINARCHOS⁹ add at most a touch or two, showing that the Persian question, with the memories of its former interest for Athens, is yet alive. The Makedonians, Demades argues, in the acme of their strength, were ready to grasp at the sceptre and treasures of Persia, if only Demosthenes had let them alone.¹⁰ Deinarchos, like Demosthenes,

¹ Condemned to death 411 B.C. for his part in the overthrow of the Democracy, Thuc. 8. 68. 1-2; Plutarch, *Mor.* 832 f.

² Of the extant speeches apparently the eldest may be dated c. 389 B.C., the youngest c. 353 B.C. Blass, *Attische Bereds.* ii.² 488. References occur to the battles in Eleusis, Spartolos, Knidos, 5. 42; to the Korinthian, Thessalian, Theban wars, 9. 14, etc., but merely as incidental to the lives of his clients. Timotheos is mentioned 6. 27.

³ Andokides was notoriously involved in the proceedings against the Hermokopids (415 B.C.), but his earliest extant speech, No. 2 (*On his Return*), is dated c. 407 B.C., the speech *On the Mysteries* (No. 1) 399 B.C., and that *On the Peace* (No. 3) 392-1 B.C. Cp. Blass, *Att. B.* i.² 298.

⁴ Cp. p. 38 *supra*; Andok. 3. 5 (especially *ἀντί δὲ τῶν τριήρων αἱ τότε ἡμῖν ἦσαν παλαιαὶ καὶ ἀπλοὶ αἰς βασιλεία καὶ βαρβάρους καταναυμαχῆσαντες ἡλευθέρωσαμεν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἀντί τούτων τῶν νεῶν ἑκατὸν τριῆρεις ἐναντηγησάμεθα* κτλ.).

⁵ 1. 107 *ὕστερον δὲ ἡνίκα βασιλεὺς*

ἐπεστράτευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα (the Athenians decided) *τοὺς τε φεύγοντας καταδέξασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιῆσαι* κτλ. *ἤξιουν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς προτάξαντες πρὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπάντων ἀπαντήσαι (sic) τοῖς βαρβάροις Μαραθωνάδε* κτλ. *τὴν πόλιν ἀνάστατον παραλαβόντες ἱερὰ τε κατακεκαυμένα τείχη τε καὶ οἰκίας καταπεπτωκυίας* κτλ.

⁶ *Fr.* 3, Plutarch, *Them.* 32.

⁷ The *Περσικὴ σκηνή* made for Alkibiades at Olympia by the Ephesians is a suggestive spot of colour, 4. 30.

⁸ After Chaironeia one of the leaders of the Makedonian party; author of the death-sentence against Demosthenes, Plutarch, *Demosth.* 28; met his own death in Makedonia 319 B.C. The portion of the speech *ὑπὲρ τῆς δωδεκαετίας* extant is generally condemned as spurious; Baizer and Sauppe, ii. 312 ff.

⁹ Last, not least, of the 'Ten' Orators; born c. 360 B.C. and flourished under Demetrios Phalereus. The three extant orations are all concerned with the *cause célèbre* of Harpalos. B. and S. i. 483 ff.

¹⁰ § 13 *ἡμάζον δὲ τοῖς σώμασιν οἱ*

Aischines, and others, takes up his parable on Arthmios, son of Pythonax of Zeleia,¹ and has a good deal to say against Demosthenes in reference to Alexander's money embezzled by Harpalos, and received by Demosthenes, as well as the earlier money from the great king²; but his only direct reference to the Persian question in its fifth-century stage just serves again to prove that Athens, in the fourth century, thought of Aristides only as the assessor of her tributes, and of Themistokles preferably as the rebuilders of her walls.³

This review of the oratorical deposit upon the traditions of the Persian war may fitly conclude by an appreciation of two extant examples of that specific type of rhetorical exercise, the Funeral Oration, from which might naturally be expected the richest and most direct contribution to the subject here under consideration. Perikles in the *editio princeps* of this *genre* had apologized, in a way, for omitting the expected reference to Marathon and Salamis.⁴ The pseudo-Demosthenes, in the oration which ought to represent the speech of Demosthenes over the heroes of Chaironeia, formulates or adopts the oft-repeated contrast between the Athenians in the Persian war and the Greeks at large in the Trojan war, much to the advantage of the former; and does not hesitate to ascribe the double repulse of the Persian wholly and solely to Athens, thus spreading the halo of Marathon boldly over Salamis, Plataia, and the rest.⁵ But none the less is the reference somewhat perfunctory, and all details taken for granted. The *Epitaphios* found among the works of Lysias, in any case probably an earlier example of the kind, treats the subject more generously. A long passage recites the glories of Marathon,⁶ and a still longer passage envelops and conveys a surprising number of Herodotean details in a rhetorical flood of atticizing commentary.⁷ Xerxes is there,⁸ and the date is there,⁹ the number of his ships¹⁰ and the innumerable company of his host,¹¹ his pride and his impiety,¹² his

Μακεδόνες, οὓς ἤδη ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἐπὶ τὰ σκήπτρα καὶ τοὺς Περσῶν θησαυροὺς ἡ τύχη διεβίβαζεν.

¹ 2. 24, 25.

² 1. 10, 18, 20, 70.

³ 1. 37 τοὺς μὲν ἀρχαίους ἐκείνους μακρὸν ἂν εἴη λέγειν Ἀριστείδην καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα, τοὺς ὀρθώσαντας τὰ τεῖχη τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοὺς φόρους εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἀνεγκόντας παρ' ἐκόντων καὶ βουλομένων τῶν Ἑλλήνων. The deposition of the tribute in the Akropolis involves an anachronism.

⁴ Thuc. 2. 36. 4, without prejudice to the purely Thucydidean authorship of the speech. Blass, *Att. B.* i. 2 436, regards Gorgias as the real literary founder of the type; cp. Baier and Sauppe ii. 129.

⁵ Dem. †60. 10 ἐκείνοι τὸν ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἀσίας στόλον ἐλθόντα μόνοι δις ἡμύναντο καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν,

καὶ διὰ τῶν ἰδίων κινδύνων κοινῆς σωτηρίας πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν αἴτιοι κατέστησαν . . . τοσοῦτω γὰρ ἀμείνους τῶν ἐπὶ Τροίαν στρατευσαμένων νομίζουσιν· ἂν εἰκότως, ὅσον οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὄντες ἀριστεῖς δέκ' ἔτη τῆς Ἀσίας ἐν χωρίον πολιορκούντες μόλις εἶλον, οὗτοι δὲ τὸν ἐκ πάσης τῆς ἡπείρου στόλον ἐλθόντα μόνοι, τὰλλα πάντα κατεστραμμένον, οὐ μόνον ἡμύναντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τιμωρίαν ὑπὲρ ὧν τοὺς ἄλλους ἠδίκουν ἐπέθηκαν.

⁶ Lysias †2. 20-26. Cp. *Hdt.* IV.-VI. ii. 195 (Appendix X. § 22).

⁷ †2. 27-47.

⁸ Ξέρξης ὁ τῆς Ἀσίας βασιλεὺς . . .

⁹ δεκάτῳ ἔτει.

¹⁰ χιλίαις μὲν καὶ διακοσίαις ναυσὶν . . .

¹¹ ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἔθνη τὰ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἀκολούθησαν πολλὰ ἂν ἔργον εἶη καταλέγειν.

¹² ὑπεριδὼν καὶ τὰ φύσει πεφυκῆτα καὶ

bridge on the Hellespont and his trench through Athos,¹ and the multitude of traitors that flocked to his standard, from fear or avarice.² The synchronous struggle at Artemision and Thermopylai³ and the diverse fortunes of Athenians and Lakedaimonians are duly rehearsed, not without a passing acknowledgement to the courage of the latter.⁴ The patriotic heroism of the Athenians in evacuating the city⁵ gives place to a record of the battle of Salamis, in which the concrete details of the fight are lost in a sensational description of the feelings of the warriors and spectators.⁶ The *Aristeia*, however, are boldly accorded to the Athenians in virtue of their three-fold claim: the number of their ships, the skill of their men, the *strategy* of their general Themistokles.⁷ The treachery of the Peloponnesians behind the Isthmian wall is terminated by an Athenian taunt, accompanied by a hint of possible medism, far more delicately veiled than in Herodotus: the orator in this respect is more tender of the fame of Athens.⁸ The final battle of Plataia follows, on essentially Herodotean lines: the bulk of the allies run away under cover of night; the Lakedaimonians and Tegeans defeat the barbarians; the Athenians and Plataians account for all the Greeks on the king's side.⁹ That day is final and secures the liberties of Europe, and the hegemony of Athens.¹⁰ This whole passage is rhetoricized history *in excelsis*.¹¹ Elsewhere the genuine Lysias pays interest to the name of Themistokles,¹² and preserves a fact or two in the inner history of Athens not without a bearing on the war, or on the policy of Themistokles, though the bearing is not specified.¹³

The one genuine *Epitaphios Logos* which has come down to us falls chronologically into the close of the period: it is the panegyric pro-

τα θεῶα πράγματα καὶ τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας
διανοίας.

¹ ζεύξας μὲν τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, διορύξας
δὲ τὸν Ἄθω.

² ἀμφοτέρω δ' ἦν αὐτοὺς τὰ πείθοντα,
κέρδος καὶ δέος.

³ γενομένου δὲ τοῦ κινδύνου κατὰ τὸν
αὐτὸν χρόνον.

⁴ Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν ἐνίκων τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ,
Λακεδαιμόνιοι δέ, οὐ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐνδεεῖς
γενόμενοι . . . οὐχ ἡττηθέντες τῶν ἐναντίων
. . . τῶν μὲν δυστυχισάντων, τῶν δέ κτλ.

⁵ ἐξέλιπον ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὴν
πόλιν . . .

⁶ πόλιν δὲ γνώμην εἶχον ἢ οἱ θεώμενοι
. . . ἢ οἱ μέλλοντες ναυμαχήσειν κτλ.

⁷ πλείστα δὲ καὶ κάλλιστα ἐκείνῳ ὑπὲρ
τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας συνεβάλοντο,
στρατηγὸν μὲν Θεμιστοκλέα, ἱκανώτατον
εἰπεῖν καὶ γινῶναι καὶ πράξαι, ναῦς δὲ
πλείους τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων συμμάχων,
ἀνδρας δὲ ἐμπειροτάτους . . . ὥστε δικαίως
μὲν ἀναμφισβήτητα τᾶριστεια τῆς ναυμα-
χίας ἔλαβον παρὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος κτλ.

⁸ περὶ ἅπασαν τὴν Πελοπόννησον τεῖχος
περιβαλεῖν· εἰ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων
προδιδόμενοι μετὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἔσονται
κτλ.

⁹ § 46.

¹⁰ βέβαιοι μὲν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ
κατειργάσαντο . . . ὑπὸ πάντων ἡξιώθησαν
. . . ἡγεμόνες γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

¹¹ The reminiscences of Hdt. in the
passage are quite as conspicuous as those
of Thuc. The rhetorical tropes, some
of which recur in Isokrates, have been
largely omitted.

¹² 12. 63, the building by Themistokles
contrasted with the destruction under
Theramenes. 30. 28, Themistokles is
coupled with Solon and Perikles as a
good legislator. (†2. 42, he is named as
at Salamis, see above.)

¹³ 14. 39, the ostrakisms of Alkibiades
and Megakles (before the invasion of
Xerxes); cp. Appendix III. § 4 *infra*.

nounced by HYPEREIDES on Leosthenes and the Athenians who fell in the war at Lamia in 323 B.C.¹ Hypereides no doubt shared the views of his quondam friend Demosthenes upon the relative danger to Greece and upon the intrinsic barbarity of Persians and Makedonians severally. In more than one respect this genuine and actually delivered oration contrasts with the rhetorical conventions of the time and occasion. In the first place, the speech is in the main an encomium on Leosthenes, the strategos. Hypereides apologizes, indeed, for spending so much on the leader, and saying so little of the men-at-arms, explaining that praise of the general includes praise of the citizen-soldiers, so far as there were any, who followed him.² In fact, this departure from rule and precedent may perhaps be taken as a recognition of the difference which had come over military service and esprit in the age of mercenary soldiers and professionalized leading. In the second place, it was hardly possible for Hypereides to speak of a battle at Lamia against the Makedonians without any reference to the earlier fighting in the same region against the Persians, and the reference is forthcoming.³ But with a truly refreshing novelty Hypereides does not hesitate to describe the exploits of Leosthenes as the most glorious ever performed in that neighbourhood,⁴ he does not hesitate to prefer the virtues and achievement of Leosthenes to the deeds of Miltiades, Themistokles, and the other liberators of Hellas.⁵ The first point might pass with an audience which at all times esteemed Marathon and Salamis above Thermopylai; the second might almost have seemed a rhetorical *lèse-majesté*. Had we the lost *Plataikos* of Hypereides, should we too adjudge it a greater honour to his country than the victory of Aristides?⁶

§ 10. To pass from the rhetors to the philosophers, from Isokrates and Lykurgos back to Plato and on to Aristotle, is to come into a cooler temperature, a clearer light, and, in a sense, into a more historical atmosphere. The philosophers, moreover, make their own proper contribution, not so much to the traditions themselves, though that is not wholly wanting, as to the framing of the traditions of the

¹ Or. 6, ed.³ Blass, *Hyperidis Orationes* sez., 1894, Teubner.

² § 15.

³ § 12 ἑλθὼν εἰς Πύλας καὶ καταλαβὼν τὰς παρόδους δι' ὧν καὶ πρότερον ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας οἱ βάρβαροι ἐπορεύθησαν.

⁴ § 18. The remark that the annual assemblies of the Hellenes at Thermopylai will redound to the credit of the departed heroes might well be transferred to the earlier story: ἀφικνούμενοι γὰρ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἅπαντες δις τοῦ ἑνιαυτοῦ εἰς τὴν Πυλαίαν, θεοὶ γένησονται τῶν ἔργων τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτοῖς· ἅμα γὰρ εἰς τὸν τόπον ἀθροισθήσονται καὶ τῆς τούτων ἀρετῆς μνησθήσονται.

⁵ § 38 λέγω δὴ τοὺς περὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθέρωσαντες ἐντιμον μὲν τὴν πατρίδα κατέστησαν ἐνδοξον δὲ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἐποίησαν, ὧν οὗτος τοσοῦτον ὑπερέσχευ ἀνδρεία καὶ φρονήσει ὅσον οἱ μὲν ἐπελθοῦσαν τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων δύναμιν ἡμίναντο, ὁ δὲ μὴδ' ἐπελθεῖν ἐποίησεν. κάκεῖνοι μὲν ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐπείδον ἀγωνιζόμενοι, οὗτος δὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περιεγένετο τῶν ἀντιπάλων. The orator's logic is a little thin.

⁶ Cp. Plutarch, *Mor.* 350 ἀρ' οὖν ἄξιον προκρίναι τὸν Ἑπερίδου Πλαταϊκὸν τῆς Ἀριστείδου στρατηγίας καὶ νίκης;

war. Plato and Aristotle exhibit in this as in other departments minor differences, but three broader notes are common to the twain. First, while they share, indeed, with Isokrates and the rest the antithesis between Europe and Asia,¹ the patriotic prejudice, or preference, for the Hellenes above the barbarian,² they have little or no interest in the Persian question, in the conquest of the barbarian, whether in Asia or in Europe, and the record of the former wars are as ancient history to them, in the actual details of which they show very little concern. Secondly, the philosophers have but one opinion in the moral they draw from the war for political philosophy and the theory of the State: both interpret the course of the war in a sense unfavourable to democracy, both win from the war a verdict favourable to aristocracy and the government of the few. This verdict is not altogether satisfactory, or conformable to the facts of the case, and involves Aristotle at least in something very like a self-contradiction; but, thirdly, it is quite consistent therewith that both philosophers adduce the statesmen of that period, and of the fifth century generally, to wit, in Athens, as typical specimens of great and good men in more or less favourable contrast to their successors. Beyond these three points the general agreement hardly extends, and each philosopher must be estimated separately. The *Menexenos*, ascribed to PLATO, and not unworthy of him, contains, in its model Funeral Oration, a subtle satire on Lysias or Isokrates, as if to show how much better, if such things must be, an Aspasia or a Sokrates could achieve them for love,³ than the paid rhetors achieved them for money. There is, in truth, a comparative sobriety in the tone of the mock-oration, which makes it difficult to dismiss the historical exaggerations, suppressions, or accommodations as introduced with a specifically satiric intent. Nor is the history altogether so bad as to constitute a *reductio ad absurdum* of Attic tradition: it is no worse than appears in the Aristotelian *Aθηναίων πολιτεία*, and passed muster everywhere in Athens during the fourth century. The ostensible speech follows the normal lines of the *Epitaphioi Logoi*, but contains a specially lengthy passage on the Persian wars,⁴ for the introduction of which, perhaps, some external reason in the circumstances of the time, or in the sources from which the author was drawing, might best account. The passage falls into three sections—on the Marathonian campaign, on the Xerxeian invasion, and on the sequel, whenas the Athenians carried the war into Asia and Egypt, and compelled the king in his plans to substitute his own preservation for the conquest of Greece. The relative space allotted to these three stages in the story may, perhaps, be taken to indicate

¹ Plato, *Menex.* 239; Aristot. *Pol.* 1285 a, 1327 b.

² Plato, *Rep.* 470 "Ἕλληνας μὲν ἀρα βαρβάρους καὶ βαρβάρους "Ἑλλήσι πολεμεῖν μαχομένους τε φήσομεν καὶ πολεμίου φύσει

εἶναι: Aristot. *Pol.* 1252 b ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δούλον.

³ 236 E ἀλλὰ μέντοι σοὶ γε δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι κτλ.

⁴ 239 c-241 E.

their relative importance in the eyes of the Athenian public of the day, being as 3 : 2 : 1.¹ Marathon was all along for all Athenians the prime victory: won on their own soil, unaided, eclipsing not merely Salamis, but still more Thermopylai and Plataia. But within the limits of the second war itself the *Menexenos* cleverly ranks "Salamis and Artemision"—for nought is heard of Thermopylai—next to Marathon, as having afforded by sea the same prerogative instance of victory as Marathon by land.² The third place, and only the third place, belongs to Plataia, "the common achievement of Lakedaimonians and Athenians,"³ the presence of allies having been ignored at Salamis and Artemision equally as at Marathon. This hierarchy of the battles, which corresponds to the temporal order, and also to the relative part played by Athens in each case respectively, is significant of the state of the traditions, at least in Athens. By a miracle of Attic chivalry, indeed, the Lakedaimonians are allowed precedence at Plataia, but it is a bare precedence and nothing more: the confederate victory is but an application of the lesson of Marathon. It is perhaps a negative sign of grace that Mykale is passed over in silence; but Mykale seems to have dropped out of fourth-century sources, until Ephoros revived, and rationalized, the story from Herodotos; and in any case, as a naval undertaking, it belonged to an aspect of the question which Plato, or a Platonist, would not be anxious further to aggrandize.

Such is, indeed, a fair inference from the second element above noted in the philosophic stratum, which for Plato is most fully exhibited in *The Laws*. Two great passages in this work enforce the political and moral lessons of the Persian war in a sense adverse to the claims of the 'naval mob' and its achievements, favourable to the merits of the moderate democracy, the quasi-aristocracy, its polity, its education, its *êthos*, its victories. *How can a political constitution be a good one*—asks the anonymous Athenian—which is based on the sea-folk? Where to Kleinias: *Why, we Kretans opine that the battle of Salamis was the salvation of Hellas. A common opinion all the world over, replies the Athenian, but not mine or that of Megillos here (the Spartan): on the contrary, we assert that the battle of Marathon began and the battle of Plataia completed the salvation of the Hellenes, and, moreover, that the land-battles made the Hellenes better men, and the sea-battles the reverse.*⁴ The same moral is urged from the positive side in an earlier and longer passage on the same theme.⁵ *The secret of the success of Athens in the Persian wars was to be found in the old order, the moderate constitution, the people*

¹ After a proem of twenty-two lines, the first takes thirty-four lines, the second about twenty-two lines, the third about twelve (Zürich ed. 1839).

² τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀριστεία τῷ λόγῳ ἐκείνοις ἀναθετόν, τὰ δὲ δευτερεῖα τοῖς περὶ Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἐπ' Ἀρτεμισίῳ ναυμαχήσασιν

καὶ νικήσασιν. (With this juxtaposition cp. *Laws* 4. 707.)

³ τρίτον δὲ λέγω τὸ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς ἔργον καὶ ἀριθμῶ καὶ ἀρετῇ γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς σωτηρίας, κοινὸν ἤδη τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων.

⁴ 4. 707.

⁵ 3. 698 f., cp. 692 f.

nurtured in the fear of the Laws, a united people, whose only refuge and trust, at the oncoming of the innumerable host of barbarians, was in themselves and in their deities, while on the other side the failure of Persia was due in part to its despotic form of government, and the total lack of liberty among its people. Success and failure in war depend on many factors, and there are wars and wars; but it would be a curiously perverse political philosophy which saw no connexion between the inner constitution and *êthos* of a state and its success or failure in warfare, defensive and offensive, by land and by sea. The suggestive remarks of Plato upon the subject reappear in Aristotle later with a difference, and pass on to Polybios in a theorem, which leads him, in its application to Roman history, not so much to a false estimate of the causes of Rome's success in war, as to a false analysis of the nature and working of the Roman constitution.¹ Even in the hands of Plato this dogma proves a treacherous weapon, and yields him not merely a somewhat idealized perspective of the past but a somewhat enfeebled perception of the present: or was the democracy of Athens even more law-ridden and law-abiding than in the fourth century? His admiration for the past, however, does not lead Plato to extol everything in the conduct of Hellas during the crisis of the Persian wars. All may have been well with Athens, and there may not be any express fault to find with Sparta, but there was much in the action of the Greek states at the time open to censure; in fact, the Persian invasion was an unnecessary and avoidable experience: a united Athens had repulsed the invader, a united Hellas would have made invasion from the very first impossible.²

Thirdly, as of the institutions, so too Plato judges of the men of the past; the practical statesmen of the fifth century had left no successors: this fact is at once their glory and their shame. They were good men, and able; but they could not make others able and good—though Themistokles taught his son, Kleophantos, to ride.³ The Sokrates of the *Gorgias*, indeed, which is the classical depository of this argument, comes to the conclusion that all Athenian statesmen stand alike condemned, as not having made the people whom they led, or governed, any better;⁴ but, allowing for the irony of the argument, Plato here, as elsewhere, bears witness to the position and reputation of the historic names. It is, therefore, the more interesting to observe that, while Aristeides is but twice adduced as an instance of the good man,⁵ Themistokles figures in that capacity, or at least as a man of

¹ Polyb. 6. 3 ff.

² *Laws* 3. 692 f. *εἰ δ' ἦν τις προορῶν τότε ταῦτα . . . οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὁ Περσικὸς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα οὐδ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς στόλος ἂν ὤρμησε κτλ. αἰσχυρῶς γοῦν ἡμῶν ἄνθρωποι αὐτοὺς κτλ. πολλὰ δὲ λέγων ἂν τις τὰ τότε γενόμενα περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν πόλεμον τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐδαμῶς εὐσχήμονα ἂν κατηγοροῖ . . . εἰ μὴ τό τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων*

κοινῇ διανόημα ἤμυνε τὴν ἐπιούσαν δουλείαν κτλ.

³ *Men.* 93 D (repeated in the spurious *de virt.* 377 B).

⁴ 517 οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικά ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει.

⁵ *Men.* 94, *Gorg.* 526 B *εἰς δὲ καὶ πανὶ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονε καὶ εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιστάχου* [*de virt.*

note, some five or six times.¹ On the other hand, Xerxes is named curiously often, and serves as a stock example of the results of tyranny, wickedness, and a bad education,² just as the Persian constitution has been censured as despotic, and Persian culture as luxurious and intemperate.³ In all this, while there is much characteristic of the *media* through which the tradition of the Persian wars was transmitted, there is little, if anything, of definite historical moment added to the corpus of tradition itself. All the more striking are two concrete statements of quite fresh import, to be found in the Platonic writings. The authentic *Laches* advances as admittedly true a statement calculated to illuminate, if not to revolutionize, the conception of the last day's fighting at Plataia, according to Herodotus.⁴ Unfortunately the passage reads like a distorted reminiscence of the description in Herodotus of the Spartan fighting at Thermopylai;⁵ and though the one day ended with defeat and the other in victory for the Spartan arms, the absolute independence of the Platonic record, as genuine tradition, is far from incontrovertible. The doubtful or spurious *Axiochos*, which at any rate may count as an early and possibly fourth-century witness, fathers a strange tale on one Gobryas, a Magian, who reported that his grandfather and namesake had been sent to Delos, at the time of the expedition of Xerxes, to keep guard over the island birth-place of the two divinities.⁶ The story, if true, might have a useful bearing on the question, how far religion and religious motives operated in the invasion of Greece. But the story looks only too much like an invention, devised in the interests of the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul, the Persian or Magian belief thereof being ingeniously traced to the discovery at Delos, on that occasion, of certain bronze tablets, which had been brought by Opis and

376 c]. There is no special connexion with the Persian war.

¹ *Men.* 93 D, 99 B, *Gorg.* 503 C (with Kimon, Miltiades, Perikles), 515 D, 516 D (ostrakism, and banishment), 519 A; *Rep.* I. 330 (his witty reply to the Seriphian, cp. Hdt. 8. 125). In the spurious *Theages* 126 A Themistokles, Perikles, Kimon are cited as τὰ πολιτικά δεινοί. His death in exile is pointedly referred to, *Axiochos* 368 D. Xanthippos is twice named in doubtful dialogues, but merely as the father of Perikles, *Alk.* i. 104 B, *Menez.* 235 E. Pausanias 'the Lakedaimonian' is mentioned as a great man only in *Ep.* 2. 311 A.

² *Gorg.* 483 D οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττοντος ἀρχεῖν καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποῖω δίκαιον χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; cp. *Rep.* I. 336 A, *Laws* 3. 695 D μετὰ δὲ Δαρείου ὁ τῇ βασι-

λικῇ καὶ τρυφῶσιν πάλιν παιδευθεὶς παιδείᾳ Ξέρξης. Ὡ Δαρεῖε, εἰπεῖν ἐστὶ δικαιοτάτων ἴσως, δὲ τὸ Κῦρου κακὸν οὐκ ἔμαθες, ἐθρέψω δὲ Ξέρξην ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡθέσειν ἐν ὅσπερ Κῦρος Καμβύσῃ. ὁ δὲ, ἅτε τῶν αὐτῶν παιδείων γενόμενος ἔκγονος, παραπλήσια ἀπετέλεσε τοῖς Καμβύσου παθήμασι. Cp. *Alk.* I. 105 C (123 C, *Axioch.* 371 A, 'without prejudice').

³ *Laws* I. 637 D (where Persians are classed with Skyths, Thrakians, Kelts, Iberians, Carthaginians), 3. 698.

⁴ *Laches* 191 C Λακεδαιμονίους γὰρ φασιν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τοῖς γερροφόροις ἐγένοντο, οὐκ ἐθέλειν μένοντας πρὸς αὐτοὺς μάχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ φεύγειν, ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐλύθησαν αἱ τάξεις τῶν Περσῶν, ἀναστρεφόμενους ὥσπερ ἵππεας μάχεσθαι καὶ οὕτω νικῆσαι τὴν ἐκεῖ μάχην. ΔΑ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

⁵ 7. 211.

⁶ *Axioch.* 371 A ἔφη κατὰ τὴν Ξέρξου διάβασιν κτλ.

Hekaerge from the Hyperboreians,¹ and the occasion itself being perhaps but a vague reminiscence, or an exchange of circumstances between the first and the second wars.

Plato, then, adds little if anything to the genuine traditions of the war, but he furnishes more than one interesting and significant commentary on the facts. His judgement on the war is that of an Athenian, and an Athenian of the old school. Plato judges the Persian war to have been an unnecessary war, but not a trifling or an insignificant war. Athens of all Greek states comes best out of the story, and the Athens of Marathon better than the Athens of Salamis. The conduct of Sparta was not quite beyond reproach, and the rest of the Greek states disgraced themselves. Of all the heroes of the war Themistokles stands highest, his name occurs most frequently. Of the battles Salamis is named some five times,² Plataia four times,³ Artemision twice,⁴ and Thermopylai not at all. Plato sanctions 'the canal through Athos,' and 'the bridge over Hellespont,' but never commits himself to details in regard to figures, and presents the facts for the most part in a sublimated residuum. His references to the war and to Persian history generally seem traceable, notwithstanding some discrepancies, to the Herodotean story, reinforced by other and independent sources. It remains only to add that the Platonic writings, in contrast with those of Thucydides and of Aristotle, know the war only as the 'Persian' war, in this respect agreeing with the terminology of Isokrates.⁵

With ARISTOTLE the war is habitually denominated the 'Median' war,⁶ but this reversion to the older terminology does not mark any essential reaction, in relation to this particular subject, against the Platonic standpoint. Aristotle in fact, as already indicated above, exhibits a substantial agreement with Plato on three broad aspects of the question, save only that this agreement is qualified in two or three ways. With Aristotle the war is, if anything, more remote, and his standpoint in view thereof is less distinctly Attic, or Atticized, while events and personages have dropped more than a peg or two into the limbo of historic instances and logical illustrations. This mortal result is part of that general growth of scholasticism, which infects the passage from Plato to Aristotle. Yet this degeneracy is not equally apparent in all the Aristotelian writings, but varies to some extent with the subject and interest of the particular treatise. It may, therefore,

¹ Cp. Hdt. 4. 35.

² *Laws* 3. 698 c (a mere date), 4. 707 (not altogether a benefit); *Menex.* 241 (*bis*), 245 A (the trophy).

³ *Laches* 191 c (a possible novelty); *Laws* 3. 707 c (final); *Menex.* 241 c (inferior to Marathon, and to Salamis), 245 A (the Athenians in the fourth

century would not shame the trophy by assisting the king).

⁴ *Laws* 4. 707, *Menex.* 241.

⁵ ὁ Περσικὸς στόλος *Laws* 1. 642 E, 3. 692 c, 698 c; ὁ Π. πόλεμος *Menex.* 242 B.

⁶ ὁ Μηδικὸς πόλεμος *Post. An.* 94 a, *Pol.* 1307 a, τὰ Μηδικὰ *Metaph.* 4. 1018 b, *Pol.* 1303 a, 1303 b, 1304 a, 1341 a.

be convenient to distinguish the distinctly political works from those of logical or similar purport, and to allow here to the latter the precedence which chronologically belongs to them.

Thus, in the *Metaphysics* the Median war serves as a sample of Ancient History, though not quite so ancient as the Trojan:¹ in the *Posterior Analytics* it occurs as an instance in which efficient causality can be shown as a middle term predicable of major and of minor.² In the *Sophistic Elenchs* Themistokles does duty as the mere symbol of a man, where any other proper name would have served the turn as well.³ In the *Rhetoric*, however, he appears in historic circumstance, though still merely to point a distinction between the witness to a past event and the witness to a future event, in one boat, forsooth, with the oracle-mongers.⁴ Aristides is here in better case, being twice cited as the just and virtuous man, but his virtue has nothing directly to say to the Median war.⁵ More in point is the notice of Salamis and Marathon as proper subjects for panegyric in Athens, though the purpose in view would warn us, were it more fully exemplified, not to expect pure history.⁶ Finally, the invasion of Xerxes sinks to a *paradeigm*,⁷ and Xerxes himself swells to a *pelore*, or monster,⁸ mere figures, that is, of rhetoric, mere details of literary criticism. After this descent it is refreshing to unearth, from the purely literary criticism of the *Poetics*, such an historical gem as the real, or supposed,

¹ *l.c.* πρότερα γὰρ τὰ Τρωϊκὰ τῶν Μηδικῶν, ὅτι πορρώτερον ἀπέχει τοῦ νῦν.

² *l.c.* τὸ δὲ διὰ τί ὁ Μηδικὸς πόλεμος ἐγένετο Ἀθηναίους; τίς αἰτία τοῦ πολεμεῖσθαι Ἀθηναίους; ὅτι εἰς Σάρδεϊς μετ' Ἑρετρίων ἐνέβαλον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐκίνησε πρῶτον. πόλεμος ἐφ' οὗ Α, προτέρους εἰσβαλεῖν Β, Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ Γ. ὑπάρχει δὴ τὸ Β τῷ Γ, τὸ πρότερον ἐμβαλεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τὸ δὲ Α τῷ Β· πολεμοῦσι γὰρ τοῖς πρότερον ἀδικήσαν. ὑπάρχει ἄρα τῷ μὲν Β τῷ Γ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις· πρότερον γὰρ ἤρξαν. μέσον ἄρα καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ αἴτιον τὸ πρῶτον κινήσαν. This delightful passage, which reduces τὰ Μηδικὰ to a logical figure on the blackboard, refers primarily to the Marathonian campaign, and might have found a place in *Hdt.* IV.-VII., Appendix X. § 23.

³ 175 b τί γὰρ διαφέρει ἐρωτῆσαι εἰ Καλλίας καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς μουσικοὶ εἰσιν ἢ εἰ ἀμφοτέροις ἐν ὄνομα ἦν ἑτέροις οὖσιν; Or is there a latent reference to the anecdote which was recorded by Ion, and reappears *ap.* Plutarch. *Kim.* 9, *Themist.* 2, and even in Aristoph. *Wasps*, 959, 989 *κιθαρίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι*: *cp.* Plutarch, *Them.* ed. Bauer.

⁴ 1376 a περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων κτλ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων οἱ τοιοῦτοι μάρτυρες, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ οἱ χρησμολόγοι,

οἷον Θεμιστοκλῆς, ὅτι ναυμαχητέον, τὸ ξύλινον λέγει τεῖχος κτλ.

⁵ 1398 a γελοῖον ἂν φανείη, εἰ πρὸς Ἀριστείδην κατηγοροῦντα τοῦτο τις εἴπειεν (sc. σὺ μὲν ὦν Ἀριστείδης οὐκ ἂν προδοίης ἐγὼ δὲ κτλ.). 1414 b οἷον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστείδην ἐπαινεῖ. 1490 a (*Fr.* 83, Plutarch, *Aristeid.* 27) merely points an hereditary quality of ἀρετή.

⁶ 1306 a εἰ μὴ ἔχομεν τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην κτλ. (how could we praise the Athenians?). 1411 a b mentions Salamis, in citing a metaphor from the *Epitaphios* of Isokrates: ἄξιον ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ τῷ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τέλευτησάντων κείρασθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὡς συγκαταθαπτομένης τῇ ἀρετῇ αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

⁷ 1392 a b ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν παραδειγμα τοιόνδε τι, ὥσπερ εἰ τις λέγοι ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς βασιλέα παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἰς Ἀἴγυπτον χειρώσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ Δαρείος οὐ πρότερον διέβη πρὶν Αἴγυπτον λαβεῖν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη, καὶ πάλιν Ξέρξης οὐ πρότερον ἐπεχείρησε, πρὶν ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη· ὥστε καὶ οὗτος, ἐὰν λάβῃ, διαβήσεται· διὸ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον.

⁸ In a quotation, 1406 a οἷον Λυκόφρων Ξέρξην πέλωρον ἄνδρα.

synchronism between the battles of Salamis and Himera,¹ even though accompanied by a denial of any real connexion between them; nor is the human interest missing in the *Problem*, why we rejoice in that victory yet take no pleasure in the fact that the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles?² The joy in Salamis runs risk of being turned to sorrow when Themistokles is discovered to have misbehaved himself at Olympia, but no doubt the moral of that fable was well-meant.³ In the *Nikomachean Ethics* no person or event of the Median war is used to point a moral, but the Persian government comes in, as with Plato, for a censorious rap.⁴ The *History of Animals* mentions the tomb of Themistokles not for the sake of its heroic contents, but for the sake of its unwholesome surroundings⁵: was it that work, or was it Aristotle at all, that handed the dog of Xanthippos down to posterity for his devoted loyalty and his conspicuous reward?⁶ And does this Aristotelian medley leave any impression upon an historian's mind, save perhaps of the persistent rise of the name of Themistokles, whenever the Persian war comes into view?

The *Politics*, as a treatise of pemmicanned history, yields somewhat better results, though the space occupied by the Median wars, and the Persian question, is surprisingly small, especially in view of the rate at which Aristotle's greatest pupil was making history in Asia, while this very treatise was on the stocks.⁷ The philosopher does, indeed, formulate the title of the Greeks to empire, of the Barbarians,

¹ 1459 a κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἢ τ' ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ἐγένετο ναυμαχία καὶ ἡ ἐν Σικελίᾳ Καρχηδονίων μάχη, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνουσai τέλος. Cp. Hdt. 7. 166.

² 956 a Διὰ τί οὐ χαίρομεν θεώμενοι . . . ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς ἐντὸς γωνίας . . . ἀλλ' ὅτι Ὀλυμπία ἐνικώμεν, καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι, χαίρομεν καὶ μεμνημένοι καὶ ἐλπίζοντες τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' οὐ τάναντία τοῖς τοιοῦτοις.

³ 1233 b (*Eth. Eud.*) τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ᾔετο Θεμιστοκλεῖ πρέπειν ἢν ἐποιήσατο Ὀλυμπίαζε, διὰ τὴν προηπάρεσαν ταπεινότητα, ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι. Cp. Plutarch, *Themist.* 5 (where Bauer has overlooked this passage in the *Eudemian Ethics*).

⁴ 1160 b ἐν Πέρσῃσι δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννική· χρώνται γὰρ ὡς δοῦλοι τοῖς νείεσιν. Cp. 1344 b (*Oikou.*) Περσικὸν δὲ ἦν τὸ πάντα ἐπιτάττειν καὶ πάντ' ἐφορᾶν αὐτόν. These passages hardly square with 398 (*de Cosm.*), where the wondrous κόσμος of the Persian empire is described. The conclusion has a bearing on Hdt. 9. 3, and runs: τοσοῦτος δὲ ἦν ὁ κόσμος, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν φρυκτωρίων, κατὰ διαδοχὰς πυρσευουσῶν ἀλλήλαις ἐκ περάτων τῆς ἀρχῆς μέχρι Σούσων καὶ Ἐκβατάνων,

ὥστε τὸν βασιλέα γινώσκειν αὐθημερόν πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ καίνουργούμενα . . . ἄσεμνον ἦν αὐτῷ αὐτὸν δοκεῖν Ξέρξην αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα κτλ.

⁵ 569 b γίνονται δ' (sc. αἱ ἀφύαι) ἐν τοῖς ἐπισκόποις καὶ ἐλῶδεσι τόποις ὅταν εὐημερίας γενομένης ἀναθερμαίνηται ἡ γῆ, οἷον περὶ Ἀθήνας ἐν Σαλαμῖνι καὶ πρὸς τῷ Θεμιστοκλεῖ, καὶ ἐν Μαραθῶνι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς τοῖς τόποις γίνεται ὁ ἀφρός. Cp. Hdt. IV.-VI. ii. 201.

⁶ 1539 a (*Fr.* 360, Plutarch, *Them.* 10, cp. *Cat.* 5) ἐν οἷς ἱστορεῖται κύων Ξανθίππου τοῦ Περικλέους πατρὸς οὐκ ἀνασχόμενος τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ μόνωσιν ἐναλέσθαι τῇ θαλάττῃ καὶ τῇ τριήρει παρανηχόμενος ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τὴν Σαλαμίνα καὶ λειποθυμήσας ἀποθανεῖν εὐθύς· οὐ καὶ τὸ δευκνύμενον ἄχρι νῦν καὶ καλούμενον Κυνὸς σῆμα τάφον εἶναι λέγουσι. The anecdote does not occur in the Ἀθ. πολ. Bauer does not recognize its Aristotelian provenience. If true, it might help to explain the double name of the promontory; cp. Hdt. 8. 76. Xanthippos here too is 'the father of Perikles.'

⁷ The death of Philip (336 B.C.) is the latest event mentioned in the *Politics*, 1311 b.

especially in Asia, to subjection; but he never hints, or seems to suspect, that the one constitution through which Hellenism was to exercise that sovereignty of natural right was the Makedonian monarchy under his very eyes.¹ Aristotle is still immersed in the prejudices of the city-state; but, less aristocratic, decidedly less philo-Lakonian in his sympathies than Plato, he reverts, even more distinctly than his master, to old Athens for his political ideal. From this point of view the Persian war marks an era of decline in the state of Athens; and Aristotle deals less with the antecedents and events of the war than with its sequelae. In tracing them he involves himself in a serious inconsequence, which is surely due to an historical misconception. The inconsequence lies in ascribing to the war double and contrary effects upon the constitution of Athens, an aggrandizement of the democracy, an aggrandizement of the aristocracy.² The misconception arises out of a false inference from the attack by Ephialtes on the Areiopagos in 462 B.C.,³ coupled with the distorted history of that institution current in the fourth century at Athens. The Attidographs of that period antedated the democratic institutions of the state, and exaggerated the demotic *êthos* of pre-Persian Athens. Some reformers also desired to restore the Areiopagos to the position which it had *ex hypothesi* enjoyed before Ephialtes, nay, before Solon. To both sides alike an attack upon the Areiopagos and its powers, seventeen years after the battle of Salamis, was only intelligible on the supposition that the Senate had recovered powers and authority, of which it had been shorn by the fathers of the Democracy, Solon and Kleisthenes. In truth the previous loss of power had not been so great as was supposed, and the supposed recovery of powers was an illusion. Perhaps the first great blow to the Areiopagos, apart from the competition of the Solonian and Kleisthenic *Boulai*, was concealed in the introduction of the *Lot* for the Archontate, shortly after the battle of Marathon; but that reform would scarcely have had time to make itself fully felt by the date of the invasion of Xerxes. The Areiopagos may well have shown itself operative, efficient, patriotic, during the crisis of the war. But the

¹ 1285 a διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἦθη φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες. Cp. 1327 b (τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος) ἐλεύθερόν τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἀρχειν πάντων, μᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. (On the 'Physics and Politics' in this passage cp. notes to Hdt. 9. 122.)

² 1274 a τῆς ναυαρχίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος ἐφρονηματίσθη, καὶ δημαγωγὸς ἔλαβε φαύλους ἀντιπολιτευομένων τῶν ἐπικίων. 1304 a

ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ εὐδοκίμησασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ἔδοξε συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυρότεραν ἐποίησεν. 1341 a σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ γιγνόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας καὶ μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ἔτι τε πρότερον καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, πάσης ἤπτοντο μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες ἀλλ' ἐπιζητοῦντες κτλ.

³ 1274 a τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλήν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς (emended).

direct and nett result of the war was assuredly the increase of the democratic power and *êthos* in the state, until they found vent in the legislation of Ephialtes and of Perikles. It is no solution of the Aristotelian antinomy to say that the Athenian state as a whole was enlarged and strengthened by the efforts and the rewards of the great struggle, each element, aristocratic, democratic, profiting in the common movement: the argument deals with the relative aggrandizement of internal factors. A state cannot become both more aristocratic and more democratic at the same time. Our conclusion may well be that the Areiopagos had retained more powers down to the Persian war than Aristotle and the fourth century generally conceived, and that the great legislation of Ephialtes, which followed not long after the crowning victory of the Eurymedon, was not a democratic restoration but a democratic advance, bringing the institutions of Athens into harmony with the heightened consciousness of individual worth and common achievement, on land and sea, which was the natural product of some twenty, or even thirty years of warfare, sacrifice, and victory. However that may be, behind the Aristotelian antinomy or paradox there rises the historic witness to the service of the citizens at Salamis, otherwise indeed still better known, and the service of the Senate in the hour of need, which is a *fait nouveau*, acceptable and eminently characteristic of such a corporation, as the Areiopagos still was at the date of the invasion. Apart from this most interesting theorem the *Politics* offer scarce any contribution directly to the subject of the Persian war. No battle but Salamis is mentioned¹: none of the heroes are named save Pausanias, for his subsequent *coup d'état*,² and Xerxes, merely in the hour of his death.³ For the rest, the Median war is merely a date, an epoch; though this fact is itself significant.⁴

Whether the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία is very Aristotle, or, as seems infinitely more probable, only very Aristotelian,⁵ it has in four

¹ 1304 a; cp. *supra*.

² 1307 a ἐάν τις μέγας ἦ καὶ δυνάμενος ἔτι μείζων εἶναι, ἵνα μοναρχῇ, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι δοκεῖ Πανσανίας ὁ στρατηγὴς κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον. From him Aristotle, of course, distinguishes Πανσανίας ὁ βασιλεὺς (1301 b, 1333 b), a distinction obliterated in the *Index Aristotelicus* (Bonitz); cp. Hdt. 9. 76. A third Pausanias, the assassin of Philip, occurs 1311 b.

³ 1311 b. The source might well be Ktesias.

⁴ 1303 a ἐν Τάραντι ἡττηθέντων καὶ ἀπολομένων πολλῶν γνωρίμων ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰαπύγων μικρὸν ὕστερον τῶν Μηδικῶν δημοκρατία ἐγένετο ἐκ πολιτείας (cp. Hdt. 7. 170). 1303 b οὖον ἐν Ἑστιάδᾳ συνέβη μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά. Aristotle, like Thucy-

dides, evidently makes τὰ Μηδικά end with Herodotus.

⁵ (1) The treatise can be dated between 329 B.C. (c. 54) and 325 B.C. (c. 46), or certainly before the legislation of Demetrios. It is later than the *Politics*. Aristotle died in 322 B.C. (2) It was one of 158 similar treatises, all alike ascribed in antiquity to Aristotle: did he write them all with his own hand, and after this one? (3) The supposition that the treatises were written on Aristotelian lines and under Aristotelian auspices fully meets the case, and has many analogies in its favour. (4) The stylistic argument is inconclusive; also (5) the material argument that the history in the treatise is bad, especially the early history.

respects enriched our materials for the history of Athens in the period of the Persian wars, without adding any item to the actual history of the warfare itself. (1) The inner history of Athens between the dates of Marathon and Salamis has been illuminated by the account of the Reform of the Archontate, and the operation of Ostrakism, throughout the decade.¹ (2) The naval law of Themistokles has been more clearly dated, defined, and presented than heretofore.² (3) The exact nature of the service of the Areiopagite Senate in the supreme crisis of Athens, which was taken for granted in the *Politics*, is here described.³ (4) The legend of Themistokles, and indeed the legend of Aristides, are developed before our eyes, in a way calculated to arouse a deep distrust of the authorities upon which this portion of the tract was based. This last item hardly belongs to our present subject, but falls to the historian of the *Pentekontaëteris*⁴; the first three items can be more fully and more conveniently discussed in another connexion.⁵ It only, therefore, remains here to notice that, as in the *Politics* so in the *Polity of Athens*, the 'Median' war has become a date, a convenient era, by which to fix events totally unconnected with the war itself:⁶ the supreme significance of the battle of Salamis for Athens receives the like homage, by the chronological purpose it serves.⁷ No other battle of the war is named, and, as in the *Politics*, no other personages excepting Pausanias, and he, not for his victory at Plataia, but for his outrageous conduct thereafter.⁸

§ 11. During the period which may here be called the Greco-Makedonian, or Hellenistic period,⁹ historical literature suffers an

¹ c. 22.

³ c. 23.

⁴ It may, however, be worth while to note that the 'Aθ. πολ. accentuates the Aristotelian antinomy, above analyzed, in two particulars: (a) by making the seventh Constitution 'that which succeeded the Median wars, under the supremacy of the Areiopagos,' and the eighth Constitution 'that sketched by Aristides and accomplished by Ephialtes,' c. 41. (b) By making Themistokles joint-author of the overthrow of the Areiopagos, c. 25. The treatise adds two further absurdities of its own. (c) In c. 28 Themistokles and Aristides are opposed to one another as the respective leaders of the Demos (government) and γνώριμοι (opposition), and in c. 24 Aristides is represented as the author of extreme democratic developments. (d) In c. 41 Ephialtes completes the democratic constitution; in cc. 26, 27, after his death, Perikles still further develops and aggrandizes the democracy. If Themistokles took the place of Aristides in c. 24, if

² *ib.* § 7.

Themistokles and Perikles took the places of Aristides and Ephialtes in c. 41, the historical sketch of the *Pentekontaëteris* given by the tract would present a less improbable and a more consistent result.

⁵ Appendix III. § 4 *infra*.

⁶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά 23. 1, 25. 1, 41. 2.

⁷ c. 23. 4 ἔτει τρίτῳ μετὰ τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῶνι ναυμαχίαν (formation of the Athenian symmarchy); 27. 2 μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῶνι ναυμαχίαν ἐνὸς δέι πεντηκοστῷ ἔτει (outbreak of Peloponnesian war).

⁸ 23. 4 ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπόστασιν τὴν τῶν Ἰώνων ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων συμμαχίας Ἀριστείδης ἦν ὁ προτρέψας, τηρήσας τοὺς Ἀάκωνας διαβεβλημένους διὰ Πανσανίαν. This passage has another value too, in its bearing upon Hdt. 9. 92, 106.

⁹ On the terms cp. Holm, *Hist. of Greece*, E.T. iv. 5 ff., where the polemic against Droysen's terms appears to me exaggerated; but the substantive *Hellenism* certainly cannot be restricted to the culture of this period.

extraordinary and prolonged eclipse. No works have come down to us belonging to the generations between Philip II. and Perseus. The historic literature produced during the interval, whether it dealt with contemporary or with past events, has all alike perished, or lives only in so far as subsumed into the works of writers of the Greco-Roman or Roman period. To be strictly accurate, we have no extant historic literature between Xenophon and Polybios.¹ Even for our knowledge of Alexander's achievements and adventures we are dependent upon such later writers as Diodoros, Arrian, Plutarch. These writers had, indeed, primary sources on which to draw of quite exceptional merit, and the results for the life of Alexander leave comparatively little to be desired. For the succeeding section, until the history of Greece and of the Mediterranean world becomes, in the pages of Polybios, merged in the triumphant record of Rome, we have to be content with mere fragments and scraps, and those not contemporary with the events. How fared the traditions of the Persian wars throughout that period it is hard to say. Were they overwhelmed in the rapid changes of power and fortune among the *Diadochoi*, and forgotten during the reformation of the Greek world into the new system of relatively large political units and unions? Were they conned and recommitted to new forms by the scholars of an age, when science and letters were becoming more and more of a profession? Were they ever appealed to, in a practical sense, by orators of Greek states, still struggling for a shadow of freedom? There were not wanting events, which might have challenged such analogies. Exactly two centuries after the invasion of Xerxes, and but forty-four years after the death of Alexander, the Greeks at Thermopylai successfully withstood the assault of swarms of Gallic barbarians led by Brennus, and Delphi again witnessed a great deliverance, far more formidable in reality to the temple and its treasures than the visitation of the Persians; but for our knowledge of these events we are dependent on three late authorities, the earliest of which merely refers *en passant* to the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi, while the second and third depict the occurrences in terms more and more highly charged with colours from the Herodotean palette.² One remarkable document emerges from the literary darkness of this transition to illustrate the survival, in learned corners, of the bare facts of the old story, and something more. The *PARIAN CHRONICLE*³ presents, or rather presented, a somewhat arbitrary sketch of Hellenic history from

¹ Cp. A. Schaefer, *Abriss der Quellenkunde* i.³ §§ 23-54.

² (1) Polyb. 1. 6. 5, Pyrrhus entered Italy τῷ πρότερον ἔτει τῆς τῶν Γαλατῶν ἐφόδου, τῶν τε περὶ Δελφοῦς φθαρέντων, καὶ τῶν περαιωθέντων εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν: cp. 2. 20. 6, 2. 35. 7, 2. 46. 1. Polybios does not mention the battle at Thermopylai, which appears, with other details, in (2) Diodoros, *Fragg.* 22. 9 (ed. Teubner

iv. 306 ff.). Finally, the whole story is found, with fuller Herodotean *motifs*, in (3) Pausanias 1. 4. 1-5, 10. 19-23. Were the *Parian Chronicle* complete, perhaps this event would be found recorded in it. The date of the Celtic invasion is 280 B.C.

³ Cp. F. Jacoby, *Das Marmor Parium*, Berlin, 1904.

the accession of Kekrops to the Archontate of Diognetos, 264–3 B.C. The lines which record the Persian war are fortunately preserved and decipherable, and not devoid of a special interest.¹ The space devoted to the subject is relatively large. The record is enhanced by the comparative rarity of such notices on the stone: thus, previous to the battle of Marathon, the only wars specified are the Argive-Theban war,² the Trojan war,³ the Sacred war,⁴ and the war of Kyros against Kroisos⁵; while the first battle mentioned after Plataia is Leuktra⁶: thus the Persian wars are set in high relief. The events of the two campaigns selected for mention are also noticeable: the bridging of the Hellespont, the canal of Athos, the ‘battle’ in Thermopylai, the naval ‘victory’ for the Greeks at Salamis, mark the campaign of Xerxes, and the archontate of Kalliades.⁷ For the next year the battle of Plataia is recorded as a purely Athenian victory over Mardonios, the general of Xerxes, and his death in the battle is specified.⁸ The perverse Atticism of this passage, in which more credit is given to the Athenians for Plataia than for Salamis, goes beyond anything in evidence from earlier sources, yet it but marks the climax of a process of appropriation, which the fourth-century orators had in their time promoted. The items of general history in this *Chronicle* have been, with high probability, referred to Ephoros (so far as his work extended)⁹; but Ephoros certainly did not justify this wholesale plagiarism of Sparta’s victory. Some fifty years¹⁰ after the era of the *Parian Chronicle*, Lykiskos, an Akarnanian orator, pleading at Sparta the cause of Makedon and Achaia against Rome and Aitolia, appeals to the memory of the Persian wars, in three definite particulars,¹¹ to prove that the men of

¹ *Epp.* 48, 51, 52, ll. 62, 63, 66–68.

² *Epp.* 22, l. 37.

³ *Epp.* 23, l. 38.

⁴ *Epp.* 37, l. 52.

⁵ *Epp.* 42, l. 57.

⁶ *Epp.* 72, ll. 83 f. (The *Anabasis* of Kyros is given *Epp.* 64, l. 78.)

⁷ 51. ἀφ’ οὗ Ξέρξης τὴν σχεδίαν ἐξευξεν ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ καὶ τὸν Ἄθω διώρυξε, καὶ ἡ ἐν Θερμοπύλῳ (67) λαὸς μάχῃ ἐγένετο, καὶ ναυμαχία τοῖς Ἑλλήσι περὶ Σαλαμίνα τοὺς Πέρσας, ἣν ἐνίκων οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἔτη ΗΗΔΓΓ, ἀρχοντος Ἀθήνησι Καλλιάρχου.

⁸ 52. ἀφ’ οὗ ἡ ἐν (68) Πλαταιῶν μάχῃ ἐγένετο Ἀθηναίοις πρὸς Μαρδόνιον τὸν Ξέρξου στρατηγόν, ἣν ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Μαρδόνιος ἐτελεύτησεν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ, καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐρύη ἐν (69) Σικελίᾳ περὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ἔτη ΗΗΔΓΓ, ἀρχοντος Ἀθήνησι Ξανθίππου.

⁹ Jacoby, *op. c.* xiv.

¹⁰ 210 B.C.; cp. Freeman, *Hist. of Federal Gov.*² p. 451.

¹¹ (1) The outrage on the envoy of Xerxes (*sic*), (2) the heroism of Leonidas

and his men, (3) the vow to ‘betithe’ the Thebans (*sic*); cp. Polyb. 9. 38. 2 ff. τίνος χάριν ὑπολαμβάνετε τοὺς ὑμετέροους προγόνους, ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καθ’ οὓς καιροὺς ὁ Ξέρξης ἀπέστειλε πρεσβευτὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν αἰτούμενος, ἀπώσαντας ἐς τὸ φρέαρ τὸν παραγεγονότα, καὶ προσεπιβάλλοντας τῆς γῆς, κελεύειν ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ Ξέρξῃ, διότι παρὰ Λακεδαιμόνιων ἔχει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν; τίνος πάλιν ἐθελοντὴν καὶ προδήλως ἐξορμᾶν ἀποθανουμένους τοὺς περὶ Λεωνίδην; ἀρ’ οὐχ ἵνα δόξωσι μὴ μόνον τῆς αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας προκινδυνεύειν; 9. 39. 4 f. καλὸν γε, ταύτης τῆς συμμαχίας μετασχεῖν κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἄλλως γε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ὑπάρχοντας, οἳ γε Θεβαίους, τοὺς κατ’ ἀνάγκην ἡσυχίαν ἔχουν βουλευσαμένους μόνους τῶν Ἑλλήνων κατὰ τὴν τῶν Περσῶν ἐφοδὸν, ἐψηφίσαντο δεκατεύσειν τοῖς θεοῖς, κρατήσαντες τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν βαρβάρων. These statements differ in several obvious details from the stories in Hdt.

Lakedaimon ought now to join or head the cause of Hellenic liberties against the barbarians of the west, as erst against the barbarians of the east.¹ But we must take the report of this oration on trust from POLYBIOS, whose birth probably fell some years later than the date of the conference at which this appeal was addressed to the Spartans. Polybios himself must have been acquainted with the history of the Persian wars in the work of Ephoros, but he makes little use thereof.² The chief war with Persia for him, indeed, is the conquest of Asia by Alexander,³ but he has no occasion to celebrate it. For Polybios the greatest of all wars, expressly greater than either Peloponnesian or Persian, was the first Punic war, especially for its continuous length, and the magnitude of the ships and navies employed.⁴ The old Persian power, in its rigid confinement to Asia, supplies him with one of several contrasts to the greatness of the Roman,⁵ and the passage of Xerxes into Europe serves him as an epoch-making event:⁶ but such invasions of barbarian hordes Polybios accounts more alarming than really dangerous, and easily to be averted by inferior numbers of valiant men fighting for fatherland and freedom.⁷ The damage inflicted upon the Athenians, though it involved the evacuation of their land, and the destruction of their city, was transitory, and converted to their ultimate aggrandizement.⁸ Naturally Polybios censures the conduct

¹ Cp. 6. 49. 3 ff., where Polybios himself points out that the Spartans afterwards, for the sake of their own supremacy in Greece, οὓς ἐνίκησαν μαχόμενοι, τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπέμειναν ποιεῖν τὸ προσταττόμενον. ἐπιπορευομένους μὲν γὰρ τοὺς Πέρσας ἐνίκων, διαγωνιζόμενοι περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας· ἐπανελθούσι δὲ καὶ φυγοῦσιν προῦδωκαν ἐκδότους τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις κατὰ τὴν ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου γενομένην εἰρήνην, χάριν τοῦ χρημάτων εὐπορῆσαι πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων δυναστείαν.

² Cp. § 6 *supra*.

³ Cp. 3. 6. 4–14, where he discusses the true αἰτία τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πολέμου. The use of the term ὁ Περσικὸς πόλεμος for war with Perseus of Makedon (27. 13. 8) is remarkable.

⁴ 1. 63. 4–8 πόλεμος ὦν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν, ἀκοῇ μαθόντες, πολυχρονιώτατος καὶ συνεχέστατος καὶ μέγιστος. . . εἰ δὲ τις βουλευθείη συλλογίσασθαι τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν πεντηρικῶν πλοίων πρὸς τὰς τριήρεις, αἷς οἱ τε Πέρσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, καὶ πάλιν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐναυμάχουν· οὐδ' ἂν καθόλου δυναθῇ τῇλικαῦτας δυνάμεις εὐρεῖν ἐν θαλάττῃ διηγωνισμένας. This passage reads, both in form and substance, like a reminiscence of Hdt. and Thuc.

⁵ 1. 2. 2 Πέρσαι κατὰ τινὰς καιροὺς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν κατεκτήσαντο καὶ δυναστείαν· ἀλλ' ὅσῳ ἐτόλμησαν ὑπερβῆναι τοὺς τῆς Ἀσίας ὅρους, οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ σφῶν ἐκινδύνευσαν.

⁶ 3. 22. 2. The first treaty between Rome and Carthage is dated twenty-eight years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes (τῆς Ξέρξου διαβάσεως εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα).

⁷ 2. 35. 7 f. καὶ γὰρ τοὺς τὴν Περσῶν ἔφοδον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ Γαλατῶν ἐπὶ Δελφοῦς εἰς μνήμην καὶ παράδοσιν ἡμῖν ἀγαθόντες, οὐ μικρὰ μεγάλα δ' οἶμαι συμβεβλήσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας ἀγῶνας· οὔτε γὰρ χορηγῶν, οὔθ' ὅπλων, οὔτ' ἀνδρῶν πλήθος καταπλαγείς ἂν τις ἀποσταλῇ τῆς τελευταίας ἐλπίδος, τοῦ διαγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῆς σφετέρας χώρας καὶ πατρίδος, καὶ μνημονεύων ὅσας μυριάδας καὶ τινὰς τόλμας καὶ πηλίκας παρασκευὰς ἡ τῶν σὺν νῦ καὶ μετὰ λογισμοῦ κινδυνεύοντων ἀλρεσις καὶ δύναμις καθεῖλεν.

⁸ 38. 1^b μέγιστον ἡ τύχη δοκεῖ φόβον ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατὰ τὴν Ξέρξου διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην· τότε γὰρ ἐκινδύνευσαν μὲν πάντες, ἔπταισαν δὲ τελέως ὀλίγιστοι, μάλιστα δὲ τούτων Ἀθηναῖοι· προειδόμενοι γὰρ ἐμφρόνως τὸ μέλλον, ἐξέλιπον τὴν πατρίδα μετὰ τέκνων

of the Thebans at the time, which he ascribes simply to their fears, and a love of peace at any price, and in this condemnation Pindar is expressly involved by name.¹ Thus in general terms Polybios reflects upon the permanent lessons of the Persian war, but contributes nothing to the details, except a transparent mistake or two.² He never names a single battle of the war, and the two great Athenians whom he does happen to mention by name are cited, not for their services during the war, but for their reputation as statesmen.³ Polybios never names Herodotus, but he inherited from Ephoros the idea of a universal history and applied it to the absorption of the Mediterranean world by Rome.⁴ He himself beheld and recorded the descent of the black cloud from the west,⁵ which shrouded Hellas in a misery, passing, in his opinion, that of total annihilation itself.⁶ Polybios made his own peace and found his welfare with the barbarian conquerors. But the first Greek historian of Rome was still too deeply immersed in the categories of the City-state, inherited from Plato and Aristotle, even to reap the full political moral of his own age, much less to foresee the fate of the Roman constitution, which he admired as one in kind with the Spartan in its prime: he failed to prognose the consequences for the state and the individual, involved in the great process of which he was the historian. Small blame to him therefor: the Roman Republic, the constitution of which, however superior to Sparta and to Athens, was still a mere city-state, died hard: a century later than Polybios, Cicero still did not quite despair of it, though monarchy had been advancing in one form or another all the time, and philosophers of the Garden and of the Porch

καὶ γυναικῶν· βλάβην μὲν οὖν ὁ καιρὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπήνεγκε· κύριοι γὰρ γεννηθέντες οἱ βάρβαροι, πικρῶς διέφθειραν τὰς Ἀθήνας· οὐ μὴν ὄνειδος οὐδ' αἰσχύνῃν, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον εὐκλείαν παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν μεγίστην ἀπήνεγκαν, ὅτι πάντα ἐν ἐλάσσονι θέμενοι, τῆς αὐτῆς τύχης εἶλοντο κοινωνεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλήσι. τοιγαροῦν καλῇ χρησάμενοι προαιρέσει, παρὰ πόδας οὐ μόνον ἀνεκτέσαντο τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὴν ἐαυτῶν χώραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας μετ' ὀλίγον ἡμφισβήτουν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους.

¹ 4. 31. 5 οὐδὲ γὰρ Θηβαίους ἐπαινοῦμεν κατὰ τὰ Μηδικά, διότι τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀποστάντες κινδύνων, τὰ Περσῶν εἶλοντο διὰ τὸν φόβον· οὐδὲ Πίνδαρον συναποφηνάμενον αὐτοῖς ἄγειν τὴν ἡσυχίαν διὰ τῶνδε τῶν ποιημάτων κτλ. Cp. § 3 *supra*.

² Cp. p. 57 note 11 *supra*.

³ Aristides is twice mentioned: 9. 23. 6 (with Perikles) as a sound statesman, in contrast to later demagogues; 32. 8. 6 f. (with Epameinondas) as an

honest man, in money matters (but not equal to L. Aemilius Paulus).

Themistokles is mentioned once, and possibly the epoch of the Persian war is in view: 6. 44. 2, Athens was unstable compared with Rome, but had her great men and her great moments: καὶ γὰρ αὕτη, πλεονάκης μὲν ἴσως, ἐκφανέστατα δὲ τῇ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀρετῇ συνανθήσασα.

⁴ 2. 37. 4 οὐ τινὰς πράξεις, καθάπερ οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν, οἷον τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς ἢ Περσικὰς, ὁμοῦ δὲ τὰς ἐν τοῖς γνωρίζομένοις μέρεσι τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀναγράφειν ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν.

⁵ 9. 37. 10 τηλικούτων νέφος ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσπέρας, δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ παρὸν ἴσως πρώτοις ἐπισκοπήσει Μακεδόσι, κατὰ δὲ τὸ συνεχὲς πᾶσιν ἔσται τοῖς Ἑλλήσι μεγάλων κακῶν αἴτιον.

⁶ 38. 1^a καθόσον τοὺς ζῶντας μετὰ τιμωρίας ἐλεεινοτέρους νομίζομεν τῶν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ἐκλειπόντων τὸν βίον, κατὰ τοσοῦτο καὶ τὰς τότε περιπετείας τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλεεινοτέρας νομίστων τῶν συμβάντων Καρχηδονίους κτλ. The whole passage has served as model for Diodoros 32. 26.

had come from Hellas to Rome carrying the anodyne for subjection, the indifference or the superiority of the individual to all his surroundings, with them. CICERO, whose mind clung to the political ideal of the City-state¹ while a whole world was waiting for reorganization, sought light or alleviation in his hour of need from the precedents afforded by Greek history. His own exile was consoled, if we may believe Dio Cassius, by the precedents of Themistokles and Aristeides.² He judges Pompey's strategy, in quitting Rome and Italy, in the light of the evacuation of Attica by Themistokles and the Athenians.³ In his eyes Caesar is a new Peisistratos,⁴ and his assassins are 'tyrannicides,' liberators, like Harmodios and Aristogeiton.⁵ The immense erudition of Cicero is familiar with Herodotus, whose name here first meets us in the Latin tongue, and Tully cites freely the leading names in historiography from Herodotus to Ephoros, from Ephoros to Polybios.⁶ Cicero is deeply versed in the Themistoklean legend, and Themistokles fills a larger space in his writings than is taken by any other Greek statesman.⁷ Aristeides too is there, of course, as the righteous

¹ Cicero seems never to have grasped the fundamental need of his age, which was the reorganization of the Mediterranean world, only to be effected under a centralized and monarchic government. But his ideal of a *moderator Rei publicae* was a concession in advance to the Augustan régime and the Principate, even though the aim and object of the prince, in Cicero's plan, was to be the happiness and welfare of the *citizens*, not of the subjects, of the Romans rather than of the Roman world; cp. *ad Att.* 8. 11.

² Cp. the conversation of Philiskos with Cicero reported by Dio Cass. 38. 26, including the maxim so utterly subversive of the old order: *αὐτὸς ἕκαστος αὐτῷ καὶ πατρίδι καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ δέῃ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιεῖ* (§ 2).

³ *ad Att.* 7. 11. 3 *Urbem tu relinquis? ergo idem, si Galli venirent. 'Non est' inquit 'in parietibus res publica.'* At in aris et focis. 'Fecit Themistocles; fluctum enim totius barbariae ferre urbs una non poterat.' At idem Pericles non fecit, etc. Cp. also *ad Fam.* 2. 12. 5 (a passage misunderstood by Orelli, and others, to refer to the exile and restoration of an individual).

⁴ *ad Att.* 8. 16. 2.

⁵ Tyrannoctoni, *ad Att.* 14. 15. 2, 16. 15. 3; Harmodius and Aristogeiton as patriots, *Tusc. Disp.* 1. 49. 116; nostri liberatores, *ad Att.* 14. 12. 2.

⁶ Cp. especially *de orat.* 2. §§ 51-58. Polybios is mentioned not there, but

elsewhere (e.g. *de re pub.* 1 § 34, 2 § 27, 4 § 3). Herodotus is named and cited by Cicero more than a dozen times; for ref. cp. Orelli's *Onomasticon* and Freund's *Cicero Historicus*. In the celebrated letter to Lucceius, Cicero seems to regard Hdt. as a panegyrist of Themistocles (*ad Fam.* 5. 12. 7). Cicero is our authority for calling Hdt. 'the father of History' (*de legg.* 1 § 5 et apud Herodotum, patrem historiae, et apud Theopompum sunt innumerabiles fabulae). Cicero's notes on Hdt. are largely concerned with the question of style: the material citations are mainly from Bk. 1.

⁷ There are upwards of three dozen passages in which Themistokles is named: among the points elucidated are the following: (1) his date, contemporary with Coriolanus, *Brut.* §§ 28, 41; cp. *Lael.* § 42. (2) His evacuation of the city, *ad Att.* 7. 11. 3, *ad Fam.* 5. 12. 5; cp. *de off.* 3 § 48 (stoning of Cyrus). (3) His unpopularity and exile, *ad Att.* 10. 8. 7, *de Rep.* 1 § 5. (4) His voluntary death, *ad Att.* 9. 10. 3, *pro Scauro* § 3, *Lael.* § 42, *Brut.* 42. (5) His proposal to burn the Lacedaemonian fleet, *de off.* 3 § 49. (6) His early ambitions (the trophies of Miltiades), *Tusc.* 4 § 44. (7) His patriotism, *pro Sest.* § 141. (8) His wisdom and eloquence, *Brut.* § 28, *de Or.* 3 § 59. (9) His craftiness, *de off.* 1 § 108 (equal to Jason of Pherae). (10) His good memory, *Cat.* § 21, *Acad.* 2 § 2. (11) His retorts and *bons mots*,

man.¹ The heroism of Leonidas, the treason of Pausanias, are not forgotten.² The chief battles of the war are all at least mentioned.³ He emphasizes the religious aspect of the war.⁴ But Cicero's main service to the matter in hand is to show that, before the fall of the Republic, learned Rome was familiar with the story of the Persian war, and in possession of a whole corpus of writers who could be cited as authorities.⁵

§ 12. The Makedonian conquest had signalized the collapse of the Greek city-state system in the eastern Mediterranean, and had made Monarchy the chief order of the day over that region. The Roman Empire was the legitimate outcome of the failure by the city-state in the west to organize the world which it had conquered, or inherited. Julius Caesar was the inevitable and conscious successor of Alexander, and his union with Cleopatra, the queen of the last surviving of the kingdoms carved out of the heritage of Alexander, is the most profoundly symbolic wedding in history.⁶ The interval between Alexander and Caesar, rather more than two centuries, may seem a long one: time was needed to settle the question of supremacy in the west before the warring leagues and kingdoms of the east could be absorbed into the Roman system. Meanwhile, with the possible exception of Rhodes, no city in the east could pretend to revive the autonomous glories of the Greek *polis*, no combination of states could impose a universal peace even upon the eastern Mediterranean. Greek history during the interval between Alexander and Caesar is, even in the eyes of its best friends, deficient in political interest and importance: it is, in its best aspects, the history of a culture, not of a state, or even a complex of states.⁷ The political centre of gravity

de orat. 2 §§ 299, 351, *de fin.* 2 § 104 (the art of oblivion); *Cat.* § 8 (his reply to the Seriphian); *de off.* 2 § 71 (on the marriage of his daughter).

¹ *pro Sest.* § 141 (unus omnium iustissimus), *Tusc.* 5 § 104 (nonne ob eam causam expulsus est patria, quod praeter modum iustus esset?), *de off.* 3 § 16. His opposition to Themistocles, *de off.* 3 § 49. His good example, *de fin.* 5 § 62 (quis Aristidem non mortuum diligit?).

² Leonidas, *de fin.* 2 § 97; *Tusc.* 1 § 101 (cp. Hdt. 7. 228); Pausanias, *Topic.* § 75.

³ Thermopylae, *Tusc.* 1 § 101; Salamis, *Tusc.* 1 § 110 (ante enim Salamina ipsam Neptunus obruet, quam Salaminii tropaei memoriam). Cp. *de off.* 1 § 61. Hinc rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataeis, Thermopylis, etc.

⁴ *de legg.* 2 § 26; cp. note to Hdt. 8. 109. 15.

⁵ *Brut.* § 42 (Attico loq.) Ut enim tu

nunc de Coriolano, sic Clitarchus, sic Stratocles de Themistocle finxit (viz. the death by bull's blood). On Kleitarchos cp. Schaefer, *Abriss* § 37, Susemihl, *Gr. Lit. in Alexandrinernz.* i. 537 ff. Cicero did not think well of him, and represents Atticus as saying of Sisenna, *de legg.* 1 § 7, in historia puerile quiddam connectatur, ut unum Clitarchum, neque praeterea quemquam de Graecis legisse videatur. Stratokles might be the Stoic? cp. Susemihl, *op. c.* ii. 239.

⁶ To identify Pompey with Alexander as the Romans did was to judge by externals and accidents (Plutarch, *Pomp.* 2). Far more significant is the anecdote of Caesar, Plutarch, *Caes.* 11. Plutarch himself rightly included the *Lives* of Alexander and Caesar in one Book; cp. *Alex.* 1.

⁷ A. Holm's *Hist. of Greece*, vol. iv. (E.T. 1898), says all that can be said for the Greeks of the transition, and their efforts to recover or achieve political

had shifted, as Polybios saw, to the west. But Hellenism effected conquests such as Hellas could hardly have conceived, and the greatest of them was the conquest of Rome.¹ By the time of Augustus, history had refuted the doctrine of Aristotle that man was of necessity a 'political animal,' that the City-state was the necessary condition of human welfare: the empire and the peace legitimated the cosmopolitan and the individualistic ideas, which had long been shaping themselves among the conquered peoples of the east, and now became necessities to the conqueror himself. Literature, the faithful mirror of the times, developed on the historical side two rival yet complementary forms of expression; the Universal History and the Biography came equally into vogue. Diodoros and Trogus exemplify the one tendency, Nepos and Plutarch the other. From such writers direct contributions to the matter in hand are, of course, to be obtained. A hardly less direct tribute is made by writers on topography and antiquities, for whom Strabo and Pausanias, though by no means contemporaries, may stand as leading representatives. Writings of this class are also significant of dwindling interest in politics, of an age of peace and relative prosperity, wherein mind and body were free to rove and to research. Nor is it merely from writers dealing professedly with history, biography, geography and monuments of the past that the student of Herodotus and of the Persian war may enrich his materials. The *Moralia* of Plutarch, even from this point of view, are second in value only to the *Lives*, and light may fall, if not upon the actual events, then at least upon the growth of tradition, the accretion of legend, from unexpected sources. Poets, historians, philosophers, rhetors, may illustrate a point in passing, or sometimes on purpose, and at greater length. Juvenal denounces Sostratos: but his arrows reach Herodotus, who supplied the facts.² Josephus is not

freedom and importance; but he hardly succeeds in proving that the City-state was more than a survival, a shadow of its former self. His admirable appreciation of the New Comedy (pp. 150 ff.), his clear recognition of the significance of Stoicism and Epicureanism, the philosophies of the cosmopolis, of the individual (pp. 142 ff.), his sketch of the displacement of the old religions by the cult and apotheosis of kings and living men, are not consistent with the theory of real vitality in the city-state. The substitution of mercenary and professional soldiery for the citizen-army, and even the foundation of countless cities by the kings, are symptoms with the same moral: a city, even a state-city, is not a city-state. The prominence of the Leagues and their constitution virtually points to the same conclusion.

The establishment of the *tyrannis* in Sparta, only to be suppressed by Roman aid, is not a witness to political freedom. The Athens which added Antigonis and Demetrias to the Kleisthenean tribes is not the Athens of Themistokles and Perikles, nor yet of Kallistratos and Demosthenes, even if it could play off Egypt against Makedon or, somewhat later, Pontus against Rome. But the latter end of Athens was by no means despicable; it gave to mankind what had been too long absorbed in the town Council: from a city-state it was transformed into the premier University of the world.

¹ Horace, *Epp.* 2. 1. 156.

² Juvenal 10. 173-186—

creditur olim
velificatus Athos, et quidquid Graecia
mendax

concerned with the Persian war, but he can use, or abuse, Herodotus upon occasion.¹ Seneca takes his knowledge of Aristeides from elsewhere,² but Xerxes is a familiar instance with him³; he adds a later touch to the legend of Thermopylai,⁴ and a whole paragraph to the Demaratos-fable.⁵ The rhetors, of whom Dio Chrysostom and Aelius Aristeides are the eminent survivors, found so much to say on our subject proper, that they must stand in a class and possess a paragraph to themselves. And various as the value of these different writers and kinds of writers may be, they have one advantage or disadvantage in common. To all alike, whether Greek or Roman, the history of Greece before Alexander, yea before Augustus, was as ancient almost as it is to us. They viewed it dispassionately as a subject for amusement or for moralization.⁶ The study of its records had for them the

audet in historia; constratum classibus
isdem
suppositumque rotis solidum mare;
credimus altos
defecisse amnes epotaque flumina Medo
prudente, et madidis cantat quae
Sostratus alis.
ille tamen qualis rediit Salamine relicta,
in Corum atque Eurum solitus saevire
flagellis
barbarus, Aeolio nunquam hoc in carcere
passos,
ipsum compedibus qui vinxerat Ennosigaeum?
mitius id sane quod non et stigmatibus
dignum
credidit. hinc quisquam vellet servire
deorum!
sed qualis rediit? nempe una nave,
cruentis
fluctibus, ac tarda per densa cadavera
prora.
Cp. Lucretius, 3. 1029 ff.—
ille quoque ipse, viam qui quondam per
mare magnum
stravit iterque dedit legionibus ire per
altum
ac pedibus salsas docuit superare lacunas
et contempsit equis insultans murmura
ponti,
lumine adempto animam moribundo
corpore fudit.

¹ Josephus is naturally concerned with the Second Book of Hdt.; cp. *Ant.* 8. 6. 2; 8. 10. 2, 3; 10. 2. 4; c. *Ap.* 2. 13. Hdt. disproved generally, *ib.* 1. 3, especially by Manetho, *ib.* 1. 14. Hdt. does not mention Rome, *ib.* 1. 12, but he does virtually mention the Jews, *ib.* 1. 22. Incidentally Roman historians may illustrate the Persian war, as when Livy describes Tempe (44. 6), or Appian Thermopylai, *Syr.* 18 (with a distinct

reference to Xerxes, Leonidas, and the path).

² See the curious anecdote of the righteous man's meekness, *Dial.* 12. 13. 7 ducebatur Athenis ad supplicium Aristides, etc. (for the occasion cp. Plutarch, *Arist.* 26).

³ *Dial.* 10. 17. 2 (the despot's tears; cp. Pliny, *Epp.* 3. 7. 13); *Dial.* 5. 16. 4 (the son of Pythios).

⁴ *Ep.* 82. 20, the *bon mot* of Leonidas (Sic, inquit, commilitones, prandete tanquam apud inferos coenaturi).

⁵ *de benef.* 6. 31 cum bellum Graeciae indiceret Xerxes, etc. After a free paraphrase of Hdt. 7. 101 ff., with reminiscences of cc. 47 ff. (Artabanos) and of c. 203 (Leonidas, nihil tam magnum est quod perire non possit), Seneca adds: itaque Xerxes pudore quam damno miserior Demarato gratias egit, quod solus sibi verum dixisset, et permisit petere quod vellet. Petiit ille ut Sardis, maximam Asiae civitatem, curru vectus intraret rectam capite tiaram gerens. Id solis datum regibus. Dignus fuerat praemio, antequam peteret: sed quam miserabilis gens in qua nemo fuit, qui verum diceret regi, nisi qui non dicebat sibi! This story reappears in Plutarch, *Themist.* 29. The passage in Seneca has been missed by Bauer, *Plutarchs Themistokles*, 1884.

⁶ Cp. Dionys. Hal. 11. 1. 2157 τοῖς τε γὰρ πολλοῖς οὐκ ἀπαρκεῖ τοῦτο μόνον ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας παραλαβεῖν ὅτι τὸν Περσικὸν πόλεμον· (ἐν' ἐπὶ τούτου ποιήσωμαι τὸν λόγον·) ἐνίκησαν Ἀθηναῖοι τε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δυοὶ ναυμαχίας καὶ πεζομαχίαν μίαν καταγωνισάμενοι τὸν βάρβαρον τριακοσίας ἀγωντα μυριάδας αὐτοὶ σὺν τοῖς συμμάχοις οὐ πλείους ὄντες ἑνδεκα μυριάδων· ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τόπους, ἐν οἷς αἱ πράξεις

charm of a revival. Its material and political conditions were so entirely remote from their own that even under a sensitive and jealous Caesarism no suspicion of *lèse majesté* attached to the study of Hellenic antiquities. Satirists or critics might make capital out of the real or supposed mendacity of the Greeks: emperors delighted to honour their venerable and harmless traditions.¹ In an age where individuals had ceased to make history, at least as history was then understood, there was evidently a large public interested in the great men and the great events of other days. A large amount of history was rewritten in the spirit of the times; study of the older authorities was revived or augmented.

This literary zeal and revival of historical interests under the Caesars worked for the benefit of the subject here in view in two distinct ways. In the first place there appears to have been a great and growing interest in the work of Herodotus. Among Greek writers none could appeal more successfully to the mind of the age than the historian of the Persian war, and that to a great extent because he was so much more than the mere annalist of a single war. Herodotus, with his wide range in time and space, his interest in "barbarians" of all sorts, his passion *visendae antiquitatis*—for viewing the monuments of ancient history—hit the fancy of the Augustan and still more of the Antonine age, as perhaps none other of the ancient prosewrights. The *fin-de-siècle* Romans felt the full charm of his

ἐγένοντο, βούλονται παρὰ τῆς ἱστορίας μαθεῖν, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἀκοῦσαι, δι' ἃς τὰ θαυμαστά καὶ παράδοξα ἔργα ἐπετέλεσαν, καὶ τίνες ἦσαν οἱ τῶν στρατοπέδων ἡγεμόνες τῶν τε βαρβαρικῶν καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἱστορήσαι, καὶ μηδενὸς ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀνῆκοι γενέσθαι τῶν συντελεσθέντων περὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας. Dionysios 9. 1. 1739 cites the invasion of Xerxes as a memorable event for the 75th Olympiad, and the Archontate of Kalliades, but he has himself something else to do than to repeat the work of his great townsman. Once, 5. 17. 4 (886), he names Artemision, Salamis, Plataia and Marathon in a breath, to claim priority for the funeral oration pronounced on Brutus the Regifuge. His critical works, in which a large amount of space is devoted to Herodotus, are concerned not with the matter but with the style of that author.

¹ Cp. the anecdote of Gaius, Dio Cass. 59. 17 (A.D. 39): διὰ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης τρόπον τινὰ διηπεύσαι ἐπεθύμησε, γεφυρώσας τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν τε Πουτεδίων καὶ τῶν Βαύλων . . . λέγων ὅτι καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν αὐτὸν ἐφοβήθη, ἐπεὶ ἐς γε τὸν Δαρεῖον καὶ τὸν Ξέρξην οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέσκωπτεν, ὡς καὶ πολλαπλάσιόν σφιν μέτρον τῆς θαλάσσης ζεύξας. If Hadrian (as is some-

times asserted, cp. Bury, *Student's Roman Empire*, p. 506) had transferred the celebration of the *Eleutheria* from Plataia to Athens, he would have seemed to endorse the most extravagant claims made on behalf of the Athenians in regard to that battle (cp. p. 57 *supra*); but August Mommsen, *Feste der Stadt Athen* (1898), p. 168, argues that Neubauer's assumption is untenable, *C.I.A.* iii. n. 127 proving that the *Ἐλευθέρια* at Plataia survived the institution of the *Πανελλήνια* at Athens. Mommsen, however, endorses Neubauer's suggestion that Hadrian, in instituting the *Panhellenia*, had the *Eleutheria* in view; cp. Dio Cass. 69. 16; Plutarch, *Arist.* 21. Caracallus, who fancied himself a second Alexander ('*Alexandrum Magnum eiusque gesta in ore semper habuit*', Aelius Spart.), on his way to the East (c. 215 A.D.) raised a bodyguard of young Spartans and called it his Pitane cohort (Herodian, 4. 8. 3 ἀπὸ τε Σπάρτης μεταπεμψάμενος νεανίας Λακωνικὸν καὶ Πιτανάτην λόχον ἐκάλεϊ); this must have been a reminiscence of Hdt. 9. 53. The emperor Julian refers to Hdt. as ὁ Θεόριος λογοποιός, 389 B, *Fr.* β, but places him in a goodly company, 423.

vivacity, his *naïveté*, his simplicity, his good nature. The evidence of contact with his work is constant from Dionysios to Plutarch, from Arrian to Lucian.¹ The estimate of his value may not be quite uniform, may not increase in any definite ratio, but the evidence of the popularity of his work is conclusive. If from one point of view this fact is characteristic of the times, from another point of view it is a guarantee of the authentic and genuine nature of the text, as far as it goes. Lucian and Pausanias, Plutarch and Arrian, Dionysios and Cicero seem to have used a text, which is substantially identical with our own. Whatever dialectal heresies and errors ignorance or taste may have induced upon the original, the mere historian has the consensual testimony of the writers of the Roman period to the substance of our primary source for the history of the Persian war.

Secondly, the writers of the Roman period, who dealt with a history which was ancient in their time almost as fully as in our own, have a great value for us, as embodying a large supplement of traditions, evidences, materials, in addition to the primary authorities open to our direct inspection. This value cannot easily be over-estimated, although it varies from author to author, from case to case, sinking with the facile methods and afterthought of Diodoros, rising in the learned and variegated pages of the industrious Plutarch. Perhaps Diodoros may have read more authorities than recent criticism is disposed to allow, and may have contributed more to the structure and treatment of his subject than the Graeco-Roman, or Makedonian chronology, its most patent and sometimes ill-applied ground-plan; but doubtless for the brief period here under consideration he gives us less indeed than was in Ephoros, but little or nothing which was not in Ephoros.² With Plutarch the case is different. Though we are dealing at present with the history of but two or three years, that were to Plutarch of no very special importance, his contribution to our materials is the most varied and most valuable, coming from any single extant source, outside the work of Herodotus. Plutarch may not have read all the authors whom he cites by name, much less

¹ To the *testimonia* might be added that of the elder Pliny, who in the *Historia Nat.* cites Hdt. by name at least ten times: half of these references are to the Second Book, and the others to the Third and Fourth Books. None refer to the Persian war, or the later Books, but the antiquity of Hdt. is emphasized in places (8. 4. 1; 12. 41. 1 *fabulose narravit antiquitas, princepsve Herodotus*; 36. 17. 2, where Hdt. heads a long list of writers on the pyramids).

² Diodoros describes the work of Hdt. at the close of his own account of the war, 11. 37. 6 *Ἡρόδοτος ἀρξάμενος πρὸ τῶν Τρωικῶν χρόνων γέγραφε κοινὰς σχεδὸν τὰς τῆς οἰκουμένης πράξεις ἐν βιβλοῖς ἐννέα,*

καταστρέφει δὲ τὴν σύνταξιν εἰς τὴν περὶ Μυκάλην μάχην τοῖς Ἑλλήσι πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας καὶ Σηστοῦ πολιορκίαν. He also ventured to criticize it: 10. 24. 1 *καὶ ταῦτα παρεξέβημεν οὐχ οὕτως Ἡροδότου κατηγορήσαι βουληθέντες ὡς ὑποδείξει οἱ τῶν λόγων οἱ θαυμάσιοι τοὺς ἀληθεῖς κατασχέειν εἰώθασιν.* But the only direct references to the text of Hdt. are to passages in the first three Books, and even these may not be at first hand. Diodoros also refers freely to Thucydides, Ktesias, Xenophon, in a way which might seem to imply some acquaintance with their works, as well as to Ephoros and Theopompos, whom he is believed to have followed in the main.

verified all his citations pen in hand; but no author, not Photios himself, not the earlier or the later lexicographers, does so much to reproduce for us the lost literature, and therewith the lost history of older Hellas.¹ And what is true of Diodoros and Plutarch, in their several ways, holds good for the writers generally of the Roman period, whether primarily writers of universal histories, or of biography, or of any kind of literature, which brings them in contact with our subject.

§ 13. DIODOROS presents us once more with an express and connected story of the war as a whole, the like of which has not been seen since we took to the secondary sources. This distinctive quality gives the account in Diodoros a special and all but unique interest.² The personal equation counts here, however, for very little: Diodoros is in this case, at least so far as the Persian war is concerned, almost purely Ephoros, probably on a somewhat reduced scale.³ The continuous text does not equal one-fifth of the text contained in the last three Books of Herodotus. With the exception of the Sicilian episode, or just the story of the battle of Himera, which bulks largely in the Sicilian's work, Diodoros is, perhaps, but the epitome of an epitome.⁴ The narrative breaks up into four, or with the section just named into five distinct portions.⁵ I. The preparations on both sides for war (cc. 1-4, corresponding to Hdt. 7. 1-207). This section represents not merely a reduction, but also a rearrangement, and a partial rationalization, of the corresponding section of Herodotus. It makes also two notable additions to the Herodotean story, to be specified below, in their proper contexts. This section further divides into four sub-sections, the account of the war-preparations alternating from side to side, more rapidly than with Herodotus, apparently in the interest of an improved chronology, minuter sub-division emphasizing supposed synchronisms. Thus, after the literary proem to the Book,⁶ and the usual chronological indication,⁷ (i.) the reason of the undertaking is given, the king's preparations are described, including the building of fleets, the *levée en masse*, the Bridge and the Canal;

¹ In the *Life of Aristides* Plutarch cites by name six authors, including Hdt., for the period of the Persian war (and nine for the subsequent period, including Thucydides). In the *Life of Themistokles* he cites by name twelve authors, in addition to Hdt., for the earlier period, and in addition fifteen others, including Thucydides, for the later period. A large number of these citations appear to be at first hand.

² On Diodoros cp. A. Schaefer, *Abriss der Quellenkunde* ii. (1881) § 37; Wachsmuth, *Einleitung* (1895), 81-103; Busolt ii.² (1895) 622 ff.; iii. i. (1897) pp. 15 ff.; E. Schwartz *ap.* Pauly-

Wissowa v. i. (1903) 663-704. My citations are from the Teubner editions of L. Dindorf (1867), F. Vogel (1890).

³ *Die Geschichte der Perserkämpfe, der Pentekontaetie und des peloponnesischen Krieges* bietet fast nur einen Auszug aus dem grossen Werk des Ephoros, Wachsmuth, *op. c.* 101. The *fast nur* suggests a qualification; see further below.

⁴ The Sicilian history in Bks. 11-14 Wachsmuth *l.c.* derives so *gut wie ausschliesslich* out of Timaios; see below.

⁵ Bk. 11. cc. 1-37.

⁶ c. 1. 1.

⁷ § 2.

but to these details Diodoros makes a fresh and suggestive addition. Xerxes sends an embassy to Carthage to arrange for a concomitant invasion of Sicily; the synchronism between the war in Sicily and the war in Greece is here, for the first time, ascribed to intention and design on man's part. Diodoros also brings the king and the land-forces to Sardes, and the fleet to Kyme and Phokaia, in this section.¹ There follows at once² (ii.) an account of the Hellenic expedition to Thessaly, and its return; a list of the medizing Greeks, in somewhat rationalized form, and an account of a meeting of the Hellenic *Synedrion* at the Isthmos, whereat the celebrated vow against the Medizers is made, and embassies are despatched to neutrals to engage them for the cause of 'the common Freedom.' A rhetoricized account of the *pourparlers* with Argos follows. The previous Book had contained an account of a prior meeting at the Isthmos, and the despatch of an embassy to Sicily, Diodoros in this respect too presenting a revision of the Herodotean perspective. (iii.) The third sub-section³ reverts to the Persian side and carries Xerxes from Sardes to Doriskos, which is expressly marked as the first rendezvous for army and fleet. Figures on a reduced, that is, rationalized basis are given for the forces there assembled and reviewed. (iv.) On the national side the *Synedroi* decide on the occupation of Artemision and Thermopylai; the arrangements for the command and the numbers of the forces are set out on the Herodotean lines, but Diodoros makes a major and a minor addition to the record. The Lokrians, who had submitted to the Persian king and promised to secure the Pass in his interest, revert to their natural loyalty and join the Greeks—that is the minor point. The other is more significant. The theory of the death of Leonidas as an act of devotion, already given by Herodotus, is here presented in a developed and elaborate form, and Leonidas leaves Sparta resolved to die 'for the common Freedom,' in obedience to the oracle, and with the full knowledge and consent of the Spartan Ephors. This *motif* stands side by side, in Diodoros as in Herodotus, with the evidences which prove that the defence of Thermopylai was seriously meant and really attempted.⁴ There follows in Diodoros—II.—a passage, or rather two passages, separately recounting the fighting at Thermopylai (cc. 5-11, corresponding with Hdt. 7. 208-239) and the fighting at Artemision (cc. 12, 13, corresponding with Hdt. 8. 1-20). In the preliminaries the narrative closely follows the Herodotean theme with characteristic variations: thus there is a fresh estimate of the king's army⁵; scouts or messengers are sent to Thermopylai; a rhetorical reply is received from the Greeks; there ensues a conversation between Xerxes and Demaratos. But in the account of the actual fighting at Thermopylai, Diodoros (i.e. Ephoros) undertook to develop and improve the

¹ c. 1. 3-c. 2. 4.
⁴ c. 4. 1-7.

² c. 2. 5-c. 3. 5.

³ c. 3. 6-9.

⁵ Cp. p. 76 note 3 *infra*.

Herodotean record. On the first day selected nations in succession are sent against the Greeks, only to be in succession repulsed. On the second day picked men from all the nations are massed for the attack, with no better result. Then a certain anonymous Trachinian¹ comes to the king with the plan for circumventing the Greeks, and 20,000 men are despatched for the purpose.² The plan is reported to Leonidas by a deserter from the king's side, one Tyrastidas of Kyme³: a *synedrion* is held, Leonidas dismisses all the Greeks but the Lakedaimonians and Thespians—he has only 500 men in all—and then heads a night-assault upon the Persian camp, which very nearly proves successful; but at daybreak the Barbarians, on discovering the paucity of their opponents, surround and shoot them down. This novel episode had evidently been disputed, for Diodoros pauses in his panegyric on the heroes of Thermopylai to defend the story⁴: his eulogy then runs on to a veritable *Epitaphios logos*, and preserves an otherwise lost fragment of Simonides.⁵ Thus, even more completely than Herodotus, Ephoros-Diodoros isolates the action at Artemision from the action at Thermopylai, and freely re-arranges the actual story. Only after winning 'the Kadmeian victory' at Thermopylai⁶ does the king resolve to make trial of a naval battle. The admiral, 'Megabates,' and the fleet are summoned from Pydna: three hundred longships are lost in the storm off Magnesia; three hundred more are despatched to circumnavigate Euboia, the remainder (i.e. 600) are attacked, off Aphetai, by the Greek fleet (less than half in number⁷), and the ambiguous engagement, in two stages, lasts until nightfall.⁸ A (second) storm follows, as in Herodotus, intended to equalize matters,⁹ and the Greek fleet receives a reinforcement of fifty Athenian vessels¹⁰: a second naval engagement apparently repeats the experience of the former one, but the *Aristeia* for both battles are duly awarded to the Athenians on the Greek side, to the Sidonians on the Persian.¹¹ The news from Thermopylai causes the Greeks to

¹ This anonymity is probably a result of the attempt to harmonize the variations in Hdt. 7. 213 f. coupled with the desire to epitomize.

² As against the 10,000 Immortals in Hdt. 7. 215. Ephoros has used them up in the first day's fighting.

³ A notable variation, by the Kymeian historian, on the Herodotean account 7. 219. From the description of this patriot, c. 8. 5 τὸ γένος ὦν Κυμαῖος, φιλόκαλος δὲ καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὦν ἀγαθός, he might be a double, or forbear, of Ephoros himself.

⁴ c. 11. 2 καὶ τὴν τῶν Περσῶν δὲ κατάπληξιν οὐκ ἂν τις ἀπιστήσαι γενέσθαι κτλ.

⁵ Cp. § 3 *supra*.

⁶ c. 12. 1 κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν τὴν

Καδμεῖαν νίκην νενικηκώς: cp. Hdt. 1. 166. The phrase is misapplied to Thermopylai, which might, however, have been called a Pyrrhic victory; cp. the king's own remark after his victory at Asculum (Apulia), Plutarch, *Pyrrh.* 21 ἂν ἔτι μίαν μάχην Ῥωμαίους νικήσωμεν, ἀπολούμεθα παντελῶς.

⁷ 280 in all, of which exactly the half are Athenian.

⁸ The Greeks attack and scatter the Persian ships, but afterwards the king's fleet draws together and a *ναυμαχία* *ισχυρά* ensues.

⁹ c. 13. 1; cp. p. 76 note 6 *infra*.

¹⁰ As against 53 in Hdt. 8. 14.

¹¹ c. 13. 2 ἀριστεύσαι δὲ ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ναυμαχίαις φασὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν Ἀθηναίους, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις

retire; the Athenians effect the migration to Salamis, and the Persian navarch occupies and plunders Euboea. Thus in this whole passage the Herodotean account of Thermopylai is enlarged, rationalized, and rhetoricized, the Herodotean account of Artemision is reduced, and the connexion between the two actions, or series, hopelessly broken.¹ There follows—III.—the Persian advance through central Greece, and the battle of Salamis (cc. 14–19, corresponding to Hdt. 8. 21–120). Here Diodoros adds to a reduced account of the Persian assault on Delphi the valuable notice of the monument erected and inscribed to record it.² Here too occurs a report on the Korkyraians transferred from the Seventh Book of Herodotus, again presumably in the chronological interest.³ The battle of Salamis follows and is described on a relatively large scale.⁴ A naval battle is assumed to be inevitable, but the *Synedrion* meets to decide on its locality. The Peloponnesians advocate the waters at the Isthmos; Themistokles demonstrates the advantage of the Straits: a decision follows to fight at Salamis. But the ‘masses’ and the ‘mob’ dissent from the decision of the *Synedroi* and all is disobedience and confusion in the island, while at the Isthmos ‘the wall from Lechaion to Kenchreai’ is already a *fait accompli*. Whereupon Themistokles sends the message to Xerxes, which puts the Persian fleet in motion, and brings about a battle in the Straits. Diodoros here supplies the indispensable manœuvre by which the retreat of the Greek fleet was cut off; he also adds, or at least greatly develops, the patriotic action of the Ionians on the king’s side, until it becomes one of the chief factors in the Greek victory. On the tactics of Salamis the account throws some light, but not a perfectly white light. The Greek fleet fills ‘the passage between Salamis and the Herakleion,’ the Athenians and Lakedaimonians (*sic*) on the left wing, the Aiginetans and Megarians on the right, opposed respectively to the Phoenicians and medized Greeks. The Persian fleet is clearly massed outside the Straits, enters the Straits to do battle, and is then thrown into some confusion by the necessary alteration of its array, and by the loss of the admiral and the admiral’s ship, which was leading the van. The Barbarians back water and then retreat into the open sea. The fate of their right wing is first decided and described. The Athenians perform prodigies of valour and of skill; the Phoenician and Kyprian vessels are routed, the Kilikian, Pamphylian, Lykian, on the same wing, abandon the fray; the victorious

Σιδωνίους. Hdt. has very little to say of the second day’s fighting at Thermopylai, but clearly articulates the three battles off Artemision: Ephoros characteristically inverts the Herodotean emphasis.

¹ The strategic connexion is not restored by the rhetorical analogy c. 13. 2, obviously copied from Hdt. 8. 15.

² c. 14. 4—

μνᾶμα τ’ ἀλεξάνδρου πολέμου καὶ μάρτυρα
νίκας

Δελφοὶ με στᾶσαν, Ζανὶ χαρίζμενοι
σὺν Φοίβῳ, πολλίπορθον ἀπωσάμενοι στίχῃ
Μήδων

καὶ χαλκοστέφανον ῥυσάμενοι τέμενος.
Cp. § 2, note, *supra*. This elegy was not
ascribed to Simonides.

³ c. 15. 1; cp. Hdt. 7. 163.

⁴ cc. 15. 2–19. 6, some five pp.

Athenians decide the fate of the Barbarians' left likewise, and a general rout ensues. The king, who is viewing the battle from 'over against Salamis,' visits the Phoenicians with condign punishment, insomuch that the remnant of their fleet sails under cover of night for Asia. Themistokles crowns his victory with a second stratagem. A message to Xerxes announcing the projected destruction of 'the bridge' procures the instant retreat of the king, with a large portion of the forces, though 'forty' myriads of the best, both horse and foot, are left behind with Mardonios in Greece. The inevitable moral is drawn that the two 'stratagems' of Themistokles were the salvation of Hellas.¹

IV. At this point, or pause, Diodoros inserts his account of the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, culminating in the battle of Himera (cc. 20-27, corresponding to Hdt. 7. 165-167), with the difference that here, for once, the narrative of Diodoros completely eclipses that of our primary authority both in bulk and in detail. The story here is not drawn from Herodotus and amplified, but derived from an independent and local source.² There is, however, an obvious parallel indicated between Gelon and Themistokles, and indeed an express comparison between the battle of Himera on the one hand and the battles of Salamis and Plataia on the other, the moral of which is drawn in favour of the Sikeliotes, the more plausibly inasmuch as Diodoros makes the victory of Gelon over Amilkar synchronize exactly, not with the victory at Salamis, but with the defeat of Thermopylai,³ the eastern Greeks thus profiting by the example and results of the great success of their brethren in the west.⁴ According to the Sikeliote story the victory at Himera was due to a brilliant stratagem on the part of Gelon. Advancing to the relief of the city, which was blockaded by Amilkar from two camps, one for the ships and naval force, the other for the land-army, he intercepted despatches from the Carthaginian summoning the men of Selinûs to a great sacrifice on a certain day in honour of Poseidon. On that day Gelon, who had likewise formed camp outside Himera, sent round his cavalry by a detour from the west to appear at the gates of the Punic naval camp, personating the Selinuntines; once admitted, they were to fall upon the *strategos*, to fire the ships, and generally to slay and destroy. Their admission to the camp was to be the sign to Gelon for a separate attack on the Punic land-force in its camp. The whole plan succeeded to perfection. By Gelon's orders no quarter was given⁵; vast numbers were slain; the remainder, which had occupied a hill without water, surrendered. Hosts of prisoners were made, and employed

¹ On this account see further, Appendix VI. § 5 *infra*.

² The source is plainly Sikeliote, and philo-Syracusan, as against Akragas, and highly favourable to Gelon's memory: the author may very well have been

Timaïos, cp. *Fr.* 87 = Polyb. 12. 26, b (*F.H.G.* i. 213). On the story cp. Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, ii. 166 ff.

³ c. 24. 1.

⁴ c. 23.

⁵ c. 22. 4.

afterwards on the great works of Syracuse and Akragas.¹ Twenty ships, which had been left in the water, rescued a few of the survivors, but encountered a storm and were lost on the home voyage; only a few men, in a small boat, reached Carthage and reported the disaster.² The Carthaginians expected invasion in turn, and sent an embassy to Gelon to avert it. He granted them terms, the moderation of which was dictated partly by his own character, partly by his desire to go to the help of the Greeks against Xerxes.³ As he was preparing to start, news came from Korinth of the victory at Salamis and of the retreat of Xerxes, and Gelon abandoned his intention.⁴ The narrative points the parallel between Gelon and Themistokles by the contrast in their ends. Themistokles and Pausanias, the Greek leaders in the east, were, the one done to death by his fellow-citizens, the other driven out to find a refuge with his enemy Xerxes; but Gelon lived long in honour as king of Syracuse and bequeathed his power to his kinsmen.

This story is not free from the rhetoric, the rationalism, and the improbabilities which belong to the context in Diodoros; it can neither be accepted as a simple substitute for the story in Herodotus, nor quite completely reconciled therewith. The traitor in Sicily disappears; the direction of the attack on Himera is not intelligible; the part played by Theron and the Akragantines is obscure.⁵ But upon the main issue, the great stratagem of Gelon, by which the Carthaginian forces were annihilated at Himera, the local Sikeliote story looks acceptable, even if its acceptance might seem to destroy the Herodotean hint, that is, the Carthaginian theory, of the death of Amilkar, as

¹ c. 25. 2. The prisoners were distributed *κατὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν συστρατευσάντων*, as afterwards the spoil at Plataia, c. 33. 1. The explanation, which follows, of the problem, how then the Akragantines, who had done little or nothing in the battle, according to the story in Diodoros, yet came by so many prisoners, is transparently 'pragmatic.'

² Freeman ii. 200 remarks: "That boat is clearly the fellow of that other boat in which Xerxes crossed the Hellespont." For "that other boat" cp. p. 80 note 1 *infra*. The Carthaginians in the boat collide with the previous statement c. 23. 2 *μηδὲ ἀγγελον εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα διασωθῆναι* (a poor echo of the stronger phrase, Hdt. 8. 6 *μηδὲ πυρφόρον . . . ἐκφυγόντα περιγενέσθαι*).

³ c. 26. 4.

⁴ c. 26. 5. As Freeman remarks (ii. 205 note²), "surely the horsemen of Syracuse might have been useful at Plataia." The further record of Gelon's *apologia pro vita sua*, and the constitu-

tional titles and honours heaped upon him, hardly concern the historian of the Persian war, though they throw an interesting side-light upon the history of the Greek *tyrannis*.

⁵ c. 23. 3. "In one way Himera was more than Salamis; no Plataia was needed to finish the work," Freeman, ii. 200. But the work in Sicily had to be done again and again; in Hellas it was done once for all.

Terillos had been driven out of Himera by Theron, and called in the Carthaginians, Hdt. 7. 165. Freeman well remarks that in Diodoros "there seems a certain disposition to put the energy of Gelon in contrast with the faint-heartedness of Thêrôn" (ii. 191), and that "Thêrôn and his people have clearly received less than their due share of honour" (p. 206). He has not observed that the elimination of Terillos and Theron is, if not essential, at least expedient for the hypothesis that the invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians was in response to the request, or dictate, of the great king.

an act of devotion, after its kind, as pious and as patriotic as the death of Leonidas itself.¹

V. Finally, Diodoros, returning to the story of the Persian war, relates the double campaign of 479 B.C.² by land and by sea, culminating at Plataia and Mykale, in two successive passages (cc. 27–33, cc. 34–37), corresponding exactly to the Ninth Book of Herodotus, with its two parts (cc. 1–89, cc. 90–121), to which also the end of Bk. 8 (cc. 121–144) must be added to complete the correspondence. Here again we have a narrative reduced, rationalized, and rhetoricized in places from the ampler, less coherent, but far weightier traditions in Herodotus. The assignment of the *Aristeia* for Salamis to the Aiginetans is explained as due to Spartan policy, which tries to compensate at least Themistokles by doing him honour. The Spartan honours to Themistokles alienate Athenian sympathies, and lead to his removal from the *Strategia*. The alienation of Athens and the fall of Themistokles are followed by overtures from Mardonios, and an embassy from Sparta; the Athenian replies are simply the Herodotean report in little. The story of the Plataian campaign follows the lines of Herodotus till the climax is reached, and rewritten freely in the interests of the national honour. Mardonios reinvades Attica and retires to Thebes. The Greeks advance to Plataia, after registering a solemn vow to fight to a finish for the common cause, and if victorious to found a festival in honour of Freedom, and to celebrate it for ever at Plataia.³ They are led by Pausanias and Aristeidēs, and their first position is at Erythrai. Mardonios has a camp on the Asopos fortified, like all camps in Diodoros, ‘with a deep ditch and a palisade.’⁴ The 100,000 Greeks are opposed by 500,000 barbarians. A set battle takes place in this position, corresponding to the *Hippomachia* in Herodotus, but begun by the Barbarians at night, and apparently from the first a general engagement: victory is secured by the Athenian support to the hard-pressed Megarians.⁵ This success encourages the Greeks to advance to a second position, ‘better fitted for a complete victory,’ between a lofty hill to the right and the river Asopos on the left.⁶ Here in this narrow room

¹ Cp. Hdt. 7. 167. If the Syracusan horsemen cut him down, he did not perish by leaping into the fire.

² c. 27. 1 gives the chronological index. The passage is a good example of Diodoros' method. The Archontic year of Xanthippos, or Xanthippides, would begin at midsummer, the consular year (two items in Roman history are incorrectly given afterwards c. 37. 7, the Volscian war and the execution of Sp. Cassius) would, in those days, have begun with March, while the events narrated in cc. 27, 28. 1, 2 obviously occurred in the winter or early spring

preceding. This overlap is not, however, as bad as occurs later on in the work, when the chronology is complicated by data taken from records based on the Makedonian calendar, in which the year began, like the Spartan, at the autumn equinox.

³ c. 29. 1 ff. The exact words of the vow are given, cp. notes to 7. 132.

⁴ c. 30. 1 *τάφρω βαθεία καὶ τείχει ξυλινφ*. Cp. c. 20. 3, 21. 2, 34. 3. See too p. 75 note 14 *infra*.

⁵ c. 30. 2–4.
⁶ *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς ὑπωρείας μετεστρατοπέδευσαν εἰς ἕτερον τόπον εὐθεώτεραν πρὸς τὴν ὀλοσχερῇ νίκην. 5 ἦν γὰρ*

a great battle ensues, the Greeks apparently assuming the offensive, though the actual assault is delivered by the Barbarians.¹ A triple break-up on the Persian side leads to a similar division on the Greek side.² The Lakedaimonians, after slaying Mardonios and routing the Persians, pursue them to the fortified camp. The medized Greeks have made for Thebes, and are followed thither by the Athenians: there under the walls takes place a great battle, in which the Athenians, at length victorious, drive the Thebans into the city, and return to support the Lakedaimonians in the attack upon the fortified camp; after a desperate struggle the attack, in which Lakedaimonians and Athenians compete, is crowned with success.³ No quarter is given, and upwards of ten myriads of barbarians are put to the sword.⁴ Meanwhile Artabazos, with more than 40,000 men, has made good his escape to Phokis, and ultimately passes through Makedonia into Asia.⁵ The historian goes on to record the burial of the Greek dead—upwards of 10,000 in number—the division of the spoil, the adjudication of the *Aristeia* to Sparta and to Pausanias.⁶ Nor is the dedication of the tithe to Delphi in the form of a golden tripod with an inscription thereon forgotten⁷; two epigrams from Thermopylai are added by a curious afterthought.⁸ Most significant of all, the honours at Athens to the heroes of the Persian war, including the institution of the Funeral Oration and the 'law' governing its delivery, are here inserted⁹: the narrative then reverts, after the manner of Herodotus, to the visitation of Thebes, briefly and easily disposed of,¹⁰ and concludes with the story of the campaign of Mykale, told on an unexpectedly large scale.¹¹ The narrative follows the

ἐκ μὲν τῶν δεξιῶν γεώλοφος ὑψηλός, ἐκ δὲ τῶν εὐωνύμων ὁ Ἀσωπὸς ποταμός· τὸν δ' ἀνὰ μέσον τόπον ἐπεΐχεν ἡ στρατοπεδεία, πεφραγμένη τῇ φύσει καὶ ταῖς τῶν τόπων ἀσφαλείαις.

¹ 6 πολλά συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὴν νίκην ἡ τῶν τόπων στενοχωρία.

² c. 32. 1 τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἐν τῇ φυγῇ τῶν βαρβάρων σχισθέντων, ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πλῆθος διεμερίσθη κτλ. The tripartite break-up has been recorded in the previous chapter, though it is accounted for only by the successful resistance of the Lakedaimonians, who put the Barbarians to 'flight' (in three directions) after the fall of Mardonios.

³ c. 32. 4 ἡμιλλῶντο γὰρ πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγούμενοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, μεμετρωρισμένοι μὲν ταῖς προγεγενημέναις νίκαις, πεποιθότες δὲ ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀρεταῖς. That has the true Isokratean ring!

⁴ § 5 μηδὲνα ζῶντων: cp. c. 22. 4.

⁵ c. 31. 3, 33. 1. Does the omission of Thessaly and Thrace point to compression, carelessness, on the part of

Ephoros, or to the extent of Makedonian influence in his day?

⁶ c. 33. 1.

⁷ § 2 Ἑλλάδος εὐρυχόρου σωτῆρες τὸνδ' ἀνέθηκαν | δουλοσύνης στυγερὰς ῥυσάμενοι πόλιας. Not attributable to Simonides; cp. Hauvette, *de l'authenticité*, etc. p. 131. He places the inscription on the marble base, under the column, which supported the tripod.

⁸ The first two in Hdt. 7. 228. Cp. § 3 *supra*.

⁹ c. 33. 3 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμος ἐκόσμησε τοὺς τάφους τῶν ἐν τῇ Περσικῇ πολέμῳ τελευτησάντων, καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν ἐπιτάφιον τότε πρῶτον ἐποίησε, καὶ νόμον ἔθηκε λέγειν ἐγκώμιον τοῖς δημοσίᾳ θαντομένοις τοὺς προαιρεθέντας τῶν ῥητόρων. Perhaps the ultimate authority for this assertion is only Thuc. 2. 35. 1.

¹⁰ c. 33. 4. The guilty Thebans at once surrender, and are all put to death. Their names are suppressed. Cp. Hdt. 9. 86–88.

¹¹ cc. 34–37, upwards of four pages.

Herodotean lines with almost servile fidelity.¹ The Greek fleet under Leotychidas and Xanthippos advances from Aigina to Delos spontaneously, from Delos to Samos by invitation. The Persian navarchs retire before it to Mykale, draw up their ships, surround them with 'a wooden wall and a deep ditch,' summon reinforcements. The scene of the battle is rightly located on the land, but in three or four particulars the version in Diodoros takes liberties with the Herodotean original. Thus the Herald's staff becomes a live Herald, with a loud and definite appeal to the Ionians on the Persian side.² The divine *Pheme*, or Rumour of victory, is degraded to a deliberate fiction, devised by Leotychidas to encourage his men.³ The services of the Ionians in the Persian ranks to the national cause are set forth in no ambiguous terms, and virtually secure victory for the Greeks.⁴ The actual delivery of the attack is assigned to the Persians, though they have allowed the Greeks to land unhindered. The diverse fortune of the Athenians and Lakedaimonians, and the *Aristeia* of the former, are passed over in silence.⁵ The battle is recognized as a great one, and its effects are far-reaching.⁶ The proposed transfer of the Ionians to European Hellas is at first accepted, and is then annulled on the interpellation of the Athenians;⁷ the confederate fleet parts at Samos, Leotychidas and the Lakedaimonians going straight home, Xanthippos with the Athenians, reinforced by the Ionians, to Sestos. That city is forthwith attacked and easily taken: a garrison is left in occupation, the allies are dismissed, the Athenians under Xanthippos return home.⁸ 'Such was the end of the Medic war, which lasted but two years,' and was narrated in the work of Herodotus, the contents of which are briefly described,⁹ as if to reveal or confess the principal, if not the sole, source from which the eventual narrative has been borrowed.

Whether Diodoros, throughout the whole passage just analyzed, gives us much more than what he found in Ephoros is a moot point. The annalistic chronological data are his own, no doubt, but the adjustments and synchronisms, as well as the temporal dislocations of the

¹ The synchronism with the last battle at Plataia is accepted, c. 34. 1.

² c. 34. 4 *κήρυκα τὸν μεγαλοφρόντατον τῶν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ*. However, the herald is in Hdt. 9. 98 as well as the herald's wand in 9. 100, so perhaps the wand has simply been dropped.

³ c. 35. 1-3. The passage is not quite self-consistent: the rumour of victory is duly reported and then half-heartedly explained as a device of the commanders to encourage their men. Had the ruse of Agesilaos before the battle of Koroneia in 394 B.C. (cp. Xenoph. *Hell.* 4. 3. 13) anything to say in this case to the rationalism of Ephoros?

⁴ c. 36. 2. Leotychidas mistakes them at first for reinforcements from Sardes (§ 3): this is hardly consistent with the immediate sequel, in which their appearance is the mark for the flight of the Barbarians.

⁵ Though given by Hdt. 9. 102, 105.

⁶ c. 34. 1 *μεγάλη μάχη*. For the results cp. c. 35. 5-7. There is great slaughter, a general movement to revolt from Persia, the retreat of Xerxes to Ekbatana, etc.

⁷ c. 37. 1-3.

⁸ §§ 4, 5. The Herodotean narrative is here 'telescoped' for the sake of brevity. ⁹ § 6.

Herodotean narrative, may be due to Ephoros. The great passage on Sicilian affairs, a real though not quite satisfactory addition to our resources, 'Diodoros of Sicily' will have taken not from Ephoros, but from the work of a compatriot. The textual citations from Simonides may perhaps come from the fourth-century writer; but the literary description of the work of Herodotus, as 'in nine Books,' cannot do so; and the reference to Pindar,¹ from the context in which it occurs, may be accounted to Diodoros himself for bibliographical righteousness. For the rest, in further characterizing this important contribution to our resources, our appraisal passes through Diodoros back to Ephoros, and the historiography of the fourth century, of which he is the type. The omissions in the story, as retold from Herodotus, it is hardly necessary to enumerate; they are patent and wholesale.² The rearrangements and readjustments are more subtle, and are not a mere matter of literary presentation. They are sometimes dictated by a chronological motive;³ they are sometimes designed to make good a previous omission:⁴ they sometimes amount to novelties, intended to improve the Herodotean position, and must be reckoned with as such. But to a great extent they are flowers of the rhetoric and fruits of the philosophy, or rationalism, in which the whole fabric had been steeped or stamped. The rhetoric attains distinct body in such passages as the diplomatic retort to the Argives,⁵ the secret conversation between Leonidas and the Ephors,⁶ the Greek reply to the overtures of Xerxes at Thermopylai,⁷ the epigrammatic *parainesis* of Leonidas,⁸ the elaborate panegyric on the heroes of Thermopylai,⁹ the vows of vengeance and loyalty taken by the Greeks,¹⁰ the valiant rivalry of Athenians and Spartans,¹¹ as well as in the general description of the fighting,¹² in the deliberate cultivation of dramatic effects,¹³ and even in the recurrence of typical phrases.¹⁴ The rationalism, though not always equally crude or ungainly, appears in proper form to

¹ At the end of the Sikeliote story, c. 26. 8, a very natural connexion in which to mention Pindar's acme; cp. Watkiss Lloyd, *History of Sicily* (1872); E. Boehmer, *Pindars Sicilische Oden* (1891).

² e.g. (1) description of the army of Xerxes, (2) action of Thessaly, (3) of Makedon, (4) reduction of the engagements off Artemision, (5) omission of the defence of the Athenian Akropolis, and (6) of the Psyttaleia episode at Salamis, (7) reduction of the operations at Plataia, (8) omission of the services of Theron in the Sikeliote story, besides numbers of lesser details, names, etc.

³ Cp. p. 66 *supra*.

⁴ The anonymous Samian, who swims to Salamis with information from the Ionians to Eurybiades, c. 17. 3, looks like the double of Skyllias, Hdt. 8. 8.

⁵ c. 3. 5.

⁷ c. 5. 5.

⁸ c. 9. 4 *τούτοις παρήγγειλε ταχέως ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι, ὡς ἐν ἄδου δειπνησομένους*.

⁹ c. 11.

¹⁰ cc. 3. 3, 29. 3, especially the latter.

¹¹ c. 32. 4.

¹² Thermopylai is the worst case, but all the battles are rhetoricized: Freeman, however, ii. 198 note, praises the 'vigorous picture' in Diod. 11. 22. It is apparently intended for a speaking, or rather a shouting likeness of the preliminaries of a battle.

¹³ The partiality for night-effects is obvious; cp. cc. 9, 10, 30. 2.

¹⁴ e.g. *τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας*, cc. 3. 1, 3. 5; 4. 4; (5. 5; 6. 2; 7. 1; 11. 1); 11. 5; (29. 1; 36. 5). Cp. p. 72 note 4, p. 73 note 4 *supra*.

⁶ c. 4. 2-4.

motivate the expedition,¹ to explain the victories,² to reduce the monstrous estimates and figures,³ to account for the disappearance of Themistokles,⁴ to eliminate the supernatural.⁵ Yet this rationalism is not quite successful or even self-consistent; it leaves the supernatural a sort of supernumerary rôle in the action,⁶ and it fails to eliminate the inconsistencies present in the Herodotean tradition. In particular, the inconsistency still survives, and in an aggravated form, between the *devotio* of the Spartans at Thermopylai and the evidently serious intention of defending the pass. The parallel inconsistency for Salamis remains, between the resolution of the Greeks to fight at Salamis and their desperate efforts to escape. It is characteristic of the superficiality of the Ephorean criticism that the natural *aporiai* created by the duplication of the storms,⁷ of the messages of Themistokles,⁸ of the Greek vows,⁹ and by some minor episodes and items of intrinsic improbability, are not even detected, much less resolved.¹⁰ Yet amid all this provoking show of second-rate art and pseudo-science there emerge certain items, with which the modern reconstruction

¹ c. 1. 2 διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, viz. the ambition of Mardonios. c. 2. 2 διὰ τε τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπιβολὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ Μαρδονίου συμβουλίαν. The great works were undertaken partly to facilitate the passage of the forces, partly to terrorize the Greeks, *ibid.* § 4.

² The superiority of Greek weapons is much insisted on in the story of Thermopylai, c. 7. 2 ταῖς ἀρεταῖς καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἀσπίδων. § 3 ἀσπίσι γὰρ καὶ πέλταις μικραῖς οἱ βάρβαροι χρώμενοι κτλ. μεγάλας ἀσπίσι σκεπαζομένους ὄλον τὸ σῶμα, αὐτοὶ δὲ διὰ τὰς κουφότητας τῶν σκεπαστηρίων ὅπλων ἐλαττούμενοι κτλ. The advantage of the Greeks at Artemision is explained partly by the scattered bases from which the Persian fleet has to act, c. 12. 6 ἐκ πολλῶν λιμένων ἀναγομένων. The victory of Salamis is due to the 'strategy' of Themistokles (c. 19. 5), that of Himera to the same merit in Gelon (cc. 21. 3, 22. 5). The victory of Plataia is due to the wisdom of the Greeks in choosing their ground: c. 30. 6 τοῖς μὲν οὖν Ἕλλησιν ἐμφρόνως βουλευσαμένοις πολλὰ συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὴν νίκην ἢ τῶν τόπων στενοχωρία. The physical facts are here altered to suit the theory proper to Thermopylai or Salamis. The victory at Mykale is largely traced to the action of the Ionians.

³ The king's fleet is left at the Herodotean figures, c. 3. 7-9 (more than 1200 longships, 850 transports, 3000 triakonters: the items, however, do

not quite square with the totals). The army is greatly reduced: starting with upwards of 800,000, it is raised to 1,000,000 by the European contingents, c. 5. 2. The force that goes round at Thermopylai is doubled, c. 8. 5. The army of Mardonios starts at 400,000, c. 19. 6, and is raised to 500,000 on the field of battle, c. 30. 1, where the Hellenic force falls to 100,000. Rhetoric here gains on rationalism and has a kindly word to say for the figures c. 5. 3.

⁴ c. 27. 3, owing to the estrangement between Sparta and Athens and the honours paid him there.

⁵ c. 35, the rationalistic explanation of the Φήμη.

⁶ The oracle, on which Leonidas relied, is omitted; but the deliverance of Delphi was παραδόξως and proved τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἐνεργεῖαν (c. 14. 3), the storm showed τὸ θεῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων (c. 13. 1); otherwise the supernatural machinery has disappeared.

⁷ cc. 12. 3, 13. 1.

⁸ cc. 17. 1, 19. 5. The absurdity of making the same man act as messenger on both occasions is, however, studiously avoided.

⁹ cc. 3. 3, 29. 2-3.

¹⁰ The most interesting is the fourth-century anachronism put into the mouth of Demaratos in addressing Xerxes, c. 6. 2 τοὺς γὰρ ἀφισταμένους τῶν βαρβάρων Ἑλληνικαῖς δυνάμεσι καταπολεμεῖς.

of the story is bound to deal more seriously: nine such may be enumerated, and treasured for that purpose. (1) The theory that the invasions of Sicily and of Hellas was a concerted movement, not a fortuitous synchronism.¹ (2) The elevation of Doriskos into the first rendezvous for Fleet and Army on the Persian side.² (3) The clear and definite statement of the circumnavigation of Salamis and the closing of the western outlet of the straits by a squadron of the king's fleet;³ and in general the effort to clear the tactics of this battle. (4) The services of the Ionians at Salamis, and especially at Mykale, in securing victory for the national cause.⁴ (5) The original documents quoted in the text, which have an obvious and independent value;⁵ with them may be associated the notices of the Delphic tripod, the Delphian trophy, the Gelonian offerings. (6) Though the particular numbers for armies and fleets have no intrinsic value, their substitution for the Herodotean figures attests a legitimate incredulity. (7) A similar remark applies to readjustments of the Herodotean chronology or sequences: Ephoros exercised a liberty in this matter, which we may claim, and use perhaps to better purpose. (8) The story of the war in Sicily, though hardly an integral portion of 'the Median war,' yet deserves enumeration, as it is distinctly though briefly anticipated in Herodotus, and supplies an important complement, or correction, and a valuable supplement to the Herodotean record. (9) The bibliographical notice of the work of Herodotus⁶ has a value not merely for the *testimonia*—whether it go back to Ephoros or only to Diodoros—but also as bearing upon the problem of the proper end and completion of the Herodotean work, and so inferentially upon the problem of the composition of that work. Diodoros and Ephoros to boot—as we may feel with certainty—regarded the work of Herodotus as complete, and the siege of Sestos as a natural and fitting end to the story of the Median war. But after all the greatest benefit derivable from the *Library* of Diodoros in this connexion is the proof of the processes to which the tradition of the Persian wars was subject in the fourth century, and the popularity accorded to the result in much later times.

TROGUS POMPEIUS⁷ by general consent stands a class or two higher than Diodoros as historian, or at least as artist.⁸ Even in the careless *Epitome* of Justin and in the *Prologues*, described by Niebuhr as 'indescribably barbarous,' which still exhibit the main lines of his

¹ c. 1. 4.

³ c. 17. 2.

⁴ cc. 17. 3; 36. 2, 4.

⁵ (1) c. 11. 6 (Simonides); (2) c. 14. 4, 'elegy' on the Delphic trophy; (3) c. 33. 2, the three epigrams; (4) c. 29. 3, the vow before Plataia; (5) the notice of the *Δαμαρέτειον νόμισμα* (c. 26. 3) is important, but probably inaccurate; cp. Freeman, *Sicily*, ii. 190.

² c. 3. 7.

⁶ c. 37. 6. As Ephoros himself was the first historian to write 'Books' it is not likely that he specified that the work of Hdt. was 'in nine Books.'

⁷ Cp. Teubner edition by F. Ruehl (1886), which contains the *Prologi* from Gutschmid's recension.

⁸ Cp. Niebuhr, *Lectures on Anc. Hist.* i. (1852) pp. 7 ff.; Wachsmuth, *Einleitung* (1895), pp. 108 ff.

work, the greatness of his plan and the skill with which his episodes were handled shine through.¹ The section on the Persian war, as epitomized, extends barely to six pages,² but the lines upon which the story is constructed are so strongly marked that we must suppose the *Epitome* a faithful miniature of the original. The war is here presented in nine successive episodes, or *tableaux*, which dispose themselves obviously into three groups, distinguishable in subject, scene, and sequence. The omissions of traditional items in Justin are frappant,³ but the unity of the argument is so intimate as to suggest that Troguus himself, not his epitomator, is responsible therefor. In the first three episodes the action may be regarded as taking place on the Persian side. (1) *The accession of Xerxes*⁴ virtually opens the story, as with Herodotus. 'Dareus' dies in the midst of preparing for the re-invasion of Greece. 'Ariamenes,' the deceased king's eldest son, claims to succeed: Xerxes urges two pleas in his own favour, his birth 'in the purple,'⁵ and his mother's right.⁶ The dispute is referred to Artaphernes as arbiter: he decides in favour of Xerxes. 'In those days brothers divided kingdoms more amicably than small fortunes nowadays'—a moral not unworthy of Tacitus.⁷ (2) *The tablet of Demaratus*⁸ is next introduced. The exile has not figured, as with Herodotus, in the first episode, but the second is all to his credit. The anecdote, which appears at the end of our Seventh Book of Herodotus, here occurs, with the trifling variation, due to a lapse of memory, or perhaps an error of a translator, that the lady, who discovers the real inwardness of the apparently blank missive, is described, not as the wife but as the sister of King Leonidas. (3) *The magnitude of the Persian forces*⁹ is next presented in terms that might have been borrowed from Diodoros or from the Attic Orators: the magnitude of the forces, the powers at the king's disposal, are used to accentuate the incompetence of their leader, and the disgrace of their fate.¹⁰ But at this point the scene shifts instantaneously to central

¹ Cp. Justin's *Praefatio*. The work was in forty-four Books: *omnium saeculorum, regum, nationum populorumque res gestae continentur*. It was the first universal history in the Latin tongue. Troguus belonged to the generation after Diodoros, and was acquainted with Livy's work, Justin 38. 3. 11.

² Justin 2. 10–14.

³ Among the most notable are (1) the king's march, (2) the storm, (3) the fighting at Artemision, (4) the Greek preparations, (5) Artabazos and his achievements, (6) the siege of Sestos.

⁴ c. 10. 1–11. Cp. Hdt. 7. 1–4.

⁵ §§ 3, 4 de nascendi felicitate . . . se regi primum natum.

⁶ § 8 materno . . . se iure et avito vincere.

⁷ § 11 tanto moderatius tunc fratres inter se maxima regna dividebant, quam nunc exigua patrimonia partiuntur.

⁸ c. 10. 12–17.

⁹ c. 10. 18–24. The numbers are *septingenta milia de regno* and *trecenta milia de auxiliis*. For Diod. cp. p. 76 note 3 *supra*. The figure for the ships is incredible and corrupt: *naves quoque decies centum milium numero habuisse dicitur*. But cp. Diodor. 11. 5. 2. With § 19 cp. Diodor. 11. 5. 3.

¹⁰ §§ 21 ff. ipse autem primus in fuga, postremus in praelio . . . in periculis timidus, sicubi metus abesset, inflatus . . . veluti naturae ipsius dominus et montes in planum deducebat et convexa vallium aequabat et quaedam maria pontibus sternebat . . . turpis ac foedus discessus fuit.

Greece, no time or space being wasted on the advance of the forces, and a second group of three episodes carries the narrative onwards to its climax. (4) *The story of Thermopylai*¹ reproduces the most significant features of the story in Diodoros with a difference or two, not to the credit of Trogius. The reference to Marathon is there,² and above all the grand finale of the night-attack on the Persian camp is there; but the figures for the forces are varied, in a somewhat rhetorical interest,³ and the fighting is vaguely extended, beyond the *triduum*, on to a fourth day.⁴ As with Diodoros the struggle at Thermopylai is quite dissociated from any operations at sea; moreover, Artemision is altogether omitted, doubtless in the interest of the sequel, and the second episode in this group is confined to (5) *the appeal of Themistokles to the Ionians*,⁵ which is paraphrased in a thoroughly Isokratean fashion.⁶ But though Artemision has been omitted, (6) *the assault on Delphi*,⁷ and the supernatural discomfiture of the Persians are briefly recorded, and the successful destruction of Thespiei, Plataia, and Athens serve as a brief appendix, or transition,⁸ to sustain the interest, which might otherwise have culminated with the attack on the gods.⁹ (7) *The battle of Salamis*¹⁰ follows, and is thus made to appear as the first sea-battle, and the chief interest of the story. The episode is treated as self-contained, its antecedents going back to Marathon and the post-Marathonian policy of Themistokles. The story, told on strictly Herodotean lines, comprises the Delphian Response and its interpretation, the evacuation of the city, the union of the fleet at Salamis, the differences of opinion, the ruse of Themistokles, the valour of Artemisia the Halikarnassian queen. But in one respect this account further develops the *motif*, which Diodoros, *i.e.* Ephoros, had already evolved from Herodotus: the victory is expressly ascribed to the withdrawal of the Ionians in obedience to the injunctions of Themistokles.¹¹ (8) *The flight of Xerxes*,¹² with its cognate episodes, is also repeated on Herodotean lines. Mardonios proposes the return of the king, and remains himself with a select force behind. A second message from Themistokles, by the hands of the same slave, converts the king's retreat into a flight. Xerxes finds the bridge over the Hellespont broken down, as in Herodotus; but a new rhetorical point is gained by reducing the ship, in which Herodotus allowed the

¹ c. 11. 2-19.

² § 2 eos pugnam capessere iubet, quorum cognati Marathonica pugna interfecti fuerant. Cp. Diodor. 11. 6. 4.

³ The total forces with Leonidas are reduced to 4000, cp. Hdt. 7. 228; the force remaining with him at the end numbers 600 against 500, Diodoros 11. 9. 2. The number of the Persian force sent round is put (with Diodoros 11. 8. 5) at 20,000.

⁴ §§ 4, 5 triduo ibi . . dimicatum quarta die, etc.

⁵ c. 12. 1-7.

⁶ e.g. § 4 an ideo moenia vestra condidimus, ut essent qui nostra delerent?

⁷ c. 12. 8-10.

⁸ § 11.

⁹ § 9 prorsus quasi non cum Graecis tantum, sed et cum diis immortalibus bellum gereret . . ut intellegeret, quam nullae essent hominum adversus deos vires.

¹⁰ c. 12. 12-27.

¹¹ §§ 25, 26.

¹² c. 13. 1-12.

king to cross the channel, to a fisherman's boat¹; and, as if to betray the fictitious character of this climax, an elaborate moral is drawn from the situation.² The sufferings of the army could not exceed the earliest records in Aischylos and Herodotus; but the birds and beasts, which consume the corpses, have perhaps migrated from another context in Herodotus.³ After Salamis and the king's flight, (9) *the double-victory of Plataia-Mykale*⁴ is briefly dismissed, in two short parallels, both of them saturated with Atticism. At Plataia little more than the bare fact of a battle is recorded, Mardonios is left alive and allowed to escape, perhaps by a careless identification with Artabazos,⁵ and the plunder of his camp is made responsible for the beginnings of luxury in Greece.⁶ The operations of the fleet are treated no less cavalierly. Mykale is apparently converted into a strictly naval engagement,⁷ but though the synchronism with Plataia and the *fama* are duly recorded, the services of the Ionians are omitted, perhaps because this *motif* has already been employed in the account of Salamis. The record concludes with the award of the *Aristeia* by universal consent to Athens among the states, and to Themistokles among the leaders, his fame still further augmenting the glory of Athens.⁸

The conciseness and rapidity of this narrative, the graphic individuality of the episodes selected for treatment, the calculated omission of items likely to duplicate and so to weaken certain effects, the coherence and balance of the whole, show a high degree of literary art. Expressly rhetorical passages are not bad rhetoric, presenting, as they do, points with the epigrammatic terseness proper to the Latin tongue. But if it be asked whether Trogius has fished up any forgotten pearls of genuine tradition, or adds anything of real history to our materials, the answer must be in the negative. There is very little in Trogius which is not in Herodotus or in Diodoros, and that little is probably or certainly wrong. Ariamenes, not Artobazanes, may have been the name of the eldest son of Dareios, but the supposed arbitration of Artaphernes looks like exaggeration, or misunderstanding, in the interest of the moral. The description of the unnamed Gorgo as 'sister' of Leonidas is simply an error. The reduction of the

¹ § 9 ubi cum solutum pontem hibernis tempestatibus offendisset, piscatoria scapha trepidus traiecit.

² § 10 erat res spectaculo digna et ad aestimationem sortis humanae, etc.

³ § 12. Cp. Hdt. 7. 10 ad f.

⁴ c. 14. 1-6, 7-9. In § 1 Mardonius (*sic*) captures Olynthus; cp. Hdt. 8. 127. This might be defended by regarding Artabazos as his lieutenant.

⁵ Ktesias might be responsible; cp. § 5 *supra*.

⁶ § 6 castra referta regali opulentia capta unde primum Graecos diviso

inter se auro Persico divitiarum luxuria cepit.

⁷ §§ 7, 8 navali proelio in Asia sub monte Mycale adversus Persas dimicatum est. ibi ante congressionem, cum classes ex adverso starent, etc.

⁸ §§ 10, 11 confecto bello, cum de praemiis civitatum ageretur, omnium iudicio Atheniensium virtus ceteris praelata. inter duces quoque Themistocles princeps civitatum testimonio indicatus gloriam patriae suae auxit. Leonidas and Themistokles are the only Greeks mentioned by name.

number of men under Leonidas at Thermopylai is a carelessness traceable to the uncritical use of the epigram in Herodotus. The variant version in the appeal of Themistokles to the Ionians is transparent rhetoric: the extension of the fighting to four days is, perhaps, a displaced reminiscence of an Herodotean item. The important rôle assigned to the Ionians at Salamis is the most plausible addition or development in this authority, but it can hardly be ascribed to a genuine tradition: it is more like a rationalistic suggestion to account for the victory, rendered the more artistic by the suppression of all notice of the Ionian services at Mykale. The fisherman's boat in which Xerxes crosses the Hellespont is an effective novelty, for which we have long been waiting. It is the last logical effort of the satiric nemesis, which could no further go; for, to have made the king swim across the channel would have set him up again among the heroes. The escape of Mardonios from Plataia may be due to mere confusion, or may have been taken from Ktesias; but anyway has the effect of reducing the fame of that Spartan victory. The apparent conversion of Mykale into a strictly naval battle is, perhaps, but the unintentional result of compression and omission; but the assignment of the *Aristeia* to Athens and the Athenian general, for which of course Trogius had authority, gives the lie to the best sources. There is, in short, nothing to be gained for the history of the Persian war from the work of Trogius in Epitome. The indications it affords of a partial emancipation from Diodoros, and a partial return to Herodotus, and other independent sources, have a decided value and interest for the history of the traditions themselves. It may be due to the good name of Trogius to add that the Persian war was not, and could not well be, the portion of his work wherein he showed to the greatest advantage.¹

¹ The fragment of the mysterious ARISTODEMOS may be conveniently noticed here, as it maintains the character of a general history, though its date may be considerably later than Trogius, or even Justin. For the text see Mueller, *Fragg. Hist. Gr.* v. (1873) pp. 1-6. Schwartz *ap.* Pauly-Wissowa ii. 928 may be right in saying that the only novelty in Aristodemos concerning the Persian war is the notice of the Disk, with the list of states in league against the Mede; *cp.* Aristod. c. ix. *op. c.* p. 12 *ζητήσεως δὲ οὐσης παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τινὰς δεῖ προγραφῆναι αὐτῶν τῶν συμμαχικῶτων ἐν τῷ Μηδικῷ πολέμῳ, ἐξεύρον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὸν δίσκον, ἐφ' οὗ κυκλωτέρως ἐπέγραψαν τὰς ἡγωνισμένας πόλεις, ὥς μήτε πρῶτους τινὰς γεγράφθαι μῆθ' ὑστέρους.* Until this round-robin turns up, we may safely regard the story as an invention. But to a student of the evolution of the history, or legend,

of the war the Disk is not the only item of interest in the context. Aristodemos evidently gave a brief, but complete, survey of the war. The fragment opens in the midst of the story of Salamis; accounts of Plataia and Mykale follow. Some half-dozen points at least are of interest in *the story of Salamis*. (1) Themistokles pleads—evidently with the other admirals—for a delay of 'one day more,' and utilizes the interval to despatch Sikinnos with a message to Xerxes. Sikinnos reports the intended flight of the Greeks: the king assumes, or infers, the medism of Themistokles. (2) The project of crossing to Salamis by a bridge (*ξέυγμα*) is distinctly placed before the battle. (3) The king's throne is located on 'Parnes,' near to the Herakleion. (4) The affair of Psyttaleia is given a special turn. (a) The occupation is distinctly dated after the commencement of the battle. (b) 'Myriads' of

§ 14. *The Biographers.*—CORNELIUS NEPOS, a Transpadane,¹ the friend of Catullus,² of Varro,³ of Atticus,⁴ and of Cicero,⁵ exhibited in his writings both the universalist and the biographical tendencies of his age. Only a portion of his biographical works has come down to us, and that in a questionable and imperfect form.⁶ The *Life of Miltiades* happens, in the absence of other authorities, to have acquired a factitious value, for it preserves the Ephorean account of the battle of Marathon, after a fashion.⁷ The brief biographies of Themistokles, Aristeides, and Pausanias add little of substance and less of value to the materials for the history of the Persian war. The Grecisms in the vocabulary of Nepos point to his employing native sources.⁸ Not

Persians are landed. (c) Their slaughter is signalized as the greatest achievement of Aristeides in the cause of Hellas (eclipsing his command at Plataia). (5) The *Aristeia* are assigned to Athens, Aigina is placed second. (6) The projected move to the Hellespont is ascribed to 'the Hellenes,' is opposed by Themistokles, and by him betrayed to Xerxes, who thereupon takes to flight. (7) As evidence for the interposition of the gods is cited the vision of 'the son of Theokydes' (whose proper name is textually corrupt), i.e. apparently the vision is dated to the day of battle. There is an equal number of significant items in the story of Plataia. (1) Alexander is commissioned to negotiate for the neutrality of Athens, and is dismissed with contumely. (2) The actual fighting is cut down apparently to one engagement, the victory in which is secured by the advent of the Athenians to the support of the Lakedaimonians. (3) The story of the exchange of positions is confused, curtailed, and brought into immediate connexion with the battle-piece. (4) Mardonios, 'bare-headed,' is slain by Aemnestos, a 'Lakedaimonian.' (5) The Persians fly to Thebes (not to a fortified camp). (6) There is a curious precision in figures. Plataia is 80 stades from Thebes. There are 40,000 Boiotians with Mardonios. The slain amount to 120,000. A mongrel item occurs in the 60,000 annihilated by Alexander of Makedon on their homeward way. (7) The trophies, the betithing of Thebes, according to oath, and the foundation of the *Eleutheria* are noticed. The story of *Mykale* is more curtly related. (1) The Greeks pursue the Persian fleet to Mykale, (2) a mountain in Milesia, 4000 stades distant from Salamis. (3) The battle takes place on land, (4) synchronously with Plataia, and (5)

40,000 barbarians are slain. The record of the Persian war thus preserved shows very clearly (1) the return to Herodotus, coupled with (2) accessory sources, of the rationalizing and rhetorical schools, especially favourable to Athens. Later on, e.g. in the story of Pausanias, Aristodemos betrays the same sources as Nepos. Wachsmuth, regarding the fragment as a forgery, takes no account of it in his *Einleitung*. The nominal author cannot be identified with any known writer; but the fragment itself, notwithstanding its literary history, has a plausible air, and presumably goes back to the Roman period.

¹ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 3. 22. 2 Nepos . . . Padi accola. Cp. Pliny, *Epp.* 4. 28. 1.

² Catullus, *Carmen* 1 ad Corneliū Nepotem.

³ The *Imagines* were probably the pattern for his *Vitae* (Wachsmuth, *op. c.* p. 210), and Varro perhaps named one of his works after Nepos (Wissowa in *Real-Enc.* iv. 1410).

⁴ The *Life of Atticus* (xxv.) is the *chef d'œuvre* of Nepos.

⁵ Aulus Gellius, 15. 28; Suetonius, *Julius* 55. Nepos wrote a life of Cicero (Gellius, *l.c.*). The second Book of Letters from Cicero to Nepos is cited by Macrobius, *Sat.* 2. 1. 14, and a letter of Nepos to Cicero by Lactantius, *Instit.* 3. 15. 10. Two rather ambiguous references occur in Cicero's letters to Atticus after Caesar's death: 16. 5. 5; 14. 4.

⁶ As copied (and edited with a dedication) for Theodosius II. (408-450 A.D.) by one Aemilius Probus (not without assistance).

⁷ Cp. *Hdt.* IV.-VI. ii. 206 (Appendix X. § 26).

⁸ e.g. Astu = Athenae *Them.* 4, obsonium *ib.* 10. Some Greek words are introduced *simpliciter* (Ἀδομαρία, προσκυρεῖν). A good many are transliter-

that the *Lives* are based on Herodotean authority: Nepos betrays little, if any, sign of the return to Herodotus, which was barely beginning in his day. The Greek authority whom Cornelius is most apt to cite by name is Thucydides;¹ but there is nothing of the better spirit or practice of Thucydides in his methods. He drew mainly from the rhetorical historians; but even the worst of them are not to be made responsible for the blunders of Nepos, some of which would have been impossible for any Greek writer. Thus he substitutes the 'Corcyraeans,' and a war with them, for the Aiginetans, as the first occasion of public service by Themistokles;² he avoided the blunder of representing Pausanias as 'king' of Sparta, only to fall a victim to the 'kingship' of Eurybiades, an even less excusable error.³ He was something of a chronological authority, yet his chronology is frequently deplorable.⁴ He had written a work on geography, yet he makes an egregious confusion between the battles of Mykale and the Eurymedon.⁵ His superficial and borrowed rationalism may especially be seen in his account of the defence of Thermopylai and Artemision: 'many of the cities were displeased with the policy of a naval battle,' hence the occupation of Thermopylai!⁶ And the abandonment of Artemision is ascribed, not to the fall of Thermopylai, but to the apprehension that the Greek ships might be circumvented and taken in the rear by the king's fleet.⁷ We hear the reverberation of the fourth-century rhetoric in the statements that, at Salamis, 'one man saved Greece' and 'Asia succumbed to Europe.'⁸ We sadly miss the comic Nemesis—Nepos is no great humorist⁹—when solemnly assured that 'Xerxes greatly distinguished himself by invading Greece with the largest army and the largest fleet on record.'¹⁰ There is hardly a single item to be found in Cornelius which can be treated as authoritative. His estimate of the forces of Xerxes is, of course, a bit of rationalism, and it is ruined by the absurd figure for the cavalry.¹¹ The army of Mardonios, selected *viritim*, is at least

ated (acroama, anagnostes, gynaeconitis, scytala, strategema, tenasmus, etc. etc.). Others are obviously paraphrased, or translated.

¹ e.g. *Them.* 9, *Pausan.* 2.

² *Them.* 2.

³ *Them.* 4. The *Pausanias* was included among the *Lives* of those who had not been kings. *Licet enim legibus eorum cuius ephoro hoc facere regi* (c. 3) must, therefore, not be pressed. It is translated from *Thuc.* 1. 131. 2.

⁴ Catullus *l.c.* refers to the *Chronica*. The title is supplied by Ausonius, *Epp.* 16. Nepos restores Aristeides in the 'sixth' year of his exile, though he allows him to be present (in a private capacity) at Salamis.

⁵ *Cimon* 2. The elder Pliny seems

to quote a geographical work freely; cp. Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 1411.

⁶ *Them.* 3.

⁷ *ibid.*

⁸ *Them.* 5 sic unius viri prudentia Graecia liberata est, Europaeque succubuit Asia.

⁹ *ibid.* seque a Themistocle non superatum sed conservatum iudicavit. Probably from the Greek source as much as the anecdote of Aristeides, *Arist.* 1.

¹⁰ *de Regibus* 1 Xerxi maxime est illustre, quod maximis post hominum memoriam exercitibus terra marique bellum intulit Graeciae.

¹¹ *Them.* 2. 1200 longships, 2000 transports, 700,000 infantry, 400,000 cavalry.

more manageable.¹ The description of 'Mardonius' as a 'royal satrap' is spoilt by making him 'a native of Media.'² Cornelius perhaps follows the better tradition in marking the augmentation of the Attic fleet distinctly by instalments;³ and though his report of the king's return to Asia from Athens in 'less than thirty days,' whereas 'more than six months' had been spent on the outward journey, transgresses the Herodotean account at both ends, the doubled estimate for the invading march is not unreasonable.⁴ The neatest, or at least the most living touch in these presents, is the notice of the sepulchre and statues of Themistokles 'still extant' at Magnesia;⁵ and the incidental remark that Themistokles returned from 'Persis' to 'Asia' unconsciously but delightfully betrays the Roman point of view.⁶ In short, Cornelius is for our purposes here devoid of value, except as a witness to the continuity and character of the literary tradition of the Persian war, and withal a poor witness even to that.⁷

To pass from the extant Nepos on to the extant PLUTARCH is to exchange brass for gold, to leave the cave for the open air. The contribution made by the prince of biographers to our subject is large even to embarrassment at this stage in the proceedings. The two *Lives*, Themistokles and Aristeides, furnish together an almost complete account of the war, or at least of the principal battles, Artemision, Salamis, Plataia. If Plutarch wrote a *Life of Leonidas* no doubt ample justice was done to Thermopylai.⁸ Nor is Plutarch merely a biographer. The *Moralia* are rich in references to the incidents and agents of the Persian war; one treatise in particular supplies a running commentary upon the work of Herodotus, including of course the last three Books.⁹ In dealing with the Plutarchian materials it will be legitimate and convenient to follow the accepted classification of the works, and also to lay an emphasis upon the novel, or at least the characteristic, additions made, that is preserved, to the story of the Persian war, by the latest member of the Boiotian triumvirate in letters.¹⁰

The variety and number of Plutarch's sources are in strongly marked contrast to the labour-saving methods of most of his predecessors. He is no one-sourced author. In this respect he recalls the wealth and the generosity of Herodotus himself, with a difference. Plutarch's sources are all literary: a living tradition, a voice still audible and dating from the Persian wars, hardly existed in his time;

¹ *Pausan.* 1. 200,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry.

² *ibid.* satrapes regius, natione Medus.

³ *Them.* 2. One hundred triremes are built for the 'Coreyraean' war; another hundred after the Delphic Response about wooden walls!

⁴ *Them.* 5; cp. *Hdt.* 8. 51, 115.

⁵ *Them.* 10.

⁶ *ibid.* The Latin writer is thinking of the Roman 'province.'

⁷ On Cornelius Nepos cp. Wachsmuth, *Einleitung* 142 ff., 210 ff. Wissowa in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 1408 ff.

⁸ He promised to do so, *Mor.* 866 (*de malig. Hdti* 32).

⁹ *Περὶ τῆς Ἡροδότου κακοηθείας*, especially cc. 28-43.

¹⁰ Hesiod and Pindar are constantly on Plutarch's page.

or, if it existed, makes no sound in his pages. Yet we profit much, not merely of Plutarch's mind and character, but of his circumstances and time. He is no partisan, except of virtue. He has the merits almost without the defects of his Hellenic culture. Oddly enough, if he was ever the sophist, it was in his critique of Herodotus. The language, the landscape, the spirit of Greece, were his own. Though his knowledge of the past is derived from literature, it is informed, vivified, by touches concrete and subtle, which belong to his own present. Ancient monuments in countless numbers he has seen, and perhaps copied.¹ Plutarch of Chaironeia knows that it is a day and a half's journey from Thermopylai to Thebes,² and reckons Plataia five hundred stades distant from Delphi.³ He has in person attended the Plataian *Eleutheria*,⁴ just as he has witnessed Spartan boys whipped at the altar of Artemis Orthosia.⁵ True, the one ceremony like the other was a revival, and something of an anachronism.⁶ But the possibility of such revivals is itself significant of time, place, and spirit. Plutarch was infinitely closer to the whole life of ancient Greece—ancient even to him—than most of his contemporaries, or than any of his successors, in literature, not excepting Pausanias. The *genius loci* was with him, too, and what may, perhaps, be called the genius of polytheism, at its best, its humanest, so necessary to a true appreciation of ancient life. The subjects of his biographical essays are in fact his heroes, and he writes the *Parallel Lives* with a practical object, an ethical interest, to help himself and others to be better men.⁷ This purpose may detract more or less from their historical value, though it has helped to make them, at great epochs of humane awakening—the Renaissance, the Revolution—doubly popular.⁸ But the industry, the erudition, the wealth of detail, deposited in the form of biographical hero-worship, matures to the benefit of critical history.

The two *Lives* here chiefly in evidence present a considerable contrast in many particulars. Themistokles came into court with an almost hopelessly damaged reputation. Aristides had been all along the Hellenic ideal of the righteous man. Plutarch had no difficulty in sustaining the reputation of Aristides, even if, on one or two occasions, his saint seems to sail rather near the wind.⁹ Themistokles appears almost past Plutarch's arts of rehabilitation. Yet Aristides is after all the meaner man. The immense greatness of

¹ Cp. note 1 p. 6 *supra*.

² *Mor.* 864 F. ³ *Aristeid.* 20.

⁴ *ib.* 21. ⁵ *Lykurg.* 18.

⁶ But cp. R. C. Bosanquet, *Times*, 7th August 1907, p. 10.

⁷ Cp. *Fore-word* to *Timoleon* (vulgo *Aemil.* 1).

⁸ Cp. North's translation, Shakespeare's *Plutarch*, and the nomenclature of the French Revolution.

⁹ The anecdote told of Aristides in c. 4 would be discreditable to him, were it true. The suspicion that, if not restored, he would medize (c. 8) is not complimentary. The admission made in c. 25 that his policy was often conformable to 'the hypothesis of his country' shows him a 'good citizen' rather than a 'good man.'

Themistokles is attested, not merely by the patriotic services recorded of him, but by the place he is indirectly shown to have filled in literature. The two *Lives* are precisely the same in length; but whereas in the *Aristeides* Plutarch cites by name only some fourteen authors besides Herodotus, in the *Themistokles* he cites seven-and-twenty; and of these authors cited five in the former case¹ fall to the chapters on the Persian war as against twelve in the latter.² The same moral may belong to another observation: the number of novelties, or quasi-novelties, is larger in the *Themistokles*, but the items are in themselves trifling. In the *Aristeides* there are at least two or three statements, or stories, which, if true, are of cardinal importance. One class of trivial novelties is common to both *Lives*. The hero in each case alike is nominally associated with actions, which have been recorded from of old—generally by Herodotus—but anonymously. Thus the resignation of the Hegemony,³ the procuring of portents,⁴ the recall of the exiles,⁵ are expressly put down to the personal agency of Themistokles. Similarly the replies of the Athenians to the Spartans and to Mardonios,⁶ the speech against the Tegeans,⁷ the intervention of the Athenians in the cavalry-skirmish,⁸ the interview with Alexander,⁹ the exchange of positions with the Spartans,¹⁰ the final engagement with the Thebans on the right,¹¹ are all, with Plutarch, expressly acts of Aristeides. Such precision might well be due simply to constructive inference. Certain fresh anecdotes and items, additions or modifications of Herodotean story, are common to the two *Lives*, notably the record of a human sacrifice, extorted by the diviner Euphrantides at the hands of Themistokles from the captives sent by Aristeides from Psyttaleia;¹² also, the transfer to Salamis and to Aristeides of the conversation which is recorded by Herodotus of Eurybiades and Themistokles at Andros.¹³ Plutarch also consistently substitutes for Sikinnos, Arnakes, an eunuch and prisoner, as employed by Themistokles in the second mission to Xerxes.¹⁴ For the rest, the real contribution made to the events in the Persian war, with which the name of Themistokles was specially associated, is exiguous. A few proper names are added: Epikydes, the would-be Athenian Strategos, who at all hazards had to be kept out of office¹⁵; Pelagon, the Euboian, who brought the money of his countrymen to Themistokles at Artemision¹⁶; Architeles, the trierarch of the sacred ship, who was artfully punished and rewarded to do his general's bidding¹⁷; Nikagoras the Troizenian, who passed a decree for

¹ Aischylos, Ariston, Demetrios Phalereus, Idomeneus, Panaitios.

² Aischylos, Akestodoros, Ariston, Aristotle, Kleidemos, Neanthes, Phantias, Phanodemos, Pindar, Plato, Simonides, Stesimbrotos.

³ *Themist.* 7.

⁵ *ib.* 11.

⁴ *ib.* 10.

⁶ *Aristeid.* 10.

⁷ *ib.* 12.

⁹ *ib.* 15.

¹¹ *ib.* 18.

¹² *Arist.* 9, *Them.* 13.

¹³ *Arist.* 9, *Them.* 16.

¹⁴ *ib.* *ib.*

¹⁵ *Them.* 6.

¹⁶ *ib.* 7.

⁸ *ib.* 14.

¹⁰ *ib.* 16.

¹⁷ *ibid.*

the benefit of the Athenian boys in exile;¹ Ariaramenes, the Persian admiral, who boarded an Athenian ship and was knocked off into the sea²—such names are hardly mere inventions. As much, perhaps, can scarcely be said for the heroic hound that swam the Straits,³ or the portentous owl that perched upon the shrouds.⁴ But Themistokles may have had a hand in bringing ways and means to light for the fitting to Salamis.⁵ The ascription to him of a psephism by which the interpreter, who acted for the Persian ambassadors in demanding earth and water, was put to death, looks less probable and rather anachronistic.⁶ The story of Arthmios of Zeleia involves an almost demonstrable anachronism;⁷ not so the apparent transfer of the visitation of the islands to a date later than that given by Herodotus.⁸ But the description of Themistokles as a youth at the time of the battle of Marathon is hardly consistent with Plutarch's own statement of his service in the battle,⁹ much less with his age at his death¹⁰—to say nothing of his probable Archontate in 493 B.C.¹¹ In chronological matters Plutarch is not over-careful. The day on which a victory was celebrated seems to have stood to him as the day upon which the battle had been fought;¹² and he, or some one before him, transferred the Eleusinian vision to the actual day of the battle of Salamis, perhaps as a more effective synchronism.¹³ Apart from topographical items—the description of Artemision,¹⁴ the position of Xerxes at the battle of Salamis¹⁵—there are, perhaps, only two statements concerning the Persian war of much value, and also new, in the *Life of Themistokles*, and one of these is a 'natural' observation. The morning wind favoured the Greeks at Salamis, and that calculation had entered into the plans of Themistokles.¹⁶ The Athenian vessels mounted eighteen *Epibatai*, of whom fourteen were archers, and four were hoplites.¹⁷

With the *Life of Aristeides* the case stands differently. Before the battle of Plataia there is nothing further that calls for remark, except the statement that Themistokles procured the ostrakism of Aristeides by accusing him *regni affectandi*, of aiming at a tyranny, a statement which will hardly stand against the Aristotelian *Polity*.¹⁸ To the story of Plataia, however, Plutarch contributes three or four additions of great intrinsic interest, with some further points, and an appendix, of considerable value. These additions are not, indeed, incontrovertible matters of fact; but, even if merely developments of the legend, they possess significance.

¹ *Them.* 10.

² *ib.* 14.

³ *ib.* 10.

⁴ *ib.* 12.

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ *Them.* 6.

⁷ *ibid.* Cp. p. 36 note 12 *supra*.

⁸ *Them.* 21.

⁹ *ib.* 3; cp. *Arist.* 5.

¹⁰ Themistokles was sixty-five years of age at his death according to Plutarch, *Them.* 31, probably about 468 B.C. Cp.

Busolt, III. i. 138, who regards that as an under-estimate.

¹¹ Cp. Busolt II. 2 642.

¹² *Arist.* 19; cp. p. 89 below.

¹³ *Them.* 15.

¹⁴ *ib.* 8.

¹⁵ *ib.* 13.

¹⁶ *ib.* 14.

¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁸ *Arist.* 7; cp. § 10 *supra*.

(1) *The story of a mission despatched by Aristides to Delphi*, apparently from the battle-field of Plataia, is far too good to be true.¹ The circumstances are against it, and the silence of Herodotus in itself almost fatal. Yet Plutarch, if ever any one, should be an authority on the Delphic archives.² Is it rash to see in this response a genuine utterance of the Pythia (even though recorded in prose) dating from the time of the original alliance of Athens with Plataia, and referring to those engagements with the Boiotians, in which the Athenians had already done and suffered much for their allies on Kithairon?³ (2) *The reported conspiracy to overthrow the Athenian democracy*.⁴ Some verisimilitude is lent to this story by the introduction of the chief offenders by their official names.⁵ Against that might be set the assembling 'in a house at Plataia,' at a time when Plataia was in ruins. Wonderful to relate, Themistokles is not brought into this plot. Is there reason to suspect that the Athenians were disunited, and threatened with traitors from within, after the victory of Salamis? Is not this story a transfer from the memories of Marathon, or, it may be, some much later occasion? In the next two cases Plutarch makes palpable hits. (3) He must be more or less right in *the record of the Aristeia*—that frappant omission from the pages of Herodotus.⁶ *Aristeia* must have been awarded for Plataia, as for every other battle in the war. The Athenians had not obtained them for Salamis, and the Spartans did not obtain them for Plataia. They went to the Plataians in the one case, as they had gone to the Aiginetans in the other. Plutarch's story can hardly be true in detail. That the Athenians claimed the *Aristeia* at Plataia is hardly credible: that they opposed the grant to Sparta, though hardly at sword's point, is probable enough. Possibly the mediation of the Korinthian, Kleokritos, is historical. The Athenians would have backed him. Incidentally Plutarch supplies the names of two of the Athenian Strategoi besides Aristides.⁷ Theogeiton the Megarian also is a witness to character. The passage reads on the whole like good history: Plutarch, alas! does not name his source. (4) A smaller but grateful item is *the number of Greeks actually slain in the battle*, 1360, among them fifty-two Athenians, all of the Aiantis.⁸ But members of the other tribes too will have fallen. The total in any case only represents hoplites and full citizens. Plutarch's appeal here to the monuments is made elsewhere in sharper form.⁹ Other details in the story of Plataia are less acceptable. (5) *The oblivion*¹⁰ and *the tears*¹¹ of Pausanias may safely be forgotten and dried. (6) *The story of the Lydians*,¹² who got in and upset the Spartan

¹ *Arist.* 11.

² He was Priest in Delphi, and Boiotian *Hieromnemon*; cp. Wachsmuth, *Einleitung* p. 214.

³ *Hdt.* 6. 108.

⁴ *Arist.* 13.

⁵ Aischines of Lamptra, Agesias of Acharnai.

⁶ *Arist.* 20.

⁷ Leokrates, Myronides.

⁸ *Arist.* 19; cp. *Mor.* 628.

⁹ *de Malig.* passim.

¹⁰ *Arist.* 17.

¹¹ *ib.* 18.

¹² *Arist.* 17.

leader's sacrifice, is a transparent cult-fiction, as the context suggests. (7) The *Appendix*¹ hardly affects the actual story of the battle, but links the present—Plutarch's present—with the past in a pious and immortal memory. *The death of the runner, Euchidas*,² may be an inference from his epitaph: *the psephism of Aristeides*,³ founding the festival of the *Eleutheria*, and a national levy withal for the war with the Barbarian, cannot be authentic. But the festival itself, in its original as in its revived form, is a precious addition to Hellenic Heortology, and as concrete and authentic in its kind as *the shrine of Athene*, erected by the Plataians from their share of the spoil, and still visible, in Plutarch's day, adorned with paintings, which, if he is to be trusted as a critic, had never undergone restoration.⁴ Such is the high value and interest of the *Aristeides*, especially in what concerns the great battle in Boiotia; such too the relative obscurity and shortcoming of the real work of Aristeides in general tradition. For the historian of the Persian war the loss of this biography would have left far more to be desired than if the life of the greater man *Themistokles* had dropped right out of Plutarch's legacy.

The *Moralia* contain many references to the agents and events of the Persian war, but (except for one treatise) add little of bulk or novelty to the general tradition, or to the deposit in the *Lives*. They show, however, even more clearly, if possible, the trivial gossip character of much that Plutarch thought authoritative, and the unscrupulous fashion in which the tradition of the Persian war had been developed, or rather encrusted with anecdote, before his time. To precise dates for Plataia and for Salamis the *de gloria Atheniensium* adds the statement that Salamis was fought at full-moon.⁵ This statement, if correct, might have some importance for the argument touching the movements of the Persian ships on the night before the battle. But the month given by Plutarch is Mounychion, and he has probably inferred the day of battle from the day of Thanksgiving, which may well have been about the next full-moon. The *Moralia* are full of anecdotes of Themistokles, many of them to be found in the *Life*⁶; this repertoire obtains the most astounding addition, on the authority of Agatharchides of Samos. Themistokles, it appears, had a brother named Agesilaos. Their father Neokles in a dream beheld Agesilaos with his two hands cut off. When Xerxes invaded Greece with five million men, and anchored off Artemision, Agesilaos was sent, disguised as a Persian, to spy out the camp. He mistook Mardonios for Xerxes, and slew him. Arrested and brought before the king, who was just engaging in a sacrifice, Agesilaos thrust his

¹ cc. 21, 21.

² c. 20.

³ c. 21.

⁴ c. 20.

⁵ Boëdromion 3 for Plataia, Munychion 16 for Salamis; cp. p. 87 *supra*.

⁶ Vast numbers of these are apophthegms, *bons mots*, etc., e.g. seventeen are given *Mor.* 184-5; cp. 1, 92, 534, 541, 602, 800, 807, 809, etc. The *Life* passim, and especially c. 18.

right hand into the fire upon the altar, to show what manner of men the Athenians were, and offered to forfeit the left hand likewise if the king was unconvinced. After this example of his prowess in history, the loss of Agatharchides of Samos becomes bearable. Plutarch himself points the parallel with the story of Mucius Scaevola.¹ Themistokles acquires, presumably in his own right, a fresh epithet, 'the slayer of Persians,'² and his mentor Mnesiphilos appears, in the company of the Seven Sages, as a man of the Solonian School³—a charming anachronism which rules him out of the battle of Salamis, more than a century later. Aristides, as a subject of anecdote, is nowhere in comparison with Themistokles.

The *Lakonic Apophthegms*⁴ preserve sundry sayings attributed to Demaratos,⁵ Leotychidas,⁶ Leonidas,⁷ Pausanias,⁸ Gorgo⁹; even 'Buris and Spertis' (*sic*) are not forgotten.¹⁰ Again the anecdote-monger is in evidence, but nothing useful is added to tradition. Elsewhere, on the authority of Aristides of Miletos, in his *Persika*, the legend of Thermopylai receives a doubly grotesque accretion.¹¹ The Milesian evidently accepted the Ephorean story of the Spartan invasion of the Persian camp by night, and added that Leonidas, transfixed with spears, rushed at Xerxes and snatched the crown from his head. After such a derring deed, no wonder the heart of Leonidas was found, his body having been opened, to be covered with hair! There are items direct to the address of Xerxes. His wrath was exhibited not merely in flogging and branding the sea, but in a letter, which he addressed to Mount Athos, the very words of which are preserved, including the threat that, if the mountain was troublesome, the king would topple it into the sea.¹² Two other anecdotes of Xerxes are more respectable. The first offers an interesting variant on the Herodotean account of the king and the corn-ships. Xerxes refused to eat Attic figs, till he should eat them *an Ort und Stelle*, in Attica itself!¹³ The second supplies a still more plausible variant upon the Herodotean story of the accession of Xerxes. Plutarch has here preserved, as an illustration of fraternal affection, a variant so respectable, and further, so well supported, that it deserves to be reckoned with seriously.¹⁴ It would be pleasant to believe a good report of

¹ *Mor.* 305 (*Parallels*).

² Περσικότρονος, *Mor.* 349.

³ *Mor.* 154.

⁴ *Mor.* 208 ff.

⁵ Eight.

⁶ Three.

⁷ Fifteen, all but one referring to Thermopylai. One of the apophthegms is transferred to Leonidas from Dienekes, *Hdt.* 7. 226.

⁸ Six, the only two referring to the Persian war being taken from *Hdt.*

⁹ Four, none referring to the Persian war; *Mor.* 240.

¹⁰ *Mor.* 236 (*Ap. Lac. ix.*). In *Mor.* 826 they reappear as Bulis and Sperchis; cp. *Hdt.* 7. 134-137.

¹¹ *Mor.* 306.

¹² *ib.* 455.

¹³ *ib.* 173. This variant explains the curious passage in Eusebios, *Sync.* 470. 7 Κίμων ἐπ' Εὐρυμέδοντι Πέρσας ἐνίκα ναυμαχία καὶ πεζομαχία. καὶ ὁ Μηδικὸς πόλεμος ἐπαύσατο διὰ φιβάλεως ἰσχυράδας Πέρσας καὶ Ἀθηναίους καὶ πάντων Ἑλλήσιν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ.

¹⁴ *Mor.* 488. Cp. notes to *Hdt.* 7. 2, and App. II. § 2, p. 123 note 3 *infra*.

Gelon's dealing with the Carthaginians, twice recorded¹; but it reads like an Hellenic suggestion of what should have been, or a late plagiarism of a Roman precedent, and not a genuine fact in Syracusan history.

The *Moralia*, in fact, contribute practically nothing from the objective order of events to the history of the Persian war, but they indicate two literary facts, one of evil and one of good omen: the first, a deplorable degeneracy in the tradition, or literary treatment of the old story; the second, what has been called above 'the return to Herodotus.' This return is shown not merely in the biographical notes—his 'exile' or migration, his friendship with Sophokles²—or in the express citation of his work, Book by Book,³ but still more in the silent use of the work, for historical or quasi-historical purpose,⁴ in the express citation of Herodotean phrases,⁵ in the appeal to Herodotus as an authority.⁶ This familiar and friendly use of the work *passim* in the *Moralia*, as in the *Lives*, makes it somewhat more difficult to treat the *De malignitate*, which systematically criticizes Herodotus in a far different spirit, as *bona fide* or genuine Plutarch. Perhaps it was a relatively juvenile work; perhaps Plutarch has been to 'the schools of the Sophists' not long before penning it; perhaps he was more or less 'defending a thesis,' playing 'the Devil's advocate'; perhaps he is not the real author. Anyway the work attests as none other the position which Herodotus has recovered and enjoys in, or rather before, the Antonine Age. That position it was apparently the object of this tract to destroy, and that object was, at least in part, effected. The authority, and even the character, of the great historian of the Persian war were levelled down to the demands of a Ktesias, an Aristophanes, an Agatharchides, and it was left to the modern world gradually to re-discover the supreme value of the Herodotean *Histories*.

Considerably more than half the tract here in view is directly concerned with the examination of the last three Books of Herodotus, that is, the history of the Persian war.⁷ Our present concern is not

¹ *Mor.* 175, 552. Cp. Freeman, *Sicily* ii. 208, who discusses the point at length, and thinks there must have been some truth in it. The same story was told, Freeman says, of 'Darius'—but he gives no authority therefor.

² The migration from Halikarnassos to Thurioi, *Mor.* 605, a much kindlier reference than in 868 (*de malig.* 35). The Epigram of Sophokles, *Mor.* 785 (beautifully completed by Gomperz in *Mélanges Henri Weil*, 1898).

³ In the *de malig.* *passim*; cp. also *Mor.* 826.

⁴ *Mor.* 470, 601, 828, etc.

⁵ *Mor.* 414, 417, 607, 436.

⁶ *Mor.* 403, 479, etc.

⁷ The first two Books are dealt with in cc. 11–20 (though he has little to say against Book 2): the Third occupies cc. 21, 22. The Fourth is passed over. The Fifth Book is dealt with in cc. 23, 24, the Sixth in cc. 25–27. The Seventh Book is not expressly cited, but its contents are criticized in cc. 28–33. The Eighth Book fills cc. 34–40, 'the Ninth and last' cc. 41, 42. A general summary concludes (c. 43), corresponding to the general Introduction (cc. 1–10). Obviously the Themistoklean portion of Hdt.'s narrative bulks most largely in the critic's work, and the last three Books are more fully reviewed than the first six.

so much with the critique as such, as with the contribution indirectly made, over and above, to the materials for a history of the Persian war, or, it may be, merely to the history of that history.

The supplementary *Sources* are not badly represented in the latter portion of the tract; and, if Plutarch had been more concerned to make good the omissions for which he censures Herodotus, the result might have been more instructive, even if less entertaining. Aristophanes of Boiotia, Nikandros of Kolophon, Hellanikos, Ephoros, are all cited by name, as well as Pindar and Simonides. We owe to this tract our knowledge of upwards of thirty lines of epigram, epitaph, elegy. The references to monuments erected to commemorate the war are valuable. But when we come to add together the actual contribution to the story of the war, the debt is not large, nor all perhaps *bono nomine*. (1) The feuds between Thessaly and Makedonia, Korinth and Megara, Chalkis and Eretria, with which the Herodotean record of the reconciliation of Athens and Aigina is capped,¹ look a little inferential. (2) The recent dominion of the Thessalians over Phokis and a part of Boiotia, their defeat by the Thebans, and the death of their leader Lattamyas, may be a legitimate extension of the story in Herodotus of the Thessalo-Phokian feud, and was doubtless to be found in Aristophanes.² (3) The statements that the Thebans sent 500 men under Mnamias to Tempe,³ and that (4) the commander of the 400 Thebans at Thermopylai was Anaxandros (not Leontiades),⁴ presumably came from the same authority, and look plausible; less so the other additions to the legend of Thermopylai—or is it Thebes?—(5) that Demaratos, as *hospes* of Attaginos, intervened to save the Theban captives,⁵ (6) that Leonidas foresaw in a dream the future rise, and fall, of Thebes.⁶ The censure on Herodotus for omitting the night-attack on the Persians before Thermopylai is merely the expression of the writer's preference for an Ephorean fiction.⁷ The fine anecdote of the refusal of the Spartan warrior, who haughtily declined to save his life by acting as despatch-bearer, has occurred already elsewhere,⁸ and is in any case probably only *ben trovato*. Other concrete facts there are none. But the arguments, by which it is proved, that the Thebans were well received by the Persians,⁹ that the Greeks did not 'run away' from Artemision,¹⁰ nor the Korinthians from Salamis,¹¹ nor the centre at Plataia,¹² are valid, and the conclusions acceptable: equally so the suggestion that Herodotus has done less than justice to Themistokles.¹³ And, perhaps, we must allow that in twitting Herodotus with the prominence accorded to Artemisia in the councils and campaign of Xerxes,¹⁴ this sophistic

¹ c. 35.² c. 33.¹¹ c. 39.³ c. 31.⁴ *ibid.*¹² c. 42.⁵ *ibid.*⁶ *ibid.*¹³ cc. 37, 38, where the writer adds that 'Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐπωνομάσθη διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. Also c. 40.⁷ c. 32.⁸ *ibid.* Cp. *Mor.* 225.¹⁴ *ibid.*⁹ cc. 31, 33.¹⁰ c. 34.

writer has touched a human weakness; though oddly enough Plutarch himself elsewhere ascribes to Artemisia a service to Xerxes, for which Herodotus is not his authority.¹ Of the critique as a whole suffice it to say that, while certain details in the Herodotean story are shrewdly censured, the whole method of the critic is vitiated by the failure to distinguish between Herodotus and his Sources, and by a confusion between the intention and the results of his historiography. None can fail to recognize the dominance of the Attic and phil-Attic tradition in Herodotus, a dominance due, in part no doubt, to the simplicity and good faith of the man. A critical historian Herodotus was not; yet his work would not have been better, but far worse, less a treasury and a mirror of history than it is, could he have anticipated, and adopted, the critical or the constructive principles of his censors. This canon applies not merely to Ktesias, Plutarch, and all that class, but to Thucydides, whose own great work was intended to be the last word on Herodotus. But the truer verdict on Herodotus must ever be an appreciation, and that Plutarch exhibits by his own practice rather than by his critique.²

§ 15. *Topographers*.—Strabo and Pausanias, though divided in date, and to some extent in subject and method, may be conveniently here classed together for our purpose, both alike dealing rather with the *Realien* than with mere tradition as such. To both history is but incidental, in the one case to geography, in the other to antiquities, and antiquities in strict topographical setting. As geographer STRABO makes, indeed, some contribution to our subject, though hardly as much as might have been expected. Strabo is addicted to Homer: the Homeric landscape, or at least the Homeric choriography of Greece, is predominant with him. His descriptions of Thermopylai and the neighbourhood,³ of Salamis and the Attic coast,⁴ of Plataia and the Parasopia,⁵ are of value, but he attaches very little of the story of the Persian war to these localities, and that little is manifestly not derived directly from Herodotus. The heroes of the Persian war are scarcely named by him. Themistokles is mentioned, but not in connexion with the war.⁶ The names of Xerxes⁷ and Mardonios⁸ are associated with traditions of the war; Leonidas is barely lauded⁹; the traitor Ephialtes is not forgotten¹⁰; and a martyr to barbarian

¹ *Them.* 14.

² Some few trifles will have escaped the above sifting of the *Moralia*, e.g. the mission to consult the oracles of Amphiaraos etc. is referred to *Mor.* 411 (*de defect. Or.* 5), and the story goes that the slave—a Lydian—sent on this mission had a dream which foreshowed the defeat and death of Mardonios, who was killed by a stone. Again, *ibid.*, an oracle at Tegyra foretold the Greek victory, one Echekrates being the prophet.

³ C. 428.

⁴ 393.

⁵ 409.

⁶ 587; cp. 636; passages which show that Strabo followed those who dated Themistokles' reception in Asia to the reign of Xerxes.

⁷ 10, 131, 394, 395, 443.

⁸ 412.

⁹ 10, 429, 467.

¹⁰ 10, 19 (a bogle).

ignorance, Salganeus by name, unknown to Herodotus, makes his appearance, together with a Persian admiral Megabates¹; but Pausanias, Aristides, Artemisia, and the rest are all forgotten. The battles of the war, so far as noticed, are dismissed in brief generalities. Artemision is not even mentioned, but the storm may be recognized in the rhetorical statement that 'Hellas was full of wrecks at the time of the Xerxean expedition,' and is afterwards referred to not without a touch of scorn in the description of Magnesia.² The anecdote of 'Salganeus,' or the man of Salganeus, is, indeed, a remarkable addition to the log of the Persian fleet, if only it could be accepted as anything more than a historicized fable to illustrate a topical illusion.³ Nothing is added to the story of Thermopylai except the rhetorical inference that 'the Persians despised Leonidas and his men for their hair-dressing till they met them in battle'⁴; but the notice of the monuments and inscription *in loco* has a real value.⁵ The topographical notes on Salamis are naturally welcome,⁶ the battle is dismissed summarily,⁷ and the dispute between the Athenians and Aiginetans, though not expressly mentioned by Herodotus, does not go beyond the common tradition.⁸ Two items, however, in this context have some importance, one for the theory of the battle, and both as illustrating the relation of Strabo to Herodotus. (1) The king's attempt to build a mole across the ferry to Salamis is recorded, and recorded to have been arrested by the battle.⁹ If that was the case, the building of the mole preceded the battle. (2) Strabo mentions as a tradition that the Persian wreckage was cast ashore at Kolias, and he quotes as an Apolline oracle the line which Herodotus ascribes to Lysimachos.¹⁰ In neither of these cases is Strabo drawing directly on

¹ See below.

² 10 πλήρης τε ναυαγίων ἡ Ἑλλάς ὑπῆρξε κατὰ τὴν Ξέρξου στρατείαν. 443 ἡ μέντοι Σηπιάς ἀκτὴ καὶ τετραψόδηται μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐξύμνηται διὰ τὸν ἐνταῦθα ἀφανισμόν τοῦ Περσικοῦ στόλου κτλ.

³ 10, 403. The second passage gives the story. Salganeus was employed to guide the Persian ships through the Euripos. On approaching the straits the admiral, Megabates, thought the guide was running the fleet ashore, and slew him. The mistake was discovered, and the Persians buried Salganeus in a magnificent tomb. This was the origin of the Boiotian city of Salganeus. The true eponymous hero of Salganeus will surely be much older than the Persian war. The *Etymikon* was Σαλγάνιος, Steph. Byz. *sub v.*, who adds, however, Σαλγανίτης and Σαλγαγεὺς Ἀπόλλων. Possibly 'a Boiotian of Salganeus' may have acted the part and met the fate recorded in this story; if so, it is

Strabo's one contribution to the history of the war.

⁴ 467 τοὺς περὶ Λεωνίδα κτενιζομένους, ὅτ' ἐξήσαν εἰς τὴν μάχην, καταφρονηθῆναι λέγουσιν ὑπὸ τῶν Περσῶν, ἐν δὲ τῇ μάχῃ θαυμάσθηναι. This will be the commentary of Ephoros, or his like, on Hdt. 7. 208.

⁵ 429; cp. § 2 *surra*.

⁶ 393.

⁷ 394 ἐπιφανὴς δὲ ἡ νῆσος ὑπῆρξε . . καὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν νῆσον ταύτην καταναυμαχηθῆναι Ξέρξην ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ φυγεῖν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν.

⁸ 375 αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ καὶ θαλαττοκρατήσασα ποτε καὶ περὶ πρωτείων ἀμφισβητήσασα πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῇ περὶ Σαλαμῖνα ναυμαχίᾳ κατὰ τὰ Περσικά. Cp. Hdt. 8. 122.

⁹ 395 ὁ εἰς Σαλαμῖνα πορθμὸς ὅσον διστάδιος, ὃν διαχοῦν ἐπειρᾶτο Ξέρξης, ἐφθῆ δὲ ἡ ναυμαχία γενομένη καὶ φυγὴ τῶν Περσῶν.

¹⁰ 398; cp. Hdt. 8. 96. So, more

Herodotus.¹ For Plataia as for Thermopylai the topographical notes are valuable, and the notice of the tombs, of the temple of Zeus Eleutherios, and of the actual celebration of the festival, anticipates, so to speak, our debt to Plutarch²; but the battle itself is dismissed with the facile remark that 'Mardonios and his thirty myriads were simply wiped out at Plataia by the Hellenic forces.'³ Mykale is frequently mentioned as a grand landmark,⁴ but is described without a word about the battle that capped Plataia. Sestos and the *Heptastadion* are duly surveyed at some length,⁵ the bridge of Xerxes being just mentioned there,⁶ as the canal at Akanthos, though without any express citation of Herodotus; but there is no record of the siege, the story of which bulks large in Herodotus. In short, Strabo was not much interested in the Persian war, and his notices of it were not derived directly from Herodotus.

Nevertheless Strabo was much occupied with the work of Herodotus, and his own work bears constant witness to his acquaintance therewith. But it was not the last three Books, probably, with which Strabo was best pleased; nor was it the story told by Herodotus, which Strabo was ever prepared to endorse.⁷ Strabo had a poor opinion of Herodotus as historian. He recognizes indeed, to a certain extent, his charm, or at least his readableness,⁸ but he classes Herodotus as an historical authority with Hellanikos, Ktesias, Eudoxos, and other gay deceivers⁹; he prefers Hesiod and Homer as truthful storytellers¹⁰; he agrees with Theopompos—he might have said Thucydides—that Herodotus was a myth-monger.¹¹ Still, Strabo upon his own proper ground pays Herodotus the compliments of use and approval. For physical geography, topography, even for local customs or *curiosa*, Strabo cites Herodotus by name as an authority,¹² and perhaps uses

remarkably still, Strabo transforms a Persian *bon mot* into a Delphic response; cp. my note to Hdt. 4. 144. 2.

¹ Strabo, 635, quotes Kallisthenes as his authority for the story of the fining of Phrynichos, cp. Hdt. 6. 21; Strabo, 531, states that on the Araxes Kallisthenes followed Herodotus. Suidas cites the second book of the *Περσικά* s.v. *Σαρδανάπαλος*. The identification of the *Περσικά* with the Alexander-history is purely conjectural.

² Strabo 404, 408–412. He mentions *inter alia* the injury done to Boiotia by the Persian war (402), and notices, characteristically, that the name Plataiai is singular in Homer.

³ 412 *ἐνταῦθα Μαρδόνιον καὶ τὰς τριάκοντα μυριάδας Περσῶν αἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων δυνάμεις ἄρδην ἠφάνισαν*.

⁴ cp. especially 636.

⁵ 124, and especially 591.

⁶ 331, *fr.* 56.

⁷ 331, *fr.* 35, where the doubts of Demetrios of Skepsis are recorded.

⁸ 818 *πολλὰ δ' Ἡρόδοτός τε καὶ ἄλλοι φλυαροῦσιν, ὥσπερ μέλος ἢ ρυθμὸν ἢ ἡδυσμὰ τι τῷ λόγῳ τὴν τερατεῖαν προσφέροντες* (the examples quoted are from Book 2).

⁹ 43, 508, 550.

¹⁰ 508.

¹¹ 43. As an actual instance he gives 'the myth of Arion,' 618. Cp. Hdt. 1. 24. In 61, 62 he censures the Hyperborean argument, cp. Hdt. 4. 32 ff.

¹² e.g. 59 (the alluviation of the Echinades, Hdt. 2. 10); 544 (Halys-mouth); 626 (Hermos-mouth); 533, 627 (Lydian customs); 823 (Egyptian); 98, 100 (circumnavigation of Libya by order of Dareios (*sic*)); 151 (Arganthonios); 301, 305 (expedition of Dareios into Skythia); 448 (the *Sagene* in Eretria); 473 (temple in Memphis); 573 (Termilai in Lykia).

him also without citation. To the last volume of Herodotus there are, in Strabo's work, at least four express references, and oddly enough all to the Seventh Book. Herodotus on the Thracian Chersonese,¹ on the origin of the Pamphylians,² on the foundation of Hyria,³ and on the topography of Trachis,⁴ is apparently good enough for Strabo to borrow of. Certain Herodotean phrases and turns, in relation to matters geographical, are specially happy in Strabo's opinion. One such he quotes expressly not less than four times⁵; another he transfers silently⁶; others he notes, apparently with approval.⁷ Thus Strabo, a contemporary of Dionysios of Halikarnassos,⁸ as of the emperor Tiberius,⁹ bears, after his kind, witness direct and indirect, both to the revival of Herodotean studies, and also to the extent to which the Herodotean tradition of the Persian war had been superseded by writers of the rhetorical and rationalistic school.

PAUSANIAS the *periegete*, whose life and composition fall into the second and third quarters of the second century of our era,¹⁰ may be taken to exhibit the high-water mark of the Antonine reaction, or development, in Herodotus' favour. Of all his contemporaries Pausanias is the most conscious and loyal follower of Herodotus, for Arrian, much as he is indebted to Herodotus, is primarily a pupil of Xenophon's; and Lucian's satire and parody recall in more genial aspect the scorn of Strabo and the indignation of Plutarch. The Lydian¹¹ antiquary is one in mind and to a great extent in method with the 'father of history,' so far as the conscious reproduction of antique examples can ever be really homogeneous with them. Pausanias emulates his great exemplar's piety and philosophy, reproduces his formulas and parrots his phrases. The style alone would prove the man a plagiarist.¹² His real use of the work of Herodotus is

¹ 331, *fr.* 52; cp. Hdt. 7. 58.

² 668; cp. Hdt. 7. 91.

³ 282; cp. Hdt. 7. 170.

⁴ 428; cp. Hdt. 7. 199, 200.

⁵ δῶρον τοῦ ποταμοῦ 30, 36, 536, 691; cp. Hdt. 2. 5.

⁶ πρόσχημα τῆς Ἑλλάδος 440 (Kalydon and Pleuron); cp. Hdt. 5. 28 τῆς Ἰωνίης πρόσχημα (Miletos).

⁷ ἐντὸς ἄλλως 534.

⁸ 656; cp. 455, 478.

⁹ 228; cp. 291, 305, 618.

¹⁰ 5. 21. 15 he gives Ol. 226=127 A.D. as ἐφ' ἡμῶν. He refers to Trajan (4. 35. 3, 5. 12. 6), Hadrian (*passim*), and the two Antonines (8. 43). The wars with the Germans and Sarmatians there mentioned began in 166 A.D., and were not really terminated by the 'triumph' of 176 A.D.; but this may well be the latest reference in Pausanias. The first Book on Elis he was writing in 174 A.D.

Cp. 5. 1. 2 (Frazer, iii. 465). He wrote the *Ἀρχαία* before, and the *Ἀγχαία* after, 160 A.D.; cp. 7. 20. 6 with Frazer's note (iv. 149). The invasion of the Kostoboks (10. 34. 5 κατ' ἐμέ) is dated by Frazer (v. 439 f.) between 166-180 A.D. Cp. Frazer, *Introduction*, i. xv. ff.

¹¹ If a Lydian he was: 5. 13. 7 hardly proves it. But cp. Frazer, i. xix.

¹² e.g. 1. 14. 3, 1. 26. 4, 1. 38. 7, 1. 39. 3, 2. 17. 4, 3. 11. 1, 3. 25. 5, etc. etc. Cp. Frazer, *Introduction*, i. lxxiii. The style of Pausanias is not, of course, Herodotean; but if he got his vinegar from Hegesias, he drew his drops of honey from Hdt. Curiously enough, for the instability of human happiness Pausanias cites the authority not of Hdt., but of a greater than Hdt., viz. Homer; cp. 8. 24. 13. The reference to 'the Age of Kroisos' in the immediate context suggests, however, the latent association of ideas.

proved not merely by direct citation—Herodotus is cited by name not less than fifteen times in the course of the *Periegesis*¹—but still more by the silent use of the master's work everywhere as authoritative. A score of such cases is easy to glean from the history of the Persian war alone.² Not that Pausanias repeats Herodotean stories. On the contrary, Pausanias studiously avoids mere reproduction of stories told by Herodotus, and makes a canon of this avoidance.³ Thus he takes for granted everywhere the story of the Persian war as told by Herodotus, and in all the major episodes he plainly follows Herodotus, and not Ephoros, or his like.⁴ But though he avoids mere repetition, he supplements and amplifies the Herodotean tradition, he comments on Herodotean themes, and he reports or reconstructs later episodes, under Herodotean influences, in a way almost to persuade us, if that were possible, that history repeated itself. All this he does mainly in reporting tradition, though he is not primarily historian or logographer. Pausanias is primarily archaeologist and topographer. Under these heads, too, his work forms a valuable commentary upon the work of Herodotus, especially as concerning the Persian war. His topographical descriptions of places and positions amplify and confirm the Herodotean descriptions of the battle-fields.⁵ His archaeological inventories of buildings, tombs, monuments, and so forth, connected with the war, have an independent value of their own, which has been already indicated under another heading.⁶ We are here concerned to exhibit merely the contribution which Pausanias makes to the actual traditions of the war. These novelties will not all have been committed to writing before Pausanias; several would appear to have been gathered by the *periegete* in the presence of material monuments or objects with which the story or tradition was associ-

¹ (Hdt. 1) 2. 16. 1, 3. 25. 7, 3. 2. 3; (Hdt. 4) 1. 43. 1, 4. 35. 12, 1. 33. 5; (Hdt. 5) 1. 5. 1, 2. 30. 4; (Hdt. 6) 2. 20. 10; (Hdt. 7) 5. 26. 4, 10. 20. 2; (Hdt. 8) 10. 32. 8, 9; 10. 33. 8, 10. 33. 9, 10. 33. 12. Four Books of Pausanias (6, 7, 8, 9) have no citation of Hdt. by name.

² (1) 2. 3. 8=Hdt. 7. 62. (2) 3. 9. 7=Hdt. 7. 21, 22, etc. (3) 6. 5. 4=Hdt. 7. 125. (4) 7. 10. 2=Hdt. 7. 6, 130, etc. (5) 1. 19. 5=Hdt. 7. 189. (6) 3. 12. 9=Hdt. 7. 227. (7) 9. 1. 3=Hdt. 8. 1. (8) 2. 29. 5 Hdt.=8. 46? (9) 10. 8. 7=Hdt. 8. 39. (10) 3. 11. 3 (Artemisia). (11) 3. 16. 6 (Eurybiades). (12) 1. 1. 5=Hdt. 8. 96. (13) 9. 23. 6=Hdt. 8. 133 f. (14) 10. 2. 1=Hdt. 9. 17. (15) 8. 6. 1=Hdt. 9. 28. (16) 6. 14. 3=Hdt. 9. 33 ff. (17) 9. 4. 3=Hdt. 9. 49. (18) 3. 4. 9=Hdt. 9. 76. (19) 1. 27. 1=Hdt. 9. 63. (20) 7. 10. 2=Hdt. 9. 89, etc. etc.

³ 2. 30. 4 ταῦτα εἰπόντος Ἡροδότου καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐπ' ἀκριβὲς οὐ μοι γράφειν κατὰ γνώμην ἦν κτλ. Cp. 1. 5. 1.

⁴ 1. 18. 2 (capture of the Akropolis), 1. 27. 2 (portent of the olive-shoot), are probably from Hdt., though the first passage contains a touch of rhetoric, and the second an inaccuracy (αὐθημερόν). 8. 52. 2 f. gives a remarkable summary, or outline, of the Persian war, but goes beyond Hdt. Ephoros is (rightly, I believe) not even mentioned by Dr. Frazer among 'Historians used by Pausanias,' *Introduction*, lxxiii. f.

⁵ Thermopylai did not strictly come within the *Periegesis*, and is only incidentally illustrated; cp. 7. 15. 3, 10. 22. 8. But the description of Salamis, 1. 35. 1, 2; 36. 1, and more especially of Plataia, 9. 2-4, are valuable. (For Marathon cp. *Hdt. IV.-VI.* ii. 225 ff.)

⁶ Cp. § 2 *supra*.

ated, and orally handed down. However that may be, we at least owe them to Pausanias, in whose work they make their first appearance as literary deposit.

There are some fifteen such items. (1) Pausanias solves the problem left open by Herodotus as to the visitation of the Athenians for their ill-treatment of the Persian heralds in 491 B.C.—Miltiades had been the author of the crime, and his fate was the divine consequence. Pausanias has here surpassed Herodotus in his own properest vein.¹ (2) The statement that the Hellenion at Sparta was used for the deliberations of the national representatives in the Persian war may have been gathered by Pausanias in Sparta, but can hardly be allowed to supplant the statements of Herodotus, which make the Isthmos the scene of meeting. Either further deliberations took place in Sparta, of which Herodotus knows nothing; or Pausanias, that is, Spartan tradition, associated the confederate meetings in the Persian war with a building, which may have been used by the Spartan *Symmachy* on other occasions.² (3) The Olympian list of the Hellenic confederacy as given by Pausanias is undoubtedly an important, and presumably an authentic document. But this list of states agrees neither with the list on the serpent-column at Delphi nor with the Herodotean army-list for Plataia; and both the Delphian and Olympian lists include island-states, which surely were not represented on that occasion. Obviously, even if the monuments were defrayed from the Plataian spoil, the lists went beyond the Plataian battle-roll. The Olympian list, as given by Pausanias, only differs from the indubitably authentic Delphian list by the omission of four names. As the exact date and circumstances under which the Eleian list was compiled are not recorded, there seems insufficient reason for doubting its accuracy; but neither the Olympic nor the Delphian list can discredit the army-list in Herodotus.³ (4) Pausanias tells a curious story of 'Skylis' of Skione and his daughter Hydna, which he presumably picked up at Delphi in presence of their statues. They were reported to have dived, during the storm which befell the ships of Xerxes off Pelion, and to have loosened the Persian anchors, and so contributed to the wreckage. This report does not exactly contradict the record of 'Skylis' in Herodotus, but might rather be accounted one of the fictions about the diver which Herodotus knew, but would not repeat, even on Delphic authority.⁴ (5) Far more valuable is the mention in Pausanias of a Trachinian route 'through the Ainianes,' even though he incontinently identifies it with the path—Anopaia—by which Leonidas and his men were circumvented. This route should be alternative not merely to Thermopylai, and to Anopaia, but even to the route

¹ 3. 12. 7; cp. Hdt. 7. 133.

² 3. 12. 6; cp. Appendix III. § 5
infra.

³ 5. 23. 1, 2. Cp. Dr. Frazer's admirable note to 10. 13. 9, v. 299 ff.

⁴ 10. 19. 1, 2; cp. Hdt. 8. 8.

into Doris by the Asopos gorge, and may really have been used by a Persian division.¹ (6) Tradition long expected the conversion of Thermopylai from a failure into a success, from a defeat into a victory. This conversion Pausanias expressly records as accomplished in Spartan tradition, and he gives us a clue to the making, or to the transfiguring agency, in his notice of the annual celebration of the event at the tomb of Leonidas in Sparta. In his own notices of the Persian war he virtually adopts the Spartan point of view on this subject.² (7) That the Boiotian town of Haliartos was loyal during the Persian war to the national side, and was destroyed in consequence by Xerxes, if true, marks a startling omission in the pages of Herodotus. The site of Haliartos would make its isolated heroism more inexplicable than the loyalties of Thespiiai and Plataia. Did the legend of the heroism of Haliartos only date from the days when the Romans, after razing the city for its adhesion to Perseus, handed over the Haliartian land to Athens?³ (8) The story of Salamis is enriched with the apparition of the serpent-hero, Kychreus, perhaps from one of those 'songs of Salamis' which Pausanias elsewhere notices, and peradventure heard.⁴ (9) The trophy set up by Themistokles is already an old friend, though not observed by Herodotus. Perhaps Pausanias may actually have seen it.⁵ (10) The legend of Themistokles obtains a startling addition by the story of the refusal of the Delphian Apollo to accept an offering at his hands. This story cuts, as some may have seen, both ways. Themistokles had asked leave of the god to make him a present from the spoils of Salamis. Had the god been so consulted in other cases, would he have accepted any gift from the spoils of the Mede? As a matter of fact there was no Athenian offering in commemoration of

¹ 10. 22. 8 ἡ ὑπὲρ Τραχίνος might be the route through the Asopos gorge. ἡ διὰ τῆς Αἰνιάνων must be sought further to the west; cp. notes to 7. 216. Pausanias expressly identifies it with the route followed by Hydarnes and the Medes, i.e. the 'Anopaia' of Hdt. As he nowhere uses the Herodotean term, he may possibly in this case be intending to correct the Master. Cp. 3. 4. 8.

² 1. 13. 5 Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ πρὸ μὲν ἐν Λεύκτροις οὐδὲν ἐγγέγονει πταῖσμα, ὥστε οὐδὲ συνεχώρουν ἀγῶνι πω κεκρατῆσθαι περὶ. Λεωνίδα μὲν γὰρ νικῶντι οὐκ ἔφασαν τοὺς ἐπομένους ἐς τελέαν ἐξαρκέσαι φθορὰν τῶν Μήδων κτλ. 3. 14. 1 τοῦ θεάτρου δὲ ἀπαντικρὺ Πανσανίου τοῦ Πλαταιῶσιν ἡγησαμένου μνημῆμα ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον Λεωνίδου· καὶ λόγους κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς λέγουσι καὶ τιθέασιν ἀγῶνα, ἐν ᾧ πλὴν Σπαρτιατῶν ἄλλω γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγωνίζεσθαι. Cp. 3. 4. 7, 8; 8. 52. 2 Λεωνίδας δ' Ἀναξανδρίδου καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς δ' Νεοκλέους ἀπόσαντο ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος

Ξέρξην, ὁ μὲν ταῖς ναυμαχίαις ἀμφοτέροις Λεωνίδας δὲ ἀγῶνι τῷ ἐν Θερμοπύλαις.

³ 9. 32. 5; cp. Strabo, 411. The strategic importance of Haliartos must be obvious to every traveller in Boiotia. The city commanded the col, or passage, between the plain of Thebes and the basin of the Kopais lake.

⁴ 1. 36. 1. Cp. 8. 10. 9 ἄδεται δὲ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ὡς θεοὶ σφισιν ἐν Μαραθῶνι καὶ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τοῦ ἔργου μετὰσχοιεν.

⁵ 1. 36. 1. Elsewhere, 8. 50. 3, Pausanias records that the spectators stood up to receive Themistokles at the Olympian Festival (Ol. 76?). Be it remarked here that Pausanias does not love Aristides. He associates his name with the Plataian victory, but adds that he forfeited his popularity by taxing the Islands (8. 52. 2); and he mentions the destruction of 400 Persians on Psyttaleia (1. 36. 2) without naming the hero of that exploit.

Salamis at Delphi, for fairly obvious reasons. Pausanias has not, however, observed that the argument, or explanation, he records does not harmonize with the request addressed by the Delphian god to Aigina, according to Herodotus.¹ (11) Pausanias will have seen the doorless and roofless Heraion on the road to Phaleron, said to have been left in that condition as a monument of the devastation wrought by Mardonios in Attica—in any case a local legend.² (12) Far more important and like a genuine tradition, of local provenience, is the story of the destruction of a portion of Mardonios' forces in the Megarid. This episode, if accepted, would be of real assistance in explaining the movements of Mardonios for the evacuation of Attica.³ (13) Pausanias gives, what Herodotus could not have given, 'the seventy-fifth Olympiad' as the date of the battle of Plataia; but he does not give the year in the quadrennium precisely.⁴ (14) He makes 'Arimnestos' (*sic*) general of the Plataians 'in the battle against Mardonios,' as previously at Marathon.⁵ (15) Finally, he records the destruction of a remnant of the forces of Mardonios in the grove of Demeter Kabiria—perhaps an alternative, but not a direct contradiction, of the pious observation in Herodotus on the immunity of the precinct of Demeter Eleusinia from the pollution of blood.⁶

The items thus enumerated are not all of equal value, or of similar import. In a class by themselves stand the Olympian list, and the notice of the alternative route in Trachis. The defeat of the Persians in the Megarid is more plausible than the destruction of the remnant after Plataia, and this, again, more pleasing than the ruin of Haliartos. Mere wonders, like Skyllis the Diver's feats, or Kychreus the Hero's apparition, are easily disposed of: they belong to the regular repertoire of Greek story-tellers. More interesting as reflexions of debate and after-thought are the Delphian rejection of the victor of Salamis, and the Spartan conversion of Thermopylai from a fiasco into a success. The judgement exercised in finding a scapegoat for Athenian crime might be credited to Pausanias' own exercises in the Herodotean theodicy. He is on safer ground when he envisages trophy, or Heraion, or Hellenion, without, however, adding so much to our reconstruction of events, or to the actual story of the Persian war.

Finally, in another class of passages, Pausanias goes rather further beyond Herodotus, while still attesting his own Herodotean interest, and illustrating the survival of Herodotean authority. (1) The

¹ 10. 14. 5, 6; cp. Hdt. 8. 122.

² 1. 1. 5. Elsewhere (10. 35. 2) he records the vow of the Greeks (unknown to Hdt.) not to rebuild the temples destroyed by the Persians. Cp. pp. 32, 40, (70) *supra*.

³ 1. 40. 2, 3. The story was, perhaps, told in connexion with the statue of Artemis Soteira. The benighted and

panic-stricken Persians, lost in the mountains on the way from Megara to Thebes, and idly discharging their arrows against the groaning rocks, are a spectacle worthy the pen of Herodotus. Pausanias rises to the occasion. Cp. Hdt. 9. 14.

⁴ 6. 3. 4.

⁵ 9. 4. 2.

⁶ 9. 25. 9; cp. Hdt. 9. 65.

mysterious prophet Bakis, who flits across the pages of Herodotus, materializes for Pausanias into a Boiotian, with something at least of a human personality.¹ (2) The unwritten chapters in the history of the Thessalo-Phokian feud are supplied by Pausanias with material which commands respect, whatever the channels by which it has filtered through to this late authority.² (3) Herodotus had given the bare pedigrees of the Spartan Royal Houses; Pausanias repeats them, not without a trifling variant or two, but with a wealth of historical or biographical detail which makes the mere genealogies good reading.³ (4) Furthest from Herodotus in one sense, yet nearest in another, is the astounding story of the invasion of Greece by the Gauls under Brennus, the circumvention of Thermopylai and its defenders, the miraculous preservation of Delphi: a story, or series of episodes, narrated, with the most transparent plagiarisms, as exact parallels to the episodes of the Persian war, as narrated by Herodotus. Possibly the Gauls really did use the route 'through the Ainianes,' in their attack on Thermopylai; and Pausanias, in his determined parallelism, has been led to identify it with the path 'betrayed by Ephialtes of Trachis to the Medes.'⁴

§ 16. *The Rhetors*.—There will be no great injustice done to either if Dio, the exponent of 'the simple life,' and Aristides, a devotee of 'faith-healing,' are here classed together as representatives of rhetorical literature, albeit they belonged to different generations, and were in other respects contrasted characters. Both, indeed, were Asianic Greeks; both represented a strong atticizing tendency in literature; both were exponents of a revived national feeling among Hellenes; both made use of the traditions of the Persian war, in the literary, rhetorical and national interests; and both attest the popularity of Herodotus, or at least the steady recourse to his work, in the first and second centuries of our era. DIO CHRYSOSTOM,⁵ indeed, true to his Attic preference, places Thucydides and Theopompos above

¹ 10. 12. 11 ἐκ Βοιωτίας Βάκιν . . κατάσχετον ἄνδρα ἐκ νυμφῶν. Cp. 4. 27. 4, 9. 17. 5, 10. 14. 6, 10. 32. 8 (Bakis and Hdt. reconciled).

² 10. 1. 3-11; cp. notes to Hdt. 8. 27.

³ The Agids, 3. 2-6; cp. Hdt. 7. 204. The Eurypontids, 3. 7-10. 5; cp. Hdt. 8. 131. For the differences see notes to *l.c.*

⁴ 1. 4. 1-4, 8. 10. 9, 10. 19. 5-10. 23. Cp. p. 98 *supra*.

⁵ Cocceianus Dion was alive, and in Prusa *ad Olympum*, his native place, during Pliny's Legation in Bithynia, 111 A.D., cp. Pliny's *Letters*, 10. 81, 82. His birth, however, may fall as early as 40 A.D. (W. Schmid, *ap. Pauly-Wissowa*, v. 849). His life divides itself into

three distinct stages—(i.) c. 40-82 A.D., during which he became more or less the typical rhetor; (ii.) 82-97 A.D., the period of his exile or retirement, travels and hardships, during which he more and more put on the philosophic mind; (iii.) c. 97 A.D. to the end, the period of his restoration and greater influence, though his good intentions and activity were not a little thwarted by local jealousy and *Kleinstädtereii*. Philostratos, *de vit. Sophist.* 1. 7, gives a short account of him, but the main points in his biography are to be recovered from the 80 extant Orations: the results admirably put together by Schmid, *l.c.* Cp. also L. Dindorf's edition, Teubner, 1857. The title *χρυσόστομος* was not borne by Dio during his life-time.

Herodotus, as historians¹; but his highest praise is reserved for Xenophon.² He does not cite Herodotus as authority for the Persian war, though the Herodotean tradition reappears strongly throughout his own references to the course of events³: the work of Herodotus is to Dio a form of literature rather than of history.⁴ Dio himself, a philosopher in his way, sits rather loosely to historical facts,⁵ and uses the story of the Persian wars of old mainly with an ethical reference, which is at times Herodotean.⁶ He adds nothing concrete to our knowledge of the actual traditions of the war, but his occasional comments are not without intrinsic value, and a refracted interest.⁷ His defence of the lie in history, as illustrated by the Persian accounts of the war, is distinctly suggestive.⁸ His preference of Aristides to Themistokles is not surprising,⁹ but he has a good word to say for Themistokles too as against the Athenians.¹⁰ It is the moral of the war, which Dio delights to draw; and the moral sometimes leads to a slight transfiguration of the story.¹¹ The mishandling of nature as

¹ *Or.* 18, i. 282 ff. The reff. are to Dindorf, *ed. cit.*

² *ibid.*

³ The *Corinthiaca*, *Or.* 37, is replete with Hdt., but it is not genuine; the references in the genuine *Orations* are, however, strongly Herodotean. But Dio is not concerned to defend Hdt. even against Ktesias, cp. *Or.* 11 (i. 210), *οἱ μὲν φασιν ὕστερον γενέσθαι τὴν περὶ Σαλαμῖνα ναυμαχίαν τῆς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς μάχης, οἱ δὲ τῶν ἔργων τελευταῖον εἶναι τὸ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς.* Cp. § 5 above.

⁴ *Or.* 18 l.c. *Ἡροδότῳ μὲν οὖν, εἰ ποτε εὐφροσύνης σοι δεῖ, μετὰ πολλῆς ἡσυχίας ἐντεύξει. τὸ γὰρ ἀναιμὲνον καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ τῆς ἀπαγγελίας ὑπὸ νοῖαν παρέξει μυθώδες μᾶλλον ἢ ἱστορικὸν τὸ σύγγραμμα εἶναι.*

⁵ He makes curious slips, e.g. the confusion of the *Σκυρίτης λόχος* with the *Πιτανάτης* (i. 210); the inclusion of Thrake and Makedonia in the dominions of the Great King (*Or.* 3, i. 45): as Sokrates is one of the interlocutors, this involves an anachronism.

⁶ e.g. *Or.* 17 (i. 276) *ὁ τοίνυν Ξέρξης, ὁ τῆς ἐτέρας ἡπείρου κύριος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπεθύμησε καὶ τοσοῦτον στόλον καὶ τοσαύτας μυριάδας συναγαγὼν ἤνεγκεν, ἅπασαν μὲν αἰσχυρῶς ἀπέβαλε τὴν δύναμιν, μόλις δὲ τὸ σῶμα ἴσχυσε διασῶσαι φεύγων αὐτός.*

⁷ e.g. his observation that a mob is not an army: *οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Ξέρξεως στράτευμα λαμπρὸν ἦν, πλὴν εἰ μὴ τι διορύττειν ἢ διασκάπτειν ἢ τοιοῦτον ἕτερον ἔργον πράττειν.* *Or.* 32 (i. 430).

⁸ *Or.* 11 (i. 211) *ἐγὼ γοῶν ἀνδρὸς ἤκουσα Μήδου λέγοντος ὅτι οὐδὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν οἱ*

Πέρσαι τῶν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἀλλὰ Δαρεῖον μὲν κτλ. After a few lines which reduce the battle of Marathon to the merest *βραχὺ πρόσκρουσμα* (cp. *Hdt.* IV.-VI. ii. 222) the passage continues: *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Ξέρξην ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα στρατεύσαντα Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν νικῆσαι περὶ Θερμοπύλας καὶ τὸν βασιλέα αὐτῶν ἀποκτείνειν Λεωνίδα, τὴν δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν ἔλόντα κατασκάψαι, καὶ ὅσοι μὴ διέφυγον ἀνδραποδίσασθαι. ταῦτα δὲ ποιήσαντα καὶ φόρους ἐπιθέντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀπελθεῖν.* The comment which follows might be added to the previous note: *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ψευδῇ ταῦτα ἔστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὅτι δὲ εἰκὸς ἦν τὸν βασιλέα κελεῖσθαι στρατεῦσαι τοῖς ἄνω ἔθνεσιν οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἵνα μὴ θορυβώσιν.*

⁹ Themistokles was a 'rhetoric Demagogue,' Aristides a 'genuine Philosopher.' *Or.* 22 (i. 303), cp. *Or.* 49 (ii. 146).

¹⁰ *Or.* 73 (ii. 252) *Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ ἐκπεσεῖν ὡς προδιδόντα, ὃς παραλαβὼν αὐτοὺς οὐ δυναμένους τοῦδαφος τῆς πατρίδος οἰκεῖν, ἀλλὰ παραχωροῦντας τοῖς πολεμίοις αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἄσπεως καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν, οὐ μόνον ταῦτα πάντα ἀπέδωκεν, ἀλλ' ἐτι καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμόνας ἐποίησεν, ἀφελόμενος Λακεδαιμονίους ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔχοντας τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην.* Cp. comparison of Themistokles and Perikles, *Or.* 25 (i. 312).

¹¹ (1) On Thermopylai (Spartan love of Honour, Fame, Liberty), *Or.* 31 (i. 349), *Or.* 78 (ii. 283). (2) Athenian victories and Education, *Or.* 13 (i. 247 f.). (3) The pride and punishment of Xerxes, *Or.* 17 (i. 276) quoted note 6 above; *Or.* 14 (i. 254) *οὐδ' αὖ Ξέρξην ὀπηρῖκα ἀνα-*

an exhibition of power by the Persian despots seems to excite his disapprobation¹; and once at least, in his comparison of the tyrant with the cook, he might seem to formulate the comic Nemesis.² But Dio's interests, to do him justice, were not so much in the past as in the present, with his own contemporaries. He was, in his better moments and actions, more than a mere rhetor, or philosopher. He had immediate and practical ends in view. He was a municipal reformer and benefactor, a counsellor of princes, a man of wide travel and experience, and truly an ornament and an honour to his age.³ His best historical work was connected with contemporary history⁴; and his practical and ethical discourses are chiefly to be admired as a mine of information in regard to his own time and circumstances, and as a mirror of the social and ethical conditions and tendencies in the Roman world from Vespasian to Hadrian.⁵ AELIUS ARISTEIDES⁶ is a less imposing and a less attractive figure than Dio, little more than a mere rhetor in letters and hypochondriac in life; but he brings a larger contribution to the matter here in hand. The Orations of Aristeides are long-winded and elaborate, and probably intended for readers rather than for listeners.⁷ They are full of pauses and digressions, and are constructed with a painfully self-conscious art.

χωρῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ χειμαζόμενος ἐν τῇ νηὶ πάντα ἐπείθετο τῷ κυβερνήτῃ καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γνώμην οὐκ ἐπέτρεπεν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ νεύσαι οὐδὲ μεταβῆναι. This too might be added to the previous note as an 'improvement' in tradition.

¹ Or. 3 (i. 44) ὅ γε ἔνεστι καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα δοκοῦντα ποιῆσαι δυνατά, εἰ βούλοιτο περσεύεσθαι μὲν τὴν θάλατταν, πλεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὄρη, τοὺς δὲ ποταμοὺς ἐκλείπειν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων πινόμενους. ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι Ξέρξης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεὺς τὴν μὲν γῆν ἐποίησε θάλατταν, διελὼν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ὄρων καὶ διαστήσας ἀπὸ τῆς ἡπείρου τὸν Ἄθω, διὰ δὲ τῆς θαλάττης τὸν περὶ τὸν στρατὸν ἄγων ἤλαυνεν ἐφ' ἄρματος;

² Or. 4 (i. 72) ὅτε γοῦν Ξέρξης καὶ Δαρείος ἀνωθεν ἐκ Σούσων ἤλανον πολὺν ἔχλον Περσῶν τε καὶ Μήδων καὶ Σακῶν καὶ Ἀράβων καὶ Αἰγυπτίων δεῦρο εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀπολούμενον, πότερον βασιλικὸν ἢ μαγειρικὸν ἔπραττον ἔργον λείαν ἐλαύνοντες κατακοπήσομένην;

³ Philostratos *de vita Apollonii Tyannensis* 5. 27 ff. (ed. Olearius, 1709, pp. 209 ff.) represents Dio as in attendance on Vespasian in Egypt, and reports a debate, in which Euphrates, Dio and Apollonios with the Emperor discuss the situation. Dio is represented as approving Democracy *in abstracto*, and advising Vespasian to give the Romans their choice between that and monarchy (c. 34).

⁴ He wrote, apparently, a work in eight Books on the achievements of Alexander (Suidas), possibly for Trajan's benefit. Of more importance were his *Γερικά*, probably an idealistic study of 'the noble savage,' after the manner of Tacitus' *Germania*, but based upon his own experience; cp. W. Schmid, *ap. Pauly-Wissowa*, v. 873.

⁵ Dio appears among the witnesses to the monuments and trophies of the Persian war: 'the sword of Mardonios' at Athens outshines Propylaia and Olympieion in Or. 2 (i. 27); the *Persike Stoa* at Lakedaimon figures in Or. 47 (ii. 134), cp. § 2 *supra*.

⁶ 129-189 A.D., born in Mysia, studied in Pergamon and Athens, paid a long visit to Egypt, was in Rome in 156 A.D., returned to Smyrna. Was a chronic invalid and devotee of Asklepios, and apparently gained relief. Six of his fifty-one extant Orations are occupied with this topic (Nos. 23-28). He found favour with the Emperors M. Aurelius and Commodus.

⁷ I have used the somewhat antiquated edition of Canter, 1604, a caprice that may be condoned if I add that my copy has belonged, in succession, *inter alios*, to Thomas Gaisford and Walter Pater. But Dindorf's numbers are added.

They make a free use of history, and historical subjects, and, besides more casual references, in at least two extensive passages Aristeides comes to speak at length on the traditions of the Persian war: once in 'the Defence of Themistokles,'¹ again in the *Panathenaica*,² an epitome of Greek history, to the glory of Athens. Though Aristeides rarely, if ever, cites or names Herodotus; though 'the law of all great expeditions,' which he applies to the Persian invasion, he probably borrowed from Thucydides³; and though he cites Aischines, the Sokratic, as express authority for a part at least of his defence of Themistokles,⁴ that, and his whole treatment of the story of the Persian war, bear witness to a first-hand and first-rate acquaintance with the work of Herodotus, such as mediate sources could never supply.⁵ To the vogue and authority of the work of Herodotus Aristeides is, indeed, a more copious and consistent witness than was Dio; there is very little in all his elaborate diatribes on history, where they cover the Herodotean area, which conflicts with Herodotus, and still less which, so far as it conflicts with Herodotus, might not be ascribed to mere inference, invention, or carelessness.

The 'defence of Themistokles' is undertaken in the *second Platonic Oration*, which is directed against the strictures contained in the *Gorgias* on the four great Athenians, Miltiades, Themistokles, Perikles and Kimon.⁶ *There are three periods in which the greatness of Themistokles may be tested: (i.) before the coming of the 'Barbarian'; (ii.) during the war; (iii.) after the war, when he prevented the destruction of the medizing States, upwards of thirty in number, by the Lakedaimonians.*⁷ The orator's apology for Themistokles observes these periods, and consists, for the first two, in little more than a rapid but withal rhetorical review of the Herodotean traditions in Books 7, 8, 9, save that to Themistokles is ascribed more expressly than in Herodotus the authorship of the various proposals and acts which conduced to the defence and salvation of Hellas. So (1) the decision to join the national cause, (2) the reply to the Persian heralds, (3) the composition of feuds, (4) the restoration of exiles, are all recorded expressly as *Dogmata* of Themistokles.⁸ To these are added (5) the waiver of the Hegemony,⁹ (6) the psephism

¹ Or. 46 (Oratio Platonica secunda, pro Quatuorviris).

² Or. 13.

³ Or. 30 (Sicula post.), ii. 53, ἅμα δ' οἶμαι τὸν νόμον εἶσονται τῶν ὑπερορίων καὶ μεγάλων στρατειῶν· ὃ περιέπεσε μὲν ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς ὁ δεῦρο στρατεύσας, περιέπεσον δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι διαβάντες ἐς Σικελίαν μυριάσι πολλαῖς καὶ πεζῆς καὶ ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως. Cp. Thuc. 6. 33. 5 ὀλίγοι γὰρ δὴ στόλοι μεγάλοι, ἃ Ἕλλήνων ἢ βαρβάρων, πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐαυτῶν ἀπάραντες κατώρθωσαν.

⁴ iii. 363.

⁵ There is, however, a good deal in

Aristeides which recalls Plutarch, or Plutarch's Sources, to mind.

⁶ Cp. note 1 *supra*. iii. 293 sqq.

⁷ *ib.* 360 D. Perhaps all resumed in the previous phrase, 294 C διεξῆλθε διὰ τῶν τρικυμῶν νικῶν.

⁸ *ib.* 303 A τὰ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους δόγματα. Themistokles is made responsible for the answer to the Heralds and the death of the *interpreter*, a refinement probably due to the dialectic of tradition. Aristeides apparently means the Heralds of Xerxes.

⁹ *ib.* 310 C.

for the evacuation of the city,¹ (7) the decision in favour of a naval battle, and the choice of the scene of battle, as previously (8) the creation of the Athenian navy.² Further services of Themistokles are specified, such as (9) his interpretation of the oracles, (10) his appeal to the Ionians, (11) his management of Eurybiades, (12) his management of Xerxes, (13) his management of the Greeks. All the virtues and graces are heaped upon the head of Themistokles.³ He is expressly exalted above Miltiades and Kimon⁴; his maritime policy is justified as salutary and necessary for Athens⁵; to it are traced all subsequent successes; and it is acquitted of the charge of demoralizing the Athenians.⁶ The two most damaging charges against Themistokles, his corruptibility or avarice, and his treachery or *Medism*, are virtually ignored. They disappear under the flood of his personal merits and achievements: they seem absurd as qualities of 'the good genius of Hellas,'⁷ of the man who 'with the Gods and with Athens,' wrought salvation for Greece⁸; through whose lips some God spake,⁹ and to whose voice the Athenians clung, as to 'an holy anchor.'¹⁰ With really consummate art Aristeides points out, as the end and climax of the argument,¹¹ that Themistokles had never aimed at 'the tyranny,' but was the author and establisher of Liberty; he, who rebuilt the city on a grander scale, had first taught the Athenians, in the words of Alkaios, that *not stones, nor wood, nor walls a city make; where brave men and free are found, there shall be no lack of cities.*¹² And not Themistokles alone, but all the operations of the war are in this passage: Tempe and Thermopylai, Artemision and Salamis, Plataia and Mykale; and all exploited in the interests of Athens. Thermopylai was a defeat, Salamis a victory¹³; Artemision was the corner-stone of liberty,¹⁴ and at Mykale the Athenians were admitted victors.¹⁵ Even Plataia is converted to the glorification of Athens, for *none vied at Plataia with the Athenians—except the Lakedaimonians*¹⁶—who, as Plato

¹ iii. 316 A.

² *ib.* 306 f., 342. Some added that Themistokles determined not merely the scene but the very hour of battle: *στησάμενος τὴν ναυμαχίαν κατιόντος τοῦ πνεύματος.*

³ He is expressly accredited with *ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, σύνεσις, δεινότης, πραότης, καρτερία, εὐαρμοστία, μεγαλοψυχία*, and other good qualities.

⁴ iii. 294, cp. 260.

⁵ *ib.* 336, 337.

⁶ 345 B.

⁷ *ib.* 299 A *κατέστη τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἀντ' ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ δαίμονος.* The 'tertiary predicate' here seems odd: query, *του*?

⁸ *ib.* 306 B.

⁹ *ib.* 317 A *θεῶν τις διὰ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους γλώττης ἐφθέγγετο.*

¹⁰ *ib.* 319 A *ὡς πρὸς ἱερᾶς ἀγκύρας τῆς ἐκείνου φωνῆς ἐχόμενοι.*

¹¹ *ib.* 329 C *ὁ κολοφῶν τοῦ λόγου.*

¹² *ib.* 338, 339 *μόνος δέ μοι δοκεῖ πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἢ κομῶν γὰρ ἐν δόλοισι δεῖξαι Θεμιστοκλῆς ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον ὄντα, ὃν πάλαι μὲν Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιήτης εἶπεν, ὕστερον δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ παραλαβόντες ἐχρήσαντο, ὡς ἔρα οὐ λίθοι, οὐδὲ ξύλα, οὐδὲ τέχνη τεκτόνων αἱ πόλεις εἰεν· ἀλλ' ὅπου ποτ' ἂν ὦσιν ἄνδρες αὐτοῦς σώξεν εἰδότες, ἐνταῦθα καὶ τείχη καὶ πόλεις.*

¹³ *ib.* 353.

¹⁴ *ib.* 309 D, with the stock quotation from Pindar; cp. §§ 3, 14 *supra*.

¹⁵ *ib.* 354 B.

¹⁶ *ibid.* ἐν ᾗ μόνους Λακεδαιμονίους ἐφ' αὐλλοὺς ἔσχον. The victory is cited to prove that the Athenians were none the worse men for the naval policy.

himself admitted, retreated in the battle.¹ The Gods fought for Hellas in the Persian war, and ratified the plans of Themistokles²: his contemporaries, the Spartans, crowned him for his merits³: what would Plato have done in his place?⁴ Or how, as Aristeides asks elsewhere, can you expect even a Themistokles to do what the Gods themselves cannot do, make men virtuous?⁵ Even in that passage the defence of Themistokles merges into a panegyric of Athens. Much more in the *Panathenaica*⁶ is the state glorified and the statesman or general ignored, so that in the long passage on the wars of Athens,⁷ and in the portion thereof that deals specifically with the Persian wars,⁸ as in the *Persai* of Aischylos, though 'Barbarian' kings be named, no Greek or Athenian appears *nominatim*, or in *propria persona*. Here too the story of the war with Xerxes follows very closely the Herodotean lines. Allowing for the rhetorical setting, there is very little to be found here but a transfigured, and at times a caricatured Herodotus. *Xerxes laid himself out to surpass his sire, and to punish the Greeks by one effort.*⁹ *His insane ambition aimed even at the 'Kleruchies' on the Atlantic!*¹⁰ *The sea parted,*¹¹ *and rivers failed at his coming.*¹² *Athos remains as a monument of his handiwork.*¹³ *He did not 'number,' he 'measured' his army*¹⁴: *he moved the whole world against Hellas.*¹⁵ *But it was not Athens he captured, he captured the mere wraith or semblance of a city.*¹⁶ *He sat enthroned to view the battle, then quickly changed his tune, recanted, and fled, by the way by which he had come, but in far other guise, his one object to reach the raft in safety.*¹⁷

*Athens was indeed the salvation of Greece,*¹⁸ *and would again, as at Marathon, unaided have saved Greece, but that for very modesty and shame she summoned the rest of Hellas to her aid.*¹⁹ *The removal of the city was more wonderful than the Barbarian's bridging the sea, or piercing the*

¹ iii. 344 f., a reference to the *Laches*; cp. § 10 *supra*.

² *ib.* 350 c.

³ *ib.* 360.

⁴ *ib.* 334.

⁵ *Or.* 45 (*Platonica pr.*), iii. 141 d.

⁶ *Or.* 13. *Canter i.* 160-344.

⁷ *ibid.* 199 c, *et sqq.*

⁸ *ibid.* 207 d *et sqq.* 207 d to 220 a comprises the Marathonian campaign; then follows an elaborate treatment of Xerxes and his invasion (220-261); but the passage on the war only closes with the acceptance by the king of the celebrated terms of Peace (267).

⁹ *ib.* 220 b ἀγῶνα διπλοῦν ἀγωνίζεται.

¹⁰ *ib.* 221 d ἔτι δὲ Ἀτλαντικοῦ πελάγους κληρουχίας ἀτίμους ἠπειλεῖ.

¹¹ *ib.* 223 b καὶ θάλαττα ὑπεχώρει καὶ πάλιν συνήει τῷ βασιλεῖ. He adds the enigmatic platitude: καὶ νῦν ἔστι τῆς νέας θαλάττης ὅσος τῆς ἐκείνου διαβάσεως χρόνος.

¹² *ib.* 222 d.

¹³ *ib.* 223 b καὶ ὁ Ἄθως ἀντὶ στήλης τῷ ἔργῳ λείπεται.

¹⁴ *ib.* 223 d φιλονικήσας δὲ μαθεῖν ὅ πάντα ἄτοπος βασιλεὺς ὁπόσους ἄγε (ἐχρῆν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ γενέσθαι δυνατόν) ἠναγκάσθη μετρήσαι τρόπον δὴ τινα μᾶλλον ἢ ἀριθμῆσαι τὴν στρατιάν. Cp. *Hdt.* 7. 60.

¹⁵ *ib.* 224 a πάντα κινῶν ἦει, κτλ.

¹⁶ *ib.* 226 b οὗτω καὶ Ἐρέξης κτλ. τινες, τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον τῆς Ἑλένης τὸ εἶδωλον λαβεῖν, αὐτὴν δὲ οὐ δυνηθῆναι οὕτω καὶ Ἐρέξης κτλ.

¹⁷ *ib.* 246-7 Ἐρέξης δὲ καθήστο μὲν κτλ. παλινωδίαν ἦδε, καὶ μεταστρέψας ἦει τὴν αὐτήν, οὐ μετὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σχήματος, ἐν ἥδῃ τοῦτ' ἀγώνισμα ποιούμενος, τὴν σχεδίαν καταλαβεῖν.

¹⁸ *ib.* οὕτω διὰ πάντων ἡ πόλις πᾶν ἔσωσε τὸ Ἑλληνικόν.

¹⁹ *ib.* 225 c αἰσχυνομένη μοι δοκεῖν μόνη φανῆναι τῷ βαρβάρῳ καθάπερ πρότερον ἐν Μαραθῶνι.

mountain.¹ Everything depended on the ships.² The Greeks had more confidence in the Athenians than in themselves.³ Those who fought at Thermopylai tried to emulate the victors of Marathon, but they tried in vain.⁴ At Artemision and at Salamis Athens defeated at once both Barbarian and Hellene, and saved the Greeks in spite of themselves.⁵ The victory of Salamis was almost as much their own as that of Marathon had been.⁶ The Athenians deserved the prize twice over, for themselves and for their General,⁷ a man worth all the rest, who divined, like one inspired, the time, and place, and plans of the Barbarians, and foresaw the event.⁸ A gallant appendix to the victory was the achievement of another Athenian volunteer, who, with the old men left in Salamis, landed on the island opposite, and put the Persians in occupation to the sword.⁹ It was the Athenians who, after rejecting fresh offers from the King and Mardonios, by the hands of Alexander of Makedon, assembled the Greeks at Plataia.¹⁰ The battle of Plataia is converted into a purely Athenian victory, but naturally, in this interest, details are confused and omitted.¹¹ The exchange of positions is emphasized, and references occur to the Athenian services against the cavalry, and in the assault on the fortified camp; but the campaign is cut down to the dimensions of a single battle, and the result of that battle is to impress the Barbarians for ever with a memory of Athens.¹² It is the Athenians, again, who, after the thanksgivings for the victory, and the division of the spoils, carry the war into the enemy's country. Mykale is their victory, and is treated, in logical rather than in chronological relation, as the first of a series of victories, for the clearance of Thrace and the invasion of Asia.¹³

In some of the other *Orations*, the chief moments or common-places reappear, the bridging of Hellespont,¹⁴ the piercing of Athos,¹⁵ the evacuation of the city by the Athenians,¹⁶ their superhuman heroism,¹⁷ and so forth. Kimon's after victories are set above Artemision and Thermopylai,¹⁸ but nothing diminishes the fame of Marathon and Salamis, and no statesman or general eclipses the merits

¹ iii. 226 B.

² *ib.* 228 B εἰς τὰς ναῦς ἦκε τότε τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὰ πράγματα.

³ *ib.* 230 A οὐκοῦν ὁμολογεῖτ' Ἀθηναίους γε θαρρεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς κτλ.

⁴ *ib.* 228 C.

⁵ *ib.* 232 B τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐχθροὺς τοῖς ὅπλοις τῇ δὲ ἐπιεικείᾳ τοὺς φίλους ἐνίκησαν.

⁶ *ib.* 244 C.

⁷ *ib.* 234 καὶ συνέβη τῇ πόλει διχόθεν τὰ πρωτεία ἀνελέσθαι, τὰς μὲν γὰρ πόλεις ὑπερείχον Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς δὲ ἄνδρας ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναῖος εἶς.

⁸ *ibid.* εἰς ἀντὶ πάντων ἦν, ὅς μόνος καὶ τύπους, καὶ καιροὺς, καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπόρρητα, καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ὥσπερ μάντις ἐξηγείτο.

⁹ *ib.* 246.

¹⁰ *ib.* 248 B καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτοῦ βασιλέως οὕτως εἶχε· Μαρδόνιος δὲ κτλ. 253 C συναγαγόντες δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἤδη μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς ἀκολουθεῖν δυναμένους, ἐν Πλαταιαῖς γίνονται.

¹¹ *ib.* 253, 254.

¹² *ibid.* ἕως τῶν βαρβάρων οἱ μὲν κτλ. τῶν Ἀθηναίων μεμνημένοι.

¹³ *ib.* 262.

¹⁴ *Or.* 29 (Sicula pr.), ii. 18.

¹⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶ *ibid.*, *Or.* 43, ii. 373.

¹⁷ *ibid.* l. pr. c. εἰ μὴ ταῦτα πάντα καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ γενναίως καὶ περαιτέρω τῆς ἀνθρωπείας, εἰ οἶόν τε εἰπεῖν, φύσεως διήνεγκεν, ποῦ μὲν ἂν τρώπαια τοσαῦτα; ποῦ δὲ ἡγεμονία Ἑλλήνων; κτλ.

¹⁸ *Or.* 46, iii. 260.

of Themistokles. To him Aristeides seems to ascribe even the attainder on Arthmios of Zeleia by a more uncommon anachronism, well calculated to dissipate the evil odour of Medism, which could not but cling round the memory of the great Athenian in his Asianic exile.¹

As poetry is a criticism of life, so rhetoric may sometimes bring into prominence the essential elements or features of tradition, in the very effort to improve the occasion. Aristeides says that the defenders of Thermopylai sought to emulate the victors of Marathon; that the battle of Salamis was almost as much an Athenian victory as the battle of Marathon had been; that at Plataia the Lakedaimonians, on the admission of their best friend, retreated, while the Athenians proved themselves the right men in the right place. Had he said that the stories of Thermopylai and of Marathon had been devised and developed as counterparts and makeweights; that the tradition of the wars had fallen too much into the hands of Athens and her partisans, but that wherever victory had been organized there had assuredly been an organizing will, a superior intelligence at work—could much fault have been found with such conclusions? Almost so far what may be called the inner dialectic of a literary and rhetorical tradition has carried Aristeides. His results remain empirical and superficial. Without a serious re-examination of the Sources, and the determination of their intrinsic values, coupled with a constant reference to the physical conditions of the action and its story, no material advance was to be made by history. But, within the limits of mere argument, Aristeides says all but the last word logically possible in antiquity upon the story of the Persian war. One element he lacked, a sense of humour; and he never thought of the *reductio ad absurdum*, to which his own rhetoric was at times perilously near bringing the whole story. That consummation was to come about, yet less by an express attack upon the specific traditions of the Persian war than by a general deadening of serious interests, a growing aversion toward old-world ideas, and the decline of literature upon parody and pedantry.

§ 17. In the meantime, LUCIAN, of Samosata,² if any one, might have realised these possibilities. The very incarnation of *Belles Lettres*, pure and simple, he employed satire and persiflage with a security of touch worthy of Aristophanes, making merry of all the pomps and vanities of life, pitting common-sense against every extravagance, and dissolving all pretensions in mordant ridicule. A greater contrast to Aristeides, his contemporary, could scarce be imagined. But Lucian

¹ iii. 357, cp. *Or.* 13, i. 332.

² The article in Suidas is plainly prejudiced: the date (γέγονε δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Καίσαρος Τραιανοῦ καὶ ἐπέκεινα) is perhaps too early; cp. Clinton, *Fasti Rom.* ad ann. 165, 166, 182 A.D., and ii. 288;

also 'Bipont' edition of *Works* (1789), i. lv. (where on internal grounds his date is fixed c. 120–200 A.D.). His birthplace is guaranteed, *inter alia*, by himself, *Historia quomodo*, 24 (ii. 14, Jacobitz).

is not much concerned with politics and history. The follies of poets and of philosophers are mainly his mark: the absurdities of the old mythology and of the new enthusiasm alike fall under his censure. To the matter here in hand he makes less of a contribution than might have been expected; and a part of the contribution which he makes shows him to little advantage perhaps as an historical authority, or critic. He has, indeed, composed an admirable *Recipe* for the writing of history,¹ but he has not illustrated his own canons by his own example. He condemns the vices of the rhetoricians, and he ridicules their extravagance with a delicate irony immediately applicable to Aristeides and his like²; but he has himself—Syrian that he is—no national or historical interest in the Hellenic wars of yore. Lucian applies a sound and a well-reasoned standard to historians, and plainly for him Thucydides represents the high-water mark of historical composition³; he has Herodotus, too, at his fingers' ends, and reckons him among 'the best.'⁴ But, again, it is more for style than for subject matter that he values Herodotus⁵: the stories he uses are not chiefly taken from the last three Books, nor concerned with military events⁶: he places Herodotus in one category with Ktesias and other lost souls⁷: he regards him as too 'poetic' a writer to be really a good historian.⁸ Yet Lucian none the less attests more explicitly than any of his contemporaries the popularity of the Herodotean 'Muses'⁹; and Lucian, oddly enough, contributes some striking novelties to the biography of the historian, to wit, a patronymic,¹⁰ the anecdote of the Olympian Recitation,¹¹ and a hint of the

¹ The *Historia quomodo conscribenda*, occasioned by various absurd or incompetent histories of the Parthian war, 162-166 A.D. The *Vera Historia* (two Books) has of course nothing to do with history.

² His censure on the confusion of History with Encomium, *Hist. quomodo*, 7. Cp. *Rhetor. praecept.* 18 ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ὁ Μαραθῶν καὶ ὁ Κυναιγίρειος, ὧν οὐκ ἂν τι ἄνευ γένοιτο. καὶ αἰὲς ὁ Ἀθῶς πλείσθω καὶ ὁ Ἑλλησποντος πεζυεύσθω καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὑπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν βελῶν σκεπέσθω καὶ Ξέρξης φευγέτω καὶ ὁ Λεωνίδας θανμαζέσθω καὶ τὰ Ὀθρυάδου γράμματα ἀναγινωσκέσθω, καὶ ἡ Σάλαμις καὶ τὸ Ἀρτεμίσιον καὶ αἱ Πλαταιαὶ πολλὰ ταῦτα καὶ πυκνά, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τὰ ὀλίγα ἐκείνα ὄνματα ἐπιπολαζέτω καὶ ἐπανθείτω, κτλ.

³ *Hist. quomodo*, 2, 15, 26, 38, 42, 47, 54, 58.

⁴ *ibid.* 2, 18, 54.

⁵ *Herodotus s. Aëtion* (ii. 391-4).

⁶ There is hardly a precise reference to any passage in Bks. 7, 8, 9, unless the story of Boreas and Oreithuia be such (*Philops.* 3, *de Salt.* 40). There is a large

number of references to Bk. 1 (Stories of Kroisos, Arion, Arganthonios), and also to Bks. 3 (Polykrates, Maiandrios, with a variant, etc.), 4, and 6 (e.g. Pan's *Aristeia* at Marathon, *Deor. Dial.* 22. 3, *Philops.* 3, *Bis accus.* 9).

⁷ *Vera Hist.* 2. 31 (ii. 65) καὶ μεγίστας ἀπασῶν τιμωρίας ὑπέμενον οἱ ψευδάμενοί τι παρὰ τὸν βίον καὶ οἱ μὴ τὰληθῆ συγγραφοῦτες ἐν οἷς καὶ Κτησίας ὁ Κνίδιος ἦν καὶ Ἡρόδοτος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί.

⁸ Hdt. and Ktesias are classed with Homer and the poets as ἐγγράφῳ τῷ ψεύσματι κεχημένους, *Philops.* 2 (iii. 98). Cp. *Herodotus* (i. 392) οὗτος ἐκείνος Ἡρόδοτος ἐστὶν ὁ τὰς μάχας τὰς Περσικὰς ἱαστὶ συγγεγραφώς, ὁ τὰς νίκας ἡμῶν ὑμνήσας.

⁹ *ibid.* ἀγωνιστὴν παρείχεν ἑαυτὸν Ὀλυμπίων ἄδων τὰς ιστορίας καὶ κηλῶν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀχρι τοῦ καὶ Μούσας κληθῆναι τὰς βίβλους αὐτοῦ ἐννέα καὶ αὐτὰς οὖσας. Cp. *Hist. quomodo*, 42.

¹⁰ *de dōto* 20 καὶ μοι σὺ ἤδη ὁ κῆρυξ προσκάλει αὐτὸν Ἡρόδοτον Δύζου Ἀλικαρνασσόθεν.

¹¹ In the *Herodotus*. Cp. note 9 above.

rivalry of Thucydides.¹ Of additions or contributions to the materials for the story of the Persian war from other sources, there is little or nothing to be ascribed to Lucian.² He may refer in passing to events,³ or persons,⁴ or objects⁵ associated with the war, upon their merits; but his own interests lie elsewhere, and, to do him justice, he is more occupied with the present than with the past. Thus the direct polemic, or satire, of Lucian falls wide of our mark: a fact perhaps in its own way significant of the fate impending over the traditions of the Persian wars of old, in an age when military historians were again finding matter worthy of their attention in contemporary events.⁶

§ 18. Enough has, perhaps, been here set down already to justify the conclusion, that little or nothing further of real import is to be won for the history of the Persian war from later writers under the Roman Empire. A few accretions or developments in the legends, especially that concerning Themistokles, may still be obtainable; but the story of the war itself dwindles, and is dissipated into a spray of anecdotes or *curiosa*. The Roman writers who are attracted by the work of Herodotus praise or imitate his style rather than reproduce his matter, or, if they quarry in his work, make more use of the earlier than of the later Books. Caesarians were, perhaps, rather repelled than attracted by the record of the victories of Republican Hellas over imperial Asia; and at a time when Orontes was flowing into Tiber, when the apotheosis of the earthly Leviathan was everywhere spreading, when the image and superscription of the Persian sun-god were moving victoriously from the Euphrates to the Danube, and from the Danube to the Tyne, the western world more and more lost touch with the memories of Marathon and of Salamis. The empire of Alexander, and the Roman empire itself, seemed better themes for literary emblazonment; or literature, sated with heroics, declined on mere anecdote and pedantry. A group, or series, of writers may here be somewhat arbitrarily brought under one category to illustrate these aspects of the story of the old Persian wars. ARRIAN, the disciple of Epictetus, the Legate of Hadrian,⁷

¹ *Hist. quomodo*, 42. This *motif* is found much more fully developed in the *Life of Thucydides*, by Marcellinus, 54.

² Lucian, however, points out (*Jup. Trag.* 20) the ambiguity of the celebrated line ὦ θείη Σαλαμὶς κτλ. καὶ Πέρσαι γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ Ἕλληνες τέκνα γυναικῶν ἦσαν.

³ *Encom. Demosth.* 36 (Marathon and Salamis).

⁴ *ibid.* 32 οὐδὲ κακίων ἐγὼ Ξέρξου τοῦ Βούλιν καὶ Σπέρχιν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους θαυμάσαντος καὶ, κτεῖναι παρόν, ἀφέντος. The opposition of Aristeides to Themistokles, *Calum.* 27, is not specially Herodotean, or referred to the Persian question.

⁵ The great works of Xerxes, *Nero* 2. Cp. *D. Mort.* 20. 2 εἶτα σέ, ὦ καθαῖμα, ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐφριττε ζευγνύντα μὲν τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, διὰ δὲ τῶν ὁρῶν πλεῖν ἐπιθυμοῦντα;

⁶ The *de Syria dea* (iii. 341–63) is written in Ionic, and imitates Herodotus throughout; but its authenticity is hardly admissible, and it contains no material for the present argument, except in so far as it illustrates the popularity of the ‘prince of Ionian historians.’

⁷ Cp. H. F. Pelham, ‘Arrian as Legate of Cappadocia’ in *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, Oct. 1896. Arrian became Legate in 131 A.D. and was still living in 171 A.D.

took Alexander of Makedon as his hero, and Xenophon as his literary model. But still the *Anabasis Alexandri* is full of stylistic plagiarisms from Herodotus,¹ and everywhere betrays a first-hand acquaintance with 'the Father of History.'² All the more remarkable is the slightness of the material debt from the historian of Alexander to the historian of the Persian war, and extremely exiguous is the addition made by Arrian's work to the actual history of the fifth century B.C. The *Anabasis* of Arrian even more than the *Anabasis* of Xenophon is, indeed, valuable to the modern student of the work of Herodotus, from the light shed by it upon the geography of Asia, and the organization of the Persian empire in the fourth century. Alexander's victorious career in Asia makes the defence of Hellas, a century and a half earlier, all the more easily intelligible. But, of direct reference, illustration, or supplement in the work of Arrian to the work of Herodotus, there is, perhaps, less than might have been expected: the direct references hardly concern the story of the Persian war,³ the additions fall beyond the express Herodotean limit,⁴ and now and again an opportunity for comment or reference seems thrown away, an Herodotean opening, so to speak, ignored⁵—all suggesting a diminishing interest in the person and work of the Halikarnassian. The same conclusion is more incontestably demonstrable from the

¹ Cp. H. R. Grundmann, *Quid in elocutione Arriani Herodoto debeatur* (Berlin, 1884). Arrian's style is a hash of Herodotean, Thucydidean and Xenophontean phraseology, in which Herodoteanisms preponderate; but as the ensemble is Attic, it still makes (*pace* Grundmann) the ancient verdict, that the 'Attic bee' was Arrian's chief master, defensible.

² Herodotus is cited by name six times in the *Anabasis*, 2. 16. 3 (Herakles in Egypt); 3. 30. 8 ('H. ὁ λογοποιός, the Tanais'); 5. 6. 5 (Egypt δῶρον τοῦ ποταμοῦ); 5. 7. 2 ('H. ὁ Ἀλικαρνασσεύς, the bridging of Hellespont); 7. 13. 1 (Nisaian plain); 7. 13. 5 (the Amazones). The nominal references by no means exhaust the actual use; cp. further notes below.

³ The Second and Fourth Bks. of Hdt. account for four of the six direct references. See above. References to events of the Persian war are not necessarily references to the work of Hdt., e.g. 6. 11. 6 ('If you may say that the battle of Gaugamela took place at Arbela, then you may say that the battle of Salamis took place at the Isthmos, or the battle of Artemision at Aigina or Sunion'); 1. 9. 7 (the destruction of Thebes by Alexander α μῆνις ἀπὸ

τοῦ θειοῦ . . . ὡς τῆς τε ἐν τῷ Μηδικῷ πολέμῳ προδοσίας τῶν Ἑλλήνων κτλ. Also for their cruelty to Plataia, καὶ τοῦ χωρίου τῆς ἐρημώσεως ἐν ὅτῳ οἱ Ἕλληνες παραταξάμενοι Μήδοις ἀπώσαντο τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸν κίνδυνον); 7. 14. 5 (some of Alexander's doings were worthy τῇ Ξέρξῳ μᾶλλον τι ἀτασθαλίᾳ τῇ ἐς τὸ θεῖον καὶ ταῖς πέδαις ἃς λέγουσιν εἰς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον καθεῖναι Ξέρξην, τιμωρούμενον δῆθεν τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον). Cp. also 3. 18. 12.

⁴ (1) The works of art carried off by Xerxes and restored by Alexander, 3. 16. 7; 7. 19. 2. (2) The passages on Kyros the Great, viz. 3. 18. 10 (his treasury at Pasargadai); 6. 29. 4-11 (his tomb); 5. 4. 9 (condition of Persians in his time); 6. 24. 3, cp. 4. 11. 9 (his disasters), are all of special interest. (3) The destruction of the Babylonian temples by Xerxes, after his return from Greece, 7. 17. 2, cp. 3. 16. 4.

⁵ 4. 11. 9 (speech of Kallisthenes on the προσκύνησις), though very Herodotean in substance, contains no reference to Hdt. 7. 135 f.; 5. 5. 2, Mykale is described, without reference to the battle in 479 B.C.; 1. 20-23, the siege of Halikarnassos contains no reference to Hdt., and so forth.

writings of Appian.¹ APPIAN too is an imperialist: the history of the making of the Roman Empire is his subject. His *Proëm* sets forth its claims. Compared with the Empire of Rome other empires have been feeble and shortlived. In duration as in extent it surpasses all its predecessors. The 'empires' of Athens and of Sparta, brief and insignificant though they were, entitle those states to a passing notice, which 'the wars of Liberation' would not have secured them. The greatest empire before the Roman was the Makedonian, but it passed like a flash of lightning.² Appian could not indeed describe Thermopylai, as the scene of the first great encounter between the Romans and Antiochos, without a reference to the defence of the Pass by Leonidas; but the Romans are his heroes, and the Hellenistic king is circumvented by them exactly as the Spartan king had been circumvented of old by the Persians.³ There is no reference in the extant work of Appian to Herodotus; and the one notice of Themistokles goes back to Thucydides, mediately or directly, and is not concerned with the Persian war.⁴ The case is widely different indeed with Appian's contemporary, the Makedonian POLYAINOS.⁵ He uses Herodotus freely as an authority, though only, be it observed, as one among many. The difference, such as it is, in favour of Herodotus may be due partly to the author's subject, and partly to his origin.⁶ Among his own sources Polyainos can hardly be said to show any preference for Herodotus, even as concerns the 'stratagems' employed in the Persian war.⁷ And the references to the Persian war are neither the most important nor the most numerous points at which Polyainos traverses the work of Herodotus, whether in a favourable or a dissentient mood.⁸ On the whole, Polyainos by himself scarcely

¹ Appian, of Alexandria, was an old man under Antoninus Pius. His work was composed before 165 A.D., for he gives the Euphrates as the Roman frontier. He became a *Procurator Augusti*. Cp. Schwartz, *ap.* Pauly-Wissowa, II. I. 216 ff.

² *Proëm* 10, διὰ τὴν βραχύτητα τοῦ χρόνου προσέεικεν ἀστραπὴν λαμπρᾷ.

³ See Συριακὴ 17. In 18 there is a reference to ἡ λεγομένη ἀτραπὸς, ἥ δὴ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις τοῖς ἀμφὶ Λεωνίδαν Ξέρξης ἐπέθετο.

⁴ Ἐμφυλ. δ' 48. Rebilus, escaping on a ship to Sicily in 43 B.C., οὐδὲν τι καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς φεύγων ἐποίησεν, threatened the captain with a counter-delation, if betrayed.

⁵ The eight Books of the Στρατηγικά have each one a separate dedication to the ἱερώτατοι βασιλεῖς, M. Antoninus and L. Verus, i.e. the work must have been composed between 161 and 169 A.D.

⁶ Polyainos 1 *ad init.* ἐγὼ δὲ Μακεδῶν

ἀνὴρ, πατριὸν ἔχων τὸ κρατεῖν Περσῶν κατὰ, addressing the two Emperors, after the victory 'over the Persians and Parthians.'

⁷ I. 27 (Gelon) and 28 (Theron) concerning the battle of Himera are not Herodotean. 32 (Leonidas) and 33 (Leotychides) are from later sources (Ephoros?). But I. 30, (Themistokles) is almost pure Herodotus, so far as the Persian war is concerned, except for the substitution of 'Arsakes' for Sikinnos, in the second message. (The name 'Arsakes' is suspicious in a Roman writer of the Antonine age.) 7. 15 (Xerxes) is four-fifths pure Herodotus, 33 (Artabazos) is two-thirds Herodotus, 45 (Persians at Mykale) is Herodotus. On the other hand I. 31 (the engagement of Aristides and Themistokles) is not Herodotean.

⁸ Bk. 7 deals with 'Stratagems' of 'Barbarians.' Some of these (e.g. Deiokeas, Harpagos, Oibares, Zopyros) are Hero-

reflects the popularity of the Herodotean work in his time, and somewhat heavily discounts any vivid interest in the battles of the Persian war. Had he been more of a strategist and tactician in reality, had he conceived of the art of war less as a bundle of conjurer's tricks, and more as a matter of far-sighted plans and large dispositions, he might have been attracted to the consideration of the tactics at Salamis and Plataia, which betrayed the mind and hand of a real master of the art of war. Polyainos is in sooth but a sort of military anecdotemonger. AELIAN, the only genuine Roman of them all,¹ though he displays his erudition by writing his *Miscellanies* in Greek, has no such preference for military matters. The *Poikile Historia* is a treasury of good stories, a large number of which concern persons and events familiar to the student of Herodotus.² But, though he names Thucydides, Theopompos, Epitimedes, Dinon, Pausanias, and possibly other authors, Aelian never mentions Herodotus by name as his authority for any anecdote, and even where an anecdote agrees with or reproduces an Herodotean incident, Aelian seems to have found it in some other source.³ More frequently the items in Aelian show little or no sign of Herodotean colouring, and are plainly drawn from independent sources.⁴ Sometimes Aelian might seem deliberately to invert an Herodotean situation, or from sheer carelessness to put the cart before the horse.⁵ To the history of the Persian war Aelian

dotean; others (e.g. Alyattes, Psammetichos, Amasis, Midas, Kroisos, Kambyzes) are quite different from Hdt. Others again (e.g. Kyros, Dareios) show a 'contamination' of Hdt. and other sources (not necessarily made by Polyainos himself). A similar verdict fits Bk. 8 (Stratagems by women). Even 8. 53 (Artemisia) is not pure Hdt. The bulk of cases in Polyainos come into no comparison with Hdt. at all.

¹ Cp. *Var. Hist.* 2. 38, 12. 25, 14. 45. Two *Lives* exist, one by Flavius Philostratus (*Vit. Soph.* 2. 31) and one in Suidas. Aelian, of Praeneste, belongs to the first quarter of the third century of our era, cp. note *ad l.c.*, Philostratus, ed. Oelenschläger, 1709.

² e.g. Anacharsis, Solon, Peisistratos, Pythagoras, Polykrates, Kleomenes, Leonidas, Gelon, Skythes, Aristides, Themistokles, Kyros, Dareios, Xerxes, etc. etc.

³ Cp. *φασίν* 2. 41; τὸ δ' ὄνομα λεγέτω ἄλλος 5. 11, of items to be found in Herodotus. 2. 14, 9. 39, Aelian characterizes the conduct of Xerxes in worshipping the plane-tree as absurd (cp. Hdt. 7. 31). Aelian 5. 11 goes back to Hdt. 8. 116. The story of

Xerxes and the water of the Choaspes (12. 40) is not in Hdt., but might have its root in Hdt. 1. 188. The numbers of Xerxes' army are given as 700,000, Aelian 13. 3.

⁴ 3. 25 (Leonidas) shows no sign of Hdt. 5. 10 recording the numbers of the Athenian fleet says nothing of the Persian war. 6. 1 (the treatment of Chalkis by Athens) is hardly a mere misreading of Hdt. The stories of Gelon, the notices of Persian customs, and other points, show post-Herodotean sources.

⁵ Aelian 2. 16, 4. 17 tells of Pythagoras the story which Hdt. 4. 15 tells of Aristeas. Aelian 3. 8 says that the Athenians made the poet Phrynichos a general to reward him for the martial music of one of his tragedies, but cp. 13. 17 and Hdt. 6. 21. Aelian's notice of the war between Sybaris and Kroton, 3. 43, differs widely from that of Hdt. 5. 44. His remark, 4. 22, that the Athenians 'notwithstanding their luxury' won the battle of Marathon is very un-Herodotean. His account of the origin of the Persian war, 12. 53, as due to a quarrel between Maiandrios the Samian and the Athenians would be impossible to a student of Hdt.'s work. 5. 19,

makes no direct or real contribution, unless exact dates for some engagements are to be reckoned to his credit;¹ but many references to the war occur in his pages.² The legend of Themistokles he enriches with some piquant incidents and some by no means unworthy apophthegms.³ Aelian makes two or three valuable, though unintended, contributions to a commentary on Herodotus, in preserving the moral myth of Silenos,⁴ in his borrowed description of Tempe and the *via sacra* thence to Delphi,⁵ in his record of the end of Xerxes,⁶ and further, in a number of particulars concerning Persian kings and customs,⁷ and so forth. But, though it is hardly fair to dismiss his work as a miscellany of edifying stories, and though he was certainly no philosopher, it is safe to say that a genuine historical interest is nowhere apparent in his *History*. He writes for a public of innocent triflers who have grown weary of large views, and are quite content with novelettes. His work might stand for the careless herald of that aversion from serious political and military history which built itself an immortal tomb in the *Deipnosophists* of the Alexandrian polymath not so long after.⁸ ATHENAIOS may here be taken as exhibiting the *reductio ad absurdum* of the tradition of the Persian wars. The Greek of Egypt is, indeed, well acquainted with Herodotus,⁹ and quotes him expressly Book by Book, like Plutarch in the

Amynias (*sic*) the brother of Aischylos lost his hand at the battle of Salamis!

¹ 2. 25, the Persians defeated (at Marathon? at Artemision? Aelian seems to confuse the two) on Thargelion 6, and at Plataia and Mykale on Thargelion 8. The dates are quite inadmissible (except, perhaps, for Artemision). The reference to Alexander may account for the error.

² 2. 25 (dates just given); 2. 28 (cock-fighting introduced at Athens in connexion with the war); 3. 25 (Leonidas and the 300); 3. 47 (Salamis, Plataia); 4. 22 (Marathon); 5. 19 (Salamis!); 12. 10 (valour of the Aiginetans); 12. 43 (Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ ὁ τοὺς βαρβάρους καταναυμαχήσας καὶ μόνος συνιελὶς τὰς τῶν θεῶν ἐν τοῖς χρησμοῖς φωνάς); 12. 53 (origin of the war. See above).

³ 2. 12 (bon mot on Envy); 2. 28 (his remark on fighting cocks); 3. 21 (his pride as a boy, in the days of Peisistratos!); 3. 47 (his public services brought him no benefit, but cp. 10. 17); 9. 5 (his protest at Olympia against Hieron); 9. 18 (his comparison with an oak-tree); *ibid.* (the two paths, to Hades and to the Bema); 12. 43 (his mother's name, Abrotonos; and the general description quoted above); 13. 40 (the Persian necklet, cp. Plutarch, *Them.* 18); *ibid.* (a bon mot; but cp. Hdt. 2. 172); *ibid.* (Themistokles and Eurybiades, cp. Plutarch,

Them. 11); 13. 44 (Aristeides and Themistokles had the same tutor). Attention might here be directed to a development, or a symbol of the legend of Themistokles, preserved by PHILOSTRATUS *Imagines* 2. 31, Teubner, 1893, pp. 123 ff. (a picture representing Themistokles at Babylon in the presence of Xerxes).

⁴ 3. 18, cp. Hdt. 8. 138.

⁵ 3. 1, cp. Hdt. 8. 31, 35.

⁶ 13. 3 ἀθροίσας γὰρ ἐβδομήκοντα μυριάδας ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας κακῶς ἀπῆλλαξεν· εἶτα ἐπανελθὼν αἰσχίστα ἀνθρώπων ἀπέθανεν, ἀποσφαγείς νύκτωρ ἐν τῇ εὐνῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόου.

⁷ 1. 22, 31–34; 2. 17; 3. 39; 5. 1; 12. 48 (Indians and Persians had translations of Homer); 12. 62; 14. 12.

⁸ The date of Athenaios, of Naukratis, is determined by the fact that the Ulpian of the Dialogue is a shadow of the great Jurisconsult, who died in 228 A.D. The composition therefore falls at earliest into the second quarter of the third century of our era.

⁹ Athen. 14. 620 A cites Jason for the interesting fact that Hegesias the comic actor had presented the works of Hdt. in the Grand Theatre at Alexandria (ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ θεάτρῳ ὑποκρίνασθαι Ἡγησίαν τὸν κωμωδὸν τὰ Ἡροδότου). But that would not hold good for the time of Athenaios himself. On Jason cp. Susemihl, *Gesch.*

de Malignitate; ¹ but the only passages in the story of the Persian wars which have a vital interest for the sophistic Banqueters are the passages to do with eating and drinking, and other luxuries: ² the chief addition which Athenaios makes to the ever-growing legend of Themistokles is of sorry and demi-mondaine insignificance, ³ while the great and religious oaths by the heroes of the Persian wars, which still reverberate on the lips of Demosthenes with thrilling effect, become a jest and a derision by profane and frivolous abuse in the pages of this learned and representative savant of the post-Hellenistic decadence. ⁴

§ 19. We are arrived in this review within measurable distance of the point from which we set out. The reference, in the pages of Polyainos, ⁵ to a victory over the 'Persians' and Parthians, won by Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, is ethnologically inaccurate, and may be ascribed to the Makedonian's pride or prejudice; but Persia reappeared on the stage of the world's history before the epoch reached in the previous paragraph, and for upwards of four hundred years maintained an equal struggle with Rome and with Constantinople, until not Greek Emperors but Mohammedan Caliphs made an end of the Fire-worshippers. ⁶ Doubtless the Persian Renaissance, under the Sassanian dynasty, handed on to the times of the Arabian conquerors those romantic traditions of old Persia, which are embalmed for ever in *The Book of the Kings*. The worthlessness of those traditions for our purpose has already been made manifest: they convey no genuine reminiscence of the wars of the Achaimenids with Hellas in the fifth century B.C. ⁷ Nor did the Oriental wars, in which the later Roman

d. Gr. Lit. in Alexandr. Zeit, ii. 245 (1892).

¹ Only two of the 15 Bks. of the *Deipnosophists* contain no reference to Hdt., viz. Bks. 5 and 7. Of the nine Bks. of Hdt. all are cited, Bks. 5, 8, 9 once each, Bks. 3 and 4 twice each, Bks. 6 and 7 thrice, Bk. 2 six times at least, Bk. 1 eleven or twelve times. These statistics are based on Schweighauser.

² Athen. 4. 138 = Hdt. 9. 82 (Pausanias' object lesson); 146 A = Hdt. 7. 118 (Xerxes' commissariat, *verbatim*); 146 B = Hdt. 9. 110 (the *τύκτα*, *verbatim*); 148 F = Hdt. 9. 16 (Banquet of Attaginos—ridiculed); 14. 663 A (the Thessalians from love of luxury invited the Persians into Greece). Add 6. 267 E = Hdt. 8. 105 (story of Panionios); 9. 401 D = Hdt. 7. 153 (Syagros); 11. 486 E = Hdt. 7. 76 (*προβόλους δύο Λυκοεργέας*, cp. App. Crit. *ad l.c.*).

³ 12. 533 D, 13. 576 C, a shocking scandal, rendered precise by Idomeneus, who even knew the names of the *Hetairai* yoked to the Quadriga. Athenaios adds

some better items to the record of Themistokles: 533, how, as Magistrate, in Magnesia he celebrated the Panathenaia and the Choes (auctore Possi); how he built a banqueting-hall and said he would be content could he but fill it with friends.

⁴ 9. 380 *μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι κινδυνεύσαντας καὶ προσέτι τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχῆσαντας* κτλ. Ulpian caps it with *μὰ τοὺς ἐν Ἀργεμισίῳ κινδυνεύσαντας*. The problem is concerned with cooking a pig and capping a quotation. Cp. § 8 p. 37 n. 8 *supra*.

⁵ *τὴν μὲν κατὰ Περσῶν καὶ Παρθυαίων νίκην* κτλ. *Strategica* 1, *Proëm*. The official title of the war was *bellum Armeniacum et Parthicum*. The triumph of the Emperors took place in 166 A.D. Cp. H. Schiller, *Gesch. d. röm. Kaiserzeit*, i. 638-642.

⁶ The overthrow of Parthia by Ardeschr, the son of Sassan, is dated 226 A.D., that of Persia by the Arabs 652 A.D.

⁷ See § 1 above.

Empire was involved, do so much to recall the glories of Athens and of Sparta in the Persian wars of yore as might have been expected. Caracallus, when he went eastward to the Parthian frontier, from which he was never to return alive, sent to Sparta for a bodyguard, which he was pleased to call "the corps of Pitane"¹—taking sides thereby with Herodotus against Thucydides in an old controversy; but his inevitable exemplar was not Leonidas or Themistokles, but Alexander of Makedon.² It devolved on the feeble Syrian, Alexianos or Alexander, misnamed Severus, to inaugurate hostilities with Ardeschr, the founder of the new trans-Euphratean monarchy. Thereafter the Persian power in the East grew greater constantly at the expense of the Roman. The *Augustan History* notices the varying fortunes of the quarrel, without a reference to Hellenic precedent; even the career of Zenobia, Regent of Palmyra, whether as champion of Rome or as rebel, is narrated without allusion to her prototypes, Artemisia and Ada. The Empire of Diocletian broke for ever with Republican ideals, whether in Hellenic or in Italian dress; and the establishment of Christianity, as the state religion, by Constantine did little or nothing to resuscitate traditions of a liberty tainted with paganism. The romantic but reactionary Julian, who encountered his death in the Persian war, found little inspiration in the work of Herodotus;³ and his restoration of Paganism was a religious and not a republican madness. The division of the Empire could only have the effect of still further dissociating western literature from the ancient history and liberal precedents of Republican Hellas; while the first Christian emperors of Byzantium were for the most part too busy suppressing paganism, or pursuing heresy, to encourage a study of the ancient history of their Hellenic subjects.⁴ Christianity, indeed, whether in the East or in the West, could at first have but little time or concern for the wars of old, or the works in which they were narrated. Its attention was directed against the gods and the philosophers, but could afford to leave the historians for the most part severely alone.⁵

¹ Herodian 4. 8. 3. Cp. p. 64 note 1 *supra*. ² *ibid.* 1, 2, 6, 9; 9. 3, 4.

³ For the imperial author's ref. to Hdt. cp. p. 64 note 1 *supra*.

⁴ Justinian is reported to have suppressed the Schools at Athens in 529 A.D.; cp. Gibbon, c. xl. Agathias relates a 'curious story' of the flight of Simplicius, the philosopher, with six companions to the Persian court, and their return. Chosroes subsequently secured them exemption 'from the penal laws which Justinian enacted against his Pagan subjects.' But the evidence for the original edict, closing the Schools, has been somewhat blown upon; cp. Krumbacher, *Byzant. Literaturgesch.*² (1897) p. 6.

⁵ 'The Father of History' is occasionally cited by the Ante-Nicene Fathers, but seldom in connexion with the Persian war. TATIAN cites Herodotus as an authority on Homer, possibly a reference to the pseudepigraphic *Life*, or else to Bk. 2. ATHENAGORAS uses the second Book as evidence for the religion of Egypt. THEOPHILOS, of Antioch, quotes Hdt., indeed, but throws scorn on the history of the Greeks and Persians. CLEMENT of Alexandria cites the interview of Solon and Kroisos, and mentions the Delphic Response to the Athenians (*sic*: Hdt. 7. 178) to pray to the winds. He makes also a curious contribution to the legends of the war in the statement that the sacrifices of Epimenides of Krete

Moreover, it was itself more and more involved in a struggle for existence with new hordes of barbarians, destined sooner or later to conquer the classic and Christian worlds in West and East alike. The fall of the Western Empire overwhelmed the elements of Hellenic and Hellenistic culture in an oblivion of centuries, which left our modern nations in the making strangers to the language, literature, and art of Greece, except in so far as materials and ideas may have filtered through into the Latin or German worlds from the transformed but still living workshops and libraries of the Byzantine empire. For, in the Eastern Mediterranean, neither Church nor State could ever quite discredit or disown their Hellenic origins and elements. The Greek language remained a living and official medium; a knowledge of old Greek literature never faded out of Constantinople, till the Turkish conquest drove learning once again westward, to help in the making of our own Renaissance. For a thousand years the Byzantine historians imitated the old models, Herodotus perhaps as much as any;¹ and Byzantine grammarians and scholiasts and lexicographers wrote articles on the language, literature, and institutions of old Hellas, and compiled biographies of the old authors, surely not from their own inner consciousness alone.² But the actual story of the Persian war engaged their attention very seldom; and I suppose they make little or no addition to our resources in this respect, save in so far as they have rescued from oblivion here and there an otherwise lost author of the earlier centuries.³ Actual acquaintance with Herodotus is continuous; but it is his style and language that are mainly in evidence. The name of Themistokles persistently crops up in unexpected places;⁴ but a

postponed the war for ten years. But he has no interest in the war as such. One department of ancient history the Fathers cultivate with zest, to wit, Chronology, in the interest of the Old Testament records. The Byzantine Chronographers are based on their Christian predecessors, notably Julius Africanus and Eusebios; see *infra*.

¹ PROKOPIOS, the historian of Justinian, cites Herodotus by name (e.g. *de bell. Goth.* p. 578 D), and copies his style, and that of Thucydides (cp. *de bello Persico*, ad init.). He compares the bridging of the Sangarios by Justinian with the bridging of the Hellespont by Xerxes: *de aedif.* 5. 3. See further, *infra*. AGATHIAS, who continued the work of Prokopios, so to speak, cites Herodotus. PHOTIOS (c. 850 A.D.) had read the 'Nine Muses' of Hdt., and regarded the work as the 'Canon of the Ionian dialect' (*Bibliotheca* 60). And, to omit others intervening, LAONIKOS CHALKOKONDYLAS, the only Athenian known to Byzantine historiography, in

writing his history of the Turks (1298-1463) deliberately took Herodotus and Thucydides as his models, like Prokopios nine centuries before.

² Even in later *Epitome* the work of STEPHANOS is a monument of topographical and literary lore, going back to the sixth century. TZETZES in the twelfth century had read Hdt. GREGORIOS PARDOS, of Korinth, quotes Hdt. 'at first hand.' The *Lexika Segueriana* include a *Lexikon* to Hdt. (cp. Stein, ed. mai. ii. 441 ff.). Above all SUIDAS (about a century after Photios) contributes his biographical articles 'Ἡρόδοτος, Περσέας, etc. Krumbacher holds that one of the chief Sources of Suidas was a lost work, of an encyclopaedic kind, by Constantine Porphyrogenitus.

³ As Photios, for example, the *Persica* of Ktesias.

⁴ e.g. AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS (4th cent.) has the anecdote of Themistokles and the Persian collar of gold, 30. 8. 8. Also a notice of his connexion with

new or finer appreciation of him is hardly to be looked for. The Achaimenid kings are remembered, even in out-of-the-way quarters;¹ their connexion with the Old Testament history secured them attention from monks and theologians; but too much had happened since the days of Salamis and Plataia to make those names any longer wonderful in the eyes of historians and publicists. The conquest of Asia by Alexander was in itself enough to eclipse the previous defence of Europe by Athens; and literature in Constantinople was largely taken up with the interests of the court and empire from day to day.² Yet it may be that a closer study of Byzantine literature from first to last would reveal a larger interest in the real elements enshrined in the Greek traditions of 'the wars of Liberation,' and even something more of a direct contribution to the story, than has here been claimed for it.³ At present both time and space fail for a proper exposition of this long last portion of our subject; I drop unwillingly the thread which has guided us in this undertaking, not without a half-breathed vow to resume it elsewhere, and to complete, under the shadow of Saint Sophia's, the whole history of the History of the Persian war, begun, so to speak, at the kenotaph of Herodotus. Of a truth, ever since the revival of learning in the West, preoccupation with the better and more brilliant literature of Old Hellas has, perhaps, all too much diverted attention from the later stages of that essentially continuous and distinct consciousness and activity, which made

Lampsakos, 22. 8. 4. (Ammianus cites Hdt. by name, 22. 15. 28 (the Pyramids); mentions the navigation of Áthos and the march over Hellespont, 22. 8. 2, 4; and gives a loose account of the Persian war, 23. 6. 8.) Prokopios compares Justinian and Themistokles as makers of cities, much to the disadvantage of the Athenian: *de aedif.* 1. 1. The *Chronicon Paschale* (7th cent.) specifies the flight of Themistokles to Persia, and his death, by drinking bull's blood. (Also the ostrakism of Aristides and the *floruit* of Herodotus.) The *Chronographia* of George Syncellus (9th cent.) contains at least two striking contributions to an Herodotean commentary. (1) p. 248 'Ἡρόδοτος ἱστορικὸς ἐτιμήθη παρὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων βουλῆς ἐπαναγνοὺς αὐτοῖς τὰς βίβλους. (2) Κίμων ἐπὶ Εὐρυμέδοντι Πέρσας ἐνίκα ναυμαχία καὶ πεζομαχία. καὶ ὁ Μηδικὸς πόλεμος ἐπαύσατο, διὰ φιβάλεως ἰσχάδας συστὰς Πέρσαις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ πᾶσιν Ἑλλήσιν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. (Cp. page 90 note 13 *supra*.) The remarkable account of the origin of the Persian war has been supposed to rest on a variant of Hdt. 7. 147—a doubtful hypothesis (p. 246 c. gives a noticeable

account of the battle of Marathon). The chronological statements are taken from Eusebios, or perhaps from Sextus Julius Africanus.

¹ Notably by the chronographers, including MALALAS, with whom (ed. Bonn, p. 157) Hdt. is ὁ ἱστοριογράφος.

² 'Si monumentum quaeris,' inspicie CONSTANTINI PORPHYROGENITI *de caerenontis aulae Byzantinae*.

³ CHALKOKONDYLAS *de rebus Turcicis* p. 2D shows how much the wars of Alexander eclipsed the Persian invasion of Europe. P. 81 does more justice to the great invasion: ἵστε δὴ καὶ Ξέρξη τὸν Δαρείου, βασιλέα Περσῶν, πλῆθη ὅσα ἀγόμενος καὶ ἐς τὴν Εὐρώπην διαβάς παρὰ βραχὺ ἐπῆει ἀποθανοῦμενος, εἰ μὴ Μαρδόνιος ὑποστὰς ἤμυνεν αὐτῷ τὸν δλεθρον ἐπανιόντας [ἐπανιόντι?] ἐς Σούσα. This view of the operations of Mardonios, as designed to cover the king's retreat, is put into the mouth of Paiazetes, and must be accredited not to the Ottoman king but to the Christian author. P. 78 ascribes to Paiazetes the idea that Alexander's invasion of Asia was a return for τῆς ἐς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας Ξέρξεω ἐλάσεως.

of Homer and Eustathios, of Herodotus and Chalkokondylas, but separate links in an unbroken chain of letters.

§ 20. In conclusion, then, the chief observations to be gathered from this review of the Sources, external to Herodotus, for the history of the Persian Invasion of Greece in 480 B.C., may be briefly formulated. There are, perhaps, six results especially prominent. (1) Herodotus is neither the only nor the earliest primary authority for the history of the war: the poets, his predecessors, must be allowed to bear witness. (2) There existed a strong and rival tradition, or body of tradition, which attained to definite consistency in the fourth century B.C., mainly under the shaping hand of Ephoros. Even if largely a rationalization of the Herodotean traditions, this version of the story should not be dismissed as worthless. (3) A host of minor traditions, local variants, anecdotes, inferences, conjectures, sports, fancies, inventions, have come down to us in the later Sources. Such materials are not merely contributions to the psychology of tradition, they are occasionally of material value for the local colour they convey, the criticism they presuppose, the custom or the creed which they preserve from oblivion. (4) Nevertheless, from contact with all three rival elements of evidential value, such as they are, Herodotus emerges as, upon the whole, the most considerable and indeed the supreme witness to the course, character, and circumstances of the war. (5) But, it is hardly from him, or his narrative, much less from the silence of Aischylos, that the greatness of Themistokles in the traditions of the war can have been derived. Yet that impression is inevitably there. Among the chief actors in the great drama of the national deliverance, no other personality compares with that of the Athenian *Strategos*, or General, for the impression made upon the Hellenic consciousness. The constant and instinctive homage paid to the son of Neokles and Abrotonos by a tradition not free from malignity is apparent from first to last. Themistokles was inferentially a really great man, a veritable genius; and he is the only man of supreme ability revealed in the story of the war. But his greatness was neither appreciated nor understood at the time, nor fully explained at any time in the extant Sources. They leave it, on the whole, as a problem for our solution. (6) This failure, or shortcoming, in the traditions of the war is not more obvious than the complete, or almost complete, failure to present an adequate or intelligible account of the actual operations of the war, in their strategic and tactical aspects.—These critical observations leave a critical task to be accomplished, to which modern critics have already addressed themselves. Criticism, as now understood, is not merely negative, or destructive; nor is it content merely to analyse tradition into its elements, and to determine the provenience of those elements severally. The *res gesta* is the antecedent of tradition; the *dramatis persona* is essential to the fable. Historical criticism aims at recovering the facts of the case, and the characters of

the principal agents. The process whereby these results are to be attained is undoubtedly rationalistic. Tradition is to be tested by its inner character and consistency, and by its relation to the permanent and verifiable conditions of the story, conditions, that is, of time, of place, of physical and of psychical congruity. If a tradition is exiguous, incoherent, isolated, no positive results may be attainable. Even in the presence of tolerably copious and continuous literary sources many events will be obscure, many actions doubtful, many characters ambiguous. But the cardinal points, the principal aspects of the world, or of the age of the world under observation, are ascertainable by the methods above indicated. The Persian war of 480 and 479 B.C. is not in one and the same category with the Trojan war, with the return of the Herakleids, or even with the expeditions of Kyros against the Massagetai, of Dareios against the Skyths. It is a well-attested series of historical events, of undoubtedly ecumenical import. To the elucidation of its problems, the reconstruction of its objective story, the appreciation of its leading personalities, in the light of the Herodotean and all other genuine traditions, tested and reinforced by all the critical methods at our disposal, the remainder of this volume is dedicate. Many labourers have already worked with good result in this vineyard ; but there still seems room for one and another more or ever the vintage be fully gathered and gleaned.

APPENDIX II

THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS

§ 1. Threefold subject of the first part of the Seventh Book (cc. 1-130). § 2. Causality of the war (cc. 1-19): (a) Real causes. (b) Problem of delay. (c) Inconsequent, fictitious, and historical elements in the story. § 3. The king's route, and the advance from Susa to Therme (seven stages). § 4. Engineering feats and army-service (Roads, Bridges, Canal, Commissariat). § 5. The *levée en masse* (Analysis, Navy, Army, Sources). § 6. Objective and plan of the invasion.

§ 1. THE first portion of the Seventh Book (cc. 1-137) contains, in Herodotean form, an account of the preparations *a parte Persarum* for the reinvasion of Greece, as undertaken and conducted by the king, from the disaster at Marathon down to the arrival of Xerxes with his forces at Therme, or in Pieria (c. 131), within sight of Olympos, and on the very frontier of Hellas. Elsewhere Herodotus supplements to some extent the narrative, the descriptions, in this passage by additional matter;¹ the passage itself, too, shows signs of having received additions and insertions in places at the author's own hand.² In any case, the section in question is of somewhat composite structure,³ and must have been derived from various sources.⁴ Yet it presents upon the whole a sustained and continuous argument, treating coherently three main topics, closely related to each other:— I. The causality of the war, or the reasons for the expedition of Xerxes, for the reinvasion of European Hellas. II. The actual

¹ e.g. (1) Message to Sparta from Demaratos in Susa, 7. 239, if authentic; (2) Reception of the Greek spies in Sardes, 7. 146; (3) Revenge of Hermotimos, 8. 106; (4) Army left in Ionia under Tigranes, 9. 96; (5) Persian courier service, 8. 98; (6) Xerxes in Elaiüs, 9. 116; (7) Xerxes in Thrace, 8. 115-16; (8) Total numbers of the king's forces at Therme, 7. 184-7.

² e.g. (1) parts, if not the whole, of the army and navy lists, cc. 61-99;

(2) items, if not more, in the Thracian section, such as ethnography, c. 111; geography, c. 113; the king's road, c. 115; the Lion-area, c. 126; (3) the visit to Thessaly, cc. 128-30; (4) *ὡς καὶ πρότερόν μοι δεδήλωται*, c. 108; cp. further Commentary *ad ll.* and Introduction, § 9, and Appendix III. § 1 *infra*.

³ Cp. Introduction, § 3.

⁴ Cp. Introduction, § 10, and p. 181 *infra*.

preparations made for the expedition, including the building of bridges, the cutting of a canal, the erection and storing of magazines or dépôts, and the grand mobilization of the forces by land and sea. III. The king's march from Susa, and the whole advance of the Persian forces through Asia and Europe, down to the point where the first active resistance on the part of the Greeks was to be encountered, or at least expected, on the frontier of Thessaly. These three great topics are treated with equal and complete assurance by Herodotus, but his methods are not equally sound, nor his results equally convincing, in regard to all three. We are, however, throughout in the presence of historical facts and of actual processes, nor is it difficult anywhere to discriminate between the more and the less probable elements in the record, and to attain, on many important points, a relative certainty, to restore at least the probable skeleton of the actual course of events.

§ 2. I. *The Causality of the War* (cc. 1-19).—(a) The real causes of the Persian war are not far to seek. Leaving out of account the eternal but somewhat threadbare opposition between East and West,¹ and making little of the natural expansion of an imperial and conquering state, until some definite or natural limit is reached,² we can yet see enough in the immediate antecedents and circumstances of the Persian empire at the given date to render an invasion of European Greece the chief order of the day. (i.) The secular and substantial unity of the two sides of the Aigaian made an effort to unite them under one government inevitable to any state of imperial capacity, on either side. Moreover, the reaction of the free Republics of European Hellas upon the Greeks in Asia, subjects of the Persian king, could not but be a constant source of danger and disturbance to the Persian power, and called for active intervention on its part. Sparta, if the story be true, had already warned Kyros off the Asiatic Greeks,³ and Athens had certainly supported them in their recent revolt against the king⁴; the permanent and undisturbed possession of the Asiatic side demanded a predominance upon the European main. (ii.) Nor should it be forgotten in this connexion that Persia was already something of a European power, and even, after a fashion, the paramount European power. Thrace and Makedon acknowledged the Persian suzerainty; Thasos and other islands, reckoned to Europe, had been already incorporated in the empire. The navy-list of Xerxes is proof of the range and extent to which Persia might be already considered an Hellenic or phil-Hellenic monarchy. The Persian frontier already technically marched with Thessaly. Xerxes at Therme was still

¹ Not without some justification in Hdt. Cp. 7. 11 πρόκειται ἀγών, ἵνα ἢ τάδε πάντα ὑπὸ Ἑλλήσιν ἢ ἐκείνα πάντα ὑπὸ Πέρσῃσι γένηται· τὸ γὰρ μέσον οὐδὲν τῆς ἐχθρῆς ἐστὶ (Xerxes *log.*).

² 7. 8 νόμον τόνδε . . οὐδαμὰ κω ἡτρεμί-

σαμεν : *ibid.* γῆν τὴν Περσίδα ἀποδέξομεν τῷ Διὶς αἰθέρι ὁμοῦρέουσιν.

³ Cp. Hdt. 1. 152. The message 'Hands off' is nowhere again adduced as a *casus belli*.

⁴ ἢ ἐς Σάρδεις ἐσβολή 7. 1.

within the confines of his own dependencies; the true invasion begins not at the Hellespont, but at Tempe, nay, ultimately at Thermopylai. It is a long way indeed from Susa to Sparta,¹ but no very far cry from Poteidaia to Athens! (iii.) Again, more precisely, the previous expedition determined the sequel, and the check at Marathon could not be allowed to pass unrevenged. Not merely pride but policy might seem to dictate an effort to punish or to reduce the contumacious Athenians. Marathon unavenged must have reacted unfavourably upon the western provinces of the Persian empire, Makedon, Ionia, Egypt: who could tell how soon the Athenians might be encouraged, by impunity, to a repeated aggression? (iv.) The accession of a new king was but a reason the more for a warlike undertaking. The grandson of Kyros could ill afford to abandon the tradition of conquest without an effort²; the time had not yet come when a Persian king could subside into the cares of domestic administration or become the mere puppet of palace intrigue. Was it not the great blood-letting on this very expedition which made the tamer Persian record of the next century and a half possible? (v.) Moreover, the rather to encourage the new king to this undertaking, in the direction undoubtedly of least resistance, there were not wanting positive invitations and encouragements, by the mouths and in the persons of Greek refugees, or ambassadors, from Thessaly, from Athens, from Sparta, from Argos, promising a divided and weakened resistance, and even a partial welcome; pledges, at least, of a dutiful subjection for the future. (vi.) Doubtless there were operating, besides, motives of personal ambition, hopes of spoil, captives, and fortune, not to forget the charm of adventure, which must ever make war attractive. Mardonios, as the leader of a war-party in the king's Council, is a sufficiently plausible figure. Whether there were any higher views of commercial policy and pacific settlement is a problem of more doubtful issue. Enough that, tested by the given antecedents and conditions, the invasion of Greece by Xerxes was a foregone conclusion. What rather called for explanation was the delay of a decade in the reinvasion of Hellas, after the miscarriage at Marathon.

(b) The sense that here, in the delay, was a problem calling for solution is exhibited in the very opening of the Seventh Book, which represents Dareios as doubly resolved for the reinvasion of Athens upon a scale irresistible. A space of three years is indeed filled by vaster preparations, till in the fourth year the revolt of Egypt occurs still further to retard the king's vengeance on Athens, albeit making no change in his resolve; only death supervenes to discharge Dareios of all further earthly undertakings. A disputed succession,³ and the

¹ Cp. 5. 50.

² Cp. 7. 8, 11.

³ On the question of the succession cp. note to 7. 2 and add: Trogus (Justin

2. 10) and Plutarch, *Mor.* 488, tell a story in substantial agreement with one another, and widely differing from Hdt. On four points they agree to differ from

prime urgency of the Egyptian revolt, may still further have postponed the re-opening of the Hellenic question; but from the first Xerxes is represented as resolved to assume this legacy from his father; and here the Herodotean story sets in with an initial inconsequence, and follows that up with a series of apocryphal marvels, which almost obliterate the simple rationale of the whole proceedings.

(c) The inconsequence lies in the re-opening of the previous question after the king has taken his resolution to carry out his father's project for the conquest of Greece. The resolution of Xerxes is fully formed, in the first instance, before the re-settlement of Egypt; and that successful achievement of his policy and arms would plainly form no ground for the abandonment of the other project, though the interval of time, secured between the king's first resolve for an Hellenic war, and his formal deliberations in Council, may ease the dramatic sequence. The inconsequence, however, is not exhausted above; it extends to the reproduction, at the second stage, of arguments *pro* and *contra*, which must have been, or at least ought to have been, heard and considered or ever the king resolved upon the war at all. But human action is often far from consequent, and the problem remains whether the inconsequence here detected belongs to the king or to the historian, and is a defect in the character of Xerxes or in the composition of Herodotus. The highly artificial structure of the story, presently to be indicated throughout the context, might tempt us to suppose that only a genuine reminiscence, or tradition, of a change of purpose on the king's part could account for so obvious an inconsequence in the narrative, if, indeed, we had found Herodotus elsewhere and throughout careful to avoid such incoherence. But Herodotus is nothing if not inconsequent; and his inconsequence appears often traceable to mere variations in source, and the juxtaposition of alternative stories. In the present case the main thread of the story may have passed originally from the decision of the king to invade Hellas (cc. 5-6) through the recovery of Egypt (c. 7) direct

Hdt. :—1. The question of the succession arises only on the death of Dareios. 2. It is decided judicially, and amicably, by an arbiter. 3. The name of the elder brother of Xerxes is Ariamenes. 4. The name of Demaratos and the supposed Spartan precedent are omitted. They differ from each other in three particulars:—1. Trogus makes the *iudex* Artaphernes, Plutarch the *δικαστής* Artabanos. 2. With Trogus the brothers have recourse to a *domesticum iudicem*; with Plutarch the 'Persians' appoint the *dikast*: Xerxes at first objects, and would prefer (like a true tyrant *τῷ πλήθει πεποιθώς*) a popular court. 3. In Trogus Atossa does not act directly; in Plutarch she is one of the *dramatis personae*. All

three accounts agree that (1) there was a dispute over the succession, (2) decided without violence or bloodshed, (3) chiefly by two arguments: (a) the *ius maternum*, (b) the post-regnal birth of Xerxes. Hdt. has perhaps confused the questions of appointing a vicegerent in the king's absence with the question of succession to the throne, and antedated the effective decision in the case of Xerxes. He might do so the more easily, as the question must have been often discussed, and the absence of a bloody succession may have suggested the inference that the question had been effectively settled before the death of Dareios. Perhaps also there is some justification for the rôle assigned to Demaratos.

to the preparations for the great invasion (cc. 19 ff.); and the brilliant scenes intervening, which are laid in the king's Council-chamber and in the king's Bed-chamber (cc. 8-19), may have been derived from a different quarter, or be largely a free product of the historian's own fancy, added or inserted, perhaps not in the very first draft of the original work.

Nowhere, indeed, does Herodotus appear to deal more freely with his materials or to procure a more artificial result than in this account of the king's deliberations upon the invasion of Greece (cc. 8-19). The scene is laid at Susa, about the year 483, and shifts from the Council-chamber to the Bed-chamber, and back again. The Greek exiles and their suite have disappeared; the *mise en scène* is purely Persian; the *dramatis personae* are the king, with his good genius and his evil genius, Artabanos, Mardonios, while in the background moves in and out a silent chorus of privy councillors. The drama comprises a diary of events for three days and three nights; and the king's decision alternates between War, Peace and War. Speeches are delivered, for which Herodotus could hardly have authentic record; a supernatural apparition, a vision capable of rhetoric, plays its rôle as one of the *dramatis personae*, in accordance with Homeric analogy¹ and the tradition of the Attic stage.² Thrice the Council meets by day, thrice the vision appears by night, and throughout, of course, the transactions are recorded and conducted in the best Ionic Greek. The whole passage is obviously dramatic, poetic, fictitious. How should Herodotus thus have known the secrets of the king's couch, and of the king's heart? Or how report *in extenso* the speeches in council or in chamber? Who can treat seriously the supernatural machinery, or fail to discount the too obviously ethical contrasts between the wise and the foolish councillor? The intensely Greek moral put into the mouth of Artabanos must be ascribed not to the spread of Hellenic influence at the Persian court, but to the dramatic devices of the writer. Perhaps nothing is more fatal to the historical claims of this passage than the detection of the literary origins and antecedents of the speeches.³

Not but what even this passage may have had some historical antecedents, some partial justification, in actual transactions at the Persian court. Herodotus is not so poor an artist as to reject the advantage to be derived from reproducing realities, so far as attainable. He deals with real persons, with actual relations, with genuine influences and motives. Where exactly authentic tradition ends and inference begins is as hard to determine as where inference

¹ The visions of Agamemnon, *Iliad*.

² e.g. wraith of Dareios in the *Persai*.

³ M. Hauvette, *Hérodote* (1894), recognizes three very clear *souvenirs d'Eschyle* in the speech of Xerxes, and admits that the speeches of Mardonios and of Artabanos are largely Greek, or Herodotean, in sentiment and *éthos*. Historical authority cannot be vindicated for the speeches by their quality of verisimilitude, which merely shows that Herodotus was a good artist. Cp. Introduction, § 11.

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makes way for fancy and free creation. There is enough in the age of Artabanos, his relation to the king, and the trust committed to his charge, to account for the rôle assigned to him in this dramatic fragment, even if he had not really opposed the Thracian expedition of Dareios, nor actually dissuaded Xerxes from adventuring in Greece. The part actually and undoubtedly played by Mardonios in Greece in 479, as previously in 492, and the fate which overtook him at Plataia, are quite sufficient to account for his being made into the evil genius of Xerxes in legend, as he was undoubtedly the evil genius of Greece in fact, whether there was or was not a peace-party and a war-party at Susa in 483. It is almost absurd to cite such touches as the reference to the Magi,¹ or even the mention of 'Persian authors,'² for proofs of an historical contents to the story, as though such verisimilitudes were beyond the resources of 'the prince of Ionian historians'! Upon the whole we may conclude that this passage has little or no genuine history in it, where it differs or goes beyond the previous and probably independent passage, in which Mardonios appears, side by side with the Greek exiles, as advocating a war policy. That policy was probably never in doubt; it was prescribed and inevitable all along, though the exact moment for the inception of the undertaking, the magnitude of the forces, the route, the plan of campaign, were doubtless matters of deliberation. Herodotus has treated his topic with undue freedom, and this passage is one of those which most tend to discredit his character as an historian, not because he is here sinning against light, but simply because he is doing his best according to his lights. This conclusion is doubtless an unfortunate one, from some points of view, with which to start; at the same time we may remember that Herodotus might easily know more of Greek, or semi-Greek, than of purely Persian situations and proceedings, and that the subsequent course of his narrative brings him more and more within the region of the knowable and the known. In discussing this passage we have faced all but the worst that can be said against Herodotus' history of the Persian war; it is a romance, a chapter from an historical novel, where he is dealing with Persian affairs from Persian sources. Yet it quickly improves in passing within the range of native Greek sources, and there is already a strongly marked difference upon the present topic between the longer passage, from which Greek agents and Greek sources are excluded, and the shorter passage, in which Demaratos and the Aleuads, Onomakritos and the Peisistratidai, have played their parts. The difference is all to the advantage of the latter.³

§ 3. III. *The King's Route*.—At the other end of the scale, for exactitude, verisimilitude, and historical value, are to be set the passages, which, taken together, give an account of the king's march from Susa to Therme, or rather of the king's route, from station to

¹ c. 19.² c. 12.³ cc. 8-19 compared with cc. 5, 6.

station, so far as given, or implied, between those *termini*. The anatomy of the route must indeed be distinguished from the story, or stories, of the march, even as the determination to invade Greece has been distinguished from its romantic and imaginary setting. The route-map is involved in the narrative of the march, and that narrative itself is not a bare itinerary, but is embroidered with anecdotes, and enriched with incidents, of varying probability and significance, some of these passages, indeed, presenting data of importance for the light they throw upon questions of the organization, numbers, and character of the forces, and even upon general questions of policy and strategy.

Detached from these more problematic elements the skeleton route emerges as one of the most certain results of Herodotean criticism, and carries with it, into certainty or high probability, many incidental items and consequences in the narrative. Here, too, the itinerary of the route grows in clearness and completeness as it approaches its terminus, and moves on to and over Greek soil. Between Susa and Sardes the route itself, like the march, is obscure and problematical; from Sardes to Therme it is as sure and simple as the subsequent stages from Therme to Athens, at least in regard to the main questions. No doubt this result lies in the nature of the case, the march of Xerxes having followed, from Sardes to Athens, lines well within the ken of Greek travellers, and even perhaps known visually to Herodotus himself, at least from leading point to point. Some topographical error occurs even in this relatively well-known region of Thrace, or Chalkidike¹; but what is more surprising than the exceptional error is the general fulness and completeness of the topography. This result must surely be ascribed not so much to the records of the march of Xerxes, as to the permanent knowledge of this highway possessed in Athens, in Ionia, and in Hellas at large, and already enshrined in more than one prose authority.² But, whatever the sources of his knowledge, all credit belongs to Herodotus for his relatively full map of the Thrakio-Hellespontine regions, and, in diminishing quantity, for the general skeleton of the route of Xerxes from first to last. The march of Xerxes from Sardes to Athens is at least as clearly ascertained in the pages of Herodotus as the march of Hannibal from Saguntum to Trasimene in the pages of Polybios and Livy: had Hannibal happened to start from Carthage, we might perhaps have found his route from Carthage to Gades and from Gades to Saguntum as dim and vague as the stages of Xerxes' route between Susa and Kritalla, between Kritalla and Sardes. Viewed in its whole extent between the points indicated, the march comprises seven stages geographically, of which three belong to Asia and three to Europe, while one may be assigned to the crossing. They run:—(i.) From Susa to Kritalla; (ii.) From Kritalla to Sardes; (iii.) From Sardes to Abydos; (iv.) From Abydos

¹ Cp. Commentary, 7. 22. 8, etc.

² Notably Hekataios. Cp. Commentary, *passim*, and Introduction, § 10.

to Sestos; (v.) From Sestos to Doriskos; (vi.) From Doriskos to Akanthos; (vii.) From Akanthos to Therme. It will be convenient to pursue the description of this route and the narrative of the march in detail, and to segregate the elements of anecdote, of incident, and of romance—for romance still recurs—from the strict way-bill or inventory of the road, and from the materials that find their proper uses under the heads of the Naval and Military organization of the expedition. The process will furnish at once an analysis of the text of Herodotus bearing upon these subjects, and a preliminary critique of the relative values of the various elements.

(i.) *From Susa to Kritalla* in Kappadokia (c. 26). The king himself, with suite and escort, must have moved (summer of 481 B.C.) from Susa, or one of his capitals, perhaps down the higher stages of the 'Royal Road,' some fifty days' march at least, if the itinerary, or rather the *stadiasmos*, of the Fifth Book is to be trusted,¹ to Kritalla, the first rendezvous for the forces. This journey of the king's is, indeed, an absolute blank in the pages of Herodotus, who might be taken to regard Kritalla as the true *terminus a quo* for the whole march. There was assembled, not indeed the total land-forces (ὁ πᾶς ἄπας, c. 26), as Herodotus may seem to say in the first instance, but all or so much of the infantry, and no doubt all or so much of the cavalry, as formed the column or *corps d'armée* that marched with the king in person—that is, as the sequel will show, about one-third of the total land-forces. At Kritalla, perhaps, the king awarded to one or other of the leaders of the Eastern contingents—Persians, Medes, Baktrians, Elamites, dwellers in Mesopotamia, and so forth—rewards or decorations according to the numbers and appearance of their musters; and doubtless a review, perhaps more than one, took place at Kritalla, which must have been an open plain or champaign. Unfortunately the topographical identification of Kritalla still baffles our choriographers of Minor Asia, and the exact scene of the first mustering of the forces is still left vaguely 'in Kappadokia,' where Herodotus places it: Kappadokia itself being a somewhat elastic or elusive term upon the Herodotean map, east of Phrygia, and west of (Armenia and) Kilikia. With Herodotus the Halys is the frontier between Phrygia and Kappadokia; but, then, the Halys itself is conceived as crossing Asia Minor south and north, and almost bisecting it from sea to sea.² The subsequent narrative which carries the king across the Halys might seem to imply that Kritalla is to be sought north of the upper course of the Halys, and a further natural inference would be that the army advanced from Kritalla, and from the Halys by the 'Royal Road.'³ But the clearer sequel shows that Xerxes approached Sardes from the south-east, and 'the plain of

¹ Cp. 5. 52f. and Appendix XIII., 'On the Royal Road,' in my *Herodotus IV.-VI.* (1895).

² I. 72.

³ This inference is, indeed, actually made by W. M. Ramsay, *Hist. Geography of Asia Minor* (1890), p. 41.

Tyana' has with some probability been identified as the site of Kritalla.¹ Tyana lies far to the south of Mount Argaios and the river Halys: to gain Tyana Xerxes would have had to turn south, leaving the Royal Road on the north, unless, indeed, he reached the plain of Tyana from the south through the Kilikian Gates. In any case the examination of the next and somewhat clearer stage will make it probable that Xerxes himself followed another than the Royal Road in his march from Kritalla to Sardes, if not from Susa to Kritalla.

(ii.) *From Kritalla to Sardes* (cc. 26–32).—If the 'Royal Road' had been followed, the route would here have corresponded to the forty days' journey from Sardes given in reverse order by the *stadiasmos* of the Fifth Book. The crossing of the Halys favours the adoption of that route, but the crossing of the Halys might be an inevitable inference, arising from the historian's erroneous conception of the upper course of that stream. The crossing of the Maiandros before Sardes is reached, and the occurrence of Kelainai and Kolossai upon the line of march—places which certainly did not lie on the Royal Road—prove that Sardes was not approached by the Royal Road. To harmonize these indications in a sense favourable to Herodotus it is necessary to suppose, with Sir W. M. Ramsay, that Xerxes crossed the Halys by the Royal Road, and at a later stage, for some unexplained reason, made a wide divergence to the south, and struck on Kelainai, the point from which onwards his route to Sardes is perfectly clear. It is much simpler to suppose, especially after placing Kritalla at or near Tyana, that the king's route through Asia Minor, from Kritalla to Sardes, lay wholly to the south of the Halys, and of the great central deserts and lakes, along a line roughly corresponding to the route of the Kyreian expedition in 401, or to the great trade-route, known later as the 'High-way' (κοινὴ ὁδός). The stations Kelainai and Kolossai are identical with stages on the *anabasis* of Kyros, and the route of Kyros from Sardes to the Maiandros ford, and again from the Maiandros to Kolossai, was no doubt the same as the way pursued by Xerxes in reverse order. Kyros emerged ultimately after crossing 'Lykaonia' and part of Kappadokia at 'Dana' (Tyana), but it would be rash to assume that his route between Kelainai and Tyana coincided throughout with that of Xerxes between the same points.² From Tyana to Ikonion, through 'Kappadokia' and 'Lykaonia,' was (on Xenophon's showing) some 55 'parasangs,' some nine to ten days' march, and here the route of Kyros may have coincided with that of Xerxes. Xenophon, indeed, names no towns upon the way between Ikonion (*Konia*) and Dana, or Tyana (*Kizli-Hissar*, near the modern *Bor*): the route may have lain from Tyana along the line of the later Roman road, Tyana, Kybistra, Kastabala, Barata Iconium, which appears to correspond to

¹ Ramsay, *op. c.*

² Ramsay observes that Kyros went south of the later main route; *op. c.*

one of the modern routes,¹ though not the most direct, or shortest.² The modern route is reckoned at some fifty-three hours' going, say seven days' journey at the least for an ordinary traveller, a reckoning which may correspond sufficiently to the indications of the *Anabasis*, where an army is in question. The great king will have moved even more slowly. Between Ikonion and Kelainai, apparently a fortnight's march or more (92 parasangs), the *Anabasis* places in order, going eastward, Peltai, Keramon Agora, Kaystrupedion, Thymbriion, Tyriaion; but Kyros here goes out of the direct way northwards, and at Keramon Agora touches even the Royal Road. Xerxes may have taken a more direct route. His line may have more nearly coincided with one of the modern routes between *Konia* (Ikonion) and *Dineir* (Kelainai), say Konia—Yalovach (Antioch)—Dineir,³ a journey of forty-eight hours, or some six to eight days; or, if we may mark the possible course by antique names, irrespective of a strict chronology, the king's route from Ikonion to Kelainai may have passed by Tyriaion and Thymbriion to Kaystrupedion, or Ipsos: in this stretch of 40 parasangs, perhaps a seven or eight days' march, coinciding with the route of Kyros, of course in the reverse direction. From Kaystrupedion the king (having turned the Sultan Dag) moves south-west by Metropolis to Kelainai: a distance of some sixty Roman miles or so, probably another week's work for the king's army. This route is easier but longer than the modern one above given.⁴

Before Kelainai the king's route is dim and conjectural; the only place named, Kritalla, cannot be certainly identified; we cannot surely decide whether the king reached Kappadokia through the Kilikian Gates, or by the Royal Road; in either case, it is just possible to maintain that he traversed Phrygia by the Royal Road, and only struck down to Kelainai after crossing the Halys, albeit the alternative suggestion, that he advanced from Kritalla by a southern route, does far less violence to the natural probabilities. At Kelainai the king's route emerges into relative certainty, not merely because Herodotus supplies fuller data, but also because the march of Xerxes between Kelainai and Sardes exactly corresponds with that of Kyros, for which we have the complete *stadiasmos* of Xenophon. From Sardes to Kelainai is apparently a seven days' march for Kyros and his men (50 parasangs), though at that rate the pace is rapid; the king will probably have required at least ten days to accomplish this section of his journey. In other respects there is no reason to differentiate the

¹ Wilson, *Asia Minor* (Murray 1895), Route 52.

² Cp. Ramsay, *op. c.* p. 357, and Wilson, *Handbook of Asia Minor* (Murray, 1895), Routes 52, 53.

³ Wilson, Route 47.

⁴ Ramsay, *Asia Minor*, p. 49, notices

an error in the Peutinger map regarding the section between Ipsus (Julia) and Metropolis, the map presenting alternative loops, *via* Synnada and Euphorbium respectively, as a single route. If, however, Euphorbium was where Kiepert's last map places it, it cannot have been on any road from Metropolis to Julia.

march of Xerxes from the well-ascertained route of later times, and the bare data of Herodotus may be supplemented by names which, though representing later foundations, doubtless mark an ancient route, and even ancient settlements. From Kelainai to Kolossai ('3 stathmoi, 20 parasangs,' Xenophon) the route would have followed approximately the existing line of railway from Dineir (Apameia-Kelainai) to Gonjeli (Laodicea ad Lycum), past the salt lake Aji-tuz Geul (Anaua), through the 'celebrated' Pass of Chardak, and down the valley of the Lykos.¹ From Kolossai to the Maiandros-crossing ('1 stathmos, 8 parasangs,' Xen., a very long day's journey, probably a two days' march) the road apparently went down the left bank of the Lykos, past the site of the later Laodicea, already doubtless marked by a settlement, and crossing to the right bank of the river went on by Kydrara (Hierapolis),² which with Herodotus is the *Knotenpunkt*, junction or fork, for two roads, the one leading down the Maiandros valley 'to Karia-wards'—subsequently the first stage on the great road from Ephesos to Apameia, now marked by the railway line—the other to Sardes and the Maiandros-crossing, that then taken by the king. From Kydrara to the Maiandros-crossing would seem to be some four hours' march.³ From the Maiandros-crossing to Sardes Xenophon reckons 3 stathmoi, or 22 parasangs. It is apparently some sixty miles' distance, and presumably not less than four days' march. In later days the road passed by Tripolis, Apollonis Hieron and Philadelphia, down the valley of the Kogamos.⁴ Herodotus names one city *en route*, Kallatebos, passed by Xerxes apparently the day before he entered Sardes, an indication which would scarcely accord with even the site of Philadelphia (Alashehr); but the importance of the site may justify the identification,⁵ despite the chronological *obiter dictum* of Herodotus.

Thus the stage of Xerxes' march from Kritalla to Sardes, or rather the latter stages of it, from Kelainai to Sardes, are comparatively clear and full, and the actual route at least in this latter section ascertainable with substantial accuracy. The use of this route by Xerxes is incidentally confirmed by Xenophon,⁶ and Herodotus has had fairly trustworthy sources for the march, once it is within the horizon of the Ionian traders from Ephesos, Miletos, and the islands. The topographical indications given by Herodotus on this route are not, however, sufficient to assure us that he had himself traversed it.

¹ Between Dineir and Appa the line of rail lies rather to the north of the old line of road; cp. Wilson, *op. c.* p. 105.

² Kydrara, altitude 1250 ft. Wilson, *op. c.* p. 105.

³ Ramsay's map (*op. c.* p. 104) erroneously identifies Hierapolis with Kallatebos; cp. Wilson, *op. c.* p. 107.

⁴ Cp. Ramsay, *op. c.* p. 49.

⁵ Rawlinson, note *ad l.*

⁶ *Anab.* 1. 2. 9 *ἐνταῦθα Ξέρξης ὅτε ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγηθεὶς τῇ μάχῃ ἀπεχώρει λέγεται οἰκοδομῆσαι ταῦτά τε τὰ βασίλεια καὶ τὴν Κελαινῶν ἀκρόπολιν.* That there were buildings of Xerxes in Kelainai is likely enough; that they were erected on his return to Asia 'after his defeat' (at Salamis) is less convincing.

The occurrence of the names, Kelainai, Anaua, Kolossai, Kydrara, Kallatebos; the mention of the rivers, Maiandros, Katarraktes, Lykos, and of the salt lake Anaua; even the more graphic description of the boundary-stone at Kydrara, the fork of the roads to Sardes and 'Karia,' and the bon-bon manufactory at Kallatebos, do not transcend the possibility of second-hand information; and we may be almost sure that if Herodotus himself had ever been in Kelainai he would not have omitted to mention the palace built there by Xerxes. The anecdote of Pythios, his interview with Xerxes at Kelainai, and the incident of the plane-tree at Kallatebos, belong to the humours of the voyage, which must be tested on their own merits, and are sufficiently discussed in the commentary; here they may be cited as illustration of the growing wealth of Herodotus, his sources for this portion of the way, and an indirect testimony to the route actually followed by the king.

It may be added, however, that although clearly the king himself approached Sardes by the route Kelainai—Kolossai—Hierapolis—Philadelphia, and probably reached Kelainai from Tyana by a route passing south of the great central desert, or salt-district of Asia Minor, it is by no means necessary to bring all the forces, which reached Sardes in the autumn of 481 B.C. or the winter following, by one and the same route thither. The larger we suppose the muster at Kritalla, the greater the probability that the host advanced westward by more than one route: one moiety perhaps by the great northern, or Royal Road, while the other made good its advance by the great southern route, which was destined more and more to supersede the other and perhaps older line, as the head centres of power and commerce shifted westwards.¹ If levies from Asia Minor itself concentrated at Sardes they too would have come, to a great extent, by the Royal Road, as the army-list itself would seem to imply; possibly, however, these levies, at least in part, were appointed to meet the king at Abydos in the following spring, and made their way thither on diverse roads, according to their places of origin. Of which more anon.

The winter of 481–80 B.C. plainly was passed by Xerxes at Sardes, doubtless to a great extent in maturing the plan of invasion, pushing on the necessary works and preparations, and sounding the Greeks as to the probable reception to be expected by the Persians. To this point is expressly referred by Herodotus the mission of heralds into Hellas (7. 32), who only meet the king again at Therme (7. 131); and to this point we must refer the somewhat problematic story of the treatment of the Greek spies at Sardes (7. 146), which in Herodotus figures mainly as an illustration of the great king's whimsical magnanimity. On Greek tradition this residence of the king, still

¹ The road-making for the king's march need not be rigidly confined to Europe; cp. p. 140 below.

undefeated, and busy with organizing the great invasion, made apparently less impression than the residence at Sardes a year later, after Xerxes had fled discomfited from Salamis, and when his military and material repulse already repeated itself for Greek observers in his moral corruption and collapse.

From Sardes onwards, when the march is resumed in the following spring, we are conscious of fuller sources, stronger tradition, and a growing suggestion of personal acquaintance, more or less intimate, with the region traversed. There are other proofs of a first-hand acquaintance, on the part of Herodotus, with the Hellespont; and his meticulous choriography in Thrace and Makedon attests the high state of practical information about these regions, long known to Greek writers and travellers, thick sown with Greek settlements, and at the very time, when Herodotus was writing his history, incorporated in the alliance of Athens. To this stage still belong such romantic stories as the sequel to the Pythios' anecdote, and the dramatic conversation between Xerxes and Artabanos at Abydos on the Hellespont, beside the more plausible incidents of the visit to Troy, the sacrifice at Nine Ways, the excursion to Tempe. This whole passage also affords numerous hints, and larger sections, which supply the chief materials for estimating the numbers and organization of fleet and of army, the order of march, and the strategic ideas governing the whole movement. Ignoring for the present the anecdotal and romantic incidents, and postponing the employment of the last group of indications, until we come to discuss the strictly military aspects of the story, we may proceed to reconstruct the king's route to Therme, with all but complete fulness and accuracy, and a consequent brevity and freedom from debate.

(iii.) *Sardes to Abydos* (7. 40–44). Here first occurs in the text of Herodotus a description of the actual column upon the march (cc. 40–41), as well as something approaching to an exact way-bill, though without precise indications of time or distance (cc. 42, 43). The route passes out of Lydia into Mysia by crossing the river Kaikos, but the exact route from Sardes to the Kaikos is not clearly indicated. On the assumption that the whole army moved upon one road—which is plainly the assumption of Herodotus¹—that road was presumably the easiest one, down the valley and over the col to Smyrna—the line of the modern railway makes a detour round Sipylos—and then northwards by the coast-road past Kyme and Myrina. Possibly a second column moved by a more direct line inland, from Sardes to the Kaikos; before the army reaches Abydos there is to be found an unconscious hint of some such arrangement. The march from Sardes to the Kaikos-crossing would not have occupied the king less, presumably, than six days. No incident is

¹ e.g. in the story of the treatment of the son of Pythios, 7. 39.

recorded for this section, except the scene on leaving Sardes; nor is any place *en route* expressly named: Smyrna,¹ or, if the king kept to the Hermos valley with Mount Sipylus on his left, Magnesia, if not both, must have been touched; and between Magnesia, or Smyrna, and Kyme the Hermos must have been crossed before the Kaikos was reached, though Herodotus does not specify this crossing.

Once across the Kaikos and in Mysia, the topographical indications determining the route multiply. From the Kaikos the king moves by Atarneus to Karene, passing a mountain, of Kane, on the left hand, i.e. plainly going inland from the coast, between Karene and Adramytteion. If Karene is correctly placed on Kiepert's map,² it would lie about two marches south of Adramytteion; Antandros, also named, lies one day's march beyond. That from Antandros Xerxes passed Mount Ida upon the left, so reaching the river Skamandros and Troy, is a questionable assertion. The easier route must have followed the coast, round the promontory of Lekton past Gargara, Assos, Larissa, Sigeion; from Antandros to Sigeion, or to the Skamandros-crossing between Sigeion and Ilion, could hardly have been less than a week's march. The statement regarding Ida, however, might be an unconscious indication that a part of the army moved direct from Antandros to Abydos, by a second and inland line. From the Skamandros Xerxes visits old Troy, an incident which implies that he and the men with him crossed that river on its lower course. From Ilion to Abydos the king's route passes Rhoiteion, Ophryneion, and Dardanos; three days, or four at most, would have sufficed to take the king by easy stages from Troy to Abydos. Upon the whole the king will have taken from three to four weeks to carry the land-forces from Sardes to the Hellespont, even if his following be reduced to a single *corps d'armée*. Probably Abydos was the rendezvous for a considerable number of the forces, and the *two* days occupied in crossing might be explained as an unconscious homage to the composition of the forces at this point, where they may have comprised not merely the levies brought by Xerxes from Kritalla to Sardes, but levies from Asia Minor itself, which met the king at the Hellespont.

Abydos is certainly in the pages of Herodotus the first point where the fleet and the army come into direct touch, and Xerxes has view of the water-way covered with vessels, as well as of the plain of Abydos and the neighbouring heights and headlands occupied by masses of men. The ports and harbours of Asia Minor had been filled, the winter long, with ships and their manning; a portion of the fleet had perhaps supported the engineering works on the Hellespont and at Athos; a portion of the fleet may even have moved in the spring, from Miletos and Ephesos and Smyrna and other

¹ Or its ruins, cp. Strabo 646.

² *Formae Orbis Antiqui* (1894), ix. E. d.

points along the coast, to the Hellespont parallel with the king's movement from Sardes. The Hellespontine contingent at least may have put in at Abydos. The mustering and early movement of the fleet have left no impress upon the traditions in Herodotus, and the fleet makes its first appearance in his pages at Abydos, apparently in full force, and of a sudden. But that the whole navy mustered at Abydos is fairly incredible. Reason will presently appear for thinking that the full forces of the king first came together at Doriskos, and were there organized. But in the pages of Herodotus, the account of the advance of the Persians is complicated, from Abydos onwards, by the double series of movements, on sea and on land, of fleet and of army, both of which are duly indicated in the text of Herodotus.

(iv.) *Abydos to Sestos* (ἡ διάβασις τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, cc. 54–56).—The actual crossing concerns, indeed, only the land-forces, as the fleet was not directly engaged, except perhaps in guarding the passage. The minute topography of the bridges is elsewhere discussed.¹ The distance is given as seven stades of water-way, to which must be added the distance covered on land either side the straits from bivouac to bivouac for every several contingent.² The time occupied is variously stated by Herodotus at two days, at seven days and seven nights, and at a whole month.³ These items, of course, proceed from various sources, and belong to independent accounts, not rationalized by Herodotus into a consistent whole. The last and largest estimate is probably not much in excess of the whole period occupied in and about the Hellespont, from the king's arrival at Abydos to his departure from Sestos. The passage of the Hellespont is marked by solemn religious formalities, where the facts must be carefully distinguished from the motives conjectured by Herodotus.⁴ A new disposition of the forces takes place at Abydos, according to Herodotus, the baggage-train and camp-followers all crossing by the one bridge (on the Aigaian side), and the fighting men, in a new order, by the other bridge (on the side of the Pontos). The order of march for the fighting men is in itself more probable than the order given for the departure from Sardes: the separate apportionment of army and baggage-train to the bridges is probable enough, and perhaps based upon Hellespontine memories; while the assignment of the bridge on the side of the Pontos to the fighting men places them at the head of the column on the European side: a more proper position than their order in the procession out of Sardes.

(v.) *Sestos to Doriskos* (cc. 57–60).—The fleet, or so much of it as

¹ See notes 7. 33–36.

² The *Heptastadion* may be an underestimate; cp. notes to 7. 34.

³ Two days, 7. 54, 55; seven days and seven nights, 7. 56; a whole month, 8. 51.

⁴ With the ceremony and offerings of Xerxes at the Hellespont may be compared the performances of Alexander at the same place; cp. Arrian, *Anab.* 1. 12. 6.

had entered the Hellespont for the review at Abydos, must have made its way out again (SW.), rounded the promontory of Elaiûs, and then struck almost due north, across the mouth of the bay of Melas, for the promontory of Sarpedon (Σαρπηδονίη ἄκρη, Hdt.), and so, still making northwards, for the mouth of the Hebros, and the plain of Doriskos, where it may have awaited the army. The distance from the opening of the Hellespont to 'the beach hard by Doriskos' (τὸν αἰγιαλὸν τὸν προσεχέα Δορίσκῳ) cannot be much above 50–60 R. miles, or 400–500 stadia, i.e. an easy day's voyage on Herodotus' own showing (4. 86). The site is further marked for Herodotus by the Samothrakian colonies, or forts, Sale and Zone, and defined as extending (westwards) as far as the promontory Serreion. The locality is absolutely identified as the plain immediately west of the river Hebros (*Tusla*), the plain of *Romigik*. Doriskos itself was a Persian fortress dating (according to Hdt.) from the Persian annexation of Thrace in 512 B.C. As it is not likely that the whole Persian fleet had entered the Hellespont, we may suppose that Doriskos was the rendezvous to which the greater portion of the fleet in the first instance resorted, perhaps two of the three squadrons of which, as will hereinafter appear, the naval arm was composed.¹

The land-forces had in point of distance at least twice as far to cover between Sestos and Doriskos as the fleet, and would, of course, also move very much more slowly: the march can hardly have been accomplished in less than five or six days. The geographical indications given by Herodotus are precise, and an appreciation of the geographical facts is shown in the record that the fleet was bidden await the army at the Sarpedonian promontory, and that the army at starting moved in a direction opposite to that taken by the fleet. From Sestos the land-route lies up the Chersonese, passing the tomb of Helle on the right, leaving the city of Kardias on the left, but going straight through Agora (later Lysimacheia). This stretch might represent a two days' march. From Agora the army rounds the head of the gulf of Melas, crosses the river, and then, moving westwards, passes Ainos and Lake Stentoris, crosses the Hebros—a detail omitted by Herodotus—and so reaches the plain of Doriskos, to find the fleet, and any forces the fleet may have conveyed thither, already there.

The plain of Doriskos is, with Herodotus, the scene of the numbering and organization of the host, and the organization of the host is the occasion for a detailed description, all which will be considered more conveniently in another connexion.² The length of the pause at Doriskos is unfortunately not specified, but it cannot have been insignificant. Doriskos is in the narrative of Herodotus the most important station, from the military point of view, upon the king's march between Sardes and Therme. If we could implicitly accept the

¹ Cp. Diodoros 11. 3. 7.

² § 5 *infra*.

Herodotean record, Xerxes reached Doriskos at the head of a vast mob, and left it at the head of an organized army. It will be shown hereafter that such a record involves palpable misconceptions; but the misconceptions are based probably upon genuine tradition, especially vivid and accessible for the portion of the king's march, which led him through the Thracian district of Athenian influence and subsequent empire.

(vi.) *Doriskos to Akanthos* (cc. 108-121).—The geographical indications for this portion of the march are especially thick; cities, tribes, rivers, lakes, mountains, mines and bridges are all named in succession, and a special deed of horror is associated with the Persian crossing of the Strymon at Nine Ways. Two points of especial significance are recorded of the king's march: the army and the fleet are in touch throughout the advance from Doriskos to Akanthos, and the army moves, according to Herodotus, through this section of the way—and apparently through this section only—in three separate columns, and on three more or less parallel roads. Both points require, however, important modification and readjustment, if they are to fit the real conditions. The tripartition of the land-forces, even if originating at Doriskos, is certainly not to be confined to this one short section of the march; and not more than one of the three columns can be supposed to have accompanied the fleet as far as Akanthos: the two inner columns will certainly have moved straight on from Ennea Hodoi and the Strymon to Therme. It may also be doubted whether the fleet and the nearest shore column moved from point to point with an absolute synchronism, as the fleet would easily make each point at least twice as rapidly as the army.¹

This section of the advance falls naturally into two subdivisions: (i.) from the Hebros and Doriskos to Abdera and the Nestos; (ii.) from Abdera and the Nestos to Akanthos, or rather perhaps to Akanthos for the fleet, and to Ennea Hodoi and the Strymon for the army. These subdivisions are to some extent reflected in the narrative of Herodotus, in which Abdera figures as of some especial importance. (i.) One column may have moved along the coast by the cities named, the Samothrakian forts (Sale, Zone, previously named), and the most westerly and important Mesambria (perhaps a halting-place), and so on across the Lissos, by Stryme (a Thasian settlement), Maroneia and Dikaia to Abdera, that side the Nestos: the fleet might in one day have accomplished this distance, which the army can scarcely have traversed in less than four days; but Abdera and the mouth of the Nestos may well have been a common station for the fleet and the shore column. The other two columns, into which Herodotus divides the king's army on the march through Thrace, must have moved by routes further inland: the remarkable enumeration of Thracian tribes

¹ It is just conceivable that there were only two marching columns, the third column being conveyed on ship-board.

between the Hebros and the Strymon may be a homage to that fact; the mere choriography of the coast might have been obtained from the naval sources, but hardly the ethnography of the interior. Not but what both alike might have been derived from the general geographical sources open to Herodotus, to say nothing of his own travels, albeit he is in error in placing Abdera upon the Nestos.¹ The tradition of the king's march is, however, guaranteed for Abdera, as for Doriskos on the one side and for Ennea Hodoi upon the other, by the definite anecdotal reminiscences and incidents associated with each of these places respectively.

(ii.) From Abdera and the Nestos mouth the fleet no doubt passed on between the island of Thasos and the projecting headland, on which Pistyros is placed by Kiepert, and so round to Eion, if it did not make straight for Akanthos and the canal. The army, or rather one of its three columns, passes Pistyros, leaves Mount Pangaion on the right, and passing Phagres and Pergamos, forts of the 'Pierians,' reaches Eion and the Strymon. As Herodotus here omits to name places such as Oisyme and Galepsos, Thasian colonies known to Thucydides, upon the coast-line between the Nestos and the Strymon, he is, perhaps, giving the route of the middle column alone, the left column making its way along the coast by a more difficult route, while the right marched furthest inland, beyond Pangaion, upon the line Krenides (Philippi) and Myrkinos, and rejoined the centre at Ennea Hodoi. The mention of tribes to the north of Mount Pangaion may be taken to confirm this conjecture. The march from the Nestos to the Strymon could not have occupied less than three days.

Herodotus takes Xerxes in person to Akanthos. It is likely that the king visited the canal through which the fleet was to pass, so as to avoid the dangers of Mount Athos; but it is, humanly speaking, certain that at least one column of the army will have marched to Therme by a route far to the north, across the narrowest part of the Chalkidic peninsula—a line of march of which Herodotus takes no account. The towns named by Herodotus between the Strymon and the canal may each mark a day's march upon the route of the main column, Argilos, Stageiros, Akanthos. From Eion to Akanthos and the mouth of the canal the course of the fleet would have been due south, and the voyage easily accomplished in a single day: at Akanthos the fleet and the army-column take leave of each other to meet again at Therme.

(vii.) *Akanthos to Therme* (cc. 122–131).—The fleet is represented as passing through the canal and sweeping round the head of the gulf and down the east side of 'Sithonia'—the middle of the three Chalkidic promontories—rounding Cape Ampelos, and completing the whole circuit of the gulf of Torone from east to west, rounding Cape Kanastraion, passing up the west coast of Pallene and Krossaia, visit-

¹ Herodotos certainly visited Thasos, 6. 47.

ing every city on the way, commandeering additional contingents till, in the bay of Therme, it comes to rest on the shore between Therme and the mouth of the river Axios, in Mygdonia, a land-district already reckoned to the realm of Makedon. The narrative of this cruise from Akanthos to Therme contains an all but complete catalogue of the cities in Chalkidike, such indeed as Athenian tribute-lists might have furnished, or Ionian geographers, before or after this expedition, might have compiled. That the lists are derived from express traditions or records of the Xerxean expedition seems the least probable hypothesis. It may also be doubted whether the whole Persian fleet performed this elaborate *periplus*, instead of cutting across from Cape Ampelos to the point of Pallene, the rather because, having this time in any case considerably the longer route, the fleet nevertheless arrives first at Therme, and there awaits the advent of the king and the land-forces.

From Akanthos one column may have passed across the heads of the Singitic and Toronean gulfs, by Assa (Assera) and Olynthos, and so to Therme, though upon this route the land army would still have had touch with the fleet, at least from point to point, as at Olynthos. The king himself may have partially retraced his steps, and rejoined the centre column, so as to cut across the midland by the shortest route, across the neck of the Chalkidic peninsula, to Therme.¹ This course is described by Herodotus as leading through Paionia and Krestonia, a description which suggests a route lying still further north, and may perhaps point in a dim fashion to the route followed by the right, or inmost column, from the Strymon to the Axios, up the Strymon plain for some way, and across Mount Dysoros, and so down the valley of the Echeidoros. The whole movement from Ennea Hodoi to Therme can scarcely have demanded less than nine or ten days.

At Therme there is *ex hypothesi* a considerable pause, during which the Persian 'heralds' return from southern Hellas, further preparations are undertaken for easing the advance of the army into Thessaly, while Xerxes, according to Herodotus, makes an excursion by sea to the mouth of the Peneios and the vale of Tempe. Such an excursion would have been an absurdity, if Xerxes himself were about to enter Thessaly through the pass between Olympos and Ossa. The record may be used as an argument to show that the king crossed into Thessaly by one of the other passes, or may be discarded as an Herodotean inconsequence of the ordinary type, on the supposition that the king reached Tempe at a later stage in due course by land. This premature visit to Tempe certainly implies a considerable reliance on the loyalty of the Thessalians, a complete satisfaction with the assurances, brought back by the king's heralds, or proffered by the Aleuadai in his train. The road-making over the Makedonian mountains in front, which detains Xerxes a while at Therme, may fill

¹ i.e. the line of the Egnatian way.

a pause correctly, but must not be allowed to rule out similar undertakings for earlier stages of the march. But this problem, though not a large one, may be more conveniently discussed in the next ensuing section, than as a mere appanage to the record of the king's march.

§ 4. II. Of far less certain and ascertainable quality than the route of the Persian forces from Sardes (or Kritalla) to Therme, are the Herodotean accounts of the actual preparations for the campaign, including those measures which were necessary to make the march itself possible, such as the cutting and levelling of roads, the building of bridges, the digging of canals, the erection and storing of dépôts and magazines, all culminating in the actual mobilization of the forces by sea and land, with the lists of the army and navy so mobilized. On the last topic, indeed, Herodotus gives elaborate and more or less systematic information, which demands the closest and most minute scrutiny. On the prior group of topics Herodotus gives but incidental information, expanding here and there into a more elaborate passage, as that concerning the Hellespontine bridges, or the Athos canal. It will be convenient to envisage separately here the engineering and commissariat arrangements in the first place, and to deal at greater length with the account of the *levée en masse*.

(a) *Engineering works*: (i.) *Road-making*.—Tradition had preserved for Herodotus only the most notable instances, or reminiscences, as of the bridges and the canal; the remainder is taken for granted, or but incidentally mentioned; yet enough remains to suggest that much has been omitted or forgotten. Only for the district between Makedon and Thessaly does Herodotus happen to specify expressly any road-making;¹ but it is not unreasonable to suppose, especially in view of the bridges and canal, that the road question was not neglected, either through Thrace or Asia Minor; that improvements were undertaken, and even new roads, or sections laid or cleared, along the main line of advance, though this less sensational work has left little impression upon the Greek tradition. Only in Thrace is a hint preserved of local admiration for the European extension of the Royal Route:² we may, however, suspect that in Asia Minor the great southern route, from Tyana to Apameia, was to some extent improved for the king's use upon this occasion. The Strymon was not the only river bridged, perhaps, nor is Herodotus' list of the fortified dépôts and magazines complete. The prominence given to the two chief works of the Persian engineers has probably obscured a great deal of useful but less astonishing work all along the route. The rapidity with which the Persian advance seems to have been effected implies no less.³

¹ 7. 131 τὸ γὰρ δὴ ὅρος τὸ Μακεδονικὸν ἔκειρε τῆς στρατιῆς τριτημορίς, ἵνα ταύτη διεξίη ἅπασα ἡ στρατιὴ ἐς Περραιβοῦς.

² 7. 115 τὴν δὲ ὁδὸν ταύτην τῇ βασιλεὺς Ξέρξης τὸν στρατὸν ἤλασε οὔτε συγχέουσι

Θρήικες οὐτ' ἐπισπείρουσι σέβονται τε μεγάλως τὸ μέχρι ἐμεῦ. Cp. Xenophon, *Hell.* 4. 2. 8.

³ Alexander in 334 B.C. moved from Pella (?) to Sestos in 20 days; but his

In regard to the two chief works, the Hellespontine bridges and the Athos canal, the simple matter of fact has to be distinguished—as so often with Herodotus—from the rationale or motivation assigned by Greek tradition, popular or literary. If the fact be granted, the further question arises, how far a true description has been preserved, or is recoverable, of the particular works in question. Of the existence of the bridges and the canal Herodotus, as the representative of Greek tradition, has indeed not the shadow of a doubt; but the fantastic element in the motives, to which he ascribes these great works, and the inadequacy of his descriptions of them, from a practical or scientific point of view, have tended to aggravate the incredulity with which the traditions concerning them have been received.¹ Curiously enough, the bridges over the Hellespont have never excited so much scepticism as the actual digging and use of the canal, though the former were *ex hypothesi* quickly destroyed, and from the nature of the case have left not a wrack behind, while the latter invited, and still invites, the test of local verification. Of the two achievements the bridges were certainly the greater triumph of engineering skill: the incredulity with which the story of the Athos canal has been received arose partly from a misconception of the exact line of the work, and partly perhaps from the apparent inadequacy of motive for the work, and the disproportion between the efforts put forth and the permanent gain. In both respects it is possible on reflexion to abate the prejudice; and criticism, while showing that the Herodotean descriptions leave much to be desired, and that the Herodotean rationale is fantastic and inconsequent, may end by adhering, as firmly as Herodotus himself, to the main facts, that the bridges were built and that the canal was digged.

(ii.) *The bridging of the Hellespont: (a) The fact.*—It might be argued that the bridging of the Hellespont, a vast undertaking, was superfluous, with the fleet there ready to convey men and horses across; that the story of the bridges is no more than a legend generated of a metaphor. The fleet itself is the bridge of boats upon which the army crossed, the yoke of cords and timber which the king laid upon the neck of the sea.² For such criticism *in excelsis* there are precedents in recent research, and there may be instances to which it is applicable; but in the present case it was a manifest absurdity. Even the most poetic description of the bridge is perfectly definite as to the nature of the object; and the prose tradition leaves

army only numbered some 40,000 men, and probably a portion of it was sent on in advance; cp. Arrian, *Anab.* 1. 12. 3-5.

¹ As by Demetrios of Skepsis and Juvenal in ancient times, by Stein, Wecklein and others in modern; cp. Hauvette, *Hérodote* (1894), pp. 290 ff.

² Cp. oracle quoted by Hdt. 8. 77. Aischyl. *Persai* 69 ff. Δινοδέσμων σχεδία πορθμὸν ἀμείψας | 'Αθαμαντίδος Ἑλλας | πολύγομφον ὄδισμα ζυγὸν ἀμφιβαλὼν αὐχένι πόντου. Cp. further ll. 112, 130, 721-3, 734-6, 744-50. The oracle (Bakis) in Hdt. 8. 21 might be earlier than the Aischylean references; cp. notes *ad l.*

no room for doubt, in a case where neither natural nor mechanical impossibilities are in question. The record of the loss and destruction of the first pair of bridges, the account of the rebuilding, the description of the actual passage, the subsequent destruction of the bridges before the advent of the Greeks, and the part played by the Bridge-motive, so to speak, throughout the history of the naval operations, form in themselves a sufficient body of testimony. To these points may now be added the recently recovered name of the architect.¹ The Hellespontine tradition in regard to the bridges must have been vivid and notorious. The ropes at Athens were eloquent, if not absolutely conclusive, witnesses.² Not less convincing to us may be the consideration that the passage of the Hellespont by the bridges is almost essential to the rapid advance of the Persian host, otherwise inexplicable. Moreover there was good precedent for this bridge-building in the bridges over the Bosphoros and over the Danube, unless we are prepared to dismiss those substantial erections into the limbo of fictions, to which, indeed, they lead, in the pages of Herodotus.³ Unless there were something in the actual description of the bridges to condemn them as impossible figments, we have no reason to doubt their historical reality; yea, even in that case, while the actual form and structure of the bridges might be irrecoverable, the fact of their brief existence would remain. The description, however, though leaving much to desire, may be taken nevertheless to confirm the bare fact in question.

(b) *The description of the bridges.*—Herodotus has complicated his description of the bridges by adopting a quasi-Homeric method of narrating the actual process of construction, and so attempting to rebuild the bridges before his reader's eyes. The result is disastrous; no bridge could ever have come into being by the process, or series of successive acts, enumerated by Herodotus. There are plainly in Herodotus two bridges, and the building of each of these bridges proceeds in four great acts, of which the last comprises some four or five subordinate and successive actions. (1) *The 'synthesis' of boats*, pentekonteres 'and triremes' (360 and 314 respectively for each bridge), of course with their stems upstream. How this synthesis was accomplished Herodotus does not specify, nor what the relative positions of the triremes and the pentekonteres. (2) *The anchoring of the bridges.* Each bridge must have been separately anchored, and two sets of anchors must have been applied to each bridge, though Herodotus does not say so, and his reason for the anchoring, not the current but solely the winds, is obviously inadequate. Herodotus

¹ Harpalos, possibly identical with the Greek astronomer of the name; cp. Diels, *Laterculi Alexandrini*, Berlin, 1904, p. 8. The omission of the name by Hdt. is puzzling, especially in view of his nomination of Mandrokles, 4. 87. But the name

and fame of the Samian were preserved by the picture in the Heraion.

² Hdt. 9. 121.

³ Hdt. 4. 83, 85, 87, 88–89, 97, 98, 118, 136–142.

adds here a notice of the gap between the triremes and the pentekonteres left for the purpose of allowing ships to pass up and down the Hellespont. As a permanent arrangement this gap is an impossibility. I have conjectured that the pentekonteres in each bridge were bound together, and formed a detachable portion or raft, which could be slipped from its place, and drawn back again into position.¹ (3) *The laying and tightening of the cables.* To each bridge are assigned six cables, two of flax, or hemp, and four of papyrus, and these are now, according to Herodotus, drawn taut by capstans, or windlasses, on shore, verily a marvellous performance, if we are to conceive each of these ropes as upwards of a mile long. (4) *The roadway.* The passage is now bridged, but the roadway across the bridge, in each case, has yet to be laid: this is apparently accomplished by a succession of five distinct processes. First, wooden planks, which have been, of course, previously prepared, are laid across the six cables, apparently conceived as lying upon the triremes and pentekonteres. Secondly, the planks, or logs, so placed, are bound together, apparently by a fresh set of cables, not further described. Thirdly, upon the flooring so created brushwood, in faggots perhaps, is laid, and, fourthly, upon this floor earth is deposited, and stamped or pounded into a compact surface. Finally, the roadway of the bridge, in each case, is completed by side walls, or parapets, drawn along each side, its full length, of a material and structure not further specified.

This report, as it stands, is inadequate and unintelligible; it is neither a coherent account of the process of bridge-building, nor is it a visual description of the bridge, or bridges, as completed; but it obviously contains a large amount of usable material for the ideal reconstruction of the bridges, and it is not in all respects equally unsatisfactory. The fourth, or last stage, suggests a concrete image. We see the roadway of this bridge, or that, guarded on either side by a close palisade, or barrier, as high as a man, and presenting a smooth surface of earth, which must have been quickly converted into clouds of dust, unless kept constantly watered, an easy task under the circumstances. The basis of this roadway may have been formed of carefully selected faggots, of one kind or another, laid upon a flooring of logs, firmly bound together. No bolts, nails, rivets, pegs, pins, or any such devices are mentioned in connexion with the structure.² The attachment of these logs to the underlying cables is problematic: were they bound thereon, or were they in any direct connexion whatever with the cables? Herodotus' conception of the relation of the cables and their purpose, throughout, seems

¹ The text is in doubt; cp. 7. 36. 12. There are, it may be remarked here, six or eight textual problems in the chapter, for which see App. Crit. The critical note on 7. 36. 10 is, perhaps, not quite

clear; it would better run: τῆς δὲ ἐτέρης: τῆς δὲ ἐτέρης τῆς α: τὰς δὲ πρὸς ἐσπέρης τε van H.: eadem mihi occurrerant.

² But cp. Aischylos, *l.c. supra*, πολύ-
γομφον.

somewhat obscure. This obscurity dominates the three previous stages in the bridge-building, as formulated above. In the third stage the six cables in each bridge are stretched taut by the windlasses or capstans. Whether these six cables run across the whole length of the bridge, whether the cables of each sort are used continuously throughout the whole length, whether the cables are attached to the vessels or lie upon them independently, are all unsolved problems. The anchorage of the bridges as described by Herodotus is unintelligible. He assigns one set of anchors on the right hand to the one bridge, and another set of anchors on the left hand to the other bridge: this arrangement is absurd, unless the two bridges were so bound together as to make virtually one structure. He gives as reason for the anchorage not the current but the winds. Here, as in the remarks on the *φραγμός*, on the *διέκπλοος*, and on the orientation of the triremes and pentekonters in the first instance, he passes from description to theory, and becomes thereby doubly questionable. As to the anchorage, further, it is not clear whether each vessel is anchored, or whether the whole structure is anchored by a smaller number of huge anchors. How any interval can be left in the bridge, 'between the pentekonters and triremes,' for other vessels to pass through is not explained. The first stage of all is equally obscure. Is the 'synthesis' of triremes and pentekonters independent of the cables? Are the vessels in position across the waterway before the cables are brought into work? Are the bridges constructed across the waterway, or is the bridge first of all constructed, and then swung into position? From which side of the straits is the work begun, or is it conducted equally from both sides? All these, and other questions, remain obscure in the narrative of Herodotus.

To reconstruct the bridges conjecturally, without mechanical experience or knowledge, one might suggest that the 'synthesis' of triremes and pentekonters, or perhaps the 'syntheseis,' took place along-shore, the pontoons so formed being floated, or towed out into the straits, and securely anchored. The alternative is to picture each vessel as separately anchored, an arrangement presenting almost insuperable difficulties from the strength of the current, and the depth of the waterway. Whether either bridge in its whole length was completely constructed and floated out, or whether the bridges were made in sections, and the sections joined, may be an open question: the latter alternative looks the more probable to an unprofessional eye. The distance or interval between each vessel forming the bridge is not stated: was there any, or were not the vessels touching, broadside to broadside? Three hundred and sixty triremes, so arranged, might easily fill a space of 2600 yards,¹ so that, even with some fifty-

¹ At 20 feet for the outside width, not an over-estimate; cp. Torr, *Ancient Ships* (1894), p. 22.

oared galleys introduced, we may conceive the space from shore to shore as completely filled in with a line of ships lying side by side. The use of the pentekonters is not explained by Herodotus. It may be that the pentekonters, lashed together, formed a small section of either bridge, which could be slipped from its place and floated downstream, in order to admit the passage of merchant and other craft up and down, the section being drawn back into its place by cables, when the bridge was to be used. This arrangement would, however, make it difficult, if not impossible, to suppose that the main cables were stretched from shore to shore, or extended along the whole length of the bridge. An alternative presents itself in the supposition that the majority of the vessels composing the bridges were pentekonters, and that triremes were introduced only where it was necessary to provide for a gap, or passage, in the bridge, the cables and roadway being then carried over the larger and higher vessel, and a gap being left not between the triremes and the pentekonters but between one trireme and another; the roadway extending above like a veritable bridge, and vessels and boats passing underneath, of course with masts and sails lowered. A third, but less probable, alternative presents itself, viz. that one bridge was composed wholly of pentekonters and the other wholly of triremes. This is not the conception of Herodotus, or he would have put it more clearly; nor is it easy to suggest a reason for such a difference in the structure of the two bridges. Herodotus appears to conceive the cables as laid, and held taut, from the one shore to the other shore; but this arrangement appears both superfluous and mechanically questionable; and there is, perhaps, in his mind a confusion between two kinds of bridges, a suspension-bridge of a type not uncommon in the East, but inapplicable to a passage of the dimensions of the Hellespont, and a pontoon-bridge, the only kind of bridge suitable to the conditions. The immense cables, which undoubtedly existed at Athens in his time, and the capstans or windlasses, remains of which may have been visible still at Abydos and at Sestos, had perhaps been used for towing the pontoons into position, or for mooring them from the shores; but to pull a great cable taut from shore to shore across a mile of sea would have been a mechanical achievement transcending even the forces at the disposal of the great king.

The variety of possibilities and alternatives thus presented in regard to the actual structure and character of the bridges, the real existence of which at the time and place certified is not in dispute, shows in itself how much the Herodotean description of the bridges, as mechanical works of engineering skill, leaves to be desired. Nor does Herodotus enable us to decide with complete assurance the exact spots on either coast where the ends of the bridges were attached to the shores, nor does he specify whether the roadways were parallel to each other, or at an angle. The orientation of the vessels stem and

stern, τοῦ μὲν Πόντου ἐπικαρσίας τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥόον, suggests indeed that Herodotus conceived the Hellespont as forming an angle with the Euxine, which is correct enough, but does not enable us to locate the bridges by reference to the course of the current. *Prima facie* the words imply that the vessels individually were parallel to the current, and to the shores also; and there is no hint in Herodotus that the current in the Hellespont crosses from shore to shore. The abutment of the bridges on to a promontory upon the European side is, however, an absurdity gratuitously foisted on Herodotus¹; the bridges must have abutted upon a plain or valley, and it is possible that they were not parallel, but crossed the straits at an angle of which the apex was Abydos, abutting on the European shore on either side of a headland.²

(c) *Motivation*.—Herodotus treats the bridges over the Hellespont, and presently the Athos canal, as evidences and exhibitions of the pride and folly of the Persian despot, still further displayed in his wanton insults to the elements. The bridges had an adequate strategic justification; by no other means could so large a force have advanced so rapidly, and the possibility of such undertakings had already been demonstrated by Dareios in his European campaign. The bridging of the Hellespont was the natural sequel to the bridging of the Bosporos. Whether Xerxes hoped to maintain the bridges permanently as a strategic and commercial highway is more doubtful, and far from the thought of Herodotus, though not in itself an idea to be dismissed as absurd.

(iii.) *The Athos Canal*.—(a) *The fact* has been challenged again and again both in ancient and modern times, even by those who have credited the far more ambitious and difficult feat of bridging the Hellespont. This scepticism may in part have proceeded from a misconception of the exact line of the canal, and an erroneous assumption that the canal pierced Mount Athos itself. For such an error there is no excuse in the text of Herodotus, and the literary tradition, which includes not merely the description of the work by Herodotus and the record of the actual passing of the fleet through the canal,³ but also a guarantee by Thucydides,⁴ himself undoubtedly familiar with the region, is sufficiently borne out by the actual topography of

¹ Cp. my note to 7. 33. 4.

² Cp. Hauvette, pp. 294 ff. The unequal length of the bridges would not in itself prove that they were not parallel ("Or Stein remarque avec raison (!) que, les deux lignes de bateaux qui formaient le double pont (*sic*) étant de longueur inégale, leur direction ne devait pas être parallèle," Hauvette, *l.c.* Unless the two coasts are to be supposed exactly parallel, why should they not

have been connected by unequal parallel lines?

³ Demetrios of Skepsis, Strabo 331, Juvenal 10. 174, Stein, note to Hdt. 7. 24, Wecklein, *Tradition d. Perserkriege* p. 20, suggest that the canal was not actually used.

⁴ Th. 4. 109 ἔστι δὲ (ἡ Ἀκτὴ) ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως διορύγματος ἔσω προύχουσα, καὶ ὁ Ἀθῶς αὐτῆς ὁρος ὑψηλὸν τελευτᾷ ἐς τὸν Αἰγαῖον πέλαγος.

the isthmus, which still shows signs of the reality of the work.¹ Not to come to modern examples to prove the possibility of such work, Xerxes had the precedent of the canal of Necho and Dareios, a far more difficult and extensive undertaking,² and in relation to this fact the apologist has an easy triumph over the sceptic.

(b) *Description*.—That triumph is not gained, however, owing to the merits of Herodotus' account of the work, which again takes rather the form of a narrative of the process of construction than a description of the result when effected; a method which suggests that Herodotus follows secondhand sources for the story, and was not personally acquainted with the remains of the canal in his own time, which must still have been considerable. The praise accorded to the Phoenician engineers for following a method of construction, which, in spite of the historian's express assertion to the contrary, all the engineers, if any others were employed, must equally have followed, is proof afresh that Herodotus, in these matters, is completely at the mercy of the most popular and even trivial authorities; while his feeble and confused description of the works, which were probably intended to prevent the silting up of the entrance to the canal, but discharge no definite function in his pages, exemplifies once more the conclusion that he himself was not abreast of the mechanical art any more than of the natural science of his day.³

(c) The *rationale* or motivation of this work is also at fault in the pages of Herodotus. The ostensible reason, which he records, to save the fleet from the dangerous passage round Mount Athos, a passage which had cost Mardonios dear in 492 B.C., gives way, in his account, to another motive, the despot's pride. But for this pride, which plumed itself on accomplishing the impossible, removing mountains, taming seas, absorbing rivers, setting all natural and divine limits at defiance, Xerxes would, Herodotus opines, have contented himself with rolling his ships across the isthmus—as though such a performance could have been easily and quickly accomplished! The argument again recoils on its author, and damages his credit. Whether Xerxes had not an ulterior object, and hoped to keep open the canal as a commercial route, may fairly be asked, but can hardly be answered positively. The failure of the whole expedition involved the ruin of the canal, and even Athens, with all her later interests in Thrace, seems never to have aspired to reopen this cutting. Commercially it would probably have been a bad speculation. To this extent there is a sense in the Pride-motive advanced by Herodotus: the canal was an unproductive and useless expenditure of labour and capital, except in its purely strategic purpose: the failure of the military end in view discredited the means to that end, and the canal remained an

¹ Cp. Leake, *Northern Greece*, iii. 24, 125; Cousinéry, *Voyage en Macédoine*, ii. 153; Hauvette, *op. cit.* 291.

² Hdt. 2. 158, 4. 39.

³ Cp. notes to 7. 23, 37.

example of a despot's folly, which is but the converse of a despot's pride.

But from the Persian point of view, in the year 481 B.C., granted the design of reinvading Greece, with joint forces by sea and land, such works as the bridges and the canal were legitimate and even necessary contrivances, if Greece was to be invaded from Asia, on the scale projected, within the limits of a single campaigning season. The great engineering works are not mere bravado, but well calculated means to the given end. It is with something of a superstitious feeling that Greek tradition converts them into exhibitions of insensate human pride and folly, dictated by a mortal who mistook himself, or might have been mistaken by others, for an earthly God!¹

(iv.) *The Commissariat*.—The deliberate and practical spirit in which the great expedition was undertaken is in nothing more evidently displayed than in the provisions made for the support of the troops and animals. The commissariat is not the department of ancient warfare which ever engages the attention of the ancient historians to the degree which its interest and importance might seem to deserve. Greek warfare was on a small scale, and to a great extent self-supporting; and at all times the more showy side of warfare, the battles and sieges, the actual engagements, and adventures by sea and land, better lend themselves to rhetoric or story-telling than the more humble yet not less essential work of provisioning the forces, on the march or in the field. Herodotus is hardly the man to prove an exception to the ruling neglect with which this aspect of ancient warfare has been generally treated; yet here, as often, incidental hints and touches are not wanting, which imply a larger background and perspective, and justify some constructive inferences upon our part. The preparations which extended over four years plainly include the accumulation and deposit of huge stores of provision (τὰ πρόσφορα τῇ στρατιῇ 7. 20), and magazines were formed in Europe, upon the route already selected, to which supplies were consigned from Asia, as well doubtless as accumulated from the surrounding country. Leuke Akte, Tyrodiza, Doriskos, Eion are all specified as such dépôts in Thrace, and Makedon is also expressly included in the programme, Therme no doubt being the chief dépôt in that quarter (7. 25). These great stores accumulated upon the route may have been independent, to some extent, of the actual supplies commandeered by the Persians on arrival, from place to place, as well as of supplies conveyed by the various columns on the march,² and probably served the Persians in good stead upon the return march, when food would doubtless

¹ Cp. the anecdote 7. 56.

² 7. 83 σῖτα δὲ σφι (τοῖς Πέρσῃσι) χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων στρατιωτῶν κάμηλοι τε καὶ ὑποζύγια ἦγον. 7. 50 τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ αὐτοὶ

πολλὴν φορβὴν φερόμενοι πορευόμεθα, τοῦτο δὲ τῶν ἄν. κου ἐπιβέωμεν γῆν καὶ ἔθνος, τούτων τὸν σῖτον ἐξομεν· ἐπ' ἀροτῆρας δὲ καὶ οὐ νομάδας στρατευόμεθα ἄνδρας (Xerxes to Artabanos at Abydos).

have been more difficult to procure from the tribes or cities through which the retreat lay.¹ The Persians may have counted to some extent upon living at the expense of the enemy; but in such a country as Greece, for such a host as the king's, that prospect would rightly have seemed a very uncertain one, to say nothing of the possibility that the Greeks themselves would destroy the crops and means of subsistence for man and beast, rather than allow them to fall into the enemy's hand. Probably the king's fleet was very largely devoted to the convoy service of the commissariat: of the huge flotilla of 3000 sail (nominal), which accompanied the fleet proper, the greater part was probably for the service of the army. The resolute refusal, or inability, of the king to use the fleet upon independent service points to some such drag upon its free movement: the ships of war were needed for the protection of the Commissariat transports. Herodotus leaves no doubt as to the nature of the direct levies or requisitions made upon the Greek cities fringing the king's route.² The case of Thasos is only the most conspicuous of its class, and the entertainment provided by the Thasians is by no means confined to the king and his immediate suite; though doubtless the king's table was most sumptuously served: the provision, however, extends at least to the whole column, which marched with the king, and similar provision was doubtless made for the other columns. Nor was the arrangement an impromptu extemporization: full notice had been given a long time in advance.³ Herodotus abates his wonder at the reported failure of the rivers to support the demands made by the innumerable host of Xerxes, only to enlarge it, in view of the supply of meal for all those myriads.⁴ The exaggeration of the numbers creates a part of his difficulty; but the passage which preserves his wonderful calculation is, in any case, a just homage to the admirable provision made for the commissariat. The movement of the army from Therme to Athens also implies in itself an adequate organization; nor do the arrangements fail Xerxes on his retreat, nor Mardonios during his subsequent operations,⁵ even though the king's fleet has been dissipated, and all supplies must have been found *in loco* or drawn from Thessaly, Makedon, and Thrace overland. But the Commissariat too must have its comic and humorous side for the Greek witlings. It was no joke to have to entertain the great king,

¹ *ib. ad init.* νοστήσομεν ὀπίσω οὔτε λιμῶ ἐντυχόντες οὐδαμῶτι οὔτε ἄλλο ἄχαρι οὐδὲν παθόντες (Hdt.'s irony).

² 7. 116 case of Akanthos, 7. 119 of Thasos, 7. 120 of Abdera, 7. 121 the cities generally. The exact sum expended by the Thasians is given as 400 talents; see further, notes *ad ll.c.* The story of Pythios, 7. 27, suggests a similar arrangement for the king's

previous advance to Sardes; cp. notes *ad l.*

³ 7. 119 ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου προειρημένον.

⁴ 7. 187 οὐδὲν μοι θῶμα παρίσταται προδοῦναι τὰ ῥέεθρα τῶν ποταμῶν ἔστιν ἔν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅπως τὰ σιτία ἀντέχρησε θῶμά μοι μυριάσι τοσαύτησι. On the rivers that failed cp. note to 7. 21; *ib.* εὐρίσκω γὰρ συμβαλλόμενος κτλ.

⁵ Cp. the anecdote 9. 82.

but it was made the occasion of many an indifferent jest;¹ and no anecdote better illustrates the whimsical magnanimity of the oriental despot than the assuredly distorted reminiscence of his dealings with the Hellespontine corn-traders.²

§ 5. *The Levée en Masse: Numbers, Composition and Leading of the King's Forces.*—The subject is launched by Herodotus in an unusually rhetorical passage, not free from some rather crude exaggerations, yet bearing witness to the strength of the traditions, which represented the forces, whose preparation, organization, and mobilization had occupied upwards of four years, according to report, as the greatest ever set in motion, within Greek memory or knowledge, by one man.³ Herodotus follows up the passage cited by detailed army and navy lists, containing statements respecting the numbers, composition or description, and leading of the king's forces by land and sea. The following analysis gives the specific references under the several heads:—*Infantry*: numbers, cc. 60, 184–186; composition, cc. 61–80; command, cc. 81–83. *Cavalry*: numbers and composition, cc. 84–86; command, cc. 87, 88. *Navy*: numbers (i.) of ships, cc. 89, 97; (ii.) of men, cc. 184–186; composition, cc. 89–95; command, cc. 96–99. Incidentally the equipment and armature of the forces are also described, in graphic terms. The sources from which Herodotus derived this mass of material are not easily determinable: let it suffice here to say that there is good reason to trace various elements to various sources, and that upon the whole his descriptions and calculations of the king's sea-power are more acceptable and reasonable than his account of the land-forces. It will therefore be convenient to review the passages on the navy in the first place.

The Persian Navy-list, as first given (c. 89), comprises twelve contingents ranging from 300 ships to 17, and enumerated in geographical order from Phoenicia to the Hellespont. The particular number of ships in each ethnical contingent is exactly specified: the figures, with one exception, are all round numbers; the items and the sum total agree.⁴ Aischylos appears to confirm, if he is not the authority for, the Herodotean total.⁵ It would be carrying scepticism

¹ 7. 120.

² 7. 147.

³ 7. 20, 21.

⁴ (1) Phoenicians 300, (2) Egyptians 200, (3) Kyprians 150, (4) Kilikians 100, (5) Pamphylians 30, (6) Lykians 50, (7) Dorians 30, (8) Karians 70, (9) Ionians 100, (10) Nesiotas 17, (11) Aioliens 60, (12) Hellespontians 100: total 1207 ('from Asia,' c. 184). The Thracian region supplies 120 in addition, 7. 185, raising the total to 1327.

⁵ Aischyl. *Pers.* 341 ff. Ξέρξης δέ, καὶ γὰρ οἶδα, χιλιάς μὲν ἦν | ὧν ἦγε πλῆθος, αἱ δ' ὑπέροπποι τάχει | ἑκατὸν δις ἦσαν

ἐπὶ τὰ θ'. ὧδ' ἔχει λόγος. Herodotus has rightly understood Aischylos to put the sum total at 1207, the 207 vessels of extra speed not being included in the *Chiliad*; cp. the preceding lines on the number of the Greek fleet, where the *Decad* is plainly in addition to the 300. Aischylos gives the figures for Salamis, Herodotus the Persian figure for Doriskos; but the discrepancy is unimportant, for Herodotus rates losses and additions between Doriskos and Salamis as practically equal; cp. 8. 66. This estimate is, however, quite absurd in view of the actual losses recorded in the course of the

unduly far to regard this list as a purely ideal list: the narrative incidentally confirms the composition of the fleet in sundry particulars, and the sum total, even when raised to 1327 by the addition of 120 vessels from the European Greeks, is not absolutely incredible. Six hundred triremes had sailed to Ionia, according to Herodotus, in 490 B.C. (6. 95); six hundred triremes had served in the fleet of Dareios in 512 B.C., a fleet mainly raised from Asia Minor (4. 87); six hundred vessels was the nominal total of the fleet opposed to the Ionians at Lade (6. 9).¹ Twice that total does not appear an impossible figure for a fleet recruited from Egypt, Phoenicia, Kypros, and the whole of Asia Minor. But the fact that Herodotus in the course of his subsequent narrative accounts for the destruction of more than half the Persian fleet before it reaches Phaleron, may seem to throw some doubt upon the original total, the losses are so abnormal. Herodotus is in two minds as to the amount of these losses and their effect upon the total of the Persian fleet, but they were probably exaggerated in tradition. From 1000 to 1200 may not be an incredible figure for the nominal strength of the Persian fleet at Doriskos; but perhaps little more than half that number finally reached Phaleron. The figure 3000 for the transport and commissariat looks incredibly large, and as presented by Herodotus the figure is unacceptable. But if we suppose a part of the forces to have been conveyed to Doriskos by sea, a proportion of 2 or 3 to 1 between the transports and the battle-ships may not seem so gross an absurdity; though the total may be one small reason the more for suspecting exaggeration all along the line.

The estimate which Herodotus gives for the manning of the fleet follows from his figures for the ships. Granted a fleet of 1207 triremes, granted 200 men as the crew of a trireme, there results as

narrative, which amount to $647 + x + y$: 400 at least in the storm, 7. 190, 236; add 15 captured by the Greeks off Artemision, 7. 194; 200 wrecked in circumnavigating Euboia, 8. 7, 13; 30 captured by the Greeks in the first engagement off Artemision, 8. 11; a Lemnian vessel deserted, 8. 11; a good number, not specified ($=x$), of Kilikian vessels destroyed in the second engagement off Artemision, 8. 14; a large number, not specified ($=y$), lost in the third engagement off Artemision, 8. 16. Hdt. does not specify the number of ships destroyed or captured at Salamis, but a certain number, probably the greater part of the fleet, escaped, 8. 108, 130; in the following year the fleet only amounts to 300, the Ionians included, 8. 130; and this remnant, it may be added, was all destroyed by fire after

Mykale, 9. 106. If we allow 53 for x and y above, the total losses actually accounted for in the pages of Herodotus, exclusive of the battle of Salamis, amount to 700 vessels: adding the 300 recorded at Mykale a *Chiliad* is accounted for; by a process of exhaustion 207, or including the 120 ships from Thrace 327, would be the figure for the loss at Salamis. As a 'regulative idea' this figure is not devoid of plausibility; but no great authority can be claimed for the above calculations on which it is based.

¹ The figure of the fleet of Mardonios in 492 B.C. is not given, but it was a large fleet (*χρῆμα πολλὸν νεῶν*), and the number wrecked on Athos was put at 300, which would imply a total of at least 600, Hdt. 6. 43-45.

total of the crews, 241,400 men. Thirty *Epibatai* for each trireme—a high but not incredible allowance—gives a total of 36,210 fighting men, and a gross total for the fighting fleet of 277,610 men. This sum is no doubt conjectural, and must suffer rebate from the probable exaggeration of the numbers of the fleet, as well as discount for failures and losses on the way, to say nothing of squadrons covering the lines of communication. The figure in any case represents an estimate for Doriskos, not a record for Salamis. Herodotus adds 120 ships as raised from Europe, and estimates their crews at 24,000 men, inconsequently making no allowance for *Epibatai* upon this contingent: analogy demands an addition of 3600 on that score; but the whole item is open to grave suspicion. Herodotus adds 240,000 men as manning for the 3000 pentekonteres, and other light boats, at 80 men per boat; and counts all these to the 'fighting men,' getting a total for the fleet alone of 517,610—the European contingent (24,000 + 3600) not included. But, if the fleet of 3000 vessels represent anything, it probably represents commissariat and transport, not fighting material; and if a quarter of a million be taken as roughly the sum total of the naval forces at Doriskos, irrespective of transport, we have still a host of astonishing and unexampled magnitude. His own figure Herodotus doubles by the simple expedient of allowing an attendant for every man whom he reckons to the fighting force, a device which at one stroke of the pen raises the personnel of the navy to upwards of a million souls, always exclusive of the European additions. Put in this way the device appears monstrous, and the result incredible: the humble oarsman at least had no valet! But if we may suppose the sense underlying it to be that, whatever the numbers in the fighting fleet, all told, whether oarsmen, sailors, officers or marines, as many more must be allowed for the transports, naval commissariat and service generally, the statement is admissible, and the result, which would raise the personnel mobilized in connexion with the fleet to upwards of half a million men, remains sufficiently astonishing. Herodotus, indeed, will have slightly more than doubled that figure; but this exaggeration appears comparatively venial, after his estimates for the land-forces have been considered.¹

The Command and Organization of the Fleet is a further problem which arises naturally from the indications in Herodotus. Clearly there were four admirals of the fleet, but whether the fleet was

¹ NAVY.		Attendants	517,610
1207 ships at 200 men . .	241,400		1,035,220
30 <i>Epibatai</i> per ship . .	36,210	Raised in Europe, 120 ships .	24,000
		Attendants	24,000
	277,610	Total given by Hdt. . .	1,083,220
3000 Pentekonteres at 80 .	240,000	<i>Epibatai</i> ?	3,600
	517,610		<u>1,086,820</u>

divided into three or into four distinct squadrons, and whether there was any supreme admiral except Xerxes himself, are points open to discussion. Ariabignes commands 'the Ionian and Karian ships,' Achaimenes 'the Egyptian,' Prexaspes and Megabazos 'the rest'; whether as one or as two divisions is not stated. This express organization made by Herodotus breaks down completely, if strictly applied to his own navy-list. The 'Egyptian' contingent numbers 200; the 'Ionian and Karian' numbers 170, or including the 'Dorians,' who might be reckoned to the Karian, 200; but this would leave upwards of 800 vessels under the command of Prexaspes and Megabazos—a very improbable arrangement, all the more so as Achaimenes, the king's own brother, evidently in the traditions occupies a foremost position as admiral. The supposition, which might present itself, that the total fighting fleet numbered—as usual—600 vessels, divided into three squadrons of 200 each, takes too little account of the strength and precision of Herodotus' navy-list, and of the scale which must be conceded to the forces of Xerxes, if the general tradition in regard to the war is to be explained. Assuming that the fleet was organized in four divisions, under the four commanders named, and that the total figure is correctly stated as 1200 (1207), we obtain 300 ships as the figure for each division, a likely enough hypothesis. The exact composition of these divisions is again speculative. The Phoenician, 300 strong, perhaps under supreme command of Prexaspes, son of Aspathines, may well have constituted a unit in itself. The Egyptian contingent, 200 strong, under Achaimenes, may have been raised to the required strength for a squadron by the addition of the Kilikian 100. The 'Ionian and Karian' squadron, under Ariabignes—a fixed point of light in the tradition—may have included also the Dorian (30), Aiolian (60), Pamphylian (30), and Nesiote (17) contingents, giving a strength for the squadron of 307. There remains, as a fourth squadron, the somewhat anomalous union of Kyprians (150), Lykians (50), and Hellespontines (100) under the potential command of Megabazos. Fleets of 300 vessels, or of multiples of 300, are more or less normal in Persian history of the period, and the fourfold command suits this alternative. On the other hand, a tripartition of the fleet would be in accordance with analogy, and with some of the indications for the battle of Salamis; and a tripartition of the fleet into squadrons, of approximately 400 vessels, is also suggested by the actual grouping of the commanders by Herodotus. A natural division of the fleet into three squadrons may be thus effected: the Egyptian (200), Kyprian (150), Lykian (50), or 'Egyptian' squadron under Achaimenes; the 'Ionio-Karian' under Ariabignes, comprising Ionians (100), Karians (70), Dorians (30), Pamphylians (30), Aiolians (60), Hellespontines (100), Nesiotes (17), and amounting to 407 vessels, all told; and 'the rest,' that is, the Phoenicians (300) and

the Kilikians (100) under Prexaspes and Megabazos, a general arrangement which left the native princes in command each of the contingent from his own city. Unfortunately the indications in the narrative, although they allow us to catch a glimpse here and there of the fortunes of particular contingents, are far from enabling us to decide with absolute confidence upon the composition and number of the several squadrons, or divisions, of the fleet. Upon the whole tripartition seems the more probable alternative to my mind, and I should not hesitate to carry one, if not two, of the squadrons direct to Doriskos, as convoy for the transports, and leave one, rather than two, for the protection of the bridges and the naval review at Abydos.¹

Herodotus describes the equipment or armature of the marines, or fighting men serving on the fleet, but it is a short summary compared with the elaborate catalogue and description of the land-forces, and may better be considered later, in connexion therewith. It may, however, be said here that Herodotus involves himself in something of an inconsequence by describing the various ethnic equipments of the *Epibatai* on the fleet—it is to *Epibatai* alone that the descriptions could apply—and also apparently representing the *Epibatai* on the fleet as drawn from the Persians, Medes, and Sakai, whose armature is described in the course of the army-roll. The explanation of this apparent contradiction may be that while the various contingents carried a normal number of native *Epibatai*, a complement of Archers was added to each contingent, or vessel, drawn from the chief nations that used the bow, either in addition to the thirty *Epibatai*, specified by Herodotus for each vessel, or more probably as included in this

¹ Ephoros (Diodoros 11. 3. 7) evidently thought that the fleet first came into touch with the army at Doriskos. The 'Hellepontine' ships would naturally rendezvous in the Hellespont. On the other hand Xerxes enters a Sidonian ship at Abydos, and Phoenicians had been employed on one of the bridges. At Doriskos a naval review is held, as well as a review of the land-forces. The real or final organization of the fleet, as of the army, is effected at Doriskos, and it is little short of absurd to suppose that the whole fleet of 1000, or upwards of 1000 vessels, was previously reviewed at Abydos, in a more or less chaotic condition withal. It is to be noticed that beside the four Persian admirals the various contingents making up the fleet were under their local commanders; we have the following identifications in Herodotus:—The Sidonian, Τετράμνηστος Ἀνύσου, the Tyrian Ματτήν Σιρώμου, the Aradian Μέρβαλος Ἀγβάλου, the Kilikian Συνέννεσις Ὠρομέδοντος. Each of these commanders may represent 100 ships.

The Lykian Κυβερνήσκος Σίκα presumably commanded fifty vessels. The names of four Kyprian commanders have come down: Γόργος ὁ Χέρσιος, Τιμῶναξ ὁ Τιμαγόρεω, these two apparently in the chief place; the Paphian admiral Περθύλλος ὁ Δημοπόου had started with twelve ships from Paphos (7. 195), Φιλάων, brother of Gorgos (*supra*) of Salamis, was perhaps in command (8. 11); but the exact distribution of the 150 Kyprian ships among the native commanders remains obscure. Of the Karians (70 ships) three commanders are named, Ἰστιάιος ὁ Τυμνέω, Πίγρης ὁ Ὑσσελδώρου, Δαμασίθυμος ὁ Κανδαύλειω, to whom may be added, though in a humbler position, Ἀρτεμισίη ἡ Λυγδάμιος, who led five (of the thirty Dorian) ships. The governor, or tyrant, of Aiolian Kyme is also named as in command of fifteen ships, Σανδώκης ὁ Θαμασίου (7. 194). On the light shed by the narrative of the naval operations upon the composition of the various squadrons see further *infra*.

number. In any case the large number of *Epibatai*, and the nature of their equipment, would show that the tactics of a naval battle were intended to follow, as nearly as possible, the tactics of land-forces.

Upon the whole, Herodotus' account of the naval forces of the king is characterised by relative sobriety and verisimilitude, in spite of the uncertainty, inconsequence, and exaggeration touching the numbers of ships and of men, and the inadequacy and shortcoming of his description of the command and organization of the fleet in its various divisions. These comparative merits are only to be expected in an account of that part of the forces, a moiety of which was drawn from Greek cities, and almost all from regions with which the Greeks were familiar: the case is not the same with the army-list.

The Army or Land-Forces.—Herodotus does not start with a complete estimate of the numbers produced by the *levée en masse*. Not until he has brought the army (and fleet) to Doriskos, in his account of the advance or march of the king towards the frontiers of Hellas, does he attempt a numerical estimate. His excuse for this procedure is that not till Doriskos was reached did Xerxes himself and his Persian officers know the numbers of the forces. As thus asserted, this view seems improbable, not to say absurd. According to Herodotus himself there had been a great muster at Kritalla, and prizes given to the best equipped contingents: this record implies numbering. The king and his forces had spent a whole winter at Sardes: had there been no numbering and organization of the forces there? At Abydos a review of army and of fleet had been held: was no use made of the occasion for the purpose of estimating, or verifying, previous estimates of the numbers? With the numbering at Doriskos went, if we may believe Herodotus, the organization of the forces; till they reached Doriskos the forces of Xerxes were *ex hypothesi* an unorganized unnumbered mob. But how could a march, of hundreds of miles, have been arranged on such happy-go-lucky principles? The narrative of Herodotus itself suggests something better than such mere chaos: there is at least an organized core to the army which leaves Sardes; there is an organization for the passage of the Hellespont by the two bridges, and the fighting men and army service are clearly distinguished; nay, the order of march is changed *en route*, which implies a considerable degree of organization. The precise items for the fleet imply the levy of definite numerical contingents from the cities and nations composing it; the same method will have held good for the land-forces. From every point of view it seems impossible to admit that the great army came together, a casual and uncalculated multitude, and that, until the numbering was accomplished at Doriskos, Xerxes and his officers were completely in the dark respecting the numbers of the fighting men on land. Moreover, at Doriskos, no method is recorded for the numbering of the cavalry, while the

numbers of the infantry are ascertained by an absurd method, impossible under the circumstances; and the anecdote tends to discredit not merely the sum total given, but the whole scene laid at Doriskos.¹ Yet several considerations point to the admission that Doriskos was an important station on the Persian advance, and that some definite stage in the mobilization of the Persian forces was there accomplished. Doriskos was the last rendezvous possible for the forces by sea and by land before the passage of Athos; it was the first station in Europe where a complete muster would have been possible. It was itself on a large well-watered plain beyond striking distance from Greece, a point in its favour against the plain round Therme. From Doriskos onwards the narrative itself exhibits the Persian land-forces as a well-organized army advancing in three distinct columns, by three separate roads. The whole tradition of the scene at Doriskos, however questionable in details, may be held to imply a consciousness, a reminiscence, of some great and memorable transaction. The least we can see in the muster at Doriskos is the occasion for giving final and definite constitution and organization to the land-forces. It is possible that the forces reached Doriskos as ethnic units, the number of men in each, of course, already known and recorded, at least by the native leaders and their Persian superior officers. If so, the ethnic units were then organized and thrown together into squadrons and divisions, of approximately equal numbers, and finally massed into three great columns or *corps d'armée*. It may even be suggested that a great portion of the land-forces, including a large part of the cavalry, reached Doriskos not by the Hellespont, and overland, but by sea, in transport vessels, from Asia and the Levant. There might then be three great points on the march at which musters, and the gradual organization of the land army, were held and accomplished: Kritalla in Kappadokia, the rendezvous for the land-forces of middle Asia, which marched with the king to Sardes; Sardes, or perhaps Abydos, the rendezvous in the spring for the *levée* drawn from Anatolia; and Doriskos, to which the transports might convey direct a large part of the land-forces, not merely from the south of Asia Minor, but from further east, Parthians and Baktrians, enshipped in the ports of Syria, men and horses, and carried with comparative ease and expedition to Thrace, there probably to await the arrival of the king, his guards, and Anatolian levies. A portion of the fighting fleet would presumably have been employed to convoy the transports to Doriskos; and though Xerxes had held a review of ships at Abydos—the first available point for the purpose, and the earliest common rendezvous for army and navy—it is not likely that the whole vast fleet of upwards of 1000 vessels was taken into the narrow channel of the Hellespont, simply to be seen and taken out again.²

Numbers.—As to the actual numbers for the Persian forces, even at

¹ See notes to 7. 59, 60.

² Cp. note 1 p. 154 *supra*.

Doriskos, Herodotus has no items to give, but contents himself with simple totals, which are still in themselves surprisingly large, 1,700,000 for the foot, 80,000 cavalry. These figures are elsewhere (cc. 184 ff.) actually doubled, as in the case of the navy, by the simple expedient of allowing one servant or attendant for each fighting man. The expedient appears to be an assumption transferred from the practice of the heavily-armed Greek citizen infantry, and is plainly inapplicable to the Asiatic forces of Xerxes. A mass of attendants, of both sexes, upon the Persian officers and leaders, and other privileged persons, an immense suite and retinue for the king himself, may be admitted to swell the marching column, and to encumber the camps and laagers; but the simple duplication of the forces, by the allowance of an attendant to every fighting man, may safely be cancelled, and the original figures discussed upon their own merits. At the same time the ultimate totals, results of Herodotus' own speculation, impossible and absurd as they are, do not tend to enhance his authority in the earlier and lower estimates, for they show with how little critical faculty or concrete imagination he handles the problems of time and space, of movement and rest, of supply and accommodation involved.¹

Before discussing the incredible figures in Herodotus it may be well to notice the reduced estimates offered by the ancient authorities subsequent to Herodotus. The variants here come into account. Ktesias and Ephoros give 800,000 as the regulative number.² This figure might have resulted from the figure in Herodotus for the cavalry. Trogus and Nepos have an estimate at once lower and higher: 700,000 is indicated as the number of the infantry, raised to a million, or more, by the addition of auxiliaries, or cavalry; the form of this variant in Trogus is evidently preferable, but the figures are all alike unconvincing.³ The later estimates improve on Herodotus by lowering the totals, but might be merely rough rationalizations of his figures, have no appearance of being based upon independent tradition or evidence, and carry no authority, except as condemnatory of the Herodotean exaggerations. The oldest estimate is a poet's, and fixes the number at three millions (Simonides *ap.* Hdt. 7. 228).

¹ ARMY.		Total given by Hdt. . . .	5,283,220
Infantry	1,700,000	Omitted by Hdt. . . .	3,600
Cavalry	80,000		
Charioteers and Camel-drivers	20,000		5,286,820
Thrakians (etc.)	300,000		
	2,100,000		
Attendants	2,100,000		
Total of Land-forces	4,200,000		
Total of Sea-forces	1,083,220		

² Cp. Appendix I. §§ 5, 6, 13.

³ Cp. Appendix I. §§ 13, 14. The total in Nepos and Trogus can hardly have been obtained by omitting *καὶ ἑκατόν* in Hdt. 7. 60, for the authenticity of these words is guaranteed by the elaborate calculations in cc. 184 ff.

So far as Herodotus is concerned, the problem of number centres upon the figure of 1,700,000 given for the infantry. The figure in itself is a difficulty; it is a vast army, and considerations of time, of space, for its march and movements, especially over the bad roads and rugged highlands of Thrace and Makedon, reflexions upon the commissariat, the extravagance of such a host in view of the end to be accomplished, and the patent impossibility of conducting such a multitude under the given circumstances, all militate against the credibility of the total. Yet the figure could be more satisfactorily explained away, if its origin had been traced. It has been supposed that there were actually 170 Myriarchs, captains of ten thousand, at Doriskos, and on the supposition that every Myriarch had really 10,000 men under his command, the sum total would work out to 1,700,000 men. But if these great regiments were only of nominal strength, and your Myriarch commanded rarely a 10,000 men, and often but a half, or a quarter such, though we get a kind of origin for the given total, we have no conclusion at all as to the actual strength of the infantry; and we are left hovering over any figure between a million and a million and a half, still far too high an estimate for concrete possibilities or, we may add, for the subsequent indications of the narrative. Yet the method in this computation is not wholly amiss; and as doubtless the king and his high officers will have obtained from their subordinates evidences and returns to satisfy them how far the results of the levy realized their expectations, and what the actual number of men under arms was; and seeing that the decimal system plainly underlies the organization and leading of the Persian army as a fighting force, it is assuredly the arrangement of the command which, if anything, will furnish a clue to the actual numbers involved.¹

¹ There are three methods by which attempts have been made to reduce and rationalize the figures in Hdt.—(a) Simple rationalism, as by Rawlinson (vol. iv. pp. 151 f.), who estimates the Asiatic infantry at about 1,000,000, and allows the 80,000 cavalry to pass. This method is arbitrary, and unconvincing, having nothing but vague possibilities to guide it. (b) *Sach-Kritik*, based upon more precise material indications. Thus Duncker (vii. 206–7) got about 800,000 as the total for the land-force from the ‘seven days and seven nights’ occupied by the host in crossing the Hellespont. But the seven days and seven nights are (1) obvious folk-lore, (2) only one of three estimates for the passage, and (3) apart from other considerations no adequate basis for an inference. Welzhofer (Fleckeisen’s *Jahrb.* 1892, pp. 145 ff.)

on the same tack, choosing the ‘two days’ to steer by, reduces the fighting men to 80,000, and the forces all told to 150,000. Delbrück (*Perserkriege* 140 ff.) substitutes space for time as the calculus, disproves Hdt.’s figures by arguing that the Persian forces in Prussian marching order would have reached ‘from Damascus to Berlin,’ and, arguing from the size of Mardonios’ camp and the recorded movements of his force, to a total (for him) of about 50,000 fighting men. This *Sach-Kritik* leads to negative results of value, but affords little or no ground for positive estimates. More hopeful is (c) the method of inferring the numbers of the forces from the data for their organization and leading. Hauvette (*op. cit.* 310) has unfortunately reversed this method, arguing that there were 170-

*The arrangements for the leading, or command, of the forces in the field are, relatively speaking, rather fully described. (a) Each ethnic contingent is under native commanders (ἐπιχώριοι ἡγεμόνες) in the first instance. 'In each nation there were as many leaders as there were cities.' This provision is not as clear as might be wished. Not every nation (ἔθνος) could show cities (πόλις), indeed the terms are frequently used in Herodotus as alternatives. Perhaps the Phoenician case may be taken as illustrating what is in Herodotus' mind, though the Phoenicians belong to the navy, not to the infantry. There the several city-contingents are under the city kings, though all subordinate to the Persian admirals. Probably Herodotus intends to say that each ethnic unit was under a native commander, or leader, with other native officers subordinate to him. The exact relation of these ethnic officers to the next series of officers specified is not *ipso facto* clear. (b) Herodotus describes a numerical organization, on the decimal system, as imposed upon the ethnic organization, apparently without wholly superseding it: companies of ten, one hundred, one thousand, and ten thousand men under Dekarchs, Hekatontarchs, Chiliarchs, Myriarchs. If there were still, as Herodotus affirms, native commanders (ἐθνέων σημάντορες), what was their relation to the hierarchy of officers on the decimal system? Were they not identical, or to a great extent identical, persons? Could the Dekarch, a mere sergeant, or corporal, be anything but a native? Could the Hekatontarch, or Centurion, nay, the Chiliarch, be officers, who spoke a language foreign to the men under their command? Herodotus might seem, indeed, to have conceived the whole hierarchy, from the Dekarch to the Myriarch, as composed of native officers, albeit superimposed upon a previous system of commands, also native, without superseding it. This conception seems improbable. If a strictly numerical system (κατὰ τέλεα) was superimposed upon the ethnic contingents, led and commanded by their own officers, we must suppose that the existing officers were utilized as far as possible for the new organization, if it was new. Only it may be questioned whether native officers were entrusted with such high posts as command of ten thousands: were the Myriarchs then really native, or were they Persian, or quasi-Persian officers? (c) Throughout the whole infantry ran a system of Persian commands, and Herodotus actually gives the names of these high officers (ἄρχοντες), twenty-nine in number, a most remarkable and authentic-looking list. He represents the twenty-nine as superior to all the officers in the class just described, and based on the decimal system: were the twenty-nine, then, not related to the decimal scheme of organization? They should be so related certainly, yet*

myriarchs, as there are said to have been 170 myriads (of infantry). De Gobineau (*Histoire des Perses* ii. 191) saw that

the twenty-nine ἄρχοντες were really myriarchs, but he missed the thirtieth.

the figure stands in no clear relation to the sum total of men, or of myriads ($\frac{170}{29}$). This figure 29 is a great stumbling-block; it is extraordinary how easily the commentators and historians have glided over it! (d) Above the twenty-nine Persian commanders (*ἀρχοντες*) come six generals, or field-m Marshals, named in three pairs, as commanding the three columns into which the army was divided, *ex hypothesi*, at Doriskos, for the march to Akanthos: Mardonios and Masistes commanding the column which marched along shore, in touch with the fleet; Smerdomenes and Megabazos commanding the centre column, with which the king himself moved; Tritantaichmes and Gergis commanding the right column, which moved parallel to the others, but furthest inland. (e) Last of all is mentioned Hydarnes, commander of the ten thousand Immortals, a mere Myriarch he, albeit a Persian of the Persians. Now the first two classes, or series, of commanders look, as above shown, like the same men under different aspects, or titles, at least up to a certain point; but should the Myriarchs have been included among the native officers of each nation? Few of the nations enumerated will have furnished a full myriad of men. Hydarnes indeed is a Myriarch, and Hydarnes is an ethnic commander, a Persian commanding Persians; but what could the commander of 'the Immortals' have been else? On the other hand, as a Persian he is also co-ordinate, not with the six *Strategoi* but with the twenty-nine *Archontes*, and he raises the figure to thirty. How, then, if the thirty great Persian commanders, who are plainly next in subordination to the six *Strategoi*, are the Myriarchs proper, and what if Herodotus has wrongly included the Myriarchs in his list of the native officers? There is a passing inconsequence in his account of the appointment of these various officers: the twenty-nine *Archontes* appoint the Chiliarchs and the Myriarchs; the Myriarchs appoint the Hekatontarchs and the Dekarchs: ought he not to have said, the Myriarchs, or Persian *Archontes*, appointed the Chiliarchs, and the Chiliarchs appointed the Hekatontarchs and Dekarchs? According to Herodotus it was the twenty-nine Persian *Archontes* who effected the organization of the chaotic ethnic host into myriads, by the extraordinary and absurd contrivance above demolished; but this statement disguises a real fact: Hydarnes and the 10,000 or myriad Immortals are there from the first, a standing corps; the remaining twenty-nine Persian *Archontes*, assuming them to be Myriarchs, real or nominal, naturally constitute or represent a host of twenty-nine myriads, or, with the Immortals, an infantry of 300,000, in the first instance exclusive of cavalry. These figures stand in an obvious relation to the six *Strategoi* and the three *corps d'armée*; they give 100,000 men (infantry) to each *corps d'armée*, still nominally exclusive of the cavalry. The figure 300,000 reappears for the force left with Mardonios for the second campaign: either that figure is a gross exaggeration for the army of Mardonios, or else Mardonios retained

the bulk of the land-forces with him, after the retreat of Xerxes. Xerxes reaches the Hellespont with a mere remnant of the masses rejected by Mardonios in Thessaly, a patent fiction; for the return or flight of Xerxes is largely a legend, full of improbabilities, alternatives and self-contradictions; not least among them this, that Artabazos, after accompanying the king to the Hellespont, returns to besiege Poteidaia with 60,000 men. It may be that as Mardonios steps into the king's place as commander-in-chief, so does Artabazos take the place of Mardonios as *Strategos*, general at the head of a *corps d'armée* or a moiety, a division of a *corps d'armée*, of 50,000 infantry and 10,000 horse nominal strength; or it may be that Mardonios retained at most a moiety of the army of Xerxes. In either case, the figure 300,000 is primarily valid for the king's forces in 480 B.C. In this review the vast ethnic procession which parades through the pages of Herodotus disappears, and makes way for a relatively manageable and compact force, fairly well organized and officered. There is the king, as commander-in-chief. Under the commander-in-chief are six *Strategoï*, each commanding 50,000 infantry and a certain number of cavalry; and these six great divisions are combined into three columns, or armies. In each army there are ten Persian Myriarchs, each commanding 10,000 men, five such corps, with their commanders under each of the six *Strategoï*.

The Cavalry.—To each *corps d'armée* a cavalry division is attached, the exact number of which is doubtful. Herodotus gives the total of the cavalry as 80,000, but the only items he supplies are—(1) 1000 select Persian cavalry, heading the column on the march from Sardes, no doubt under a Chiliarch; (2) a second chiliad of chosen horse, that followed the royal bodyguard on the same occasion; (3) ten thousand Persian horse, no doubt led by a Myriarch, that followed the ten thousand Persian infantry (or Immortals) on the same occasion. Taken strictly, these three items would give a total of 12,000 for the Persian cavalry. (4) In the army-list the Sagartians are said to have furnished 8000 horse, being the only nation of those supplying cavalry not previously named and described, as furnishing infantry, in the army-list. The Sagartians and Persians between them thus furnish 20,000 of the total cavalry. No items are given for the remaining six nations named as furnishing contingents, but on the supposition that each of the six nations furnishes a nominal ten thousand (under a Persian Myriarch) the 60,000 required would be forthcoming. The allocation of the 80,000, and the eight Myriarchs implied among the three columns, or *corps d'armée*, is not however so easy. Had the total of the cavalry been given as 60,000 the case would have presented a simpler solution: six myriads, under six Myriarchs, would have allowed two myriads and two Myriarchs to each *corps d'armée*, or one myriad, under its Myriarch, to each of the six divisions under the six *Strategoï*. This

suggestion is borne out, as above shown, by the figure assigned to the division under Artabazos: it is 60,000 strong, that is, 50,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, and likewise by the same figure for the *corps d'armée* safeguarding Ionia in 479 B.C. (9. 96). The total given for the cavalry may be too large by two myriads, and perhaps should have been fixed at a nominal 60,000. The Persians, Medes, Kissians, Baktrians might have supplied each a myriad; but the Sagartians are only credited with 8000, and the three remaining nations named seem less important, Kaspian, Paktyans, Parikanians. The Persian and Sagartian contingents amount together to two myriads, the total proper, on the above theory, for one of the columns, or *corps d'armée*. It may be that these 20,000 have been erroneously added to the 60,000 which already included them, the error being due to Herodotus himself, or perhaps his source. The Persian and Sagartian myriads, or chiliads of horse, may have accompanied Xerxes to Sardes, and have formed the cavalry contingent for that central column, or *corps d'armée*, with which the king himself marched. The suggestion that the cavalry comprised six myriads, two myriads being attached to each army-corps, is further borne out by the arrangements for the cavalry command (c. 88). The whole cavalry is under three *Hipparchs*, Harmamithres and Tithaios, the two sons of Datis the Mede, and Pharnûches, who fell from his horse as the column quitted Sardes, and had to be left behind. Herodotus does not name his successor, but we may venture to find him in Masistios, who was 'Hipparch' at Plataia, and fell there gallantly leading the cavalry under his command. The 'Hipparchs' are the highest cavalry officers, doubtless with Myriarchs below them: upon the present hypothesis each Hipparch commanded two myriads, and was attached to one of the three *corps d'armée*, perhaps co-ordinate with the two *Strategoi* commanding it. It is plain that Pharnûches, and Masistios after him, was attached to the middle column, or army-corps with which the king marched, and which was probably made up of the Persian and Sagartian cavalry. The two sons of Datis would have been attached, each with his two myriad horse, to the right and the left columns respectively. It may be that Persia proper actually furnished the largest contingent to the cavalry, four chiliads in excess of the Sagartians for example, and still more in excess of the remaining six nations, none of whom need have furnished more than from six to seven chiliads, in order to bring the total up to 60,000; it may be, however, that the two chiliads of chosen Persian horse should be included in the Persian myriad, for the purposes of the present argument, and that the figure 8000 for the Sagartian contingent was an inference in the first instance from the known figure of the force at Sardes in the winter of 481-480, viz. 20,000, on the supposition that the Persians furnished 12,000, that is, two chiliads of chosen horsemen, in

addition to the normal myriad—from which as a matter of fact the two chiliads had been selected. It is hardly worth while to attempt to estimate precisely the number of chiliads furnished by each of the six remaining nations: the Medes and Kissians might have furnished ten chiliads each, like the Persians; the remaining four nations, each five chiliads; and the allocation of the four myriads thus raised, two to each of the remaining *corps d'armée*, may have followed the ethnical disposition just indicated; or the Medes, with two of the further nations, may have furnished the cavalry to one column, and the Kissians, with the remaining two nations, the cavalry to the other column. Carried further than this, speculation might prove idle. It remains to add, under the head of number and organization, that the chiliads and myriads must of course have been nominal, and the number of myriads is no guarantee for an exactly corresponding total of efficient horsemen at Doriskos, much less at Plataia (where, however, the Persians had their Thessalian and Boiotian allies to supplement their own deficiencies). The argument regarding the cavalry suggests that the figures for the Persian forces were the result of the addition of a given number of chiliads and myriads, and not the result of any process of mechanical numeration, such as is described by Herodotus for the numbering of the infantry. The number of chiliads and myriads to be raised by the *levée en masse* was presumably fixed beforehand, and a proper number commandeered from each nation, province, or satrapy: successive reviews, at Kritalla, Abydos, Doriskos, would serve to verify the extent to which the *levée* had been successful, and the requisite numbers of myriads and chiliads raised, even though the myriads and chiliads were to some extent nominal; a myriad being still called a myriad even after a chiliad or two had been withdrawn, or lost, or never mustered; and a chiliad being still called a chiliad even if the number of men fell to three figures. In regard to the cavalry, however, it is to be observed that the figures, the number of myriads given as the total, require but little qualification, comparatively speaking; and whereas it is necessary to reduce the myriads of infantry from 170 to 30, it seems necessary to reduce the myriads of cavalry only from 8 to 6; or otherwise put, whereas the figure for the infantry has been more than quintupled, the figure for the cavalry has been augmented merely by the fractional addition of a third. This relative modesty in regard to the figure for the cavalry may be due in part to the fact that in any case the cavalry was far less numerous to start with than the infantry, and the larger initial figure invited, so to speak, the grosser exaggeration. It may be due also to the obvious absurdity of bringing hundreds of thousands of horses to Greece, where there was no scope for cavalry operations on such a colossal scale. It is at least in part due, however, to the better sources, as in the case of the fleet, which have controlled the

figure. Two-thirds of the cavalry was probably transported to Doriskos by sea, and the maritime Greeks had perhaps especial means of checking the estimates of the land-forces at least under this head.

The horsemen, it is to be observed, in the army of Xerxes are all from upper or further Asia; Anatolia supplies not a single mounted man. To the cavalry Herodotus seems to attach Indians and Libyans, who drive chariots, and Arabians, who form a corps of camelry. But these chariots and these camels barely appear in the narrative of the campaign, and may be dismissed as belonging, not to the true tradition of these events, but to the abstract scheme of the *levée en masse* for the Persian Empire. The cavalry proper are credited with the same arms and equipment as the corresponding nations in the infantry, except that some of the Persian cavalry are endued with metal head-pieces, and that the Sagartians, 'drest in a style betwixt the Persian and the Paktyan,' have no other weapon but the lasso and the dagger, the former of which they are described as wielding with deadly effect. It is a ground for some suspicion that even at Plataia the Greek story of the war takes no account of the use of these lassoes.

Revised Numbers.—The numbers thus arrived at for the land-forces of the Persian army leave the figures still enormously large in comparison with any scale for military operations with which the Greeks were so far acquainted. The infantry are estimated at 300,000—no doubt a regulative or ideal number, yet still potentially involved in the thirty Myriarchs who led the forces under the six *Strategoi*. The cavalry may be added, amounting to 60,000, represented probably by six Myriarchs, two under each of the three Hippiarchs. These 360,000 are all fighting men. It may be doubted whether an ancient army moved with the same amount of *impedimenta* and as large a service-train as are attached to an army nowadays; but the description of Herodotus is perfectly explicit on this head in regard to the Persian forces, and the express assertions of Herodotus are borne out to a great extent by the narrative. It is, however, an excessive estimate to allow an equal number of non-combatants as servants, attendants, and so forth—to say nothing of camp-followers, male and female, merchants, peddlers and others, who may have attached themselves to the army for their own private objects and of their own accord. Without them the fighting forces on land, accompanied by their own baggage-train and servants, might have amounted to nearly three-quarters of a million men: a truly immense multitude in Greek eyes.¹ It remains to add the navy and the naval transport and commissariat service, as above estimated, the fighting portion of the fleet alone carrying a quarter of a million men, to which may be added as many more for the transports. Altogether upon this showing the army

¹ Dareios took across the Bosphoros, according to Hdt., 700,000 men, not counting the navy, but including the cavalry; this was the total muster for the empire, ἡγε δὲ πάντα τῶν ἡρχε, 4. 87.

and navy of Xerxes employed and set in motion upwards of a million souls, to say nothing of European contingents and additions, certainly some not inconsiderable number, and of the hosts of camp-followers, and the hosts of labourers employed on the great local works, or upon works executed *en route*.

Ethnically viewed, as the navy is drawn from twelve different nations, or quasi-nations, and as the cavalry is supplied by eight different nations, so Herodotus specifies forty-six different peoples as furnishing his 170, or, as we say, 30 myriads of infantry. In the navy-list precise figures are given for each of the twelve contingents of longships, and in the cavalry it is possible to frame estimates, as above, for the several items, some of which are even specified; but in the case of the infantry the forty-six nations stand in no obvious relation, either to the 170 myriads of Herodotus, or to the 30 myriads to which they have been reduced in the foregoing discussion; and except for the Persians Herodotus furnishes no figures for the items or particular contingents. A myriad per nation might not in itself have seemed at first sight an utterly incredible figure, and would find some slight support, or verification, in the representation of the 30 myriads in the army of Mardonios as a selection, involving the rejection of a certain number of myriads, were it only sixteen; but there is no hint or suggestion in Herodotus of forty-six myriads, one from each nation specified, rather it is implied that the ethnic contingents stood in no relation to the numerical organization of the army as constituted at Doriskos in 170 myriads, but were simply massed as they came in batches of ten thousand. On the Herodotean hypothesis of a total amounting to 1,700,000, many of the forty-six nations must obviously have furnished several myriads each to the infantry, but the attempt to conjecture particular items for a total itself disproved and incredible is a labour like that of 'milking the he-goat into a sieve.' On the more acceptable hypothesis that the total of the infantry may be set at 300,000, and the total of the cavalry at 60,000, the 30 Persian commanders (*ἀρχοντες*), representing 30 Myriarchs, each commanding a (nominal) myriad, it is possible, with the guidance of Herodotus' army-list, to assign to each Myriarch the nations supplying levies to his command, and to determine which of the ethnical units amounted to a nominal myriad, and supplied a distinct regiment, under a Persian Myriarch, and which nations appear to have supplied a part of ten thousand, generally a moiety, and to have been combined with a second contingent so as to form a full (nominal) myriad. In nearly half the cases (14) one ethnic unit is under a Myriarch, and therefore presumably supplies a nominal myriad. The case of the Persians is unique, as they furnish the 10,000 Immortals, under Hydarnes, as well as a nominal myriad, under Otanes (the father of Amestris, wife of Xerxes). Besides the Persians, Media, Kissia, Hyrkania, Assyria, Aria, Sogdia, the Kaspian region, Sarangia, Paktya, Parikania, in the

eastern moiety of the empire, are each credited with a myriad; of the myriads from the eastern provinces only five appear as drawn from more than one ethnic or territorial unit: Baktrians and Sakai (Scyths) serve under one command; the eastern Aithiopians are associated with the Indians; Parthians and Chorasmians go together, as do the Gandarians and Dadikes; the Utians and Mykians combine to furnish one myriad: in no case are more than two ethnic names combined into one unit. These seventeen myriads represent the contribution of the eastern portion of the empire to the infantry of Xerxes.¹ Thirteen units of command, thirteen myriads, remain to be supplied by the western and outlying portions of the empire, and among them Asia Minor is most largely represented. The Arabians and Aithiopians (Nubians) furnish one myriad, the Libyans a second, the Nesiotes of the Islands in the 'Red' Sea a third. The remaining ten myriads are supplied by twenty-one nations of Asia Minor, in such wise that in one instance, and in one only, the Thrakians (i.e. Bithynians) supply a myriad, under a Persian Myriarch; in two cases three nations combine to furnish a contingent; in the remaining seven cases the myriad is raised from two nations, presumably in a nominal 5000 (five chiliads) from each. This analysis of the bare essentials in the army-list seems to confirm the theory above formulated in regard to the total figures, as well as in regard to the composition and organization of the forces, and confirms the view that the king's army was raised by the commandeering of definite numbers of men, or of chiliads, from each province, satrapy, and nation; though the actual numbers of men put into the field, or, so to speak, joining the standards, may have fallen far short of the ideal delectus.

It is perhaps worth while to attempt a further advance in the direction of a reconstruction. Ten myriads (100,000 men) appear, upon this scheme, as the levy for Asia Minor, and, as already pointed out, a natural place for the rendezvous or mustering of this *corps d'armée* would have been Abydos. Two *corps d'armée* remain to be levied from the remainder and larger portion of the empire, and chiefly from the further east and Iran. One of these corps, perhaps composed of the first ten myriads (from twelve nations), had Kritalla for its rendezvous, and marched with Xerxes, or perhaps by more than one road, to Sardes, where it wintered. These two great divisions of the army, in themselves two armies, may have crossed the Hellespont in the spring of 480 B.C. and made their way to Doriskos. The third army-corps, or the greater portion of it, together with the cavalry, except the Persian and Sagartian levies attached to the king's own column, may have been conveyed to Doriskos by sea, from the ports of Egypt, Phoenicia, and Kilikia, or perhaps even in

¹ These 17 myriads of the East might be accountable for the 170 myriads of the whole army; but the figure 17 recurs in another connexion (see p. 175 below), and these coincidences are most probably fortuitous.

part through the Bosphoros and Hellespont. This third column, like the cavalry, is thus *ex hypothesi* the levy drawn from the outlying and more remote parts and portions of the Persian empire, and is represented in the army-list of Herodotus by the nine Myriarchs, and myriads succeeding the first ten, together with the last item of all, the islanders from the Erythraian sea. The displacement of this item is an anomaly not easy to explain, but that it is a displacement seems all but incontrovertible. Two solid blocks, or series, of commands occur in the list as given by Herodotus. The first seventeen (or sixteen) names, divisions, or *ex hypothesi* myriads, represent the Aryan and Semitic portion of the empire. Geographically the last item of all, the islands of the Erythraian sea, might be counted with these, or with the next two items, the Arabo-Ethiopian division and the Libyan; how it comes to be appended to the solid phalanx of ten commanders, ten myriads, from the twenty or one-and-twenty nations of Asia Minor, is one of the mysteries of the composition of Herodotus' work in this portion. For the purpose of reconstructing the *corps d'armée* of Xerxes, as finally organized or constituted on the plain of Doriskos, I do not hesitate to replace these Nesiote foot-men in their natural order and connexion as the XVIII. regiment, or myriad, forming a portion of the second army-corps. The first army-corps (I.-X.) is the column with which Xerxes himself marched. It was the central column in the march from Doriskos, and it bore the brunt of the fighting at Thermopylai. Which of the other two *corps d'armée* formed the sea-side or left marching column, and which the right, is a matter of mere speculation: it can hardly be regarded as quite certain that all three columns advanced south of Othrys; immense numbers of men will surely have been left in Makedon and Thrake, and along the whole line of communication.

Armature.—The army-list of Xerxes, even on its primary or military side, is much more than a mere catalogue of the nations supplying levies, with a computation of their numbers, total and partial, and an account of the organization and leading; it gives descriptions of the equipments and accoutrements, the weapons and defensive armour, worn and used by the forces, on land and sea. Beside, and in contrast with, the Hellenic armature, which held good for a considerable portion of the forces, twelve distinct types of armature for the army may be distinguished in the Herodotean descriptions, albeit Herodotus does not actually supply distinctive or individual titles for the whole number. Of the twelve, six belong to the further Asiatic and largely Iranian portion of the empire, viz. the Medo-Persian, Paktyan, Baktrian, Skythian, Indian, and Sagartian (i.-vi.); three types belong to Mesopotamia and the adjacent nations, viz. the Assyrian, the Aithiopian, and the Libyan (vii.-ix.); the remaining three types are taken from Asia Minor (x.-xii.) viz. the Paphlagonian, Thrako-Bithynian, and Moschio-Kolchian. Each type invites further

specification, and the naval contingents add some further types of their own.

(i.) *The Persian, the Median, or Medo-Persian* (ἡ Περσικὴ σκευή, ἡ Μηδική).—Herodotus speaks of the type as Persian, or as Median, indifferently, though he asserts that originally and properly the dress and armature were Median. The type is worn by the Medes and Persians, the Hyrkanians have apparently exactly the same, the Kissians nearly the same, except for their headgear, while the Baktrians, who present a distinct type, have nevertheless something very like the Median head-dress. The islanders from the Erythraean sea have dress and arms closely resembling the Median, the Arians and Sarangians have the Median bow, and the Sarangians the Median spear in addition. The items of the dress and equipment work out as follows. Though some of the cavalry have metal headpieces, the prevailing headgear is the stiff felt cap, or fez (πίλος ἀπάγης, τιάρα), with the point or apex bent and hanging down, varied in the case of the Kissians by the Babylonian turban.¹ The body-garment was a sleeved tunic, of gay colour, girt with a zone round the waist. The legs were encased in the most unhellenic of garments, the trowsers, or trousers (ἀναξυρίδες), a terror to behold.² The shoe, boot, or foot-covering is omitted by Herodotus. For further defence the Mede, or Persian, wore a breastplate composed of fine metal scales. This breastplate was worn apparently under the tunic.³ How efficient a protection it might prove upon occasion is exhibited in the story of Masistios; but it may be doubted whether the common soldier was provided with this costly protection. The most prominent defence was the light though large wicker-work shield (γέρρον), terminating in a point, which might be fixed in the ground, so as to form a frail shield wall or rampart.⁴ The offensive weapons were three in number. Large bows and arrows, the latter carried in a quiver; spears, short in comparison with the Hellenic, but still used, not for hurling, but for hand-to-hand fighting; a dagger, hanging in the belt, or girdle, on the right side, and of course usable only in the last resort. Had Herodotus been describing the appearance of the soldiers on the frieze of the Apadana of Xerxes in Susa, he could scarcely have made a more accurate report, except for the omission of the foot-covering.⁵ But Herodotus would not need to go to Susa in order to describe, with tolerable accuracy, the Medo-Persian equipment; it was seen of many in Asia Minor and in Egypt; hosts of Greeks in Greece proper were no doubt perfectly familiar with it, and could portray it to its minutest particulars (not omitting the boots); and it may even

¹ Cp. 1. 195.

² 6. 112.

³ Cp. 9. 22.

⁴ Cp. 9. 61 f. φράξαντες . . τὰ γέρρα οἱ Πέρσαι ἀπίσαν τῶν τοξευμάτων πολλὰ ἀφειδέως—ἐγένετο δὲ πρῶτον περὶ τὰ γέρρα μάχη. ὥς δὲ ταῦτα ἐπεπτόκει κτλ.

⁵ This frieze, or a portion of it, now constitutes one of the glories of the Louvre museum. For representations see Perrot and Chipiez, *Art of Persia*. The monuments apparently omit the *gerrhon*; cp. note to 7. 60 (i. 83).

surprise us to find Herodotus describing it here so fully, especially as he has apparently taken it for granted previously—unless, indeed, this apparent inconsequence conceals, as often in such cases, one of the secrets of the Herodotean composition.¹

(ii.) *The Paktyan* (ἡ Πακτυκὴ, sc. σκευή, c. 85).—The title is explicitly given by Herodotus *l.c.* and contrasted with ‘the Persian.’ The Paktyes are paraded in c. 67, and their equipment holds good for three other of the Iranian nations, or tribes, the Ūtians, Mykians, and Parikanians (Οὔτιοι, Μύκοι, Παρικάνιοι). It is all the more disappointing to find the items of the inventory few and slight. Neither headgear nor footgear nor body raiment is described or mentioned; nor is any defensive armour supplied, unless the cloak be so accounted. Three items only are specified, the said cloak, of hide or leather, the native bow, and the dagger. There is nothing peculiar apparently in the dagger; the native bow may be of specific form and confined to the four nations named, or it may be contrasted simply with the Median bow, and in that case not very different from the Baktrian bow. In short, the really distinguishing mark of this type was the leathern cloak or capote (σίσυρνα). The Kaspian have already been endued with such cloaks (c. 67); and in so far the Paktyan type is similar to the Kaspian, but the Kaspian soldier is better armed—he has a sword (ἀκινάκης). Anyway, the leathern capote becomes an important mark, the differentia of the type. Perhaps this skin-mantle had a hood, which served as a headpiece.

(iii.) *The Baktrian*.—The exact title (ἡ Βακτρική) is not actually given by Herodotus, but five other nations—Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadikai—are described as all having the same equipment (σκευή) as the Baktrians (c. 66), and the Arians also are in all but one particular equipped like the Baktrians; it may be therefore inferred that the Baktrian equipment furnishes a distinct type, worn by no less than seven nations of the Iranian highland, and constituting the most typically Iranian, if not Aryan, equipment of all. Yet the Baktrians have headgear very like the Median (c. 64), and have also ‘short spears’ (αἰχμὰς βραχέας), which are presumably like the Median; their differentia lies, so far as specified, only in the fashion of the bow (τόξα καλάμινα ἐπιχώρια): a differentia emphasized by the particular exception made in regard to the Arians, who have been armed with ‘the Median bow.’ Dress, defensive armour, and the other items are not specified. The Baktrian probably wore the

¹ It is, however, more briefly described, through the lips of Aristagoras the Milesian, 5. 49 ἡ τε μάχη αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τοιήδε, τόξα καὶ αἰχμὴ βραχέα· ἀναξυρίδας δὲ ἔχοντες ἔρχονται ἐς τὰς μάχας καὶ κυρβάσις ἐπὶ τῇσι κεφαλῇσι. This passage, though preceding in the finished text the fuller description in Bk. 7, is, of

course, in accordance with the theory of composition here advocated (cp. Introduction, §§ 7–9), of later genesis in the work of Herodotus, unless, indeed, the descriptions in Bk. 7 belong to the stratum of composition added, or inserted, in Bks. 7, 8, 9 for the especial benefit of Western readers or hearers.

'trews,' and presumably had some kind of shield, as well as dagger; but the effect of the description in Herodotus, which ignores all that, is to set the Baktrian bow in high relief, as the weapon *par excellence* of Iran.

(iv.) *The Skythian*.—In the army of Xerxes the Skythians, or Sakai, are represented by the 'Amyrgii' (c. 64), probably nomad tribes from the steppes, not necessarily of Aryan or Indo-European stock.¹ Their equipment is distinctive, though not fully described. For headgear they wear a cap which Herodotus elsewhere describes as the Persian or Median fez (5. 49 *κυρβασίας*), but with a difference, that the Skyths wear the point or apex upright (*ἐς ὀξὺν ἀπηγμένως, ὀρθὰς πεπηγνίας*). On their legs they too have the trews of Iran—if the trews be Iranian. No defensive arm is specified in their equipment, but they were probably not shieldless. For offence they have three weapons, the bow, of local form, the axe, and the dagger (*τόξα ἐπιχώρια, σαγάρεις, ἐγχειρίδια*). There is little to distinguish this type except the cap with the upright apex, and perhaps some variation in the make of the bow.

(v.) *The Indian* (*ἡ Ἰνδική*, cp. c. 65).—Neither headgear nor footgear is described, but the Indian type is cognizable by the cotton garments worn on the body, and the bow (and arrows) of bamboo, jointed of course, the arrows being further differentiated by having points of iron, as compared with the bronze, flint, or bone heads with which doubtless the vast mass of arrows undescribed were pointed. With the Indians Herodotus classes the 'Aithiopians of Asia' as in most respects similarly armed, though differing in respect of their headgear and shields. He has not described any shields or headpiece as proper to the Indians! The eastern Aithiopians wear horsehead-skin, with ears and mane upon the head, and for shields use crane-backs. The differences are so striking that it is strange to find the Aithiopians of the East thus treated as an appendage of India—unless we suppose that in this case they represent the dark tribes from beyond the Indus.

(vi.) *The Sagartian* (*ἡ Σαγαρτική*, c. 85).—A distinctive type is supplied from the cavalry by the Sagartians, whose distinguishing weapon is the lasso. In other respects their equipment is described as something between the Persian and the Paktyan. Did they wear the leather cape, which is the 'note' of the Paktyan type, and the Median 'trews'? They have daggers, but no other weapon of metal. The lasso of thongs, leather or skin, envelops their enemy, and drags him down; the dagger probably does the rest. The Sagartian lasso, demanding the steppes or plains of Asia for its use, plays no part in the actual narrative of Herodotus: not so much as an anecdote testifies to its real presence in the Greek theatre of war; none the less

¹ On the habitat of the *Σκύθαι* or *Σάκαι*, "between the Kaspian and Baktria," cp. my *Herodotus IV.-VI.* (1895), ii. 11.

does Herodotus not merely describe the weapon, but the method of using it. The Sagartian weapon forms the one fresh type suggested for the cavalry; the other seven nations furnishing horsemen are equipped on horseback as on foot.

The Iranian levies of the king rely principally for their weapons of offence upon the bow: they are archers, *τοξόται*, whether on foot or mounted; the short spear is also in evidence, especially among the Persians, Medes, and perhaps the Kissians. In the last resort they have daggers to use hand-to-hand. The only efficient weapons of defence specified are the scale-breastplates, or cuirasses, and the wicker shields assigned to the Persians, and the strange headpieces and shields ascribed to the eastern Aithiopians. A few of the Persian cavalry have metal headpieces. The leathern capotes of the Paktyans might be some protection; but the Iranians, with their eastern and northern neighbours, are doubtless poorly equipped for close encounter with men clad in metal armour, and using long spears and long swords. As against one another the Persian, or rather the Median, equipment seems the most effective alike for offensive and for defensive purposes. Compared with the remainder of the army the Iranian levies present a distinct type in common. The next common group contains the four types supplied by Assyria, Egypt, Aithiopia, Libya.

(vii.) *The Assyrian* (*ἡ Ἀσσυρία*, cp. c. 63).—By 'Assyrians' Herodotus here, as in most cases, understands the Babylonians and dwellers in Mesopotamia generally. Of mere dress, tunics or what not, Herodotus mentions nothing in this connexion, nor of their foot-gear.¹ Their armour is, indeed, such as to hide any garments worn merely for cleanliness or comfort. On their heads they have helmets of bronze (*χάλκεα κράνα*) or headpieces of plaited or twisted work not easily described (*πεπλεγμένα τρόπον τινὰ βάρβαρον οὐκ εὐαπήγητον*): in either case effective headpieces. On their bodies they have breastplates, or cuirasses, of linen, no doubt quilted, or thickened, so as to offer some defence to arrow and blade; they have besides shields (*ἀσπίδας*), 'like the Egyptian.' For offence they have the spear, the wooden club studded with iron nails or knobs, and the dagger. The club may seem a little out of date; but for the rest, the Assyrians are armed with the weapons of civilization, and must certainly be reckoned to the heavy infantry. Except Greeks they are apparently the only heavy infantry in the land-forces of the king.

(viii.) *The Aithiopian* (*Αἰθιοπική*, cp. c. 69).—With the Aithiopian the army-list passes out of the civilized area again, though heavier weapons are not wholly discarded. The wild-beast skins, of pard and lion, which they carried were probably, at least in part, head-gear—like the horse-heads worn by the Asiatic Aithiopians (c. 70).

¹ The Babylonian dress described in Bk. 1 c. 195 is no doubt a purely pacific attire; but the description belongs

probably to a different period, and 'provenience,' from that of the army-list of Xerxes.

The body was painted or smeared white and red, with chalk and vermillion. Of shields or further weapons of defence there is no mention, but their offensive arms are relatively formidable: long bows, full six feet, made of the palm-leaf stem, with which were used arrows of reed tipped with flint; spears, with points of horn; knotted clubs, only less massive than the Assyrian mace with its iron knobs. Of sword, of knife, there is no mention, but the Aithiopian gear is one of the most clearly marked types.

(ix.) *The Libyan* (Λιβυκή, cp. c. 71).—The note of the Libyan dress is that it is of skin, hide (σκευή σκυτινή), which may extend to head and foot conjecturally, and include a shield, though of these details there is no account in Herodotus. The weapon of offence is the javelin, with point hardened in the fire, a peculiarity which approximates the Libyan type to the type of the next group. That so little is made here of the Libyan type is the more remarkable in view of the space devoted to Libyan ethnography elsewhere—a contrast which, as in other similar cases, raises, and may help to solve, the problems of the composition of Herodotus' work.¹

(x.) *The Paphlagonian* (ἡ Παφλαγονική σκευή, c. 73).—The Paphlagonian equipment presents an absolutely distinct type, particularly as compared with the Iranian, and the Assyrio-Egyptian types. This equipment, although named after one of the Asianic nations, the very name of which had something of ultrabarbarism in it to Hellenic ears,² is worn by no less than seven of the nations of Anatolia (Paphlagonians, Ligyans, Matieni, Mariandyni, Kappadokians, and virtually by Phrygians and Armenians); it is, in short, the distinctively Anatolian equipment, and may originally have been rather of Kappadokian (or even 'Hittite') origin, than proper to the Paphlagonians. It is marked in dress (headgear and boots) and in weapons, especially by the substitution of the javelin, or throwing-spear for the bow and arrow. The items are given with relative fulness. For the head the plaited helm (κράνεα πεπλεγμένα), for the feet a boot, with toe upturned to the middle shin; for defence a small shield; for offence, beside the hurling-spear (ἀκόντιον) of which perhaps more than one was carried by each man, small spears and daggers. Wherein the Phrygio-Armenian variety differed from the normal type is not precisely specified—perhaps merely in the matter of boots. The combination of the small spear with the javelin is noticeable, but it is the latter weapon that especially marks the Anatolian type, and reappears in the armature of Mysians, Bithynians, Pisidians (as προβολή), Marians, Kilikians, and even Phoenicians, who presumably had borrowed, not originated it.

(xi.) *The Thrakio-Bithynian* (Θρηκική, τῶν Θρηγίκων τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ, sc.

¹ The passage in Bk. 7 appears to be written without reference to Bk. 4, an observation easily explicable if Bk. 7 were the earlier composed; cp. Introduction, § 8.

² Cp. note 7. 72. 1 (i. 95).

Βιθυνῶν, c. 75).—The Bithynians wore fox-fells on their heads, on their feet and legs boots of fawn or doe-skin, while their bodies were covered with an upper and an under garment, bright coloured or embroidered capes (*ἑιράς*) over tunics (of linen, or wool?). Their weapons are javelins and small daggers, but the item which gives most distinction to the type is the Thracian shield, or *pelta* (*πέλτη*), which may have been carried from Europe into Bithynia. It makes its first appearance in Greek literature on this occasion, and there is nothing to suggest here the great future which was before it in Greek history and warfare.

(xii.) *The Moscho-Kolchian* (c. 78).—As three other peoples (the Tibarenoi, Makrones, and Mossynoikoi) are described as equipped in like fashion to the Moschi, the Moschian may be reckoned a distinct type of armature. Again, as the Alarodii and the Saspeires are equipped like the Kolchians, the Kolchian type may also be regarded as distinct. Yet the Moschian and Kolchian are not very different, and may perhaps be classed together. Both have a distinctive helmet, or headpiece, of wood (*κράνεα ξύλινα*); both have shields, described in the case of the Kolchians as small and of undressed ox-hide—a description which may also probably apply to the Moschian; both have short spears (*αἰχμὰς βραχέας, σμικράς*), but the Moschian is further distinguished by the relatively large size of the spear-head: to neither is assigned the specifically Anatolian weapon, the javelin, but the Kolchians at least have swords (*μαχαίρας*).¹

Herodotus draws no hard and fast line between the types of armature in the army and on the fleet, but classes them together; rightly enough, seeing that the *Epibatai* on the fleet, whose armature alone could be in question, were simply infantry soldiers, whether native in each contingent or supplied by the Persians and Medes. Thus, as it happens, the description of the fleet adds only five types to the military ethnography of Herodotus. Speaking generally, the marines incline to the heavy infantry type, and are better armed and protected than the Iranian or the Anatolian levies, even apart from the predominance of the Hellenic type in the fleet. The naval contingents from Asia Minor naturally present the national weapon, the javelin, but generally reinforced with weightier weapons of offence. In four cases the description of the several equipments may perhaps be held to constitute a distinctive type, Phoenician, Egyptian, Kilikian, and Lykian; in the remaining three cases, Kyprian, Pamphylian, Karian, the equipment is virtually Hellenic,

¹ Two nations have not been accounted for in this survey of arms, the Mares and the Milyans. The Mares are attached to the Kolchoi in 7. 79, and to the Mossynoikoi in 3. 94. They have a peculiar helmet, and have no swords;

but they hardly constitute a distinct type. The Milyans, c. 77, would still less deserve separate classification; their distinctive mark is the fibula, a matter of dress rather than armature.

with exception of a variation in Kyprian headgear, and an addition in the case of the Karians of hooked or curved knives, and of daggers.

(xiii.) *The Phoenician* (c. 89).—The Phoenician type in armour, as in other things, seems to result from a certain eclecticism, or ‘contamination’ of other types, and hardly to possess originality. The helmet is described ‘as very like the Hellenic’; a linen breastplate is worn, as by Egyptian or Assyrian; the shield has no rim, so resembling the *pelta*. The only offensive weapon assigned to the Phoenician is the (Anatolian) javelin, or throwing-spear. It seems hardly likely that the Phoenician marine was so ill-equipped for fighting at close quarters. If the Herodotean typology were in this case really complete, an inference to Phoenician sea-tactics would be legitimate, if not inevitable, and the inference would be that the Phoenician galleys were not meant to fight at close quarters, but must have relied on speed, manœuvres, and ramming to effect their purposes. Yet who will believe that the Phoenician marine was left without sword, dagger, spear, or club, in case his own vessel was boarded, or to enable him to board the enemy on occasion? The obvious inference is that the Herodotean description in this case, as in too many other cases, is incomplete and misleading.

(xiv.) *The Egyptian type* is a perfectly distinctive one, and like most of the marine types, as well as the Assyrian, which is reckoned of course to the land-forces exclusively, may be described as belonging to the heavy infantry. Head, breast or body, and whole person are well protected by ‘plaited’ helmet (κράνος χηλευτόν), large convex shields with metal rims, and breastplates or cuirasses (perhaps of linen); while for offence the Egyptians are armed with ‘naval’ spears and large clubs. They have, moreover, what comparatively few of the king’s men have, claymores (μαχαίρας μεγάλας).

(xv.) *The Kilikian*.—That the Kilikians present a distinctive type of armature is to be inferred not merely from the description in detail, but also from the fact that the description of the arms of the ‘Lasionians,’ among the land infantry (c. 77), is postponed as identical with that of the Kilikian marines, to be subsequently described. The Kilikian wears on his head ‘a native helmet’ (κράνος ἐπιχώριον) and on his body a woollen tunic (κιθὼν εἰρίνεος); while he protects his person with the light target of undressed ox-hide (λαυσήμιον ὠμοβοέης πεποιημένον), dating at least from Homeric times. His offensive weapons consist of two javelins, reinforced by a sword (ξίφος), like an Egyptian claymore. Altogether, the Lasonians on land and the Kilikians on sea, while retaining the Anatolian javelin, present the formidable appearance of light well-protected swordsmen.

(xvi.) *The Lykian*.—If one man bore and wore all that is set down under the head of Lykian equipment, the Lykians must have been among the best-dressed, and most fully armed, of the non-Hellenic marines. Upon his head the Lykian set a felt cap, or fez (πίλος),

with a ring of (upright) feathers round it (πτεροῦσι περιστεφανωμένος). His breast was protected with a cuirass (θώραξ), and, above the cuirass, upon his shoulders he wore the goat-skin, or *aigis* (αἰγὸς δέρμα). The absence of a shield gives occasion for wonder. As weapons he carried bows and arrows of distinctive character, the bow of the cornel-tree (κράνεια), a 'tough and springy wood,' beside the inevitable Anatolian javelin; while, if matters came to close quarters, he had the hooked sword (δρέπανον) and dagger to rely on.

(xvii.) *Hellenic*.—A very large part of the fleet, and some portion even of the land-forces, were equipped in Greek fashion, of which Herodotus, forgetful in this case of the mutability of human affairs, and of the future fortune of his own work, has given no description. Yet even without such description the Hellenic type can be restored from the incidents of the narrative, and from other sources. The Greek infanterist is a heavy-armed soldier, clad in mail, with leather or metal helmet, cuirass and leggings, and large well-rimmed shield. His weapons of offence are spear and sword. The type of the Greek hoplite varied but little from state to state, nor much from age to age; yet there were doubtless variations not merely in the appearance, but in the weight, size, and excellence of the weapons, which must have told considerably on the results of particular encounters. A Greek panoply was an expensive affair, and it may fairly be doubted whether all the soldiers in the army and navy of Xerxes, described by Herodotus as equipped in Hellenic fashion, were equally well armed one with another, or as a rule as well-armed as the men they were moving to attack.

The foregoing analysis results in the recognition of some seventeen distinctive types of accoutrement and weapons to be distributed among the forty-six nations supporting the army, and the twelve nations supplying the fleet of Xerxes. This result no doubt is somewhat more systematic than the Herodotean methods were capable of attaining consciously; yet our artificial analysis may be carried even somewhat further without detriment. The forces of Xerxes more broadly viewed present six main types of armature, and these six types correspond approximately to the ethnical and geographical arrangements:—(i.) The *Iranian*, which relies chiefly on the bow for distant work, and on the knife or dagger for hand to hand, while the fighting man has little more than his dress, and his agility, to give him protection. (ii.) The *Medo-Persian*: the spear is added to the bow and dagger, the footman has a long light shield (the *gerrhon*), and in the case of the picked and superior soldiers, cuirasses and even metal headpieces are not unknown; but the fez and the trews are protections against the weather rather than the foe. (iii.) The *Anatolian* groups and levies have in the throwing-spear, or javelin, their most distinctive weapon of offence, though some add the bow, others the spear, and some the sword. Their heads and bodies are, as a rule, better

protected than the levies of the further east, skins, leather, wood, and metal being more freely employed both for headpieces and for shields, though the shields are mostly small. (iv.) *Assyrio-Egyptian*: a fourth type is supplied by the elder civilizations, Assyria, Egypt, perhaps Phoenicia; the type of weapon, both offensive and defensive, is heavier, and better provision made for fighting at close quarters: metal helmets and well-made headpieces; cuirasses, even if only of quilted linen, but sometimes strengthened by rings or scales; shields, large and strong to resist not merely arrow-flight but spear-thrust, consort naturally with the more formidable arms of offence, the spear, the club or mace, and the claymore. (v.) The *Hellenic* equipment, however, especially in its defensive aspects, leaves even the Assyrio-Egyptian type far behind, in a military point of view. Stout helm, metal cuirass and leggings, large shield also of metal, become by their weight, when rightly used, part of the offensive value of the heavy infantry armed with great spear and good sword, at least where the battle is hand to hand, on ship-board or on ground. (vi.) *Miscellaneous*: an outlying group, logically perhaps the first rather than the last in this series, may be taken to comprise the odds and ends of the army-list, not covered by any of the previously enumerated types. Under this head might fall Indians, Arabians, Aithiopians, Libyans, and any other 'utter' barbarians, some approximating to one type, others to another: so the Arabians and Aithiopians are archers, the Libyans *akontistai*.

Again, looking at the whole matter from a fresh standpoint, the army-list may be sifted so as to show a classification of the weapons and armature on simply morphological principles. Here the bow demands first attention from the immense number of tribes and peoples armed with one kind or another of bow.¹ As many as nine different species of bow might seem to be distinguishable in the Herodotean list—Median, Baktrian, Paktyan, Kaspian, Skythian, Indian, Arabian, Ethiopian, Lykian; but the first five named may, perhaps, admit of some reduction. Differences might comprise materials, size, shape; but no material is specified for the further Asiatic bows except *calamus*, that is, reed, or cane of one sort or another, though, as *calamus* is not specified in every case, at least one other material, say wood, might seem to be implicitly granted. Moreover, *calamus* itself might cover very different substances: thus the Indian *calamus* is of course the bamboo (cp. 3. 98), but the Baktrian and Kaspian native bows, though made of *calamus*, can hardly have been made of bamboo, any

¹ Medes, Persians, Hyrkanians, Kissians, Arians, Sarangians (all have the 'Median' bow); Baktrians, Parthians, Chorasians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadikai (all have the 'Baktrian' bow apparently); Paktyans, Utians, Mykians, Parikanians (all have apparently the 'Paktyan' bow); the Kaspians, the

Indians, the Skyths, the Arabians, the Aithiopians, the Lykians are all bowmen, with more or less distinctive types. The Indian bow is more fully described by Arrian, *Indica* c. 16. (Cp. Sir Ralph Payne-Gallwey, Bt., *Turkish and other circular Bows*, Longmans, 1907.)

more than the Median arrows. The bows will also have varied in size; the Median is described as a 'long-bow.' There is no suggestion of varieties of shape until the Arabian bow is reached; as that is a long-bow and recurved, it cannot have been made of any *calamus*, but must have been of wood. The Aithiopian bow, also a long-bow, is neither of cane nor sapling, but made of a palm-leaf stem. The Lykian material is clearly specified, cornel-wood, but on further niceties of construction no light is shed. We may safely posit three main types of bow from upper Asia: the Median, a long-bow of wood, perhaps of various woods; the Baktrian, or Skythic bow, not perhaps essentially different from the Paktyan, Kaspian, and Skythian, a short-bow, made sometimes of cane or reed, sometimes perhaps of wood; and the Indian bow, a long-bow (like the Median) but made of bamboo. The three non-Asiatic or non-Iranian bows are clearly distinguishable in the Herodotean list: Arabian, Aithiopic, Lykian. The reduction of the types of upper Asia leaves six main types of bow standing: Median, Baktrian, Indian, Arabian, Aithiopian, Lykian.

The arrows present similar problems. Where the material is specified it is always *calamus* (Median, Indian, Aithiopian, Lykian), but the *calamus* cannot in every case be the same (e.g. Indian and Aithiopian), and other shafts than *calamus* were probably used by other archers. The size of the arrows also varied: the Aithiopian are actually described as small, or short arrows; but all the others are not to be supposed of one size. Probably the long-bow had long arrows, and the short-bow correspondingly short shafts. The two ends of the arrow admit of different treatment: no doubt all arrows were notched and pointed, but while the vast majority will have had feathered butts (cp. 8. 128), the Lykian arrows are described as unfeathered. The point also admits of various handling. The Indian arrows have iron tips; the Aithiopian a sharp stone: what of the rest? Many must have been armed with heads of flint, bone, or other similar material; many no doubt had bronze points; some heads may have been simply of hardened wood, though Herodotus does not specify this variation. Next in importance, as in type, to the bow and arrow would be reckoned the javelin, or throwing-spear, a missile like the arrow, but necessarily used at a shorter distance. Few if any of the Anatolian nations or peoples are without this weapon; thirteen are expressly named as using it,¹ beside the Phoenicians, the Libyans, and even the Samothrakians, incidentally in the narrative.² The javelin itself is not described, but passing hints imply that all javelins were not quite alike: for example, the Pisidian *πρόβολος λυκιοεργής* will have differed considerably from the

¹ Paphlagonians, Matienoi, Ligyes, Mariandynoi, Syrians (i.e. Kappadokians), Armenians, Phrygians, Mysians, Bithynians, Pisidians (*πρόβολου*), Mares,

Kilikians, Lykians, Libyans, Phoenicians.

² Cp. 8. 90 ἄτε δὲ ἐόντες ἀκοντισταὶ οἱ Σαμοθράκιες κτλ., and they 'Ionians'!

Libyan ἀκόντιον ἐπίκαντον. Probably the majority of the *akontia* had metal heads or points, and a shaft of wood or cane. Some forms of javelin may have had thongs attached to the shaft to facilitate or improve the throwing act. Javelins probably varied considerably in size and weight, though Herodotus uses the diminutive term ἀκόντιον throughout. The missile spear is not a weapon to be despised, and was especially serviceable, perhaps, in naval engagements, such as those off Artemision and Salamis; although it hardly figures so largely in the actual narrative of the campaign as its prominence in the army-list might lead us to expect. The *akontistai*, however, of the Anatolian levies probably had very little of the fighting to do.

The number of spears, of spearmen, in the king's forces is immense, but few of them, if any, beside Greeks, or those peoples armed in Greek fashion, are possessed of the long spear, or heavy spear, which is related mainly to the phalanx, or close formation in battle. Where the javelin type ends and the spear type begins it might not be very easy to say exactly. The small or short spear might be freely used as a missile, but such spears as those which the Immortals wielded, could not have been meant to be thrown away. Large numbers of the archer nations, Medes, Persians, Hyrkanians, Kissians, Sarangians, are provided with short spears (αἰχμὰς βραχέας, Μηδικάς), in addition to the bow. As the Baktrians have such spears, probably the six other nations armed in like fashion are similarly provided with the short spear in addition to the short-bow. The seven nations with 'Paphlagonian' or Anatolian equipment, that is the hurling-spear or javelin, are armed also with 'small spears' (αἰχμὰς οὐ μεγάλας); if this weapon is not a mere duplicate of the javelin, the spears must have been meant for close quarters. The Kolchian variety (three nations) includes the short spear. The Moschian type is in so far distinct that the spear is the only offensive weapon expressly assigned to the four nations comprised in the Moschian group, and this spear is itself of special form, small-shafted but large-pointed. Assyrians and Egyptians have spears of much the same type, and that, in the case of the Egyptian at least, a weapon suitable to naval battle—perhaps a spear of portentous length. The nations using Hellenic weapons would all have spears *inter alia*, like the Greek hoplites themselves. Several nations, however, have only one weapon, and that not a spear, as the Indians, Arabs, Aithiopians among the archers, and the Libyans, Mysians, Pisidians, Marians, and Phoenicians among the 'akontists,' at least according to the account in Herodotus. Other nations again, which forgo spears, have some other weapon for close quarters to take its place—axe, or sickle, or dagger, or sword.

The paucity of swordsmen in the king's forces, other than the Greek contingents, is one of their most conspicuous defects. The Kaspian have, beside their cane bows, good swords (ἀκινάκας), but are apparently the only men of the further east thus well provided. The

Kolchian group have swords of a sort, perhaps, but short-bladed (*μαχαίρας*, c. 79); the Egyptians are credited with claymores, or cutlasses (*μαχαίρας μεγάλας*, c. 89); the Kilikians (and so the Meionians) have swords, comparable to the Egyptian, and, better still, named like the Greek (*ξίφος*); that the Greek and Hellenizing contingents are swordsmen all apparently needs no stating. Though swords thus appear conspicuous in the Persian hosts only by their rarity, nearly every one has a dagger, save and except the scanty swordsmen themselves. Medes and Persians have a dagger hanging from the belt or girdle on the right side, and so likewise presumably all those with Median equipment. Daggers are expressly specified for Sakai, Paktyans, Assyrians, all the minor Asiatics, who follow the 'Paphlagonian' style, as well as Sagartioi, Lykioi, Karians, Thrakians. Only to the following no dagger is expressly given: the Baktrians (and their group), Indians, Sarangians, Arabians, Aithiopians, Mysians, Pisidians, Milyans, the Moschian group, the Marians. Failing the sword, the Sakai wield an axe, the Lykians the sickle, the Assyrians their clubs, studded with iron knobs, while the Egyptians have clubs in addition to the sword, and the Karians 'sickles' as well as swords.

Defensive armour is not less various in type and efficiency throughout the army than the weapons of offence just described; nor is the line between armour and mere dress clearly drawn. Throughout the whole of the eastern army, from Media, Persia, Iran, and the further portion of the empire, helmets are apparently unknown; the prevalent type of head-dress is the fez, or felt cap, with the point or apex hanging down, or in the case of the Amyrgian Sakai allowed to stand upright; the Elamites have borrowed the soft turban from Babylon; in Kypros kings and commons wear soft headpieces of different form: even the Lykians have adopted the fez, and don it decorated with feathers more for show than for defence in battle. The western nations as a rule wear helmets of metal, wood, or leather. Helmets of bronze are expressly assigned to Assyrians, (Egyptians?), Phoenicians, Pisidians, and of course the Greek contingents; helmets of wood to the seven nations making up the Moschian and Kolchian group; helmets made by twisting, or plaiting (it might be leather, or lathes, or even metal bands), are worn by the seven Anatolian peoples, by the Marians, and perhaps by some Assyrians and Egyptians; while the Milyan headpiece and, perhaps, the Libyan are of hide, or leather. The strangest appearance is presented by the eastern Aithiopians, their heads surmounted by horse-heads and manes, or by the Bithynians with their fox-fell caps; and the pard and lion-skins on the Aithiopians of Nubia may have covered the head. The peoples wearing the *sisurna* could probably draw it over the head as a hood, and the list contains but three or four names, to which no definite heading is attached: Indians, Sarangians, Arabians, and perhaps Libyans.

For shields the Median equipment has the γέρον, above described, which may be assigned to all nations of this type, but no shields are reported for the rest of the nations of upper Asia, except that the Indians have crane-backs for shields: it is hardly conceivable that the Baktrian armour did not include at least a light shield, or target. A small shield is expressly predicated of at least seventeen of the minor Asiatic peoples in the infantry, the Kilikians have their ox-hide targets, and the 'Thrakians' their *peltai*; in fact, the small shield is almost as distinctive a 'note' as the javelin for the Anatolian and Asianic levies. The civilized peoples, of course, have shields; the Phoenicians rimless (probably small) shields; the Assyrians and Egyptians shields with rims; the Hellenic *hoplon* goes undescribed. As far as express description goes a large part of the army of Xerxes might have been unshielded.

The rest of the equipment, for body, legs and feet, is even less expressly and systematically described, nor is it easy here to distinguish clearly between the objects proper to armoury and wardrobe respectively. Corslets or cuirasses are worn by Medes and Persians, some of them at least strengthened by fish-scale metal plates, and even the bare linen corslets of Assyrians, Phoenicians, Egyptians, Lykians, were probably stiffened by metal rings, scales, or fittings. For leggings, the Medes, Persians, Hyrkanians, Skythians, and perhaps most of the further Asiatics, wore the unlovely 'trews' (ἀναξυρίδες); the Pisidians had bright red 'puttees' on their legs; the Lykians alone of non-Hellenic peoples are endued with proper greaves. For cleanliness, comfort, and beauty rather than protection, the Indians have their cotton shirts (εἴματα) or tunics, and tunics of one substance and kind or another are worn by the Medo-Persians (sleeved), Sarangians (coloured), Bithynians, Milyans (with *fibulae*), Kilikians (of wool); and the list is no doubt imperfect. The Kaspian cloak, or capote, defends the wearers (of some five nations) primarily from the cold; of similar use was the Arabian mantle, and the Bithynian, though of gayer appearance. How much the Libyan leather covers, the historian here does not clearly attest. The Aithiopians would have found their red and white paint a poor protection from the rigours of a Thrakian, or even a Thessalian winter.

Like too many armies the army of Xerxes seems very ill-provided with shoe leather, or the historian at least has not condescended to attest its footing. Not less than five of the Anatolian nations wear boots with points turned up half-way the shin,¹ and the Sarangian boot reaches even the knee; but for the rest, except for the Bithynians in their fawn skin foot-gear,² the whole army might have marched

¹ 7. 72, πέδιλα worn by Paphlagonians, τε καὶ τὰς κνήμας), perhaps not very different from the foregoing.
etc. (ἐς μέσσην κνήμην ἀνατείνοντα).

² 7. 75 πέδιλα νεβρώων (περὶ τοὺς πόδας

as bare of foot as of hand, for aught the Herodotean Catalogue contains.¹ Were shoes, or sandals, as much a luxury as gloves? Surely not! On the floor of the palaestra the athlete was safer if he went barefoot; but for the march from Kritalla to Therme some protection for the sole of the foot was surely desirable. The Immortals on the Susan frieze are all well-shod. The Greek soldier of the fifth century went to work with sandal or boot on his foot.² It is, in fact, not conceivable that the army of Xerxes and of Mardonios moved, or fought, barefooted; though the same canon might not apply to the *Epibatai* of the fleet; and the mere manning of the navy, put by Herodotus at 241,400 bodies, had, perhaps, hardly a pair of sandals among them. To go barefoot was the mark of a slave, and to put the shoes from off the feet a mark of homage to the king, or the god; but the omission on Herodotus' part to shoe the king's forces may safely be ascribed less to any over-subtle *arrière pensée*, even with a moral attached, than to sheer oversight, and the nature of his knowledge and its sources.

Sources.—In fact the Herodotean Catalogue is not a systematic report or investigation into the composition and equipment of the king's army, nor can it be based upon authentic and official lists, documents, or reports: it is a *tour de force* upon the part of Herodotus himself, constructed upon the precedent of the Homeric Catalogue, just as the account of the *causa belli*, or of the motivation of the war, is plainly constructed after the original in the *Iliad*. The artificial character of the Herodotean Catalogue is shown, almost to demonstration, by the mythical, historical, and geographical notes with which it is thickly sown: matter which could never have been contained in the official Persian documents drawn up by the Persian secretaries at Doriskos. It is shown by the accounts and description of the Medes and Persians, which would no more have been included by a Persian scribe in his report to the king than is a description of the Greek soldier and his equipment included by Herodotus in his Catalogue designed for a Greek public. But this great Catalogue, though in the main the work of Herodotus himself, was of course not a pure invention, or creation

¹ Elsewhere Hdt. occasionally advertises ancient foot-wear. Perseus had a *συνδάλιον* 2. 91 (rather a womanish article of attire?), and a whole city was assigned to the wife of the satrap of Egypt to provide her with *ὑποδήματα* 2. 98. The *ὑπόδημα* stitched by Histiaios and worn by Aristagoras, 6. 1, is a metaphor. Babylonian *ὑποδήματα* resemble Boiotian *ἐμβάδες*, 1. 195. But (Lydian) *κόθορνοι* are unwarlike, 1. 155.

² Cp. Thucyd. 3. 22. 2. The Macedonian military boot was the *κρηπίς*; cp. Theokritos 15. 6. The old notion that Homeric warriors went bare-foot into

battle is not tenable; cp. Buchholz, *Realien* ii. 278. *Ἰφικρατίδες* doubtless came in during the fourth century, cp. L. & S. *sub voc.* Pollux, 7. 80-94, has a disquisition on shoes and shoemakers, which implies a widespread habit of protecting the foot, but the practice was not so universal as with modern Europe; cp. *Dict. Antiqq.* *sub vv.* *Calceus*, etc. A huge haul of old boots has recently been made in Dumbartonshire; cp. Macdonald and Park, *The Roman Forts on the Bar Hill* (Glasgow, 1906), pp. 101 ff.

ex nihilo: its author had authorities and sources of knowledge, and there is no reason to doubt his good faith in the matter. Believing, as he did, that Xerxes brought all the forces of the Empire to bear on Greece,¹ and having certain data of a more or less authentic character to go upon, it was easy for him to posit an enumeration and to give a description of the forces from various means at his disposal. Hekataios, and other geographers, genealogists, and logographers, might have furnished a good deal beside the mythical and genealogical notes inserted *passim* in the bare description of the army:² Herodotus had seen the picture dedicated by Mandrokles in the Heraion of Samos;³ and the representation of the hosts of Dareios which crossed the Bosporos would hold good for the hosts of Xerxes which crossed the Hellespont. Inscriptions and inventories, such as Dareios erected on the Bosporos, may have been erected by Xerxes, on the Hellespont or elsewhere, albeit Herodotus does not say so; in any case the contents of the Dareian *stelai* would be valid for the musters of Xerxes.⁴ Hearsay, tradition in the Ionian and Dorian cities of Asia Minor, might account for a good deal of the miscellaneous information put together by Herodotus in the Catalogue. It is tempting to surmise that some documents fell into the hands of the Greeks after Plataiai, and might have furnished some of the most indisputably authentic elements, such as the list of the Persian Myriarchs (*ἀρχοντες*) and the details of the command. It is generally admitted that Herodotus was not the first prose author who had treated even the episodes of this war: how else account for the clear reference to Greek writers who were in error in regard to the correct form of the name Masistios?⁵ The hypothesis that Greek memoir-writers were busy on the Persian side is, indeed, not verifiable, but it is not absurd.⁶ To suppose that Herodotus had but one source, mediate and ultimate, and that an official Persian document, were truly simple. He himself could not have used such a document; and the Catalogue contains many items that such a document would not have contained. The composite character of the Catalogue in itself implies a variety of sources; but imperfect and erroneous as many of the items may be, artificial as the whole may be, and gross as the exaggeration in regard to the total figures assuredly is, there is no resisting the indications which point to authentic and even official sources for the ultimate anatomy, so to speak, and essentials of the Catalogue. If the arguments and aspects urged in the preceding pages be valid, it appears that in this case—as in some other cases—we understand Herodotus' data better than he himself understood them; in particular, the figures, the arrangements of command, the leading, the order of march: even

¹ 7. 21.

² Cp. 5. 36, a passage which suggests a large debit to Hekataios; Introduction, § 10.

³ 4. 88.

⁴ Cp. 4. 87.

⁵ 9. 20.

⁶ Cp. Introduction, § 10.

as we may understand better the strategic and tactical aspects of the campaign. These claims may look a trifle arrogant, but be it recognized that only through Herodotus do we undertake to explain Herodotus; he supplies all the data for the readjustment and correction of his own main theses. Moreover, his Catalogue possesses a high value as presenting, in the most graphic and lively colours, an inventory of the weapons taken by the king's host into action, and thus rendering more intelligible the inferior and motley character of the forces opposed to the well-armed Greek hoplites. The variety of nations and languages mustered for the review betrays, probably not quite without the historian's own cognizance, a desperate source of weakness on the Persian side: the army and navy lists are the best introduction to a rationale of the Greek victory. Apart from these immediate bearings of the lists upon the subject proper, Herodotus has, in this passage, as in the *Skythian* and the *Libyan Logoi*, as in the second and third Books, as in many shorter passages of his histories, put in evidence materials of interest and value for the ethnologist, anthropologist, geographer. How far such an object may have been within his conscious purpose matters nothing now to the value of the result. And if the inventory of the king's forces were even more of an ideal scheme than it has here been assumed to be, and was mainly constructed on *a priori* principles, to exhibit a graphic picture of the Persian empire, as conceived by the writer, yet these secondary interests must permanently belong to it, and must ever secure for it the attention of the anthropologist or ethnographer, to whom mere military or political events are unimportant, and merely chronological differences are negligible quantities, whereas the study of human arts, arms, culture and institutions is the main purpose in his view.

§ 6. The objective of the Persian undertaking, and the general plan of campaign, are implicitly given again and again in the course of the Herodotean narrative, and are also more explicitly stated on several special occasions. The points are obvious, and need not be elaborated. Superficial inconsistencies in the formulas for the military objective are easily harmonized. The plan of campaign no doubt underwent some modification under stress of events; the exact plans of Xerxes and Mardonios in the second year are obscure and open to discussion; but here, in the first instance, we are only concerned with the original project. The most considerable problem, in this connexion, is to ascertain, if possible, how far the synchronous invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians was a measure designed and concerted by the great king and his advisers, for the utter confusion of the Greeks and the easier conquest of the separate parts of Hellas, in detail. The several aspects of the fundamental question, thus formulated, may here be discussed in brief.

(a) Three distinct place-names occur as defining *the objective* of the expedition, to wit, Athens, Hellas, Europe. The relative frequency of

the several formulas is not without interest. Europe is thrice given as the proper bourne of the undertaking, which aims at nothing less than the conquest of the whole mainland.¹ The narrowest formula occurs twice as often, and raises the results of at least the first campaign to the rank of successes from the Persian point of view.² But the most frequent is also the most obviously reasonable formula³: certainly the reduction of the Peloponnesos, as well as Central Greece, was the goal of the Persian invasion; though whether that reduction could be effected on the fields and in the waters of Central Greece was a point to be referred to the actual strategy of the campaign. The variation in the formula for the objective is purely superficial, and the harmony is effected by Herodotus himself, or by his *dramatis personae*.⁴ The exclusively Athenian formula is due, in this connexion, less to the prejudice of the Attic Sources than to the actual course of events, which brought the Persian once and again into actual possession of Athens.⁵ The reduction of Hellas was fully understood as the inevitable and intended goal of the expedition, predetermined by the geographical conditions, the historic antecedents, the ethnical and military solidarity of the Peloponnesos and Central Greece.⁶ Herodotus certainly lends no colour to the notion that at any point or stage in the campaign the Persian contemplated drawing his frontier so as to exclude the Peloponnese and even Attica.⁷ The largest formula, which includes all Europe in the scope of the undertaking, is open to grave suspicion, as a possible device intended to involve the Persian in all the greater failure and disgrace by an exaggeration of his aims and ambitions. The most plausible ground for ascribing such an intention of universal conquest to Xerxes is lost to Herodotus, by his omission to co-ordinate the invasion of Sicily, or Western Hellas, with the invasion of the Motherland. Yet even this formula is not quite senseless. The Persians had explored the Western waters twenty years before.⁸ Their Asianic subjects had long-standing relations with their kinsmen in Italy and Sicily.⁹ Greeks from the West were

¹ 7. 50 καταστρεψάμενοι πᾶσαν τὴν Εὐρώπην νοστήσομεν ὀπίσω (X. loq.); cp. c. 54 (the king's prayer at the Hellespont); c. 101 (οἱ λοιποὶ οἱ πρὸς ἐσπέρας οἰκέοντες ἄνθρωποι).

² 7. 2, 8 (*bis*) ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας: 8. 68 οὐκ ἔχεις μὲν τὰς Ἀθήνας τῶν περ εἵνεκα ὁρμήθης στρατεύεσθαι: cp. cc. 102, 106.

³ 7. 1 στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα (*bis*), cc. 7, 12, 17, 25, 38 (Pyth. loq.), 39 (X. loq.), 46, 47, 57, 82, 101, 150, [239]; 8. 100, 115, 116.

⁴ 7. 8 εἰ τοὺς τε καὶ τοὺς τοῦτοις πλησιοχώρους καταστρεψόμεθα, οἱ Πέλοπος τοῦ Φρυγὸς νέμονται χώραν, γῆν τὴν Περσίδα ἀποδέξομεν τῷ Διὸς αἰθέρι ὁμωρεούσαν κτλ. σφῆας πάσας ἐγὼ ἅμα ὑμῶν μίαν χώραν θήσω, διὰ πάσης διεξελθὼν τῆς

Εὐρώπης. 7. 138 ἡ δὲ στρατηλασίη ἡ βασιλέος οὐνομα μὲν εἶχε ὡς ἐπ' Ἀθήνας ἐλαύνει, κατέλετο δὲ ἐς πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Cp. 7. 157; 8. 142 περὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀρχῆθ' ὁ ἀγὼν ἐγένετο, νῦν δὲ φέρει καὶ ἐς πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

⁵ Cp. 9. 1, 3.

⁶ Cp. 9. 101 μὴ περὶ Μαρδονίῳ πταίσῃ ἡ Ἑλλάς.

⁷ As suggested by G. B. Grundy, *Gt. Persian War*, p. 449. The projected political frontier is one thing, the immediate military base another.

⁸ Cp. the mission of Demokedes, about 511 B.C. (*Hdt.* IV.-VII. Appendix III. § 6), to say nothing of Sataspes, 4. 43.

⁹ 6. 21, etc.

not unknown or unwelcome visitants at the Persian court.¹ Gelon of Syracuse may be summoned as an expert witness to the dangers of a direct Persian aggression upon the Western Greeks.² Had the Hellenic peninsula passed, like Makedon and Thrake, under the Persian yoke, a further attempt at expansion westwards was nothing but a question of time. Only a military defeat somewhere in Europe could stay the natural advance of the Persian power, in accordance with the law of a merely military Empire.³ Thus, apart from any conscious or fully projected plan of campaign in 480 B.C., there was a real sense in which 'Europe' was the ultimate objective of the Persian advance, and the battles of Salamis and Plataia secured, in a sense, the liberties not merely of Hellas, and of Athens, but of the whole Western world, from the Oriental invader.

(b) *The plan of campaign* is, perhaps, nowhere clearly or fully stated, from the Persian point of view, but may be gathered from the actual course of events as narrated, and from the critique on its shortcomings and failures placed in the mouth of this or that actor in the drama, or even conveyed by the historian in proper person. The *levée en masse*, the army and navy lists, the organization of the command, the route followed, and the actual conduct of operations all imply certain conceptions on the Persian side in regard to the strategic aspects of the invasion. There is a deliberate revival of the methods of Mardonios in 492 B.C., and a design to make his conquests, or reconquests, the basis of further aggression. Two ideas appear predominant: first, a reliance on mere numbers for military superiority; secondly, a determination to keep army and fleet together, and to operate conjointly upon both elements. A partial and inadequate condemnation of the first of these ideas is put into the mouth of Artabanos at Abydos.⁴ A more adequate exposure of the defect in the second is entrusted to Demaratos, who demonstrates, moreover, that the pedantic adherence to the second principle frustrates the merits of the first.⁵ The two arms may really have been more closely tied up together on the Persian side by considerations of supply, or even by political motives—each moiety perhaps to some extent guaranteeing the loyalty of the other—than is fully brought out in the records. But, as a matter of fact, the scheme broke down in operation. The Greek fleet was allowed to win a purely naval victory at Salamis: the Greek army completed the work of liberation, a year later, on the Asopos. It would here be premature to enter more fully into the complicated relations of the several engagements during the war to each other: their strategic, as well as their purely tactical, aspects will be more conveniently discussed in a later context.

¹ 6. 24.

² 7. 163.

³ 7. 8 οὐδαμὰ κω ἡτρημένισαμεν κτλ.

⁴ 7. 49.

⁵ 7. 235. Achaimenes the Admiral

formulates the principle of the Persian strategy in c. 236 πᾶς ὁ ναυτικός τῷ πεζῷ ἀρήξει καὶ ὁ πεζὸς τῷ ναυτικῷ ὁμοῦ πορευόμενος· εἰ δὲ διασπάσεις, οὔτε σὺ ἔσται ἐκείνοισι χρήσιμος οὔτε ἐκείνοι σοί.

(c) Finally, the question recurs, related yet distinct, whether the synchronous invasions of Sicily and Greece were concerted, as a single and united effort of the 'Barbarians' to conquer all the free Greeks east and west at once, or whether the synchronism was merely accidental, and the two events two several results of independent series of historical antecedents. To Herodotus the synchronism is an accident, though doubtless a providential accident.¹ To Diodoros, that is to Ephoros in the fourth century, the two invasions were alike organized and ordered from Susa.² This idea of a concerted attack upon the Hellenes, east and west, at one moment, is not in itself preposterous or absurd. Persia had long had relations with the Punic power, and perhaps even claimed suzerainty over the colonies of Tyre in the West.³ Persia had likewise knowledge of the condition of Italy and Sicily, and doubtless cherished some vague ambitions of aggressions there.⁴ The approximate, not to say the actual synchronism of the two invasions is indubitable.⁵ Yet, for all that, this attractive hypothesis must be dismissed, not merely as unproven, but as improbable. The silence of Herodotus, his failure, the failure of his informants to draw the obvious inference, count for something. The inference is in perfect keeping with the whole method of the Ephorean historiography: it is a logical effort of 'rationalism,' it is an effective stroke of 'rhetoric.' Set in the objective order of events, it goes far beyond the resources of Persian diplomacy, or of Persian war-leading. It is not in the same class with the incompetent strategy of the campaigning in Hellas. What Hannibal with Philip and Antiochos, what Sertorius with Mithradates failed to realize in the simple case of Rome, that Xerxes will not have anticipated in the more atomic or chaotic world of the fifth century B.C. Moreover, the assault on Greece, the assault on Sicily, has each its own clearly traced chain of antecedents. The invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians in 480 B.C. would have taken place just as surely had Xerxes never crossed the Hellespont, had he been detained in Upper Asia by intrigues in his palace, or revolts in his provinces. Certainly, Xerxes did not wait on the co-operation of the Carthaginians to determine the moment of his invasion of Hellas. And probably the Carthaginians determined the moment of their appearance in Sicily by the purely local circumstances in the West. But the synchronism, though undesigned, was not, we may still believe, without results upon the actual conduct of operations. There is, indeed, little ground for supposing that any Greeks from the Motherland would have gone forth to do battle for their sons in Sicily, even had the Persian not stood just then at the gates of

¹ 7. 166.

² Cp. Appendix I. § 13 *supra*.

³ Cp. Hdt. 3. 17. Do the Carthaginians, and their native neighbours, appear among the subjects of Dareios?

Cp. *Records of the Past*, ix. 75, where the 'Maxyans' and 'Karka' figure among the tributaries of the king.

⁴ Cp. notes 8, 9, *supra*.

⁵ Cp. Appendix IX. § 6 *infra*.

Hellas.¹ But there is some ground for believing that Gelon of Syracuse might have come to the aid of the Greeks at Salamis, had he not been preoccupied and embarrassed at home by the Carthaginian question.² The event proved that his aid was not necessary for the salvation of Hellas, but leaves us speculating, perhaps somewhat idly, what the position of Gelon in the Greek world might have been, could he have added the *Aristeia* of Salamis to the honours of Himera ; and whether that world could have accommodated at once the Lord of Syracuse and the Generals of Athens, if Hellas had owed, or had seemed to owe, her whole preservation to a Sicilian tyrant.

¹ Cp. the mysterious taunt of Gelon, 7. 158.

² 7. 165.


APPENDIX III

THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS

§ 1. Character of the transitional passage (7. 128–137). § 2. The Greek preparations (7. 138–178). § 3. Condition and policy of Greek states, 490–481 B.C. ; Sparta. § 4. Athens during the decade after Marathon. § 5. The pan-Hellenic union against the Mede. § 6. The conduct of Argos, Krete, Sicily, Korkyra. § 7. The case of Delphi. § 8. Forces of the Confederacy, and prospects of success.

§ 1. HERODOTUS has postponed his account of the preparations of the Greeks, such as it is, to his review of the king's preparations and his record of the Persian advance as far as the frontier of Hellas. The historian might have had a logical, a chronological, an artistic reason for this course. The great king was the aggressor; the move remained with him after Marathon, after Paros; he still was acting on the offensive. Also, as it appears, the Greeks were tardy in realizing the necessity for union and co-operation in view of the impending danger, and it was not until the eve of the re-invasion that effective steps were taken to meet the invader. From the purely literary point of view, also, Herodotus has indubitably followed the proper order of presentation in giving precedence to the Persian movements. In all three aspects the structure of the Seventh Book fully justifies itself. Yet there remains somewhat of a mystery about its composition, and the transition from the first and greater section, dealing with the Persian preparations for the conquest of Greece, to the second and lesser section, which deals with the preparations made by the Greeks to defend their liberties, is not effected without hitch or friction. The fault does not lie in the abruptness of the scene-shifting: the more sudden and complete the transition in such a case the better. Obscurity arises rather from the complex yet inconsequent manner in which the section plainly dealing with the Persian preparations is jointed, or dove-tailed, into the section no less plainly dealing with the Greek preparations. Were the passage (cc. 128–137), by which the transition from the Persian side to the Greek side is mediated, wholly wanting, the loss would indeed be considerable from more than one point of view, for the passage in question is rich in lights and

THE SSALY



colours and more solid matters; but from the point of view of lucid arrangement and logical structure the passage would never have been missed. It comprises three disparate sub-sections, all or any one of which, however valuable or interesting in itself, might be removed without obvious loss or detriment to the historical argument and sequence of the story as a whole: to wit, (α) *The visit of Xerxes to Tempe*, with the geography of Thessaly thrown in (cc. 128–130 = 56 lines); (β) a short but composite passage (cc. 131, 132 = 14 lines) recording various disparate items, to be more precisely specified below; (γ) a longer passage (cc. 133–137 = 73 lines) giving the story of *the wrath of Talthybios* (μῆνις Ταλθυβίου) from its reputed cause, in the year 491 B.C., to its final issue in the year 430 B.C. This last and largest item yields obviously a late reference, perhaps the latest in this part of the work of Herodotus, to contemporary events; the passage is confessedly a digression, and presumably an insertion in the pre-existing draft, or text of the story (τὸν πρότερον λόγον, c. 137 *ad fin.*). This previous story is wholly excluded from cc. 133–137; it is the story of the expedition of Xerxes (ἡ στρατηλασίῃ ἡ βασιλείῃ, c. 138). The passage cannot well have been written, or inserted in the pre-existing text, before 428 B.C., and its composition might date a little later. Why the story should have been inserted in this place rather than at a more appropriate point, in chronological sequence, it is hard to say, unless we suppose that Herodotus had passed that point, in the course of his final revision, before the year 430 B.C., or before he became acquainted with the fate of Nikolas and Aneristos and their companions, or acquired the truly aetiological legend which had grown or sprung up in Lakedaïmon (ὡς λέγουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι, c. 137) to explain that catastrophe. If Herodotus wrote his history from first to last as we have it, this story would serve to date the last part of the composition as later than 430 B.C. If he rewrote or revised his work, or this portion of his work, more than once, this passage is plainly one of the last insertions, and no part of the original draft or even of the former revision.¹

The first item in the list (α *supra*) has also the air of being an addition to the original text, of course from the author's hand. *The visit of Xerxes to Tempe* is an inconsequence in the general story of the war, and jars on its own immediate context here. Having reached Therme (c. 127), or Pieria (c. 131), Xerxes is supposed, *pour passer le temps*, to have visited the outlet of the Peneios, the vale of Tempe, on a voyage of inspection (as was his way, ὅπως τι εἴηλοι τοιοῦτο ποιῆσαι): his only chance, indeed, of seeing the famous pass, as he was intending to enter Thessaly itself by another and more difficult route further inland. Surely Xerxes did not enter Thessaly from Makedonia twice, once by sea and once by land? If the king reached Tempe by sea he remained (we may suppose) in

¹ Cp. Introduction, § 8.

Thessaly, at Larissa, till joined by the bulk of his army, and did not return to Therme or to the nearer Pieria. If the king entered Thessaly by land, and by any pass other than the vale of Tempe itself, he may have visited Tempe still, but, if so, he reached the pass by land and not by sea. Is it out of reason to suppose that the Herodotean Xerxes is taken from Therme to Tempe by sea, because Herodotus himself approached this famous locality by that route? Is not Xerxes taken to Tempe in order to give Herodotus an opportunity of describing the place, and the plain of Thessaly, and of introducing a local criticism upon the medism of the Thessalians, dramatically placed for the occasion in the lips of Xerxes himself? The description of Thessaly has the note of autopsy about it, and upon the strength of this passage we are justified in taking Herodotus himself to Thessaly. The visit of Herodotus to Thessaly would, however, have preceded his migration to Thurioi, still more his return to Athens, shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.¹ It would no less naturally have succeeded his first migration from Halikarnassos to Samos, and from Samos to Athens. If Herodotus brought to Athens (as we have supposed) the first draft of his history of the Persian war, this passage upon Thessaly was not contained in it. It is an addition made after the first composition, but before the final revision of the work; it belongs to what may be called the second draft, the middle period, or stage, of his composition and of the genesis of his work. This conclusion may be acceptable even to those who are unwilling to cancel altogether the historical reality of the king's visit to Tempe, exactly as narrated by Herodotus. The story of the king's visit to Tempe may have come to the ears of Herodotus first in connexion with his own visit to the same region: that observation, however, still leaves to the passage in question all the character of a digression, an addition to the original draft of the work. Those, however, who appreciate the material inconsequence of the king's excursion from Therme to Tempe by sea, and the double inconsequence of his return from Tempe to Therme by sea, can feel little difficulty in the hypothesis here advanced in regard to the composition, and original provenience, of this portion of the text.

The case is by no means so clear in regard to the remaining section, the short passage (*β supra*) intervening between the digression upon Thessaly and the appendix upon the wrath of Talthybios (cc. 131, 132). This brief passage contains nothing which is not strictly cognate to the principal argument and narrative; yet, on the other hand, the items are not happily placed, and whether open to criticism or not, upon their own merits, heighten the confusion of the transit from the larger section of the Seventh Book, which deals clearly with the Persian preparations, to the lesser section of the Book, which deals no less clearly with the Greek. Four such items may be distinguished

¹ Cp. *Hdt.* IV.-VI. (1895), Introduction, § 21.

in the passage :—(i.) The notice of *the pause in Pieria*, while one of the three *corps d'armée* (τῆς στρατιῆς τριτημορίας) is clearing a way for the passage of the 'whole' force into Perrhaibia: a notice which simply repeats, with some slight amplification, a remark already made in the preceding section (c. 128), and is, to that extent, a 'dittograph'—whether earlier or later in original composition. (ii.) The record of *the return of the Heralds* sent from Sardes (c. 32 *supra*) into Hellas, to demand earth and water, some empty-handed, and some with the required symbols of submission. These two items may be classed strictly with the contents of the whole preceding section upon the preparations of the Persians for the invasion of Hellas and the king's advance to the border; and yet they involve, or at least naturally introduce, not merely the two following items in the passage itself, but also the manifest digression and addition upon *the wrath of Talthybios*, which succeeds. For there follows first (iii.) *a list of the medizing states* and peoples, which gave earth and water to the king's messengers, a list involving some problems here better to be postponed, and further (iv.) a record of *the solemn vow of vengeance taken by the confederate Greeks*, whose association for the defence of their common cause has still to be reported—though that is the least of the problems raised by this remarkable record. Of the four items, thus disintegrated, the last three are closely connected, not merely with each other, but with (γ) the great story of *the wrath of Talthybios* (cc. 133–137) which immediately succeeds. The question at once presents itself: to which stage in the composition of the work does this minor section (cc. 131, 132) belong? What is its stratigraphical secret? As belonging, or cognate to the main argument, it might be thought as old as anything in this portion of the text, but that the repetition of the note upon the upper pass *via* Perrhaibia into Thessaly is clumsy and enigmatical. As connected with the story of *the wrath of Talthybios* the section might seem to belong to the third, or final, revision of the work. Or is it necessary to refer the whole section, brief as it is, to the same stratum of deposit? The first two items (c. 131) adhere naturally to the narrative in c. 127, when the excursus on Thessaly (cc. 128–130) is eliminated, that is, referred to the second or middle period of composition: Xerxes is at Therme, and in the Pierian circle, while his army is making a road into Perrhaibia, and to him there return the heralds despatched into Greece from Sardes months before. The passage so far leads on naturally, and even argumentatively, to the next main section, upon *the Greek preparations*, and that without in any way anticipating or discounting it. In other words, the narrative and argument originally might have passed from c. 127 to c. 131, and from c. 131 to c. 138, while cc. 128–130 represent an addition and insertion in the second draft, still consonant with the main argument, and avoiding trespass upon the subject of the Greek preparations, the antecedents of the war from the Greek

side, but certainly discounting the record in c. 131 by the fuller notice of the upper or second pass into Thessaly *via* Perrhaibia. To the same stratum, the second draft, may be referred the two subsequent items, which do more inartistically break the clear presentation of the historian's argument, by introducing matters of fact out of their natural order: matters, indeed, which Herodotus may very well have learned for the first time in European Hellas, and more particularly in Athens. The problematical character of the alleged fact in itself but enhances this probability. Once the charm of continuity or of logical presentation had thus been broken, it was easy to aggravate the inconsequence by the further and subsequent insertion, as late as 429 B.C., of (γ) the story of *the wrath of Talchybios* (cc. 133–137). It thus appears that the stratification of this transitional section is very complex: originally we may suppose the narrative passed from c. 127 to c. 131, and from c. 131 to c. 138. The first revision of the work added cc. 128–130, and c. 132. Finally, cc. 133–137 took their place in the third or final draft, a place naturally suggested by the mention of the return of the heralds, a fact recorded in the oldest draft of the Book, and suggested by the list of medizing states, and the fate vowed, but never executed, upon their devoted heads, which may itself have been placed in that connexion already in the second state of the text.

§ 2. The additions thus made by the author, at second or third hand, are chiefly interesting as contributions to the history of the attitude and condition of the states in Greece previous to the invasion, and in view of it—a subject originally introduced in more set and formal fashion in c. 138. This passage (cc. 138–178), dealing with *the preparations of the Greeks*, once reached, is in many ways a great contrast to the previous section (cc. 1–127 and 131) dealing with the king's movements. (1) It is much shorter, smaller in bulk (22 pp. against 52 pp.), though it covers, in a way, a larger subject, seeing that on the Greek side the action of many independent states and centres of policy is involved. (2) It is, in consequence, more complicated in regard to its argument, and presumably more diverse in respect of its origin, or sources. (3) It has thus a less obvious unity and coherence than the earlier and larger portion of the Book, dealing with the Persian advance, and might seem, at first sight, more illusory, less authoritative. Such a judgement upon it would be superficial. The greater coherence and consistency of the passage dealing with the Persian history is not a guarantee of greater fidelity or truth, nor is the comparative incoherence, confusion, and inadequacy of the shorter section, dealing with the affairs of the Greek states, a reason for regarding it as fictitious. On the contrary, clearness and coherence may be dearly purchased by a paucity of witnesses, or of authorities, and by a corresponding liberty of prophesying, or historicizing, unchecked by evidence; while a conflict of numerous and authentic

witnesses, from a variety of partial sources, may result in a less consistent but a truer history. It is, indeed, obvious that Herodotus has allowed himself to take great liberties with the story of the Persian preparations, especially that part of it for which he may surely be said to have had the least authentic testimony, the scenes laid in Susa, and the private conferences of the king with his chief advisers, Artabanos, Demaratos, and so forth. But, in dealing with the policy and acts of the free Republics of Greece, and with scenes laid in relatively familiar ground, it was inevitable that he should, from the very nature of the case, and of the evidences, rely more implicitly upon his sources, his authorities, and should allow less freedom to his own fancies or inferential reconstructions. This portion of the narrative of Herodotus may, therefore, be taken to reflect more truly than the preceding portion an authentic tradition, or mass of traditions, and to exhibit less of the free creative action of the historian's own mind, and less of a debt to previous writers, unconcerned with his subject proper. The results, upon the whole, must be more satisfactory to a modern and critical reader, and the historical contents must seem, on the whole, more considerable, and pregnant with greater possibilities of ascertainable truth. Not, indeed, that an authentic tradition, or a mass of authentic traditions, is necessarily true to the actual facts of the past; but rather that authentic tradition is a kind of evidence prior both in time and in importance to the imaginative re-creations, or the inferential constructions, of the literary artist. But tradition itself is not quite artless; nor is authenticity a term convertible with truth. Tradition may be not merely inadequate, as a record of the actual facts, but may misrepresent the facts, under the influence of national and local prejudices and interests, or even simply for the greater glory of God, or the greater delight of man. The mass of independent traditions presented in this section of Herodotus' work, while but imperfectly supplying a connected and consistent account of the independent or common action of the Greek states, during the interval between Marathon and Thermopylai, reflects the humours, the prejudices, the after-thoughts, not so much of the period preceding the war, as of the period succeeding, during which Greece was accumulating a stock of memories about the Great War and its antecedents. Yet here we are dealing all along with real persons, with actual situations; the very incoherence of the narrative, as a whole, is one of the best guarantees of the authenticity of the traditions in detail. The gamut of truth, however, ranges over a wide interval in these stories, from the patent fictions, in regard to the action of Delphi, or the speeches of Gelon, through the doubtful and obscure problems in Spartan policy, to the clearer acts of Athens and her statesmen—however deeply even these may still be involved in a prejudiced medium, or disorganized by the imperfection of the record. Viewing the passage broadly, and calling in,

to supplement its imperfect record, the passage previously analyzed (cc. 128–137), and also incidental and sporadic passages or notes introduced elsewhere,¹ it may be said to contain, or adumbrate, two main topics, or groups of topics, which are rightly distinguishable from the very nature of the case itself: first, the condition, policy, and fortunes of the leading states of Greece, during the years between Marathon and the Persian invasion, especially in view of this danger; and secondly, the formation and action of the patriotic defence league, or Confederation, from its inception down to the occupation, by the national forces, of the line of defence based upon positions at Artemision and Thermopylai. In other words, the main passage here in view, supplemented by other passages to be found in Herodotus, though not by him systematized for the purpose, contains an account, or series of accounts, more or less adequate, of the preparations made by the Greeks to resist the King's invasion, and in connexion therewith some records of the contemporary or immediately anterior condition of the leading Greek states, in their domestic fortunes, and in their mutual relations. It will be convenient to deal separately with these two main departments of the subject, and in so doing to supplement, from all available sources, the fragmentary data supplied by Herodotus.

§ 3. To judge by the evidence, now available, it was only in the course of the summer or autumn of 481 B.C., about the time of the King's arrival in Sardes, and not very much before the appearance of the King's emissaries in Greece to demand 'earth and water,' that any steps were actually taken to bring about a union of Hellenic states to resist the impending invasion. Yet at any time during the previous eight years the Greeks might have been expecting a renewal of the Persian attack: not a few will have perceived that Marathon could not be the end of the long-prepared and inevitable struggle. But circumstances and events combined to postpone the reinvasion of Hellas, and postponement lulled the Greeks into a false security. Marathon gave pause, though not a final pause, to the Persian plan of conquest; preparations were indeed on foot for the reinvasion of Greece, upon a larger scale, but such preparations demanded time. The revolt in Egypt, the death of Dareios, the disputed succession, the preoccupation of the new king with the domestic situation, the need to operate first against Egypt, all combined to reassure the majority, ever satisfied with short views: only one or two of the most far-sighted statesmen in the Greek cities anticipated the inevitable development of the story. Thus, for the greater part of the decade which intervened between Marathon and Salamis, the Greek states relapsed into their normal conditions of local rivalry and domestic party-struggle. Yet indirectly out of such conditions was born the policy and wrought the weapon destined to shatter the Persian invader

¹ e.g. passages in Bk. 6 dealing with events subsequent to Marathon.

at Salamis and at Plataia. Two states with their several allies had already been nominally in league to resist the Barbarian, Athens and Sparta; and there could never have been, during the fifth century, any other nucleus for a pan-Hellenic combination against Persia than the intimate union of these two states. It is well to trace in detail, so far as the evidences permit, the fortunes and policy of these two states in the decade preceding Salamis, as preliminary to the birth of the pan-Hellenic Union of 481 B.C.

The Condition, Attitude, and Policy of Sparta from 490 B.C. to 481 B.C.—

There are but very scanty materials in Herodotus to illustrate the subject, nor do other authorities supply his deficiencies. The last three Books make no consecutive attempt to sketch the progress of events in Sparta from the date of Marathon down to the eve of the greater struggle: a couple of isolated anecdotes represent the Spartan record of the period. Recourse must be had to the previous volume of the work, especially to the Sixth Book, which partially supplies the omission, albeit the materials there introduced leave much to desire both for quantity and for quality. In particular, the chronological perspective is blurred and problematic, nor is any attempt made—such was hardly in Herodotus' way—to rationalize the policy and action of Sparta, even so far as recorded. This last is the easiest omission for us to supply, seeing that the policy of Sparta at any given crisis is sure to have been determined by more or less ascertained and constant factors. The loss of acts and events in Spartan history of the decade is more deplorable, and mere conjecture on such points were worse than useless.

Sparta started the decade in alliance with Athens against the Medes. The alleged treatment of the Persian heralds in 491 B.C., narrated out of season in 7. 133, is evidence on the point. The story, even if devoid of truth in regard to the professed argument, implies a situation, and would hardly have been told at any time except upon the basis of some such understanding. Sparta and Athens were acting together, in a common policy of resistance *à outrance* to the king's demands. The same moral is involved in the better attested and more acceptable story of the Spartan intervention, in 491, or in 490 B.C., against the medizing Aigina, and the deposit of Aiginetan hostages in Athens by the Spartan kings Kleomenes and Leotychidas—an act which cannot have anticipated by much the actual appearance of Datis, Artaphrenes, and Hippias in Attic waters (6. 49 ff.). Still more conclusive evidence is involved in the despatch of the two thousand Spartan warriors, under anonymous leading, to the support of the Athenians at Marathon (6. 105, 120), a belated fulfilment of their treaty-engagements, which assuredly brought no credit to Spartan policy or leading at the time. Of the nature of those engagements there should never have been any doubt. Sparta and Athens had plainly bound themselves mutually to a defensive alliance, and a defensive alliance only; but

even that limited obligation Sparta, for one reason or another, failed in the hour of need to fulfil. That these treaty-obligations were subsequently and formally revoked there is nothing in the traditions to suggest; but it is none the less evident that after the Athenian success at Marathon, and after the Athenian aggression on Paros, the attitude and policy of Sparta were somewhat modified for a time. Aigina was taken back into favour; the Aiginetan oligarchy was perhaps encouraged in its anti-Attic policy; an attempt was made to liberate the Aiginetan hostages in Athens by diplomatic means; and although Sparta did not take an overtly hostile part against Athens in the Aiginetan war (487-481 B.C.), she probably viewed it with a neutrality mainly benevolent to the oligarchy of the Dorian island. No doubt Sparta at this time observed the developing ambition, power, and democratic institutions of Athens with ever-increasing mistrust; and the alienation from Athens, which ensues on 'the death of Kleomenes' about 487 B.C., coincides not merely with the outbreak of the Aiginetan war, but with great changes in the domestic institutions of Athens. Of still greater significance than her action, or inaction, in Hellas is the mission despatched by Sparta to the Persian court shortly afterwards, when Xerxes was already established upon the throne (7. 134, 135). The record is now, indeed, embedded in a story the main purport and moral of which must be completely discredited: the mission of the Talthybiads, Sperthias and Boulis, in 485 B.C. or thereabouts, was not for the purpose of expiating an offence, which had never been committed, nor was it merely for the purpose of reporting upon the state of things in Susa and in the Persian empire generally; there was presumably some more definite political purpose in view, concerned with the position of Demaratos in Asia, or of Sparta in Greece, though the Spartans themselves were not the men to plead guilty to any such charge. Even admitting the historical possibility of the story as told by Herodotus, the mission of Sperthias and Boulis can hardly have failed to open the eyes of the Spartans to the realities of the danger menacing Hellas; and if the further anecdote, of the letter of Demaratos, with which the Seventh Book now concludes (c. 239), may be treated as evidence, the Spartans were the first of all European Greeks to get wind of the coming storm, and that before the congress of 481 B.C. Anyway, in 481 B.C. Sparta reverted to the policy of the dead Kleomenes, to her alliance with Athens against the Mede, and something more: nor is this reversion and this development in the policy of Sparta difficult to explain, in the light of her domestic situation, of her position in Peloponnese and in Hellas, and of her traditional attitude towards the Persian.

(i.) The domestic situation in Sparta during the earlier years of this decade was plainly distraught. The expulsion, restoration, and end of Kleomenes fall into the first lustrum, and the story, as told by Herodotus, conceals one knows not how serious a danger to Spartan

institutions, nor how ghastly an intrigue against the dangerous king. There was something of a tragedy in the elder royal line at this crisis. Moreover, the deposed and fugitive king, Demaratos, was at the Persian court, with other Greek exiles and renegades, or perhaps was already established in the Troad as a Persian vassal, scheming against his compatriots. Leonidas the Agid and Leotychidas the Eurypontid king in Sparta were both deeply concerned in keeping him at bay. Leonidas, half-brother, son-in-law, and successor to Kleomenes, inherited, we may be sure, his great predecessor's feud. Leotychidas was the personal enemy of Demaratos, had dethroned him, and succeeded in his room. The Spartans at large did not desire a Restoration, perhaps a Tyranny, under Persian auspices.

(ii.) There was further trouble and ground for apprehension in Sparta during this period beside the intrigues for and against Kleomenes, Demaratos, Leotychidas, Leonidas. The story of the 'devotion' of Sperthias and Boulis implies, and indeed expresses, as much, whatever the causes or antecedents of the trouble may have been. Apart from the perpetual dread of a Helot rebellion, disturbance in the domestic affairs of Sparta was apt to react unfavourably upon her position in the Peloponnesos and in Greece generally. She had allies to humour or to coerce, she had the constant rivalry and ambition of Argos to guard against. Kleomenes had scotched, not killed, the Argive snake about the time that Miletos last surrendered to the Persian (494 B.C.).¹ The relations of Sparta to Argos in the ten years or so subsequent to the Kleomenean war are obscure. The approximation between Sparta and Athens cannot have been followed with favour in Argos, and may already have suggested to Argos, even before the battle of Marathon, a philo-Persian policy, or a miso-Hellenic neutrality. The Argives did not officially assist Aigina in the war with Athens (487-481 B.C.), perhaps the renewed friction between Athens and Sparta contributed to stay the official hand; yet Argos went further than Sparta in the matter, if a thousand Argives 'volunteered' under Eurybates and crossed to Aigina, albeit with small advantage, it would appear, to Aigina or to themselves (6. 92). The disaster in Aigina was a reason the more for the attitude of Argos on the Persian question. Granted that Argos was medizing all along, or likely to medize (Hdt. 7. 148-152), then Sparta was all the more bound to 'hellenize'; and if Argos, indeed, was dreaming a recovery of the *Hegemonia* under Persian auspices, Sparta had no alternative but to choose the better part. Her position in the Peloponnesos, no less than her domestic peace and prosperity, became identified with the national cause, with the Athenian alliance, and with resistance to the Mede, if ever the Mede should again invade the Greeks of Europe.

¹ Mr. J. Wells's paper on "Some points as to the Chronology of the Reign of Cleomenes I.," *J.H.S.* xxv. (1905), 193 ff., leaves me unconvinced that the defeat of Argos took place "early in the reign of Cleomenes" (*op. c.* p. 196).

(iii.) Still larger aspects of the question must have supervened. Sparta will soon have discovered that she had made a great mistake in allowing Athens to win the battle of Marathon without aid from Peloponnese, or Lakedaimon: a greater and less excusable mistake, even, than when aid was refused to the Asianic Greeks in 498 B.C. Sparta's honour and prestige had suffered eclipse: Athens had flouted her in Aigina, and was bidding fair to rival her in Hellas. The Ionian revolt, the abortive expedition of Mardonios, the victory at Marathon, even the raid of Miltiades on the Kyklades, had shown that Persia was not irresistible, and might be defied with impunity, if not with success. Sparta's position as political head of Greece, recognized at least for upwards of half a century, was at stake, once the Persian reinvasion became a moral certainty. The possible success, or the more probable failure of Athens, if left to her own unaided resources, must have been viewed with almost equal apprehension in Sparta. If Athens again scored a triumph, even such a negative triumph as the victory at Marathon, Sparta was deposed, and Athens became by sea and land the protagonist of Hellas. The failure of Athens was destined to be no less disastrous. Sparta could not view with equanimity the incorporation of Athens and of central Hellas in the Persian empire. The liberties of the Peloponnesos, the very existence of Sparta itself, with its institutions, were not worth, in that case, a year's purchase. These obvious considerations demonstrate the absurdity of the view that Sparta was dragged, or cajoled, by Athens into the war with Xerxes, and had no interests of her own at stake. The physical and the historical conditions of the conflict with Persia, upon European soil, ordained for Sparta a patriotic policy, as the very condition of her own independent existence.

There was that also in the Spartan *ethos*, and in the previous relations of Sparta to Persia, to prohibit medism, or even neutrality, upon this occasion in Sparta. A genuine dislike of the Asiatic, of the Mede, his political and social institutions, his very dress and appearance, perhaps even his religion, may have had something to do with Sparta's policy. There was also the tradition of the anti-Medic alliance with Lydia in 550 B.C., and of the famous message to Kyros on behalf of the Ionian Greeks. If Sparta had done the great king less material damage than had Athens, yet her hands were really no cleaner than those of Athens. Of course, if the story of the treatment of the Persian heralds at Sparta in 491 B.C. were true (7. 133) Sparta had indeed deserved the king's vengeance; but the king declined to wreak it, nor does the supposed Spartan outrage on the law and comity of nations ever figure as a ground of Persian hostility, or of the actual disaster and losses that overtook the state in the Persian war. If a Spartan embassy to the Persian court during the period under view be admitted, the true purport of that embassy must be sought outside the traditional or Herodotean motivation. It

may have been purely exploratory, or it may have carried a protest against the reception accorded to Demaratos. The least likely suggestion would be that Sparta was making, at this time, any direct bid for Persian support.

In estimating the force of the motives and considerations just set forth upon the policy and action of Sparta it must, of course, be remembered that these forces acted concomitantly and with cumulative effect. The result of such an estimate is to render the conduct of Sparta in the second Persian war not merely intelligible but inevitable. Sparta was in no true sense the tool of Athens in the war; yet, on the other hand, the war was not of Sparta's seeking, the war was not to Sparta's advantage. Compared with Athens Lakedaimon had but a secondary interest and stake in the war, and that not merely because Athens had given the greater provocation, had earned the express vengeance, lay more directly exposed; but also and rather because the character and genius of Athenian institutions, and the recent developments of Athenian policy, made the coming struggle big with a mighty hope and a glorious ambition for the city of the Virgin goddess.

§ 4. *Condition, Policy, and Attitude of Athens, 490-481 B.C.*—The decade succeeding Marathon was a period of struggle, reform, development, for Athens. The state which fought at Marathon was one thing, the state which fights at Salamis is another thing: a city of the soil is become a city of the sea. The great change thus signified was the symptom and coefficient of much else; a further stage in constitutional history is to be recorded, a new foreign policy to be illustrated. The Athens of Kleisthenes gives way to the Athens of Themistokles.

On this immense revolution, or evolution, Herodotus throws but little light, has apparently little knowledge or perception of it. Plutarch, and others, are more helpful: the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία is our chief boon. Since its publication in 1891 the history of this decade, as of other decades of Athenian history, especially in what concerns the inner or domestic policy and condition of affairs, has been transformed. Not that the data of the Aristotelian writer can be accepted as absolute, or beyond criticism—far from it—but that the materials and traditions at the disposal of the Attic writers of the fourth century for the reconstruction of the inner and constitutional history of Athens were more copious and in some ways more authoritative than the incidental and *ex parte* stories, or mere *obiter dicta*, which Herodotus, who was not primarily concerned with the subject, has preserved for our investigation. The writer of the *Athenian Politeia* was acquainted with the work of Herodotus; difference, therefore, or conflict between the authorities must be regarded as deliberate and critical; though it does not follow that the fourth-century authority is always right as against the writer of the fifth century, or even right where, for one reason or other, no conflict arises between them. Recent investigation has, however, done little, comparatively speaking, for the

Athenian history of the decade here in view; the argument and results which follow here, however simple and obvious, cannot altogether escape the prejudice of novelty.

The constitution of Athens underwent a considerable reform or development early in the period. The battle of Marathon had been won by a Democracy, but it was a 'moderate' middle-class Democracy, of heavy-armed infantry, providing their own arms, organized in their ten *phylic* regiments, probably each about a thousand strong, commanded by the ten *Strategoï*, each elected by and from the *phyle* which he led, the whole militia being under the supreme command of the *Polemarchos*, or war-lord, elected by the whole body which he thus commanded, and taking counsel with the *phylic Strategoï* in the hour of need. But, within the decade following Marathon, two great changes were made in the military institutions of the State, the one affecting the nature of the commando, or leading, the other affecting the nature of the service and power of the State. These changes, the one a reform, the other a development, were not unconnected with each other, and involved further changes, consequential or concomitant, both in policy and institutions, which all tended to enlarge the contrast between the Athens of Marathon and the Athens of Salamis. The reform consisted in the abolition of the *Polemarchia*, as the war-lord's office had been named, and the new organization of the *Strategia*, together with the creation of certain political and military institutions, the significance of which even the *Athenian Politeia* leaves in some obscurity. The development consisted in the substitution of sea-power for land-power as the basis of the policy, position, wealth, welfare, even the very existence of the Athenian State. The former change was more obviously and immediately connected with the internal condition and domestic policy of Athens, the latter with the external relations; but the two changes stood in organic relation to one another. The need for special commanders of a new type had already been felt in connexion with maritime undertakings, as was proved in 498 B.C. by the mission of Melanthios to the support of the Ionians, and again in 489 B.C. by the mission of Miltiades to Paros. The struggle with Aigina, which became inevitable after the escape, or exchange, of the Aiginetan hostages,¹ found the Athenian *Strategia* already reformed, but the Athenian navy still inadequate to the immediate task before it, and compelled the Athenians to become a maritime people and a sea-power. The policy, thus realized, had its beginnings in the previous decade, if at least we should be right in associating the beginnings of the Peiraieus with the Archontate of Themistokles in 493 B.C.—a doubtful point, to which a preferable alternative will be suggested below.² Meanwhile it is well to envisage separately and fully the evidences and arguments concerned with the reform of the commando and the

¹ Cp. my *Hdt. IV.-VI.* (1895), ii. 115.

² Cp. III. (6) *infra*, p. 215.

development of the navy: the one, primarily a constitutional item, and only secondarily of political import; the other, primarily a matter of policy, and only in the second intention reacting upon the constitution and *êthos* of the State.

I. *The Reform of the Military Command.*—The *Polity* has given documentary authority for the view, suggested long before the discovery in 1891 of the Aristotelian tractate, that the *Polemarch* was technically still commander-in-chief in the year 490 B.C., and therefore certainly an elected, not a ballot-box officer, the ten *Strategoi* being merely colonels, or chief captains, of the ten *phylic* regiments.¹ On the other hand it was clear that in the great Persian war (480–479 B.C.) the *Strategia* occupied practically very much the same position as in the days of Perikles, and in particular that Themistokles in 480 B.C. at least was as much commander-in-chief of the State forces as ever Perikles, or Nikias, or Alkibiades afterwards. It was thus plain (at least to some scholars), even before the recovery of the *Polity of Athens*, that a reform in the command, or leading, of the Athenian forces had taken place between the battle of Marathon and the battle of Salamis; Kallimachos was plainly the last Polemarch who actually commanded the Athenian militia in the field. These conclusions were verified and more than borne out by the newly discovered text of the Athenian *Polity*. But the new authority presents the reform from a partial and even a prejudiced standpoint. The Athenian *Polity* all along lays too little stress on warfare, and the *polemical* institution; thus the second part of the tract, though containing valuable information on the *Ephebia*, the *Strategia* and similar offices, the conditions of military service, and the care of the ships, may be searched in vain for a systematic account of the military and naval organization. In the present instance the organization of the *Strategia* is concealed under the account of a reform of the method of appointing the Nine Archons, the Polemarch of course included, by the substitution of Sortition for Election. Thus the long-debated question respecting the date and significance of the introduction of the Lot for the appointment of the Archons is resolved in a manner and by an authority which there is no critical ground for disputing or disallowing in this instance, so far as essentials are concerned. In regard, indeed, to the date of the change, the *Polity* might seem to fix it to the Archontate of Telesinos, that is, Ol. 73. 2 = 487–486 B.C.; but for reasons, which will follow below, we shall interpret this datum to mean that Telesinos was himself the first Archon appointed by lot, an interpretation which throws the legislative act back at least into the preceding Archontate (Anchises, Ol. 73. 1 = 488–487 B.C.). In any case, if Telesinos and his colleagues formed the first college of Archons appointed by lot, Anchises and his colleagues were the last elected under the system of the Kleisthenean constitution. If, however, the

¹ 'Aθ. π. 22. 2. Cp. *Hdt.* IV.–VI. Appendix IX. § 13.

introduction of the lot might be ascribed to Aristеides, we can hardly refuse to carry back the legislative enactment to the previous year (Ol. 72. 4 = 489–488 B.C.), that is, the Archontate of Aristеides himself, during which he may have laid such a proposal before Council (*βουλή*) and Assembly (*ἐκκλησία*) in his official capacity.¹ That a year elapsed before the first appointment under the new system creates no difficulty. Either a year of grace was deliberately allowed to the old system, or, more probably, the measure of Aristеides was carried too late in his year of office to be brought immediately into operation, nay, the Archons for the ensuing year may already have been elected. The significance of the reform can only be fully appreciated in view of the consequential or concomitant changes involved, and of the subsequent development of Athenian policy and public action. *Imprimis*, the sortition of the Archons, even though the candidates were still restricted to the first class (*τίμημα*, *τέλος*) of citizens, implies a reduction in the functions and importance of the offices, not specified by the Athenian *Polity*. The six *Thesmothetai*, indeed, had never been more than civil or judicial functionaries, and the powers of *the king* (*Βασιλεύς*) had long been restricted to religious, judicial, and ceremonial spheres; but the *Polemarch* and (as I should suggest) the *Archon* still wielded considerable powers, and enjoyed important prerogatives, the one as supreme War-Lord, the other probably, not merely as a judicial but as an administrative and executive official, concerned with all the public interests of the State, and sitting and acting with the Council of the Five Hundred, and possibly, for some purposes, with the Areiopagos. He may even have had the presidency of the Council of Five Hundred, and would in any case be influential in moulding its *probouleumata* and in executing its decrees. One concomitant of the new law introducing sortition for the offices of *Archon*, *Basileus*, *Polemarchos*, and *Thesmothes* must have been some great invasion and limitation of the administrative spheres and executive importance of the first three magistrates: the *Polemarchia* in particular was deprived of all military function and importance, and became a mere civil or judicial magistracy, comparable to the office of *Praetor peregrinus* at Rome, but still invested with certain religious duties and dignities. Another necessary consequence, or concomitant, of the reform was the provision for the better discharge, by some other officers, of the functions which had been withdrawn from Archon and from Polemarch. This provision appears to have been made not by the institution of any new office,

¹ The authorship of the Lot is anonymous. Plutarch, *Arist.* 22, ascribes to Aristеides a reform of the Archontate after Plataia, by which all citizens became eligible (*γράφει ψήφισμα κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἰρεῖσθαι*). This cannot stand

against the *Polity*. Plutarch, *Arist.* 1, shows that Demetrios of Phaleron made the double mistake of thinking that Aristеides had obtained the Archontate (1) by Lot, (2) after Plataia. But was not Aristеides, perhaps, concerned in the reform of the office after Marathon?

but by the development of the *Strategia*, and the transfer to the *Strategoî* of the principal functions hitherto invested in the *Archon* and the *Polemarch*. The *Strategoî* now ceased to be merely the colonels of the *phylic* regiments, and became a supreme military college, an *État-major*, without the exact limits of their initiative or competence being rigidly defined upon the civil side. The college had constant access to the Council of the Five Hundred, from which the *Archon*, *Polemarch*, and *Basileus* (with perhaps the *Thesmothetai* to boot) disappeared; and a great deal of business, hitherto initiated or carried out by the 'Archons,' was now handled by the *Strategoî*. In the normal course of business the *Prytaneia*, or presidency in the College of Ten, circulated daily through the members, and the *Prytanis*, or *Hegemon* for the day, was for the time being supreme War-Lord: an arrangement of doubtful expediency from a military point of view, and perhaps responsible for disaster once and again. But it is obvious that the *Ekklesia*, perhaps on the requisition of the *Council*, itself thereto moved by the *Strategoî*, might appoint one *Strategos* as permanent *Prytanis*, or *Hegemon*, and invest him with 'autocracy' (*αὐτοκρατία*) against itself, the *Council*, or his Colleagues, any or all of these. On special service, or for independent commands, one or more members of the College could be and were employed synchronously. Obviously this development in the powers of the *Strategoî* involved the transfer of their appointment, by election, from the *Phylai* severally, to the collective *Ekklesia*: the *Strategoî* were now officials of the whole People, elected by the whole People, though the *phylic* limitation still obtained, so far as to secure the representation annually of all ten *Phylai* in the strategic college. As the *Strategoî* thus ceased to be merely *phylic* officers, provision must at the same time have been made for the command of the *phylic* regiments, and the institution of the *taxiarchs* must be referred to this same date and scheme of reform, officers commanding the ten regiments of infantry, previously led each by its own *Strategos*. As little or nothing is heard of Athenian cavalry in the second Persian invasion, and as cavalry was never a 'popular' service in the ancient state, it may well be doubted whether the Reform-programme of Aristeides, in 489-488 B.C., included any development of the *Hippeis*; nor was the infantry itself affected, except in the matter of leading. The mass of citizens (which took to itself the chief credit for the victory at Marathon) was left untouched in its military privilege and service, until the development of the navy gave the lower order of citizens an enhanced importance as men of war, and in turn necessitated further developments in the popular direction. The pressing question after Marathon, and all the more, perhaps, after the expedition to Paros, was the question of leading, whether military or political; and the immediate scheme of reform, which concerned simply the organization of the lead, or command, and of the highest official positions, was completed by the new

institution of the *Ostrakophoria*, which supplied a safety-valve for the over-violent pressure which might be generated under the new conditions of the strategic *Archairesiai*. The Athenian *Polity*, to which much of our best information about the *Ostrakophoria* is traceable, ascribes the institution to Kleisthenes, but it dates the first actual employment of the institution to the year 488–487 B.C., that is, more precisely, to the spring of the year 487 B.C. I have elsewhere¹ shown the inconsequence and absurdity of the *hiatus* thus posited between the original institution and the first employment, or, as one may say, the first five successive employments of the new device; and the relation observable in all the known cases of Ostrakism between the *Ostrakophoria* and the *Strategia*, or rather the *Strategic Demagogia*, confirms the suggestions there (as here again) made as to the synchronism of the original institutions. If any one, however, still prefers to adhere to the Kleisthenean authorship of the *Ostrakophoria*, he should in all fairness by analogy suppose that the institution was designed in relation to the election of the Archon—an office, from its original creation down to the date of its supersession by the *Strategia*, the great bone of contention, and prize for ambitious politicians, at Athens.² He must also admit, however, that the *Ostrakophoria* was never invoked, or actually put into effective operation, until the office of *Strategos* was made to supersede the offices of Archon and Polemarch. Ostrakism was a device for getting rid of a dangerous politician, or leader, without recourse to assassination, and without abuse of the forms of justice by a political verdict from a law-court. The scandal aroused in Athens by the condemnation of Miltiades, after his failure in Paros, and by his miserable death in prison, to whom the State notoriously owed, more than to any other individual, the glorious and immortal memory of Marathon, may have suggested to Aristides and Xanthippos, now high in popular favour, this more excellent way of dealing with their leading opponents, by anticipating the *δοκιμασία*, so to speak, of the potential *Strategos*, so as to prevent his election, rather than by aggravating, or abusing, the *εἴθυνα*, so as to get rid of him, after the mischief was done. The engineers of this ingenious device were, indeed, very shortly ‘hoist with their own petar,’ but this result was due to a new situation, and a new man, capable of reviving the ideas of Miltiades under circumstances which insured a triumph for the policy, both external and domestic, which Xanthippos and Aristides had set themselves to thwart and to resist. The use to which Ostrakism came to be applied, was not exactly in the intention of its first authors; but the further consideration of its use and significance, in the period before us, will best be taken in connexion with the history of the struggle, which converted the hoplite democracy of Kleisthenes or of Aristides, the victors at

¹ Cp. *Hdt. IV.–VI.* (1895), Appendix IX. § 14.

² *‘Aθ. π.* 13. 2.

Marathon, into the 'nautical mob' of Themistokles, triumphant at Salamis.

II. *The Political Struggle in Athens, 490-481 B.C.* (Phainippos to Hypsiehides).—After the return from Marathon Miltiades was apparently the most popular and powerful man in Athens. Whatever the credit due to the memory of the polemarch Kallimachos, the *Strategos* of the *Oineis* was regarded, and rightly regarded, as the intellectual author of the battle and the deliverance. The personal or party enemies, who had brought him to trial, about a year before, on the charge of 'tyranny,' in Chersonesos, were for the moment still further discredited, and eclipsed. The extraordinary commission to Paros, in 490-489 B.C., furnishes the measure of the confidence enjoyed by Miltiades for the moment. The domestic and foreign policy of Miltiades may be regarded as fairly intelligible. Miltiades had returned to Athens to oppose a Peisistratid restoration, and a Persian annexation; he was the leading and most competent representative of Attic liberties for the time being; the accusation of 'tyranny' levelled against him in 491 had broken down, and he had been elected by his own *phyletai* their *Strategos* in 490 B.C., and as such had, more than any other man, determined the victorious action of the State. The Peisistratid rump in Athens must have been thoroughly discredited for the moment; and even the Alkmaionid faction, which had no doubt for some twenty years posed as the champions of Athenian liberty, but had already, perhaps, compromised its reputation by intrigue with the Athenian exiles, was for the moment reduced to impotence. The expedition to Paros, for which we may fairly hold Miltiades responsible, is a distinctly new departure, or it may be a recurrence to ideas of expansion in the Aigaian, natural enough to the returned 'tyrant of the Chersonese,' but unacceptable to statesmen of the school of Kleisthenes, who did not want 'Ionism' in Attica, who preferred an Attica which did not include Lemnos and the Chersonese, or even the Kyklades, who had looked to Delphi for support and not to Delos, much less to Branchidai: the very men who had recalled the Athenian fleet from Ionia in 498 B.C. and had prosecuted Phrynichos in 493 B.C. successfully for his dramatic criticism of their betrayal of Miletos. The expedition to Paros in 489 B.C. is the first forward step on the part of the Athenians in the direction of making up for their abandonment of the Ionians to Persia ten years before. It was hardly as Polemarch that Miltiades acted: *Strategoï* had already commanded on such service, and it may fairly be doubted whether the Polemarch was ever called upon to lead the forces of the State beyond the frontier, or at least to conduct a maritime expedition. But the multiplication of such occasions was all the more bound to increase the powers of the *Strategoï*, and to necessitate a reform in the position and functions of the office. The failure of Miltiades at Paros is the occasion and excuse, in the first instance, for the condemnation of the forward policy, and its

author, or reviver. Xanthippos, the bridegroom of the Alkmaionid Agariste, was his principal accuser, supported perhaps by Aristides, another statesman of the same school. Probably the medizing or Peisistratid remnant united with Xanthippos and Aristides against the Philaid. Perhaps Sparta was not over well pleased with the projects of Miltiades, and took a hand against him. The too cordial reception of his elder son, Metiochos, at the Persian court looked suspicious, and doubtless was cited against him. The combination, which had condemned Phrynichos in 493 B.C. to a fine of a thousand *drachmai* for a poetical licence, now procured the condemnation of Miltiades to a fine, three hundred times as large, for a military *fiasco*, into which the court was persuaded to read a political treachery or a personal ambition. The cry of 'tyranny,' of an unconstitutional usurpation of power by the extraordinary *Strategos*, was perhaps raised once more on this occasion, and with some effect: if the institution of Ostrakism had been already in existence, the Athenians might have taken that less ingrate method of getting rid of a dangerous or unpopular leader. The fall of Miltiades only just preceded the important constitutional reforms which have been already outlined above, and we are more than justified in connecting those reforms with the situation immediately antecedent, that is, with the battle of Marathon, the death of the Polemarch on the field, the expedition to Paros, under Miltiades as *Strategos*, and the abuse of the law-courts, by which his condemnation was procured.

The end of Miltiades did not, however, bring with it any finality to the two great questions in Athenian politics at the hour—the question of a tyrannic restoration, whether in the person of Miltiades, or of some other more nearly connected with the Peisistratid house; and the question of the future development of Athens, and Athenian power, to a position of superiority at least over against Aigina, her nearest foe. The reforms of Aristides, that is, as already shown above, the reduction of the Archontate and of the Polemarchia, the development of the Strategia, and the institution of the annual *Ostrakophoria*, must have been in some way connected at least with the domestic history and policy of the State. The connexion is not far to seek. Aristides and Xanthippos, the statesmen of the Kleisthenean school, must be credited with a genuine determination not merely to resist the expansion of Athens over sea, and the Ionization of the State, but to maintain the existing democracy of Kleisthenes, or to develop it upon strictly Kleisthenean lines. Hostility to the 'Ionism' of Peisistratos and his successors was a tradition of this school, and was bound up with hostility to the tyrannic house itself. But these statesmen were not impenitently conservative, nor incapable of learning a lesson even from an enemy—as they proved very clearly in the second Persian war and its sequel. The Marathonian campaign itself must have convinced Aristides that the *Polemarchia* was out-of-date; and the

Archontate had lent itself, under the Peisistratid régime, to the purposes of the tyranny.¹ The development of the *Strategia*, the supersession of the offices of Archon and of Polemarch, each with well-defined and independent functions, by a board of ten officials, who took over, in a collegiate capacity, the functions of the two offices which most easily lent themselves to one-man power, was a reform eminently congruous with the Kleisthenean democracy. The arrangement for the circulation, in normal conditions, of the *prytany* or *hegemony* of the College daily among the members might seem a safeguard against any abuse of the new office, such as the case of Miltiades had just rendered visible, or the older precedent of Peisistratos might have recalled. To make assurance doubly sure, the scheme included the institution of the annual *Ostrakophoria*, by which any man marked out as likely to abuse the strategic office into an organ of tyranny, or monarchic power, could be surely got rid of in advance. Perhaps there was even a more distinctly personal reference in the institution of Ostrakism. The first man against whom the institution was effectively used was Hipparchos, and that in the spring of the year 487 B.C. The *Polity* declares that Ostrakism was instituted by Kleisthenes, and that for the express purpose of banishing this very man Hipparchos. The two statements are mutually exclusive: if Ostrakism was instituted to get rid of Hipparchos, it was not instituted by the act of Kleisthenes. But neither if it was first used in the year 487 B.C. can it have been of Kleisthenean institution. Aristides, indeed, may well have been its real author; its institution may well date, with the other reforms, to his Archontate (489-488 B.C.), and in this case Aristides, whatever his own immediate intention, can hardly have overlooked the possible application of the new institution to the Peisistratid rump, in the first instance. Whatever the ultimate design of the institution, its immediate application was for this very purpose of eliminating the friends of the tyrants: for three years in succession the leading friend of the tyranny in Athens was banished by this semi-judicial process, yet without prejudice, first Hipparchos, then Megakles, then Alkibiades:² the Peisistratid, the Alkmaionid, the Eupatrid, each, as we know or may suppose, regarded as hostile to the existing constitution and to the democracy, which had received its baptism of fire at Marathon.

Nothing is commoner, in the history of institutions, than to find an institution made and devised to serve one purpose, lending itself sooner or later to a different and even a contrary use; nothing is rarer than for an institution to maintain itself constant to its original

¹ Thuc. 6. 54. 6. (The phrase need not be restricted to the Archontate, but must include it.)

² I place here the ostrakism of Alkibiades the Elder. Lysias 14. 39, ps.-

Andokides 4. 34. His supposed second (or rather first) ostrakism may point to his having shared the exile of Kleisthenes the Alkmaionid, and would help to explain his renunciation of the Spartan *Proxenia*.

founder's design. Ostrakism, so Aristotle and the Aristotelians affirm, was designed to prevent 'tyranny,' or 'one-man power,' and was thrice in succession employed for this, its original purpose; but its conversion to an exactly opposite use, as a means of throwing power unopposed into the hands of a popular favourite, or of eliminating opposition to a popular policy, has long been well understood, and is attested later in the cases of Themistokles, of Kimon, of Thukydides. It is more startling to find this application, abuse it cannot be called, of the institution as early as the fourth and fifth years of its institution, or employment, yet such is the inevitable conclusion from the historic facts, unless we are prepared to count Xanthippos and Aristides himself, and that in flat contradiction to the 'Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, among the 'friends of the tyrants.' There is an irony in the fate of these exiles which should have appealed to the moral philosophy of Herodotus, but for the miserably imperfect and biassed traditions, which were all he had to rely on apparently for this decade of Athenian history. Ostrakism had been invented to make the revival of a Peisistratos, or of a Miltiades, as *Archon*, or as *Strategos*, impossible; but it was used now, once and again, to get rid of the obstruction, offered by its authors, to the policy and demands of a man who was prepared to revive, in great part, the policy of Peisistratos so far as the position of Athens in the Aigaian was concerned, and who was being 'kept awake o' nights by the laurels of Miltiades.'

III. *The Aeginetan War, and the Rise of Themistokles* (487-481 B.C.).—Herodotus gives but little information upon the subject; what information he gives about the war is in part displaced, and out of relation to Themistokles, and the rôle of Themistokles, both as statesman and as *Strategos*, presumably, during the war; and the development of Athens into a great power on the sea is dislocated and diminished in his pages, as doubtless previously in his sources. At the time, and in the places, where Herodotus collected his materials, and wrote down his history, whether in the first or in the second draft, the name of Themistokles was become a byword, and the memory of his policy and public services neglected, obscured, and even defamed. The victor of Salamis, the rebuilder of Athens, the founder of the Peiraieus, the author of the more fertile and successful ideas in the policy of Perikles, had been sacrificed to the implacable resentment of Sparta—not unjustly from the Spartan point of view—and the no less implacable jealousy of his own rivals in Athens, who had borrowed one-half of his programme and used it to defeat the other half. His flight to Asia, and acceptance of a handsome billet from the king, conduct on first sight at irreconcilable variance with his earlier and more obviously patriotic action, might have disconcerted his best friends at Athens. To Themistokles himself (as we may understand) there was nothing inconsistent with loyalty to Athens in a diplomatic medism, at a time when he at least had come to

perceive, what all Athens recognized ten years later, that the real enemy was—Lakedaimon. His ‘medism,’ indeed, was a matter also of mere self-preservation, and was never carried to the point of injury, or damage, to a single Athenian interest, and his voluntary death attested the fidelity of his feeling towards a country which had greatly wronged him. But his enemies were not silenced, nor converted by his exile, attainder, and voluntary death. The earlier stages of his story were related, or ignored, under the prejudice aroused by its later developments. The memory of the man, who had outwitted Sparta, flouted Korinth, ostrakized Xanthippos and Aristekides, and allowed no scruple to interfere with the aggrandizement of his country, and therein found his own no small advantage, was damned from a dozen different quarters. We are not concerned to deny the personal ambition of Themistokles, or even to cancel wholly the trail of corruption attached to his name. How many Greeks in prominent positions were innocent of ambition, the politician’s vice, or of avarice, ‘the vice of the wise’? Yet it is fair to Themistokles to remember that his personal ambitions were always coincident with the real interests of Athens, and that no charge of corruption, or malversation, was ever judicially brought home to him. Many of the anecdotes upon the latter subject are transparent absurdities. Against all that must be set his splendid nerve, his dauntless spirit, his unrivalled sagacity and foresight, his noble eloquence, his strategic ability, his diplomatic address, his admirable self-control. To do Herodotus justice, he supplies part of the facts in support of this apology, side by side with scandal, tittle-tattle, and self-contradictions all to the same address. The calmer and more reasoned judgement of Thucydides prevails in the court of appeal. Aristophanes is kinder to Themistokles than might have been expected. The Orators, the Aristotelian *Polity*, Plutarch, and the later authorities, supply, to some extent, though not free from the influences that are apparent in the Herodotean tradition, materials for a better and truer estimate of Themistokles and his policy. The man cannot be wholly divorced from the politician: the virtues of the good citizen, of the wise statesman, of the brilliant general, must be held to redeem a character in the day of judgement. It is far easier to understand and account for the denigration of the person of Themistokles in the records, than to hold at once that his nature was so ignoble and mean, his actions so high and unappealable, as they would have us believe.

On five or six distinct points, as far as the period here immediately under review is concerned, some degree of certitude seems attainable. (1) Themistokles was mainly and immediately instrumental in the immense developments of Athens as a sea-power, which constitutes the chief contrast between the part played by Athens in 490 B.C. at Marathon, and the part played by Athens in 480 B.C. at Salamis. On this point practically all authorities are agreed. (2) The im-

mediate motive, or excuse, for this action was supplied by the war between Athens and Aigina, which broke out afresh after the fiasco at Paros, and the release of the Aiginetan hostages from Athens (Hdt. 7. 144, Thuc. 1. 14). The answer of the Athenians to the application of Leotychidas was (I suggest) dictated by Themistokles: Aristeides, at that time, would probably have adopted a more conciliatory attitude. Probably Themistokles was engaged as *Strategos* in the war with Aigina, and perhaps such success as attended the Athenian arms in the struggle was due to his leading. That success, however, was far from decisive, and Themistokles, as a politician, before *Boule* and *Ekklesia*, at last carried his point for the enormous augmentation of the fleet. Thucydides, however, gives us expressly to understand that in the mind of Themistokles the Aiginetan war was but the ostensible pretext, the coming invasion of Attica by the king was the real ground. It is characteristic of the bias in Herodotus' sources that the maritime development of Athens is represented as the natural effect of the Aiginetan war, without direct reference to the action or policy of Themistokles. Why Themistokles should have suppressed his thought in the matter, and based the naval augmentation solely on the Aiginetan war, is incomprehensible, if the augmentation was only proposed, and carried out, or begun, in the year of the psephism, variously reported by Herodotus (7. 144) and by the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* (22. 7). Is it not probable that the proposal was made in the first instance soon after the outbreak of hostilities in 487 B.C., even if the final stage in the arrangements was only reached in 483–482 B.C.? (3) In any case one principal source, by means of which the expenses of the naval augmentation bill were to be defrayed, was the public revenue arising from the silver mines at Laureion and Maroneia. This proposal involved a patriotic sacrifice upon the part of the poorer citizens, which it must have cost them an effort to make. In nothing does Themistokles appear more the statesman and less the mere demagogue than in this demand upon the citizens at large, to sacrifice the immediate profit of the moment to larger and remoter ends. (4) The policy of Themistokles met with obstinate resistance and obstruction; Aristeides in particular, and perhaps likewise also Xanthippos previously, had to be removed by ostrakism before the bill became law.¹ The dates of these two ostrakisms are, perhaps, to be regarded as problematical. The Athenian *Polity* somewhat obscurely chronologizes both, and has been interpreted to mean that the ostrakism of Xanthippos occurred in the year 485–484 B.C., that is, in the spring of the year 484 B.C., the year immediately after the third ostrakism, or ostrakism of Alkibiades; while the ostrakism of Aristeides is

¹ I have already elsewhere suggested that Xanthippos may more particularly have opposed the Themistoklean policy of a restoration, or institution, of the

ἡγεμών, while Aristeides may more particularly have thwarted the naval bill, cp. *Hdt. IV.–VI. ii. 145*.

apparently dated two clear years afterwards, in the Archontate of Nikomedes, 483–482 B.C., the same date as that given for the final passage of the psephism of Themistokles. The *Ostrakophoria* would, of course, have taken place in the spring of 482 B.C., and the passage of the psephism would then have to be placed between the spring of 482 B.C. and the midsummer new-year. The chronological indication, however, in regard to the ostrakism of Aristides is not so precise as that in regard to the ostrakism of Xanthippos: Eusebios distinctly places the banishment of Aristides in the previous year, 484–483 B.C., under the Archon Leostatos, that is, in the spring of 483 B.C., and this date accords better with the natural probabilities of the case.¹ The Aiginetan war had broken out afresh under Telesinos (487–486), perhaps in the spring of the year 486 B.C. Themistokles may have made his proposal any time between that and the ostrakism of Xanthippos in the spring of 484 B.C. The resistance of Aristides was overcome, or removed by his banishment, in the spring of 483 B.C. (Leostatos), and immediately afterwards Themistokles was elected, or re-elected, one of the *Strategoï* for the year 483–482 B.C. (Nikomedes), during which his proposal was carried, none too long before the news from Asia left no doubt of the objective to which the movements of the Persians were directed. Little more than two years was to elapse before the fleet, as constituted by Themistokles, should be called upon to hoist sail and ply oar for the waters off the north of Euboea.

One can well imagine how easy it was for the opponents of Themistokles to represent his policy of appropriating the Laureion surplus for naval purposes as ‘unpopular.’ But for him the money was to have been distributed *viritim* to the poorer citizens, with every prospect of an annual repetition of the dole. It was Aristides, apparently, who was the chief, or the last, exponent of this *argumentum ad crumenam*. The *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* has thrown a new and not altogether convincing light upon the policy and practices of Aristides, representing him as a sort of state-socialist, mainly concerned in providing ‘free food’ (*τροφή*) for the People.² This representation refers to a date subsequent to the Persian war, and is open to damaging criticism. The rôle and policy of Perikles, but very inadequately presented in the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*, is here transferred to his less eminent predecessor, and the passage teems with anachronisms as applied to Aristides. But there may have been some such justification for the portrait of Aristides in the character of People’s Friend and purveyor of good things, as above indicated. He had opposed the confiscation of the Laureion surplus; he had advocated the annual distribution of the money to the poorer citizens. In opposing the means for the realization of the Themistoklean policy, he had opposed

¹ Cp. Clinton, *Fasti Hell.* ii. 30, *ad ann.*

² *Ἀθ.* π. 24.

the end and object of that policy, to wit, the conversion of Athens into a sea-power. Possibly news from Asia and the Hellespont, Makedon and Thrake, may have contributed to reinforce the arguments of Themistokles, before the actual great augmentation of the Fleet took place. A good many Athenians, beside Themistokles, will have been convinced, under the Archon Nikomedes and his successor, that the ships of Themistokles would be employed against a mightier power than Aigina, and that to be employed with any prospect of success they would needs be commanded by their creator.

(5) The Athenian *Polity* gives in more precise form than previously known the exact contents of the naval psephism of Themistokles, as well as an exact date therefor.¹ The year of Nikomedes may very well be the true date for the passage of the bill, but the proposal will have been mooted in the first instance at least two or three years earlier. To the mind of Themistokles the return of the Persians was only a question of time; he was convinced that the question at issue was one to be decided by sea-power, and was determined that the sea-power needed should belong to Athens. The recrudescence of the Aiginetan war may have supplied him with an occasion to urge the development of the fleet; but by the year of Nikomedes, one might suppose, he was no longer alone in anticipating the reinvasion of Greece by the Barbarian. In the following year, at least, the danger must have been fairly evident to many in Greece, now that the King's preparations at Athos, on the Hellespont, and in Asia were being reported. By the midsummer New Year of 481 B.C. the programme involved in the psephism of the previous year may have been realized; but the realization of that programme, as defined in the psephism, still leaves a lacuna to be filled, between the fleet as brought up to the proposed strength, and the fleet as presented in the actual navy-lists of the war a year, or two, later. The psephism of Themistokles had provided for an addition of one hundred triremes to the existing navy of Athens, and no more. The existing fleet numbered apparently all told seventy vessels, and had perhaps been maintained at this figure for some fifteen years previously. This figure was itself an advance upon the normal fleet contemplated under the Kleisthenean constitution, which at most numbered fifty.² The psephism of Themistokles when carried out would give Athens a fleet of 170 ships; or, as twenty of these had been borrowed hulls, and might

¹ 'Aθ. π. 22. 7.

² As the Kleisthenean *Trittyes* may be taken (*pace* 'Aθ. π. 21. 5) to correspond to the Solonian *Naukraries*, one might be tempted to conjecture that the Athenian fleet had been reduced by Kleisthenes to 30 ships of war. The 20 Korinthian hulls (Hdt. 6. 88) would

have raised the total to 50 again, which was probably the Solonian figure (48 from the Naukraries, together with the Paralos and the Salaminia? Cp. also *Iliad* 2. 556). But 70 ships apparently were forthcoming for the Parian expedition (Hdt. 6. 132) and the Aiginetan war (6. 89).

be regarded as an extraordinary squadron, a normal fleet of 150. In the war, however, the total number of Athenian vessels appears as not less than 200 (the figure ascribed in the Herodotean text, probably corrupt in this particular, to the naval programme of Themistokles). It is possible that an addition of vessels from thirty to fifty was made to the fleet in the year 481–480 B.C. (Hypsichides), and that the total number is correctly given by Herodotus as 200. It is also possible, though less probable, that a second hundred vessels were built and equipped, in the said year, in consequence of a re-enactment of the psephism of Themistokles. The method ordained in the psephism makes this latter suggestion highly problematical. Are the terms of the psephism, and the exact nature and extent of the service performed by this century of citizens, fully or correctly reported in the *Polity*? The terms of the psephism as there given (and reproduced more or less accurately in the later authorities) suggest a curious anticipation of the chief *liturgy* of later times, the *trierarchia*, but the process ascribed to Themistokles is entirely different from the procedure afterwards in force. According to the terms of the supposed psephism a hundred talents were distributed to one hundred wealthy citizens on condition of performing to the satisfaction of the State a service not specified. The hundred took each man his talent, and builded, or procured the building, each man of a trireme, to the satisfaction of all concerned. Therewith his service might seem to have ended, the State presumably taking over the said trireme and doing all the rest. This procedure is exactly the reverse of the extraordinary Liturgy, known as the trierarchy, under which the State supplied to the trierarch the vessel, and more or less of its equipment, while the trierarch, for his year of service, maintained the ship in seaworthy trim, a service likely to cost him at the lowest estimate the best part of a talent, although the wages of the crew were paid by the State. The air of mystery imparted to the proposal in the psephism of Themistokles is perplexing. Themistokles demands a *carte blanche*, or a vote of confidence and a free hand, at least to the extent of being allowed to force a loan of a talent each upon one hundred of the richest citizens, with a penalty or sanction attached that if the citizen, thus made a debtor to the treasury, failed to satisfy (the People?) by the use to which he put his talent, he should be called upon to repay the loan (with interest?). The hundred citizens, selected in a further manner, not specified, perhaps by Themistokles himself, perhaps, on the analogy of the later trierarchy, by their *phyletai*, ten from each *phyle*, gallantly and amiably meet the demand made upon them, and presumably after consultation with Themistokles one and all set to work building triremes. One talent would just about defray the expense of building and equipping a trireme. It would be satisfactory to have some information as to the maintenance of the triremes, so provided, during the next year or two, and the

arrangements made for their maintenance and their command during the actual campaign of 480 B.C. From Herodotus it only appears that Themistokles persuaded the Athenians to build ships from the surplus arising from the mines, instead of distributing it among themselves ten drachmai to each man. He expressly specified the purpose in view, and expressly alleged the Aiginetan war as the excuse. The Athenians were thus fully apprised of the design, and fully aware of the purpose to which the money was to be applied. The only mystery, or reserve, on the part of Themistokles was that he said nothing, at least in the first instance, about the probability of the ships being used not against the Aiginetans, but against the Persians, as he himself foresaw and intended. The *Polity* gives the amount of the surplus as a hundred talents, which provide a hundred ships, all apparently within one year. Herodotus does not specify the total amount of the surplus, but he mentions that it would have given the citizens of Athens ten drachmai apiece. If the surplus for one year amounted to a hundred talents, and allowed a distribution of ten drachmai to each citizen, the number of citizens must have amounted to 60,000. Just half that number, viz. 30,000, is the Herodotean estimate, and this estimate supplies fifty talents as the annual surplus of the revenue to be distributed. Thus the comparison of our authorities suggests the conclusion that the shipbuilding was spread over two years, that fifty ships were built in each year, and that the hundred ships and the hundred talents in the *Polity* represent the total expenditure, and the total result attained.¹ The hundred trierarchs taken from the *Pentakosiomedimnoi* probably were made responsible for the maintenance of these ships, and commanded them in the actual war. The total number of two hundred ships may have been reached by additional building on the part of the State, or it may be by voluntary and extraordinary efforts on the part of individual citizens, such as Kleinias, son of Alkibiades—who, however, would hardly have escaped being included in the first roll-call of the hundred richest. In fine, disguised under the confused and inadequate terms of the supposed psephism of Themistokles, which cannot be taken to reproduce the actual terms of his proposal, or to describe fully and accurately the procedure for raising and maintaining the fleet that fought at Salamis, there lurks the evidence that Themistokles, and no other, was the inventor of the *Trierarchy*, though not perhaps in the form most familiar to us from the later authorities.

(6) It only remains to indicate the position, political and official, occupied by Themistokles in Athens for the period here under review. Themistokles had been elected Archon two years before Phainippos, and was therefore a prominent citizen, a rising statesman, even before

¹ If the ship-building may be spread over three years, the total of 200 may have been attained by three annual increments of 50 vessels, added to the existing fleet; cp. chronological table below.

the return of Miltiades to Athens in 491. Themistokles had assuredly fought in his place at Marathon, if not as *Strategos*, at least as Hoplite. Themistokles had probably estimated the victory of Marathon at a much lower figure than the bulk of his countrymen, and was not deceived by the delay in the return of the Mede. Themistokles had probably approved the undertaking of Miltiades against the Kyklades, and the failure of Miltiades at Paros probably cost Themistokles quite as many sleepless nights as the trophy of Miltiades at Marathon. Themistokles was already opposed to the Kleisthenean statesmen, who had hounded Miltiades to his doom, and Themistokles perhaps even extended a helping hand to the son of Miltiades after that ill-starred general's death. Themistokles doubtless approved the reform of the Constitution in 488 B.C., even if proposed by his rivals, seeing better than they saw the uses to which the new institutions might be put. The answer to Sparta's intervention on behalf of Aigina may have been dictated by Themistokles: the first outbreak of war with Aigina was probably welcomed by him, as a desirable propaedeutic for the greater struggle which he foresaw more clearly than any one else. Early in the course of the struggle with Aigina he must have proposed, or demanded, the increase of the navy, and his proposal must have been rejected and thwarted by Xanthippos and Aristekides, the most influential demagogues of the time. It would have been like Themistokles to see the use to which the *Ostrakophoria*, designed and hitherto used by the leading demagogues as a means of eliminating the Peisistratid rump, might be turned, so as to serve not as a conservative but as a progressive device, eliminating not the enemies of the existing régime, but the opponents of further progress or reform. The ostrakism of Xanthippos and of Aristekides, in succession, left Themistokles virtually 'tyrant' of Athens, that is, the man who for the time being absolutely dominated the policy of the State, and probably occupied the highest official position. For the two years following the Archontate of Nikomedes, and the ostrakism of Aristekides, or rather for three, Themistokles was virtually Prime Minister of Athens, the leading, the only demagogue. We cannot doubt that during these years he was continuously *Strategos*, elected annually by the Ekklesia, and enjoying the undivided confidence of the citizens. If hitherto the Prytany, or Hegemony, in the strategic college had circulated daily among the ten *Strategoi*, express enactment must have now been made, on the suggestion or with the sanction of Themistokles, for a better arrangement in view of the coming invasion; and the novelty, the scale, the scene and duration of the impending war, in the preparation as in the conduct of which Themistokles was the soul, or at least the best brain, of the nation, made his *Hegemonia* the first order of the day. To this period I should assign likewise the project for the fortification of the Peiraeus, the postponement of which is hardly intelligible, if it had been inaugurated ten years

before, when Themistokles was Archon.¹ Themistokles is introduced by Herodotus as an interpreter of oracles, and it is credible that he made an effort to win Delphi for the national cause; but Themistokles belonged to the line of Athenian statesmen who were not acceptable persons at Delphi. The invitations to the national congress at the Isthmos were no doubt issued by Sparta, or at least not without Sparta; but it is not fanciful to see both in the meeting itself, in its acts, and in the subsequent plans and operations of the Confederates, the hand and brain of Themistokles at work, even where his name is not expressly mentioned in the somewhat jealously-minded sources. With the summons of the Isthmian Congress the policy of Themistokles and of Athens merges in the general story of the actions of the Confederacy: before broaching that subject, it will be well to summarise, in tabular form, the results of this section of our inquiry.

OL.	B.C.	ARCHONS.	EVENTS.
72.3	490-489	Phainippos	Battle of Marathon. Parian Expedition.
72.4	489-488	Aristeides	Condemnation of Miltiades. Constitutional Reforms at Athens: (i.) Reduction of the powers of the Archons. (ii.) Development of the <i>Strategia</i> . (iii.) Ostrakism instituted.
73.1	488-487	Anchises	Change of Spartan policy; application of Leotychidas at Athens rejected. Seizure of the <i>Theoris</i> by the Aiginetans (exchange of prisoners). First Ostrakism (Hipparchos). First Sortition of the Archons. First Election of the Strategoi by the <i>Ekklesia</i> .
73.2	487-486	Telesinos	The <i>coup d'état</i> of Nikodromos in Aigina, and its failure. Second Ostrakism (Megakles).
73.3	486-485	<i>Unknown</i>	The war between Athens and Aigina. Third Ostrakism (Alkibiades).
73.4	485-484	Philokrates	War with Aigina continued; policy of Themistokles (naval augmentation). Fourth Ostrakism (Xanthippos).
74.1	484-483	Leostratos	War with Aigina continued; struggle for naval augmentation continued. Fifth Ostrakism (Aristeides).

¹ Thucydides occasionally uses the terms *ἀρχων*, *ἀρχων*, of the Strategos. He appears also to avoid constitutional technicalities. The curious phrase in

1. 93. 3 may, perhaps, be interpreted to refer to the strategic *Hegemonia* of Themistokles.

OL.	B.C.	ARCHONS.	EVENTS.
74.2	483-482	Nikomedes	Themistokles 'prime-minister'; psephism of Themistokles carried; institution of the <i>Trierarchia</i> ; 50 ships built and assigned. Fortification of the Peiraeus begun?
74.3	482-481	<i>Unknown</i>	Supremacy of Themistokles; 50 ships built and assigned.
74.4	481-480	Hypsichides	Supremacy of Themistokles; <50 ships built and assigned? > Congress of Greek states at the Isthmos. Recall of Athenian exiles. Re-election of Themistokles as Strategos Hegemon; election of Aristides among his colleagues.

§ 5. In the course of the fourth year of the seventy-fourth Olympiad (481-480 B.C.), if not before, Sparta and Athens must have become convinced that a fresh invasion of Hellas had been ordered by the new king, and that the coming celebration of the national festival would perhaps be prevented or interrupted by the advent of the 'barbarians.' News of the preparations in Asia and in Europe, begun about the time of the Olympiad of 484 B.C., had by this time reached Hellas. The canal, the bridges, the magazines and dépôts, the requisitions from Greek states subject to the king, the orders for the *levée en masse*, must surely have been reported in Athens, in Sparta, in Delphi, wherever Greeks were gathered together, and in course of a twelvemonth no further doubt as to the reality and magnitude of the impending peril could subsist. The objective of such preparations and movements was hardly open to question, when viewed in relation to the general policy and the recent history of the empire.¹ Herodotus expressly states that the Greeks had timely warning, and he enforces the statement incidentally by a couple of anecdotes which bear the same moral. The Argives, according to their own admission, had foreknowledge of the coming storm (7. 148). Explicit and early information reached Sparta from Demaratos, and the Spartans must also have had their suspicions confirmed by the reports brought home by Sperthias and Boulis. Athens, with Themistokles at its head, was assuredly not behind Sparta either in knowledge of Asiatic affairs, or in plans to meet the impending attack. Neither Sparta nor Athens contemplated any other possibility than resistance. Each had adequate and compelling motives for offering a determined opposition to any further attempts upon their liberties. Severally and in combination they were assuredly resolved upon that

¹ Cp. Appendix II. 6.

course. There was probably subsisting, since 491 B.C., albeit in a state of 'suspended animation,' the defensive alliance between Sparta and Athens against the Mede, which bound the two states to mutual aid in case of an invasion from Asia, while leaving them free in their other relations with each other, and with all other Greek states, whenever the Persian question was in abeyance. Sparta had responded to her engagement in 490 B.C., but too late to be of use. It is not quite clear whether Sparta should have sent a confederate force upon that occasion: in any case the lead would doubtless have remained, by a well-known custom, in the hands of Athens, as the state whose territory was actually the scene of operations. But the larger scale of the invasion of 480 B.C. called for a correspondingly greater effort upon the part of Sparta and of Athens, if resistance was to be crowned with success. The existing Delphic Amphiktyony might have seemed to offer at least the nucleus for such a large co-operative movement in the common defence. The pan-Ionic League, which had maintained for upwards of five years an obstinate resistance to the Persian, even on Asiatic soil, had been apparently a development, or an extension, of the religious communion, the representatives of which had met from time immemorial at the shrine of Triopian Apollon; but there were many good and sufficient reasons why that precedent was not now transferred to Hellas. The Delphian League was a league not of city-states, but of nations, or tribes, no longer representing the chief centres of political power. Its local connexion with central Greece, and with Thessaly, placed the natural *foci* of resistance too far from Sparta and from Athens. Its existing representative machinery was not devised for direct political or military purposes, and was too cumbrous to be easily adapted thereto. Last, and not least, the loyalty of some of the members, notably the Thessalians, perhaps even that of the very custodians of Delphi itself, was not by any means above suspicion. There seems to have been never an idea of invoking the Amphiktyonic Council, or the members of the Amphiktyonic League, as such, to undertake the conduct of the national defence, at any stage in the story. The actually subsisting engagement between Sparta and Athens would have helped to preclude such an emprise. Nor could the existing Peloponnesian Confederacy, or, to speak more correctly, the Lakedaimonian Symmarchy, supply an exclusive basis for the new league. That was a permanent league of states associated with Sparta for all external purposes, and recognizing permanently the *Hegemony*, or lead, of Sparta. Athens stood outside it, in a looser and more nearly equal relation to Sparta, and could not be expected to enter it voluntarily upon the usual terms. Sparta herself did not aim at including exo-Peloponnesian states in the alliance, and might view with especial misgiving the entrance of a power which would give a predominantly maritime character to the association. Nor was Athens the only state in

question; it was contemplated, in view of the immense danger foreshadowed by the king's preparations, to form a new and unprecedented alliance, embracing as many Greek states as possible, from all quarters, in one great union against the Mede. The Congress was, in fact, summoned by invitation, for the express purpose of creating a new thing: *εἰ κως ἐν τε γένοιτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν καὶ εἰ συγκύψαντες τῶντὸ πρόσσοιεν πάντες* (7. 145): a pan-Hellenic unity, and a complete co-operation among all members of the race.

It has been suggested that the initiative in organizing the pan-Hellenic Symmarchy, or Confederacy, in 481 B.C. was taken by the Athenians, and Busolt quotes Herodotus 7. 139 to prove as much.¹ If this interpretation of the passage were binding, there would be a contradiction, or at least an inconsequence, between 7. 136 and 7. 239, where Sparta appears as obtaining the first knowledge of the king's intentions and communicating it to the rest. Such an inconsequence, arising from alternative sources, or moods, would be nothing to surprise a student of Herodotus; but in the present case the earlier passage cited does not of necessity cover the initiation of the Symmarchy, or the holding of the Congress, nor does the second passage, even if authentic, or credible, expressly refer to that. An Athenian initiative does not conflict with a Spartan executive. In respect to the Congress, Sparta may have issued the invitations after conference with Athens, and perhaps at the suggestion of Athens. The place of meeting is neither at Sparta nor at Athens, but half-way between, in the temple of Poseidon, on the Isthmos. There is no extant list of the states to which invitations were sent, nor of the states which accepted invitations and sent representatives (*πρόβουλοι*) to the Isthmos; nor do we know whether any state, which was actually represented at the Isthmos, declined to subscribe the *Symmachia*, though some of the original subscribers undoubtedly 'medized' in the sequel. The probable list of states invited to the Isthmos, or, at least, finally subscribing the treaty, may be reconstructed by certain means, within certain limits. All states must be excluded which were actually subject to the Persians already, such as the Greek settlements in Libya, in Asia, and not a few in Europe. To Kyrene, to the Ionians, to the colonies in Makedonia, in Thrake, and the adjacent islands, no invitations were issued. Again, states which joined, or were invited to join, the Symmarchy at a later stage, had presumably been unrepresented at the original Congress. Argos, the Greek cities in Krete, Korkyra, Italiotes and Sikeliotes received no invitation, and sent no representatives to the Isthmos in 481 B.C. States, the names of which are written in any of the Greek army- and navy-lists by Herodotus, or on the Serpent-pillar, or in the Olympic roll, may be safely included in the original Confederacy, so far as not known to have joined at a later stage. Sparta and her allies con-

¹ Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* ii.² (1895), 654.

trolled probably the great majority of the votes; as well the inland Arkadians, Tegea, Mantinea, and the Eleians, as the naval allies, Korinth, Megara, Aigina. Athens was, of course, represented, presumably by Themistokles, but had perhaps no second vote on which she could count except that of Plataia, even if the Euboian towns were represented. Thebes was there, and probably other members of the Boiotian League. The further powers of central Greece were perhaps represented, Phokians, Lokrians, Dorians. If any of the states of Thessaly sent representatives, they might, perhaps, on the whole tend to support Athens. Some of the western states, Leukas, Anaktorion, Ambrakia, may have been represented, but would be likely to take their cue from Korinth, and so reinforce the Peloponnesian interest, only threatened by the possible secession of Aigina and Megara.

(1) The first act of the Congress, thus brought together, must have been the creation, under all due religious formalities, of the Confederation, *Synomosia*, or Symmarchy, to resist the Persian. Technically the Symmarchy was, no doubt, an *Epimachy*, or Defensive Alliance, probably unlimited in time, but clearly defined in function. On the drafting of the general terms of the treaty must have followed a mighty and mutual swearing in of members, in the Peace and Alliance (σπονδαί τε καὶ συμμαχία) subscribed by the *Probouloi*. (2) Closely connected, indeed, with the Alliance was the establishment of Peace among Hellenes by the termination of feuds and wars (ἐχθρῶν καταλλαγὴ), the greatest of which was the quarrel between Athens and Aigina. (3) At an early stage of the Congress may also be placed the Vow of Vengeance (τὸ δρκιον), if it has any historical justification at all, to confiscate and consecrate any Greek city, or nation, which should voluntarily surrender to the Persian. Perhaps at the time of the session of the Congress, Delphi had not yet committed itself to the policy of Non-resistance. The vow was, according to its reported terms, a bid for the favour of Delphi, and the terms, if authentic, imply that Delphi is presumed to be on the national side. The oath would have been, in any case, a solemn farce, if registered at a time when nine at least of the twelve Amphiktyonic names had already 'medized,' compulsion or no compulsion. The oath is, however, carefully guarded and qualified; it bears merely on Greeks; it would not apply to the Greeks of Asia, or even of Thrake and Makedon, who were plainly acting under compulsion, nor to any other Greeks, even of those represented at the Congress, who should hereafter submit to a *force majeure*. On the whole the oath was rather of the nature of a *brutum fulmen*, a reassurance and encouragement to those combining to take it, rather than a very alarming threat to those who had submitted, or who should submit, to the king.¹ (4) Further, if we may reconstruct the Agenda-paper,

¹ Cp. further, p. 223 *infra*.

or rather the Minutes of the Congress, from Herodotus, we must conclude that a good number of important proposals were debated and decided before the meeting adjourned. Thus, spies were sent to Asia, to report upon the king's preparations and progress (cc. 146, 147). From the subsequent story it appears that these spies were well received at Sardes, and put in a position to give a full report to the *Probouloi*, or to the *Strategoi*, of the Confederacy. (5) Embassies were also appointed to visit the principal Greek states unrepresented at the Congress, namely, Argos, Syracuse (taking Korkyra on the way), and Krete. The reports of these embassies must have been made subsequently, so far as the items in the stories are historical, to an adjourned meeting of the *Probouloi*, in the following spring, or it may be direct to Sparta. In no case, be it here observed in passing, was the attempt to enlist these outlying members of the Greek race successful, and no attempt was made at all to rouse Kyrene to strike a blow for Hellas, even by invading Egypt on the one hand, or by co-operating against Carthage on the other. It is, further, evident that (6) the question of the leading, or *Hegemonia*, was raised, discussed, and settled in favour of Sparta at this Congress. The question of leading in a confederate war was not a simple one, and a large number of possibilities might have been presented to a Greek congress for dealing with the subject.¹ On this occasion the definite alternatives actually debated were, whether Sparta should be sole and supreme leader by land and by sea, or whether the supreme command at sea should be invested in Athens, which was to supply the overwhelming majority of the fleet, Sparta retaining the lead on land. The matter was decided wholly in favour of Sparta, no doubt by the votes mainly of the Peloponnesian allies, the Athenians, led in the matter doubtless by Themistokles, yielding the point not ungraciously.² It was not the only time upon which Athens, under Themistokles, sacrificed a point of *amour propre* or of liberty, in the interests of unity. From a purely strategic point of view the decision to maintain one and the same power in command over army and fleet was sound and fully justifiable; but probably political rather than military considerations determined the decision of the Congress, and the actual history of the campaigns leaves it doubtful whether Sparta ever interpreted the unity of her hegemony in the strictest and most efficient sense, or overcame the natural dualism of command by land and sea.³ (7) The question of the actual contingents to be furnished by the several allies was presumably raised and settled at some stage of the proceedings; perhaps the original act of alliance embodied an obligation binding upon all the subscribers to come to each other's support in full force to

¹ Cp. Xenophon, *Hell.* 4. 2. 16, and the alternatives proposed in 369 B.C. between Sparta and Athens (*Hell.* 7. 1. 2-14), and in 362 B.C. between the

Spartans and their allies (*Hell.* 7. 5. 3).

² Cp. Hdt. 8. 3.

³ Cp. case of Agesilaos in 394 B.C., Xen. *Hell.* 3. 4. 27.

the best of their ability by sea and by land : a provision which would mean in the Peloponnesos, and probably elsewhere, that two-thirds of the available fighting men should be employed on foreign service by land ; in regard to the fleet, however, apparently every available ship was employed, at least by Athens, and probably by all the naval allies. (8) Finally, the question of the plan of campaign for the defence of Greece must have been raised, more or less discussed, and provisionally resolved, in this Congress. There is nothing anomalous in the introduction of this item into the acts of the *Probouloi*. No hard-and-fast line divided the military and the political function in a Greek state, and probably many, if not all, the representatives actually assembled at the Isthmos in 481 B.C. commanded the contingents of their respective states in 480 B.C. Two previous acts of the Congress involve the question of the strategic plan of defence ; the enrolment of central Greece in the Confederacy gives every state enrolled a direct interest in drawing the line of defence so as to cover itself ; the decision, or necessary assumption, that the war was to be conducted by sea and by land was bound to govern the actual plan of operations. The leading on both elements had, indeed, been voted to Sparta ; but it does not follow that Sparta was left to determine, by her own unaided intelligence, the precise plan of actual operations. The lines of defence were debated and selected by a confederate organ ; the need of co-ordination for sea and land operations makes it impossible to believe that the commanders on sea and on land determined their several lines of action independently. A higher potency is required to draw the fundamental and original plan ; that organ is supplied by the Congress of representatives from all the states actually concerned. The meeting in the autumn of 481 B.C. will not have broken up without having arrived at a general understanding upon this all-important point. The king's intention could not be in doubt ; the bridges, the canal, let alone rumour and authentic information, made the Thrako-Makedonian route a foregone conclusion ; the extension of the national confederacy to Boiotia, central Greece, Euboia, and eventually to Thessaly, dictated a more or less self-evident line, or succession of lines, for the Greeks, acting on the defensive. But the obscurity which rests upon the relations of the Confederates to Thessaly infects the question of the actual plan of defence. If the commons of Thessaly, or the bulk of the Thessalian towns, are to be included among the signatories to the pan-Hellenic treaty of 481 B.C., whether as original members or as admitted before the close of the Congress, in either case the inclusion of the Thessalians in the National Union involved a plan of campaign which should draw the first line of defence much further north than would have been required in the interests of the Peloponnese, or of Attica, or even of Boiotia and central Greece. The *Probouloi*, according to Herodotus (7. 172, 173), admitted the Thessalians to the Alliance,

and decided to occupy the Pass of Tempe, a plan subsequently carried out in the following spring. The rest of that adventure belongs to the story of the actual operations and strategic conduct of the war. The Congress of *Probouloi*, however, will hardly have contented itself with the determination to guard Thessaly, and wholly omitted to discuss further alternatives in the event of the break-down, from any causes, of this first plan of campaign. Yet Herodotus appears to date the resolution to occupy Artemision and Thermopylai very distinctly to the spring of the year 480 B.C., months after the dispersion of the Congress of 481 B.C., though he lays the scene of the new resolution at the Isthmos, where the Congress had previously met. The record is, indeed, here, as elsewhere, lamentably imperfect and inexact, and considerable room is left for conjecture—a necessary evil under the circumstances—as to the actual procedure and course of action among the Confederates. Was there more than one meeting of the *Probouloi* at the Isthmos? It has been held that the Congress (*ὁ σύλλογος τῶν προβούλων*) on breaking up in 481 B.C. after its first session never met again, the executive passing at once to Sparta, her government and her commanders, advised by the meetings of confederate generals and admirals respectively (*συνέδρια τῶν στρατηγῶν*).¹ But there are several objections to be made to this view.

(i.) A meeting of the *Probouloi* would have been naturally called to receive the reports of the embassies despatched in the autumn of 481 B.C. to Argos, Krete, Korkyra, and Sicily. Even if the embassy to Argos, or that to Krete, might possibly have reported before the break-up of the first session, the report from the envoys to Sicily could hardly have been expected before the following spring. The spies sent into Asia would also have to bring back a report to the Congress. (ii.) Herodotus expressly represents 'the Hellenes' as holding a meeting in the spring of 480 B.C. at the Isthmos; and it is natural to see in this meeting a second session of the Congress of *Probouloi*. True, the only decision he reports of this meeting is the resolution to occupy Artemision and Thermopylai, now that Thessaly has been abandoned; but this resolution comes just as well from the *Probouloi* as the resolution previously and expressly reported of them, to occupy and defend the Pass of Tempe: both alike are strategic resolutions determined largely by political considerations. (iii.) Moreover, it is possible to enlarge the acts of the second, or spring-meeting, of the Congress, not only by the presentation of reports from the envoys and the spies, already referred to, but also by the transfer to this meeting of one or two items above assigned to the first meeting in the previous autumn. The Vow of Vengeance should, perhaps, be dated to this meeting, and with all the more point in view of the 'medism' now forced upon the Thessalians by the abandonment of Tempe. (iv.) A spring-meeting of the *Probouloi* was presumably

¹ Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* ii.² (1895), 667.

held in order to report the progress of preparations in the various cities which had already joined the Confederacy; to admit fresh members, if fresh members were forthcoming; to concert fresh measures, in view of any fresh circumstances; and to give the final commission to the several commanders. The actual resolution to defend Thermopylai and Artemision may only have been determined at this meeting, though it may have been considered, with other alternatives, in the previous autumn. Upon the whole, then, it appears reasonable to maintain that the Congress adjourned in the autumn of 481 B.C. to meet again in the spring of 480 B.C., and actually did then meet again, received reports from the cities comprising the alliance, from the spies despatched to Asia, from the embassies returned from Sicily, Krete, and Argos, and, above all, from the commanders already returned from Thessaly; recorded a vow of vengeance upon traitors to the national cause, a useful hint to Argos at least; and concerted a final plan for the defence of Hellas, in view of the abandonment of Thessaly. It would only be on the break-up of the Congress after this second session that the executive conduct of affairs, now a purely military and naval question, or set of questions, passed to Sparta, her king, and her navarch. This hypothesis appears to furnish the more probable perspective of the action of Greek states, and to accord better with the indications in the narrative of Herodotus, than the supposition that Sparta had taken over the whole conduct of affairs in the autumn of 481 B.C.

§ 6. The abandonment of Thessaly involved a change, or rather a development, in the plan of campaign; not so the refusal of all co-operation from Krete, Korkyra, and Sicily, or even from Argos. But these refusals must have been evil tidings for the *Probouloi*. Herodotus goes out of his way to apologize for Argos, perhaps under the glamour of a later situation; but neither his apology in itself, nor the story by which it is supported, is coherent or satisfactory. The Delphic oracle alleged by the Argives as part of the excuse for their neutrality or abstention was perhaps given on some other occasion, and transferred by the Argives to this context;¹ but, if rightly dated, it serves rather to condemn Delphi than to justify Argos. The war with Kleomenes, in which the Argives had lost '6000' hoplites, had occurred, not recently, but some half generation before, and many of the 'boys' were now come to man's estate; quite recently, however, the Argives, fighting against Athens, had lost in Aigina nigh a thousand men, of whom nothing is said in this connexion.² The jealousy of Spartan leading and the dread of Spartan power are no doubt permanent factors in the policy of Argos, and were dominant factors at this moment, all the more as Sparta found herself in temporary union with Athens; but the story of the *pourparlers* between Argos and Sparta over the question of the Hegemony is not

¹ Hdt. 9. 43.

² Hdt. 6. 92.

consistent with the facts that Argos was addressing not a Spartan, but a pan-Hellenic envoy, and that the Congress had already decided the question of Hegemony. By joining the pan-Hellenic Union, Argos would have obtained not merely a thirty years' truce with Sparta, but a complete composition of the secular feud (*ἐχθρας καταλλαγή*) such as had been just arranged between Aigina and Athens; but Argos would have obtained security at the price of recognizing Spartan Hegemony, and this price Argos was not prepared to pay. The Argives preferred to remain outside the National Union, and to wait upon events, trusting doubtless to profit by the defeat which the king was expected to inflict upon Sparta, and to recover, even at the expense of a recognition of Persian supremacy, the coveted lead in the Peloponnesos. Whether the medism of Argos went further than this constructive treason is doubtful; the patriotic vow of vengeance, mainly devised for the benefit of the Argives, was not enforced against them, and it is easy enough to understand the common report that the Argives were in correspondence with Xerxes, and had even invoked the king to the invasion of Hellas, as a commentary upon their neutrality of the normal type common among Greek political philosophers! Yet the refusal of Argos to co-operate with the National League was a serious blow to the patriotic policy, and even affected strategic plans and operations, helping, among other things, to explain the culpable reluctance of the Spartans to lead the Peloponnesian forces beyond the Isthmos.

The less malignant recusancy of the Kretans came also, in course of time, to be excused by the dictates of the Delphian oracle, but in itself, perhaps, hardly evokes surprise. Krete lay to an extraordinary degree, considering its early importance in the records of Aigaian civilization, outside the main currents of Greek politics and of Greek history in the fifth century. This isolation, so significant of the great break between the history of the Mykenaian world and the history of the Hellenic world, fortifies a suspicion that non-Hellenic elements were still potent in Krete even in the days of Themistokles and Perikles. Kretan hoplites are unknown on Hellenic battle-fields, and the days were long fled of Kretan thalattocracy. From Krete at best might have come some light-armed auxiliaries, to reinforce the Hellenic army in a somewhat defective department of its armature. Herodotus knows nothing of any such service; but, if Ktesias is to be trusted, Kretan archers were present at Salamis in the Athenian fleet.¹ The answer of Sicily, or of the Sikeliotes, to the national appeal calls for more extended discussion. Here, as elsewhere, the bare facts, which may be regarded as historically proven, must be distinguished from the motives and the circumstances, the speeches, and the setting generally, in which they are framed, or rather transfigured. It is quite certain that no Syracusan or Sikeliote forces

¹ *Persica*, 26.

came to the assistance of the Greeks in the war with Xerxes: is it equally certain that Gelon, the lord of Syracuse, had been formally incited, by an embassy from the Congress at the Isthmos, to send a contingent to the support of the motherland, perhaps actually to join the National League against the Persian? So fantastic, so transparently fictitious are the circumstances, and especially the speeches, reported of this embassy, that one might be tempted to dismiss the whole story of such an application to Gelon, were it not for the many particular incidents, apart from the story itself, which tend to confirm the historical character of the bare fact, such as the attack on the Greeks of the west whether concerted between Xerxes and Carthage, and designed to prevent a co-operation between western and eastern Greece, or not; the existence of a fully adequate and historical explanation, side by side with the fantastic and artificial story, accounting for the admitted absence of all help from Sicily; one might perhaps add, the mission of Kadmos to Delphi, on Gelon's behalf, showing at least an organic connexion between Syracuse and the progress of events in the east, which would make it extraordinary if the Greeks at the Isthmos had made no application to the Greeks in the west for assistance in the supreme hour of need. Similar expectations were entertained long afterwards in Peloponnesos under circumstances which appealed far less directly to Sikeliote interests; and though the application by the Peloponnesians to Syracuse for help against Athens in 431 B.C. met practically with little or no immediate response, the policy involved suggests an inference to the earlier and more urgent case, half a century before. The immense power of Syracuse under Gelon, far transcending that of any other single Greek state, makes it probable that the *Probouloi* at the Isthmos cannot have omitted to apply to Syracuse, when they were applying to Korkyra, to Krete, and to other out-lying members of the Hellenic name. The fact that one ship from *Magna Graecia* did actually take part in the battle of Salamis confirms the traditional fact of the despatch of the embassy from the Congress at the Isthmos to the Greeks of Italy and Sicily: we must suppose that the ambassadors visited Kroton and probably other cities of the west as well as Syracuse. The help sent by Italiotes was miserably small; the Sikeliotes sent no help at all; but Herodotus incontinently furnishes full and sufficient excuse for the absence of the Greeks of Sicily from the army- and navy-lists of eastern Hellas.

The story of the reception of the embassy by Gelon is sharply contrasted with the story told by the dwellers in Sicily, and can hardly be from a Sikeliote source, much less from a comedy of Epicharmos¹; but it is sufficiently unhistorical to have had such an origin. The story is fictitious, because the Spartan and the Athenian envoys cannot have addressed the tyrant of Syracuse and the lord of

¹ Freeman, *Sicily*, ii. 418.

Sicily in such terms as are here put into their mouths. The story is fabulous, because it has a moral, a 'tendency,' to exhibit the *hybris* of the tyrant, and the glorious independence of the free Republics of Greece. The best *mot* put into Gelon's mouth is a plagiarism from Perikles, and a clumsy plagiarism to boot.¹ The alternative story, definitely given on local Sikeliote authority, explains by a *vera causa* the absence of the Sikeliotes from Salamis: they were fully occupied at home with the great synchronous invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians. That was a fact which Syracuse could not forget, though there is no consciousness of it in the Herodotean story of the embassy. This story, though it reads to us like a satire on republican diplomacy and republican pretensions, was intended to exhibit the outrageous character of the tyrant. The total omission of all reference to Korinth, in the report of an embassy to the greatest of Korinthian colonies, may be due, not to the Syracusan, but to the Athenian provenience of the fiction. The mere story of the embassy is probably a part of the original draft of the Seventh Book, and as old as any part of the connected narrative; but it has received later additions, as the author became acquainted with additional facts, or fictions. The story of the rise of the house of Gelon is one such addition, the plagiarism from Perikles another; the appendix containing the story of the Carthaginian invasion is plainly derived from local Sikeliote sources. In the impending or synchronous invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians a real and insuperable obstacle existed to Gelon's giving any direct support to the defence of eastern Hellas; it does not, however, follow that there is no truth in the reported quarrel over the *Hegemonia*, however wild and improbable the exact terms of the speeches put into the mouths of Syagros the Spartan, the anonymous Athenian, and Gelon himself. It has been suggested that Gelon deliberately put the ambassadors off by making outrageous demands; but, granted his position at the time, and the military and naval forces at his disposal, there was nothing very outrageous in his demand for an equal share in the Hegemony, or even for the whole. The consciousness betrayed by the story, in however apocryphal a form, that, had Gelon come to the assistance of Greece, with his full forces, the question of the command must have been raised, is undoubtedly true to the conditions of the case, and in all probability the point was raised at the interview between the ambassadors from the Isthmos and the tyrant of Syracuse. But Gelon will hardly have confessed that, in view of his relations with Carthage, and the impending invasion, of which he had already in all probability intelligence, he dared not denude Syracuse and Sicily of ships and men. Gelon did not count assuredly upon the Greeks winning a decisive victory over Xerxes, least of all without his support; but neither did he regard their prospects as hopeless. As a matter of fact, the Greeks

¹ Hdt. 7. 162, with commentary *ad l.*

of the mother-country achieved a more complete success against the king than Gelon himself could boast to have achieved over the Carthaginian. Gelon looking ahead may have contemplated the possibility of a union with the eastern Greeks, after and in case he should have annihilated the Carthaginian power in Sicily. His interests lay on the side of an Hellenic victory in the east, as in the west; he had nothing to gain by the success of the Persians, though he prepared for that eventuality also. The somewhat obscure reference put into his mouth to a previous invitation of his own to the eastern Greeks, to Korinth presumably, or to Sparta, through Korinth, that they should assist him against Carthage, and secure 'the open door' in Sicily, has an unmistakably historical ring in it.¹ Such an application attests Gelon's appreciation of the solidarity of eastern Hellas and Sicily. One tradition affirms that he still intended, after his interview with the envoys, to join the Hellenes of the old country against the king²; but Salamis had rendered his assistance less desirable, and the surrender of the Hegemony by Sparta less probable than ever. The tradition probably affirms a merely logical possibility. The envoys returned from the west to report to the spring meeting of the *Probouloi*, not that any assistance was to be expected from Sicily, nor even that the Greeks of the west were precluded from sending help by the anticipated invasion of Sicily, but that the tyrant of Syracuse had complained of having been left to fight his own battles previously alone, and had offered assistance on impossible terms. On this report tradition improved, as attested by the Herodotean fable. The ambassadors from the west had, however, at least one promise of assistance to announce, and to that extent were more fortunate than their colleagues, who had been despatched to Argos or to Krete. The Korinthian colony of Korkyra had pledged itself to send assistance to the national cause, and in due time a fleet of sixty sail was despatched; but, unlike the humbler contingents from Ambrakia, Anaktorion, and Leukas, the Korkyrean ships never arrived, and the name of Korkyra was not to be inscribed in any list of the confederate Hellenes. As things turned out, the Greeks fared well enough without the Korkyrean squadron; the islanders themselves were the chief losers by the absence of their own vessels in the day of victory. Yet this story too, as told by Herodotus, is open to grave suspicion. The historian goes even further than his wont in reporting, *oratione recta*, the very words which the Korkyreans would have addressed to Xerxes, had he proved, as they expected, completely victorious, and so justified their malingering. The story betrays a strong animus against Korkyra, and may date from a time when the trouble between Korinth and Korkyra, which was one of the immediate antecedents of the Peloponnesian war, was actually brewing. But

¹ Hdt. 7. 158.

² Hdt. 7. 165. Cp. Freeman, *Sicily*, ii. 205.

Herodotus pays the Korkyreans too high a compliment when he expressed a belief that Xerxes would have shown special favour to the Korkyreans for their neutrality. Had the Persian heralds not reached Korkyra, and demanded there the symbols of surrender? Would the king have set so much store upon a mere neutrality, the ambiguous character of which could hardly have been disguised? The Korkyreans were awkwardly placed, half-way between Hellas and Italy. Their interests were really as much threatened by the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily as by the Persian invasion of Hellas. Yet their conduct undoubtedly was selfish, disloyal, unpatriotic; they profited by the victories of the Greeks in the east and in the west, without contributing one iota to the cost of either. Little wonder if Korkyra enjoyed a unique unpopularity, while she exploited from one generation to another a position which gave her a share in all the profits of the national struggle, without any sacrifice, save that of honour, on her own part.

§ 7. *The Case of Delphi.*—The problematic promise of Korkyra, the inevitable refusal of Syracuse, the punctilious neutrality of Argos, the haughty negative from Krete, the doubtful adhesion of Thessaly, may one and all have proved in the long-run less distressing and disastrous to the national counsels than despondency and discouragements from the shrine of Delphi. The invasion of Xerxes was the true, or at least the supreme, ordeal of the chief pan-Hellenic organ of divine revelation, prophecy, and counsel, and Delphi undoubtedly was found wanting in the day of judgement. Whether the Pythia actually 'medized' is not clear; that the oracle, and its conductors, failed to seize the opportunity and rise to the height of the occasion is only too evident; nay, worse, counsels of despair and cowardice were heard from the Pythian shrine. The attitude of Delphi may not have been quite uniform towards all applicants for advice, or throughout the whole crisis, but the occasion was not one for ambiguity or faint-heartedness: it demanded faith which could remove mountains, and the faithlessness of Delphi was in itself portentous. The time was not yet come when the acts or utterances of Delphi were a negligible quantity. Delphi had even recovered, to a great extent, from the damage to its credit involved in the fall of Kroisos, a good half-century before, as indeed it was destined to recover, though less completely, from its fatal error in the Persian war. Delphi had been, and still was, a great force in Hellenic history, and upon the whole a force making for righteousness. Even within the past half-century Delphi had set up and put down kings, had founded states, had dictated or sanctioned laws and constitutions, had promoted peace, had justified war, between state and state. Delphi was the most universally recognized centre of the national religion, and the Pythian festival the high-water mark of Hellenic art and culture. The most austere and intimate morality

marked the private counsels of the Pythian Sibyl. Delphi was the chief focus and capital of a great league, with a definite organization and indefinite authority, chiefly, no doubt, in matters of intertribal or interpolitical faith and morals. Had Delphi embraced, heart and soul, the national cause, and ranged itself uncompromisingly upon the side of those who had chosen the better part (*οἱ τὰ ἀμείνω φρονέοντες*), Delphi itself might have suffered, as Abai, as Athens suffered, at the hands of the Persians, but how much more resolute and perhaps successful had been the national resistance, how much more quickly achieved the national success, how much more glorious and far-reaching the fame and the future of Delphi itself! Fifty years were scarce elapsed since the accidental destruction of the old temple by fire. The piety and patriotism of the Greek world, and not of the Greek world alone, had rebuilt the temple on a grander scale; an Athenian house had put to shame the previous history of all building-contracts by its liberality, well-calculated and not ill-repaid. Thrice happy Delphi, had the Alkmaionid erection perished in flames kindled by the Persian, and had all the treasures of the past been carried to Susa, or melted into a common and amorphous mass by the god of Fire! The Pythian temple must have arisen from its ashes, to be the wonder of the world, and even the latest posterity could scarce have doubted the divine legation of an oracle that had provoked destruction at the hands of the Barbarian. Alas, it was not to be! The direct relations of the Persian to Delphi are indeed obscure; but plain and incontrovertible is the fact that Delphi passed unscathed, unsacked, uninjured through the storm that swept Athens away, and respected the oracular shrine of Abai in Boiotia as little as that of Branchidai in Ionia. If Delphi itself did not actively medize, yet nine out of the twelve members of the Amphiktyonic League gave earth and water to the great king. This fact in itself is enough to explain the immunity of Delphi in the Persian war. An examination, in detail, of the evidences as to the position and policy of the Pythian power in the crisis of the national fortunes may result in a verdict of 'not proven,' but cannot entitle the too sagacious oracle to an acquittal on the charge of medism.

And first, (i.) acts and utterances are on record against Delphi calculated to discourage the Greeks in their resistance to the Persian king, to divide them, and to justify neutrality, indifference, and medism. The Argives defended their unpatriotic abstention by appealing to a Delphic utterance, which expressly forbade them to take sides with the Hellenes. The oracle in question is, indeed, not above suspicion. If it was given to Argos 'shortly after' the loss of the 6000 in the war with Kleomenes, its proper date might rather be 491 than 481 B.C., a date that would suit well enough with the general circumstances of the time. There is nothing in the response itself to determine a date, or even to suggest a reference to the

Persian war; Argos may have kept a genuine Delphic response on hand to be produced at any time in justification of a discreet neutrality. But the fact remains that the Argives could with complete verisimilitude allege an express consultation of the oracle in 481 B.C., in witness whereof they produced a response giving their actual conduct a Delphian sanction; and the possibility remains that their story was in substance true. The terms of the oracle are in themselves truly oracular, that is, the response has all the notes of authenticity. That Argos should consult Delphi, if there were any doubt as to the better course to be pursued, or even if there were a desire to obtain a response justifying a foregone policy of abstention, accorded with precedents and probability. In fine, the response to Argos, if correctly dated, and rightly associated with the Persian crisis, is clear proof of the complicity of Delphi; and even if wrongly dated, or misapplied, is clear proof that the attitude of Delphi during the said crisis made such a story as the Argive acceptable in the next generation. The moral of the Kretan story is similar, if it be a Kretan story, and not a postscript picked up by Herodotus in the west. Anyway the Kretans were said to have obtained a response from Delphi more than justifying their absence in the day of battle. Whether the actively 'medizing' states, Thessalians, Boiotians, and the other members of the Amphiktyonic League, to the number of nine, had express advice or sanction from Delphi for their unpatriotic policy does not appear; but neither is there on record one single word of reproof, of exhortation, addressed to them from Delphi. Nor is the story of the mission of Kadmos, son of Skythes and trusty servant of Gelon, with a huge treasure, to Delphi, there to await the result of the war, and to act accordingly, favourable to the reputation of Delphi; for Gelon must presumably have had reason to believe that Delphi was a safe treasury in either event, and safety in such a case was dishonour. Victory for Xerxes must have spelt ruin to Delphi, if Delphi had been an active centre of the national defence.

Not but what there are also in evidence (ii.) acts and utterances from Delphi calculated to stimulate and to encourage the patriotic Greeks, and to increase the chances of the patriotic movement. Such is the oracle reported to have been given to the Spartans well before the war, and promising the deliverance of Sparta and Peloponnesos in return for the 'devotion' of a Spartan king (7. 220). But this oracle is almost certainly a *vaticinium post eventum*, a justification, not a prediction, of the death of Leonidas, and is part of the general but self-contradictory apology for the fiasco at Thermopylai put into circulation after the event. Hardly more historical can be the oracle, reported to have come to the Lakedaimonians from Delphi, after the death of Leonidas, and indeed after the victory at Salamis, directing them to demand satisfaction from the King for the death of their king (8. 114). These items served *inter alia* to put Delphi right, so to speak, with

Sparta, at a time when it was in Sparta's interest (as may appear anon) to condone the attitude of Delphi in the Persian war. Another link in the process of rehabilitation is supplied by the oracle 'Pray to the Winds' (*ἀνέμοισι εὐχέσθαι*), a response to the good Delphians themselves, when they consulted the god, 'on behalf of themselves and of Hellas' (*ὑπὲρ ἑωυτῶν καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος*), promptly reported by them to 'the Hellenes,' a patriotic act, whereby they won undying gratitude (7. 178). If only it were not too likely that the oracle succeeded the storm, not the storm the oracle! Perhaps the oracle which 'came to the Athenians,' bidding them invoke their son-in-law, that is Boreas, the North Wind, was a Delphic oracle (7. 189): if so, it might either be a doublet of the preceding one, which came to 'the Hellenes,' or a fresh item in the apology of Delphi, to the address of Athens. The most significant, the most problematical instance remains to be considered in the oracle, or oracles, extorted from Delphi by the Athenian *theoroi*, ostensibly before the war (7. 140, 141), admittedly before the decisive issue had been reached. These oracles have, if not in themselves, yet in their setting and circumstances, the appearance of full authenticity. The two versified responses are, indeed, startling in their photographic realism of the situation in Attica upon the very eve of the battle of Salamis, and startling in the ruthless logic with which the two alternatives, then before the Athenians, and before Greece, are presented: to wit, a great naval battle, which should risk everything on one last throw; or else flight, flight in the ships across the main, to find a new home in the west—in the west it could only be. This circumstantiality in the oracles almost compels us to date them to the point just indicated: the precise reference to Salamis is most easy of admission after the abandonment of Artemision; the description of the state of Attica is hardly conceivable before the loss of Thermopylai, perhaps before the advance of the Persians across Kithairon. The precision in the names of the Pythia, of Timon the Athenian *proxenos*, the part played by Themistokles in the interpretation of the response favourable to his own policy, all combine to heighten the authenticity of the story in its essentials, of which the ostensible date, well before the struggle actually began, is not one. After the failure at Thermopylai, and the still greater failure of the Peloponnesians to keep tryst in Boiotia, a struggle had presumably broken out in Athens itself between Themistokles and his opponents—some of the returned exiles among them—as to the best course to be pursued under the circumstances. While Themistokles was determined to do battle by Salamis, less confident and less provident leaders were already advocating the alternative policy, the *δεύτερος πλοῦς*, evacuation of Salamis itself, and migration *en masse* to a new home, in Italy, or elsewhere. That both parties consulted the oracle, and that each received a response favouring its own wishes, is as significant of the ambiguous faint-heartedness

of Delphi in that disastrous day as though the double alternative had been included in one single response; but the policy of Themistokles had at least the advantage of 'the last word.' The fact that after the fall of Thermopylai the Athenians sent a *theoria* to Delphi would be the clearest and strongest proof forthcoming that even at the eleventh hour Delphi was not yet fully committed to the Mede, nor had quite forfeited the confidence and hopes of the national forces.

Hence we can the better understand (iii.) the acts of the patriotic Greeks, which seem to recognize the patriotism of Delphi, or at least to acquit the oracle of the charge of medism before or during the struggle. The vow of vengeance, to confiscate the medizing states, and to consecrate a tithe of the spoils to 'the god in Delphi' (7. 132), is the most frappant evidence, and probably in time anterior to the Athenian *theoria* just discussed. This vow is to be dated at latest to the spring of the year 480 B.C., probably after the abandonment of Thessaly, and certainly after the announcement of the neutrality of Argos and the reception of discouraging reports from other quarters. When that vow was registered it may have been known that the Thessalians must 'medize,' but it was not expected that the Persian forces would ever penetrate Thermopylai, or pass the Euripos, or come within striking distance of Delphi. At a time when nine out of the twelve Amphiktyonic nations were vassals of the king, such a vow would have been an absurdity.¹

The greater part of the evidence in favour of Delphi comes manifestly and *ex hypothesi* after the event of the war, consisting in the tithes and offerings presented to Apollo from the spoils of the Greek victories, and the monuments erected by the Amphiktyonic Council in honour of the great and gallant Dead. In view of the present argument, these monuments form the best commentary upon those offerings. Of the medism of the vast majority of the tribes represented in the Amphiktyonic Council there can be no manner of doubt: voluntarily, or yielding to *force majeure*, nine of the twelve nations were confessed traitors. But the act of the *Pylagoroi* was in the nature of an amnesty, a self-rehabilitation, a re-admission to the larger Hellenic communion. It was also very plainly dictated by Sparta, or agreeable to the policy of Sparta, at a moment when she was looking to a revival of the Delphic Amphiktyony to furnish a counterweight to the alarming revival of the pan-Ionian confederacy of Delos, under Athenian auspices. The subserviency of the Amphiktyony to Spartan wishes at this time is evidenced by the dogma of the Council, which set a price upon the head of the reputed traitor Epialtes, the Malian.² The restoration of the Amphiktyony was a part of the rehabilitation of Delphi, but neither effort was a complete success. Themistokles defeated the policy of Sparta at Thermopylai,³ and the religious

¹ Cp. pp. 220, 223 *supra*.

² Cp. Hdt. 7. 214.

³ Cp. Plutarch, *Themist.* 20.

splendours of the Athenian Akropolis and of Eleusis more and more tended to throw Delphi into the shade. Greece had owed Delphi too little in the hour of supreme danger ; and though it was to the general interests to restore confidence in the chief organ of supernatural guidance and authority open to all comers, many tendencies of the age combined to make a complete restoration impossible. Delphi had recovered from the shock of the fall of Kroisos, and its triumphant apology for that miscarriage may be read, in various forms, alike in the verse of Bakchylides and in the prose of Herodotus. Its misgivings, its suspicious and too fortunate escape in the Persian war, irretrievably damaged its credit as an organ of political wisdom. Herodotus, indeed, accepts the apology of Delphi on both occasions at its own valuation, but Herodotus in this, as in other cases, cannot be taken as exemplifying the best or most enlightened thought of his own age. The grand *pièce justificative* presented on Delphi's behalf is the story of the miraculous deliverance from the Persian attack (8. 35-39), which, if it had only been generally believed, would have set Delphi on a higher pinnacle than ever, and made it, more than ever, the *omphalos* of the Greek world. But the subsequent fortunes of Delphi prove that the story was not generally believed even at the time, and to-day it is, of course, doubly incredible. The Herodotean version is open to a host of fatal objections, and its genesis is easily explained. The miraculous element, the sacred arms found of their own accord outside the temple, the thunderbolts from heaven, the twin peaks rent from Parnassos and rolling down upon the Barbarians, the war-cry from out the shrine of Athene, the apparitions of the departed heroes, Phylakos and Autonoos, in front of their sanctuaries, of gigantic stature, clad in panoplies, pursuing and slaying the panic-stricken Persians, are all to little purpose! The moral is obvious: Delphi too was assaulted, but preserved: *Deorum iniurias Dis curae!* Some have been tempted to rationalize the story, missing thereby, as generally in such cases, the main points in the creation and in the critique of the legend. There was no assault upon Delphi by the Persians for the very good reason that by this time, if not the Delphians themselves, yet nine of the Amphiktyonic nations had already made terms with Xerxes. But the god—as it turned out—never did Delphi a worse service than when he saved his treasures from the Persian spoiler, and his temple from the Persian flames. Not to have foreseen and foretold the victorious issue of the war, and thereby contributed to hasten and to secure it, was a great shock to those disposed to trust in the inspiration of the Pythia: the immunity of Delphi was a still greater trial to their faith. The legend of the miraculous preservation of Delphi is the god-forsaken effort of the Delphians, to rescue the credit of the shrine, in view of incontestable facts. It was not, the pious fraud seldom is, altogether a failure. The story imposed upon the easy credulity of Herodotus, and it may have imposed, in course of

time, upon the Delphians themselves. But apart from the incredibilities involved, and the obvious apologetic intention apparent in the story, it stands condemned as inconsistent with another and *prima facie* more historical anecdote in Herodotus' own pages (9. 42). Mardonios, upon the eve of battle, observing some dejection among his officers, sought to reassure them by announcing to them an oracle, which foretold ruin to the Persians should they plunder the temple of Delphi. Verily a weird consolation if the Persians, a few months before, had done their best to plunder the temple, and been discomfited, whether by natural or by supernatural means! Mardonios, when he appeals to such an oracle, knows nothing of any attempt on the part of the Persians to possess themselves of the treasures of Delphi. In vain Herodotus attempts to put himself right by restoring the oracle in question from the Persians to the Illyrians: if Mardonios used the oracle as applying to the Persians, the transfer had already been made in that direction, and may even have helped to preserve Delphi intact, and to encourage the Persians elsewhere; for the oracle might be taken to promise success to the Persian if he respected the property of Delphi, and so Mardonios interprets it. Nor does it matter to the present argument, even if the anecdote of Mardonios be itself unhistorical. Its invention must then be ascribed to some retailer of good things, who was as ignorant, as his own Mardonios, of any attempt of the Persians upon the treasures of Delphi. But Mardonios is a consulter of the Greek oracles, although Delphi is conspicuous by its absence from the list of shrines visited by his envoy; and if either the anecdote of Mardonios or the story of the attempted sack of Delphi is to be received as true, it surely cannot be the transparently fictitious story. Its credibility is not enhanced, albeit its genesis may be rendered more easily intelligible, by the occurrence of varying duplicates, two of which are supplied by Ktesias. In the first Xerxes sends Mardonios himself to sack 'the shrine of Apollon,' Mardonios is overwhelmed by a storm, and perishes. This episode occurs after the battle of Plataia, and before the battle of Salamis, according to the inverted perspective of Ktesias. In the second instance Xerxes was for sending Megabyzos to sack 'the temple in Delphi'; Megabyzos begged off, and Xerxes sends the eunuch Matakas, who accomplishes his task successfully, and returns to Xerxes: this achievement is placed after the return of Xerxes to Asia. The first of these stories is evidently a wildly distorted version of the miraculous preservation of Delphi as told also by Herodotus, though the name of Delphi is not actually used by Ktesias in this instance. The second story, in which Delphi is expressly named, has nevertheless a curiously historical suggestion about it, and may possibly deserve to be referred to an episode connected with the temple of Apollon at Branchidai, and might be converted into genuine history by exchanging the terms 'temple of Apollon' in the first instance for 'temple

in Delphi' of the second. But whether Ktesias supplies two stories in point, as in his unamended form, or only one story in point, as in the proposed emendation by exchange, in either case the duplication of the story in Herodotus of the assault on Delphi and its miraculous preservation only serves still further to discredit that incredible legend.

Not that every circumstance in the story is alike unacceptable. The panic of the Persians is a fiction, but the panic of the Delphians themselves may be an authentic fact. Even down to the loss of Thermopylai, although there is little or nothing to suggest that Delphi was putting itself forward at the head of the national defence movement, encouraging the faithful, reproving the faint-hearted, seeking to extend the area of the patriotic Alliance, and so forth, yet there is almost equally little of authentic evidence to suggest that Delphi had given earth and water to the king, or irrevocably compromised itself with the heads of the National League. When in the midsummer of 482 B.C. the 27th Pythiad was being celebrated, the preparations of the great king must have been known to the hosts of pilgrims and *theoroi* flocking to Delphi for the occasion, and doubtless were warmly debated by festive guests, and by the inner ring of Delphian authorities. But Delphi was not selected as the meeting-place of the national Congress in the following year: had the Amphiktyons, or even the Delphians, claimed such honour, could it have been denied? Yet Thessaly, and all the Amphiktyonic nations, were at first included in the national movement, and it is not conceivable that the Delphians were already medizing. After the refusal of Argos to join the national symmarchy against the Persian, and the abandonment of Thessaly, the sympathies of Delphi may have begun to faint, and the apprehensions of Delphi to grow; but Thermopylai was to be defended, with every prospect of success, and the vow of vengeance against the voluntary medizers is evidence that the patriotic Alliance had not despaired either of victory or of the loyalty and the safety of Delphi. When Thermopylai had been forced, and Artemision, of necessity, abandoned, the question became acute for Athenians, whether to stand at Salamis, or to take up their bag and baggage and make away to the west. Delphi was still approached for counsel and revelation upon this crucial question. Never were poets of Delphi more fervently excited, never prophetess more hopelessly distraught: contradictory utterances, supporting rival plans of action diametrically opposed to each other, proceeded out of the same inspired mouth, and were carried to Athens to make confusion twice confounded, until the wit of Themistokles came to the interpretation of the last word, which he (or his wealth) had procured, and 'divine Salamis' carried the day. Meanwhile, at Delphi, the more simple or more timorous had acted on the advice which had been formulated for the Athenians, and evacuated city and shrine for

fear of the Persians, not yet realizing that Thessaly, that Thebes, that the mass of medizing Greeks, by this time on the Persian side, were an adequate security for the king's clemency. A few of the wiser heads, the inmost ring of the Delphian authorities, may have been from the first, or have very soon become, apprised that there was nothing to fear. Delphi had said or done little to earn the king's displeasure; and Xerxes was not a mere bandit, or raider, but a statesman in search of fresh provinces, and more or less contented subjects. The medizing Greeks were, from the first, in a position to reassure the Delphians. Probably enough, a Persian contingent passed Delphi on the way to the south-east. Notwithstanding the criticism of Herodotus, it is not improbable that the Persians, or Mardonios in particular, received such an oracle as was afterwards reported to that council of war before Plataia. Why should Delphi, that had shown such favour to the Mermnad kings, and enjoyed such bounties at the hands of Amasis, despair of the piety and liberality of the Achaimenids? The Delphic god throughout was *in utrumque paratus*, but this ambiguous attitude was too clever by half. A genuine prophet might have forecast the Greek victory, an heroic diviner would have gladly shared the Greek disaster. Delphi never recovered from the double discredit of its collapse in the Persian war; the effort for its rehabilitation was but a partial success; no great political achievement, no national crisis, ever again owed a decisive sanction or decision to the Pythia. Delphi remained a safe depository for treasure, a store of votive monuments, and still a source of guidance and consolation in private affairs; but its desperate condition is attested by its anti-Periklean partisanship in 431 B.C., and still more by its *Philippism*, or impotence, in the fourth century. We, who have known mightier organs of a fuller inspiration side again and again with the cause of darkness against light, of slavery against freedom, of wrong against right, can the more easily condone, as all the Greek world itself conspired to do, the shortcoming of Delphi in the Persian war: the rather, 'barbarians' as we are, seeing that its failure was partly due to the defects of its virtues. Delphi had long given up to mankind what was meant for Greece, and, albeit not actually cursed with the bias of anti-patriotism—the besetting sin of other times and other churches—could not regain an exclusive Hellenism even in that hour of potential martyrdom, when to have lost this world had been for Delphi, as for every human institution or child of man in like case, to have gained a crown of immortality.

§ 8. The material forces at the disposal of the National Alliance in 480 B.C. are documented for us in the Greek army- and navy-lists. The detailed consideration of these lists is better to be undertaken in connexion with the review of the actual operations of the war; here it will be enough to consider the highest totals. There is in respect of these lists, used for this purpose, an observation to be made

similar to the observation already made for the Persian lists: the navy-lists have a greater *prima facie* authenticity, or at least verisimilitude, than the army-lists. The specific items for the various contingents of the fleets, given in ships, are more plausible than the specific items for the various contingents of the land-forces, given in men: the former are seldom merely round numbers, the latter are never anything else. Still, in regard to the army on the Greek side, as on the Persian, individual contingents were organized in tens, and multiples of ten, and the Greek units were probably more nearly full units than the Persian, if for no other reason because they were smaller, and did not aim at such immense totals. In the case of both fleet and army on the Greek side an addition might have to be made to the actual lists given by Herodotus, in order to cover ships and men detached, or left behind, for garrison-duty, or home and coast defence, and perhaps even on the lines of communication. Probably, from the nature of the case, the fullest navy-list represents more nearly the sum total of ships, and therefore of men, available for service at the front, than the fullest army-list. Taking here the lists for Salamis and for Plataia respectively, we get a total of 380 triremes, and a few (6) pentekonteres in the fleet. Allowing 200 men to each trireme for crew, a total manning of 76,000 is required for the long-ships; and supposing the *Epibatai* were in the same proportion as on the Persian ships—a very doubtful supposition—11,400 armed men would have to be added, making a total of 87,400, or, with the crews and marines of the pentekonteres, nearly 88,000 men. All things considered, it does not seem rash to compute the total manning of the Greek fleet, from first to last, losses at Artemision and so forth considered, as not falling far short of 100,000 men—a total doubtless much below, not merely the reputed, but the actual strength of the king's navy, yet still a force by no means despicable, and when fighting under favourable conditions likely to give a good account of itself. In the following year a good many of the men who had fought at Salamis probably did duty at Plataia, whereas the fleet had been cut down to 110 vessels; we are therefore not justified in simply adding the totals of men for Salamis and Plataia together, as giving a grand total for the whole forces of the Greeks: the army-list must be treated as a separate computation, and valid for the second campaign only. The computation for Plataia gives, however, a minimum of 38,700 hoplites, or heavy infantry, and 69,500 light-armed soldiers, or, adding the 1800 Thespians who had lost their armour, 71,300, making a total of 110,000 men, the largest Greek force on record, as assembled on one field, and far larger than the army with which Alexander set out to over-run the Persian empire. Adding a computation of 22,000 for crews and 3300 hoplites serving on the fleet at the same time, we obtain a grand total of 135,300 men in motion, at one and the same time, upon the Greek side in the second

year of the war: a considerable, but by no means incredible figure, albeit at a time when nearly the whole of the centre and north of Greece was in the hands of Mardonios, and supplying contingents to his forces. Had the unity of Greece, or even of the free members of the Greek name, been effected by the Congress of 481 B.C., or even had the degree of unity temporarily effected been permanently maintained, the Persian invasion need not have caused so vast a scare! Xerxes could hope to reduce Greece only by the aid of Greeks. Even with the degree of unity attained and maintained, the cause of Greece was anything but desperate in the spring, or in the summer, of 480 B.C., and it is obvious that one man at least, Themistokles, never despaired of it. He rightly estimated the enormous advantages upon the side of Hellas, in spite of the numerical superiority of the foe, and the absence, treachery, hostility, of some who should have been members of the patriotic Alliance. Provided the sound portions of Hellas remained sound and true to each other, Themistokles had forecast a glorious issue to the struggle, that should eclipse the trophy of Marathon itself. For this end he restored unity to Athens by the recall of the exiles. For this end he maintained unity in the Confederacy by the sacrifice of the Athenian claim to the Hegemony. At later stages in the course of the actual operations he again and again secured the material and moral unity of the national forces, at critical moments, by the timely concession, by the double-edged stratagem, it may be even by the judicious bribe, or the desperate threat. But Themistokles was no martyr of a hope forlorn: the real conditions, strategic and tactical, the actual course of the naval and military operations in the war, fully justified his unerring forecast, if only unity among the mere remnant of the Greeks could be preserved.

APPENDIX IV

GENERAL STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR: THESSALY

§ 1. Material conditions of the strategic problem from the Greek point of view. § 2. Chronological and geographical defects of the record. § 3. Four possible lines of defence: the Isthmos. § 4. The line of Plataia and Salamis. § 5. The line of Artemision and Thermopylai. § 6. The Thessalian question. § 7. Reasons for the abandonment of Thessaly. § 8. Subsequent conduct of the Thessalians. § 9. Strategic sequel of Salamis. § 10. The Persian strategy, and its inherent weakness.

§ 1. ABOUT the middle of the year 481 B.C. Greeks on the European side became convinced that the re-invasion of Hellas, upon an immense scale, was impending. Measures were accordingly taken, unexampled hitherto in the history of Greece, to unite, in one common league and plan of defence, all the states whose liberties were threatened. The objective of the Persian expedition could not be Athens alone, nor could its purpose be simply to avenge upon Athens the too successful resistance of nine or ten years back. The projected and now clearly ascertained route of the expedition, its double character, portending operations on land and on sea, the scale upon which it was organized, and other self-evident observations, all enforced the conclusion that, from Olympos to Tainaron, no Greek state could count its existence sure, except by submission and the surrender of earth and water to the king's emissaries, or its independence safe, except by an armed and adequate resistance. Yet from Tainaron to Olympos was a far cry, and a complete *solidarité* of interests was still to seek throughout the peninsula. Much was to happen before Peloponnesian states could needs feel themselves immediately involved in the military crisis: Argos was throughout to maintain its habitual dissidence. Athens might believe itself the primary goal of the king's ambition and displeasure; the remaining states of central Greece cannot have been ardent advocates of the national cause. Fortunately for Hellas the honour of Sparta was as deeply implicated as the liberty of Athens in a resistance *à outrance*: the question remained, on what line such resistance should be offered. That question involved more than

merely military or strategic issues. The plan of military defence could be separated neither from the policy of the leaders nor from the actual extent and composition of the league. An attempt to do so was indeed made, when the Athenians were invited to abandon Salamis for Peloponnese; but the proposal proved even in a strategic aspect disastrous, and had to be withdrawn almost as soon as hazarded. The war was to be conducted by sea and by land: a war, in which the direct co-operation of fleet and army upon the king's part was expected. Even failing direct co-operation, still indirectly the possession of supreme power at sea was bound to exercise a decisive influence upon the campaign and its issues. The theatre of the war was to be, in the first instance, the Hellenic peninsula itself, with its coasts and the islands immediately adjacent, albeit hostilities might be carried into the enemy's country, and were carried thither before long, by a brilliant development of offensive-defensive strategy. For such a development, however, a decisive victory, and for choice a naval victory, by the Greek forces was an almost indispensable condition. The lack of complete solidarity on the Greek side, the division of interest between the chief land-power and the chief sea-power, to say nothing of subordinate rivalries, led inevitably to a desire on the one hand that the fleet should bear the brunt of the attack, and to a corresponding desire on the other hand that the army should take its fair share, perhaps even something more than its fair share, of the fighting. In short, Sparta's main object will have been to obtain a victory at sea, and that as near home as possible; the main object of Athens presumably was to obtain a victory by land, and that somewhere well in front of Attica: the further north the better. These, and other cognate considerations, explain a great deal that is obscure in the Greek traditions of the war. Herodotus, indeed, is far from conceiving, clearly or consciously, the strategic aspects, or problems, presented by his own narrative; but incidentally and imperfectly he records acts and indicates discussions which help us to restate problems and to reconstruct solutions, factual or ideal, as they presented, or may have presented, themselves to the intelligent and leading minds of the time, and as they worked themselves out in the real course of events with a logic as unerring as a superhuman providence itself might have dictated.

§ 2. The chief obstacle to a generally convincing reconstruction of the war-story and the war-theory lies, no doubt, in the absence of an accurate and fairly complete chronology even of events actually on record. If the precise dates of oracles, and oracular directions, detailed by Herodotus, of political and even of military movements, of treaties and of battles, of banquets and of dialogues, are in doubt, the very first requisite for an authoritative reconstruction of theory and of history is wanting. The story becomes to some extent a function of the theory; events themselves wait upon the supposed

logic of events. Dealing with evidence so imperfect in amount, and so elastic in character, historians can hardly be expected to arrive at a complete agreement in regard to all points of debate, or even in regard to the true course of the main story. Yet the effort to recover the perfect story from the imperfect traditions will not and cannot be abandoned, so long as the history and literature of ancient Hellas retain their pristine and inalienable charm for humanity. An immense advance has been made, within living memory, in the treatment of the subject, partly owing to an improvement in historical methods and criticism, partly to the vivifying and concrete influence of topographical study pursued *an Ort und Stelle*. The history of ancient warfare is nowadays informed by a geographical science, to which the empirical observations, much more the hearsay reports, of ancient historians must conform, or else be discarded. The correction of their chronology must remain to some extent a speculation: the correction of their topography is a verifiable act. If, by some chance little short of miracle, all the generally admitted facts recorded by Herodotus could be precisely dated to the days, or even months, of the Attic calendar for the years of Hypsichides, Kalliades, and Xanthippides, the policy and strategy of the Greek states would stand in a comparatively full daylight.

§ 3. Viewed generally, and from the standpoint of Sparta, the hegemonic state in the Persian war, there were four lines of defence open to the Greeks in 480 B.C., and by them discussed and considered. Each line had special advantages and disadvantages, political and military, of its own. A review of these strategic alternatives will induce a fuller and more concrete appreciation of scarce-reported controversies, and will develop the latent record of actual events in the war-campaigns into positive, even if problematical, results. The inmost or last possible line of defence was drawn across the Isthmos; several arguments were urgeable in favour of this line. At the Isthmos the Greek land- and sea-forces could co-operate directly, a condition which could hardly be realized anywhere in central Greece, south of Euboia. Again, the Isthmos-line delayed the actual encounter with the Persian arms, and removed it further from the Persian base: the later in the season, the further in Europe the king advanced, the worse in some ways at least for his chances of victory, the greater his disaster in case of defeat. Finally, the Isthmos-line was in a high degree defensible, especially upon the land side, where it was capable of artificial strengthening; there too the leaders could count upon the courage of desperation in the Peloponnesian forces, when fighting at their own gates *pro aris et focis*. But the objections to acquiescing from the first in a defence based on the Isthmos and confined to Peloponnesos must have been so obvious and overwhelming that the Isthmos-line can hardly have been discussed openly before the disaster at Thermopylai, though the Peloponnesians and their leader

all along held this alternative *in petto*, as the one most agreeable to purely Peloponnesian interests, if pure Peloponnesian interests ever became predominant. For the Isthmos-line marked the abandonment of all central Greece to the Mede, and involved not merely the loss of Boiotia, Phokis with Delphi, and the other districts and tribes of that region, but the positive accession of local resources and recruits to the king. In particular the Isthmos-line meant the extermination of Athens: but would the Athenians suffer that no effort should be made, no blow struck, for liberty north of the Isthmos? The Athenian fleet was from the first all-essential to the interests of the Peloponnesians themselves; the Athenians had, if necessary, an irresistible argument at their disposal, to compel Sparta and the Peloponnesians to give battle beyond the Isthmos. To do Sparta justice, there can hardly, in the first instance, have been any serious question of abandoning all central Hellas to the Persian. Separate though the cause of the Peloponnesians might appear in Hellenic politics, the dullest-witted Spartan will have understood that the Persian empire might be stayed at Olympos, but could never be barred by the Korinthian gulf. So long, therefore, as political considerations were combined with the purely strategic problem, the Peloponnesians themselves must have recognized the necessity of seeking a defensive position beyond the Isthmos-line. Probably Herodotus is not mistaken in representing the question of the Isthmos-line as having taken practical shape only after the fiasco at Thermopylai, and in connexion with the alternative of Salamis, as a station for the fleet. Even at that stage the opposition of Athens to the abandonment of Salamis was sufficient to compel the Peloponnesians to remain in the straits, although the Greek army was not there to co-operate a victory, or to cover a defeat. But for a while the defence of the Akropolis by the Athenians to some extent made good the absence of the Greek land-forces. As an isolated naval engagement the battle of Salamis was a departure from the pre-ordained plan of campaign, something of an extemporized achievement. But it was perhaps only after the fall of the Akropolis that there was ever any serious thought of abandoning Salamis. In the end the line of the Isthmos remained an ideal; the actual fighting was all done beyond it; the Greeks were never driven back upon their last possible alternative. At what exact point the Isthmos-line became a practical issue, or even whether the resolution was ever seriously taken to fall back upon it, with the fleet as well as the army, remains an open question.

§ 4. North of the Isthmos, and still south of Thessaly, there were more lines of defence than one possible. The nearer or lower alternative was, however, the less clearly definable, in view of the conditional co-operation of fleet and army. No great or decisive land-battle has ever taken place in Attica; Boiotia witnessed most of the decisive battles in Greek history. But those battles were all purely land-battles, between powers whose fleets were non-existent, or not engaged. In

the Persian war the Greeks well understood that a land-battle by itself could not deliver them; nor did the Peloponnesians desire to fight a pitched battle by land at all, if such could be avoided. Upon this point there may have been some confusion, some obscurity, which led in the sequel to the isolated and therefore indecisive victory of Salamis. In Boiotia there was no possibility of securing the cover, or the immediate co-operation of the fleet. If the Greek fleet was to be stationed in the Euripos, the Persian fleet might be expected to round Euboea, and attack the Greeks in front and in rear simultaneously. If the Greek fleet was to be stationed at Salamis, where was the army to take up its position?

The logic of events decided this question in favour of an ideal line, which connects the army in Boiotia with the fleet in strictly Attic waters, and passes through the kindred points of Plataia and Salamis. But upon this line the co-operation of army and of fleet is topographically imperfect or disjointed, and this imperfection repeats itself in the mutual anachronism of the Greek victories at Salamis and Plataia. Yet, strategically viewed, the battles of Salamis and Plataia stand in the most intimate relation to each other, the one being the natural complement of the other, neither being complete in itself. Had these twin actions taken place on the same day, or even in the same month, their intimate and organic connexion would have been self-evident; the interval of eleven months dividing them cannot wholly obliterate it. In the victory at Salamis the land-forces of the Greeks took little or no part. If Pausanias could defeat Mardonios before Plataia in August 479, might not Kleombrotos have defeated Xerxes at Plataia, or it may be at Orchomenos, in August 480 B.C.? The *pezomachia*, if separate in time from the *naumachia*, should rather have preceded than have succeeded it; a defeat of Xerxes by land might have made a sea-fight unnecessary, or have left the Greek fleet but the task of pursuing a fugitive though still unbroken navy. In that very order Ktesias, to his own discredit and the confusion of our not uncritical Blakesley, actually placed the two actions!¹ The Greeks no doubt intended that, if Thermopylai came to be evacuated, the transit of the Persian forces through Boiotia should be resolutely disputed, and the passes of Kithairon occupied. Such a promise had been received, or extorted, by the Athenians from the Confederates or ever the fleet moved to Artemision. Did any one in Greece expect that the Persian, who had been defeated at Marathon, would ever force his way by land through Thermopylai? But the possibility of a defeat at sea had to be contemplated and provided for. Such a disaster would involve the evacuation of Thermopylai, and leave not merely Thebes but Attica at the mercy of the invader, unless the Peloponnesian forces appeared in time north of Kithairon. The Peloponnesians were under express engagement to be there.²

¹ Cp. p. 25 *supra*.

² Hdt. 8. 40.

The occupation of Salamis by the Greek navy, after the abandonment of Artemision, is often regarded, in deference to the supposed indications of Herodotus, as an unforeseen and undesigned development, due to the special instance of Themistokles, and a fortuitous character thus attaches to the whole series of actions which culminate in the great victory. But this opinion is a superficial thesis, derived from an imperfect reading of the Herodotean story. On the abandonment of Artemision by the Greek admirals Salamis became the next station, no doubt foreseen and prearranged, for the Greek naval forces, always upon the assumption that the land-forces had occupied Boiotia. In this position at least Attica was covered adequately both by land and by sea. A Greek army on Kithairon and a Greek navy at Salamis were not in hopeless isolation, the one from the other, much as the situation might leave to be desired from this or that point of view. Had the Peloponnesians been faithful to their pledges, Xerxes need never have set foot in Attica, and the battle of Salamis itself might never have been lost and won. The evacuation of Attica, the destruction of Athens, were sacrifices not so much to the essential military conditions of the case, as to the timidity or the faithlessness of the Peloponnesos. Those fears and failings were, indeed, natural enough after the unforeseen and unexpected fiasco at Thermopylai; but they involved a complete departure from the prearranged plan of action, which had included the possibility, and the pledge, of a battle in Boiotia, in defence of the passes over Kithairon, an engagement which had probably less terrors for the Greeks, who had not been allowed to forget the moral of Marathon, than the less tried, the never experienced venture of so great a naval encounter. The Greek victory on Kithairon was postponed a twelvemonth by the half-heartedness of the Peloponnesians. The temper of the Peloponnesians is explained, if not justified, by the Persian victory at Thermopylai, and the non-arrival of the Greek force expected in Boiotia made the occupation of Salamis an open question for the admirals, and raised the Isthmos station into a practical alternative. But the historic fact remains that upon the strategic line of Salamis-Plataia the double victory of the Greeks was actually achieved. The chronological discrepancy between the actions cannot deprive that line of its essential military significance; and the actual traditions preserve some hints that the line in question was one deliberately chosen after discussion, and not merely the result of a chapter of accidents.¹

§ 5. One supreme disadvantage, however, this first exo-Peloponnesian line of defence lay under: it covered Attica, indeed, but it abandoned all the rest of central Greece to the enemy. The arguments which could draw the Peloponnesian forces north of Kithairon at all, were enough to carry their army to Thermopylai and their ships to Artemision, the twin points on a line which undoubtedly offered,

¹ Cp. 7. 177.

from the political and strategic points of view, the maximum of advantage and the minimum of risk to the defence. Politically this line covered not merely Attica, but Boiotia, Phokis, Lokris to boot; and this political advance carried here a material and a moral advantage: the League enlarged the area of recruiting for its forces, and met the invader on the threshold, or nearly on the threshold, of continuous Hellas. Strategically the line had two great merits: the army and the fleet were in immediate or close juxtaposition; and, owing to the native character of the two stations, while each pass, or strait, viewed severally, was easily defensible even against vastly superior numbers, viewed together as a unity, the double passage was the veritable key to central Greece. But this line, which proved in the sequel the scene of first contact with the enemy, was not wholly admirable from the strategic point of view, nor wholly free, perhaps, from a certain weakness, as well military as political. Without a great and decisive victory by land, or by sea, or both, the Greeks could not hope, on this or any line of defence, to avert once for all the peril which threatened them. The line of defence actually chosen as the first line offered little or no scope for a decisive issue on land, in favour of the Greeks. The mere defence of Thermopylai could not bring about a positive decision; the annihilation of the Persian army in front of Thermopylai was not to be thought of. The occupation of the line Thermopylai-Artemision must be taken to mean that, for an actual decision in their favour, the Greeks were looking, in the first instance at least, to the fleet. This plan was a thoroughly sound one, as the sequel proved; and the victory afterwards achieved at Salamis might have been anticipated at Artemision, if only Thermopylai could have been successfully defended to the end. The twin stations stood and fell together. The very strength of the line Thermopylai-Artemision was, in the event, its weakness. Land and sea were too completely interdependent. A defeat of the Greeks upon either element made their position upon the other untenable. Were the Greek fleet driven from Artemision, the army at Thermopylai could at once be taken in the rear from the sea side. Were the Pass of Thermopylai forced, the position of the fleet at Artemision became useless, however successfully held. A complete defeat of the fleet at Artemision was, however, in the highest degree improbable: forced to retreat, or driven back into the straits, it might, perhaps, have been; annihilation was not to be anticipated. What must have been hoped for, and expected, was victory, a victory by sea, which might render the retreat of the Persian army imperative, by threatening its line of communication and its base, and by calling into active hostility all the latent disaffection in its rear. The circumvention of Thermopylai upon the land side was the chief danger to be reckoned with, and its possibility the chief flaw in the chosen line of defence. Such an eventuality the Greeks must have contemplated from the first. They knew their own

country well enough to surmise that there was never a pass in the land but could be turned by a second way round or through the mountains within a measurable distance; even if there had been no Phokians, or others, well acquainted with the landscape of Trachinia and Doris, to instruct them. But the land-force was expected to hold the land-passes at least long enough to allow the fleet time to prove its prowess off Artemision, and the expectation was not in itself unreasonable. The fleet, a few weeks later victorious at Salamis, might surely have reported a more decisive issue off Artemision, during the three days of grace gained by the valiant defence of Thermopylai. But a kind of fatality seems to have affected the Greeks all along, until their plight became desperate: the naval states still looking to the land-forces to spare them the need of sacrifice, and the Peloponnesians still hoping that a naval victory would make a pitched battle by land superfluous!

§ 6. At what exact point the decision to occupy the line Artemision-Thermopylai, as the first line of defence, was actually taken by the Greeks is a problem which cannot be decided irrespectively of the date of Thessaly's admission to the confederate Alliance. Herodotus appears to date the Thessalian application for admission immediately before the despatch of the Greek forces under Evainetos to Tempe, and to make the whole episode synchronise with the presence of the king at Abydos, or on the Hellespont, a situation which, according to one tradition, endured a month.¹ To judge by these indications, the whole affair occupies a few weeks in the spring of the year 480 B.C., and the abandonment of Tempe leaves the Greeks without any definite plan of campaign, until a fresh meeting at the Isthmos discusses and decides for a stand upon the line of Artemision and Thermopylai. But the story of the Thessalian alliance and expedition, as told by Herodotus, is incoherent, and his chronology here is by no means canonical. That the actual expedition to Tempe took place in the spring of 480 B.C. is, indeed, a matter of course; but are the antecedents of the expedition correctly narrated or chronologized by Herodotus? The question of the attitude and policy of Thessaly and the Thessalians must, in any case, have been presented to the Congress of 481 B.C. Either the Thessalians were represented among the *Probouloi* upon that occasion, and subscribed the sworn Alliance at one and the same time with Peloponnesians, Athenians, and the rest; or else the actual Confederates arranged for an embassy to Thessaly at the same time as they arranged for missions to other important members of the Greek name, unrepresented at the meeting. If the Thessalians were absent from the Congress in 481 B.C., the Greek states, which despatched from the Isthmos embassies to Argos, to Krete, to Sicily, cannot have left Thessaly severely alone. No embassy to Thessaly is recorded; but neither is there any express

¹ 8. 51.

record of the admission of the Thessalians to the Alliance, a condition surely antecedent to the despatch of the confederate forces to Tempe. If the Thessalians were original members of the League, if their admission is to be dated to the first meeting of the *Probouloi* in the autumn of 481 B.C., then a situation was *ipso facto* created which involved the defence of Thessaly by the confederate forces, in the event of the Persian advance upon the surely prefigured route. In that case, before the Congress adjourned in 481 B.C. a more or less explicit engagement had been formulated that, upon the advance of the Persian in the ensuing spring, the confederate forces should occupy the Thessalian frontier. Some such hypothesis is not difficult to reconcile with the subsequent narrative and course of events. The despatch of a force of 10,000 men to Tempe in the spring of 480 B.C. is not such a trifle as to have been lightly extemporized by Sparta, or by the supposed *Synedrion of Strategoi*,¹ upon the spur of the moment, in response to a spontaneous and apparently unexpected application from Thessaly, which reaches the meeting at the Isthmos only when Xerxes is just about to set foot in Europe. Still less can this Herodotean synchronism pass muster, if the whole strategic and political bearings of the expedition to Thessaly, hereinafter presently to be further considered, are taken into account. Again, if, as Herodotus appears to suggest, the resolution, to make Artemision and Thermopylai the most advanced line of defence, was first actually formulated and adopted in the spring of 480 B.C., after, some appreciable time after, the abandonment of Thessaly, and the return of the forces 'to the Isthmos,' the abandonment of Thessaly must have created a new and all but unforeseen situation, involving fresh military and political contingencies. The conclusion presents itself that the Thessalians had been represented at the Isthmos, in the original Congress of 481 B.C., and that the defence of the Thessalian frontier, in the foreseen event of a Persian advance by the great northern route, was a consequential resolution, which hardly admitted of discussion. The subsequent abandonment of Thessaly, and the compulsory medism of the Thessalians, obliterated the original relation of Thessaly to the Congress, and explains the disappearance of the Thessalian name from the list of those Hellenes who had chosen the better part and were confederate against the Persian. If this hypothesis be deemed somewhat too reconstructive, there remains the other and, in that case, inevitable alternative: the Congress of 481 B.C. must have sent to Thessaly ambassadors, charged with the mission of winning the Thessalians to the cause of Hellas. The mission was apparently successful; at the adjourned meeting in the following spring the Thessalians were formally admitted into the Alliance, and the inevitable plan of campaign was forthwith adopted: a confederate force was mobilized and directed to the Thessalian frontier (7. 172 f.).

¹ Cp. p. 223 *supra*.

The composition, the leading, and even the transport or route of the said force, raise some difficult questions. In the event the whole affair proved a fiasco. The failure of the expedition, and of the policy and plan implied in the expedition, may have reacted unfavourably upon the record. At the time, however, the despatch of the ten thousand to Tempe must have appeared, what indeed it undoubtedly was, an act of definite and far-reaching import. In the narrative of Herodotus the force comprises Peloponnesians and Athenians, perhaps in equal numbers; but there is no explicit evidence to exclude other hypotheses. Elsewhere there is evidence of the presence of a substantial Theban contingent,¹ and the silence of Herodotus is not in itself sufficient to discredit that evidence. The number of Spartan citizens in the force may not have been large; the numbers of men from central Greece may have been more considerable than the isolated reference to a Theban contingent approves. The substitution of a private Spartan for the king as commander-in-chief, is not suggestive of a strong Spartan leading or following for the Thessalian plan; the presence of Themistokles as the Athenian leader, and the fact that the forces were carried by sea (so runs the story), suggest that the plan and policy of the whole movement emanated from Athens rather than from Sparta. The Greek ships are, indeed, upon this occasion, used simply as transports, according to the story; but this implication agrees badly with the known conditions of the campaign, and the subsequent course of events. From first to last the war was bound to be a war on both elements conjointly, and the defence had from the first to meet the attack by sea as well as by land. The expedition to Thessaly is treated by Herodotus as a purely land expedition, though the force is conveyed to its destination by sea; but the Greeks cannot have expected, in the spring of the year of invasion, to withstand and to repel the Persian attack, without putting their war-galleys to the front. Of all men Themistokles was least likely to harbour any such illusion. If the forces which went by sea to Halos in Thessaly, and then marched to and fro Tempe, represented either element exclusively, they were the naval levies. But another possibility presents itself. The confused and incomplete tradition may have omitted 'the Prince of Denmark' from the cast of *Hamlet*: was it ever intended that the Greek army should operate in Thessaly and that the Greek fleet should remain inactive at Pogon, or at Salamis? The occupation of Tempe by the confederate army could only have been a serious move if the confederate fleet was to occupy some line or station which should cover Tempe as efficiently from the advance of the Persian fleet as Artemision covered Thermopylai, or as Salamis covered Kithairon, and, if need should be, the Isthmos. But where was such a station to be found? Certainly not in immediate juxtaposition to the harbourless Peneios

¹ Cp. p. 92 *supra*.

out-put, nor anywhere upon the inhospitable Magnesian coast, but only in the Gulf of Pagasai, or still better off the north coast of Euboia. Artemision was a station to threaten the Persian fleet, and to cover the Hellenic army in Thessaly, as effectively, or almost as effectively, as it covered the Greeks at Thermopylai thereafter. Off the Artemision, or somewhere in the channel north of Euboia, lies the naval key to Tempe, no less than to Thermopylai. The plan to defend the Thessalian frontier by land must have included a plan to defend the Thessalian adit from the sea. Nothing could have been better from the Greek, from the Athenian, point of view than to have barred the Persian fleet out of the Gulf of Volo, and left it to encounter the risks of wind and waves on the high sea in front of Pelion. We may fairly doubt whether Themistokles and the Athenians went as far as Tempe upon this occasion. If the 10,000 hoplites under Evainetos were advanced levies from Peloponnese and central Greece, the war-ships, which perhaps conveyed them as far as Halos, were but the van of the confederate fleet, in which the Athenian contingent under Themistokles was doubtless the most conspicuous. But, if the policy of the Thessalian campaign was to be a success, the chief fighting was bound to be by land. Peloponnesians and Thessalians were to win a Marathonian victory under Ossa and Olympos, which should render the further advance of the king's fleet inadvisable. No Persian need ever have set foot in hostile guise south of Othrys. What a triumph for the future cause of Athens to have preserved her two hundred vessels intact, under the shelter of the Euboian and Thessalian shores!

Herodotus, very much at the mercy of his local, varying, and partial sources, treats the expedition to Thessaly as an almost negligible by-product of the Greek plan of campaign. He seems less surprised, so to speak, that the Greeks should have abandoned Thessaly, than that they should ever have thought of attempting to defend it. But, in reality, an effort to defend Thessaly, to keep Thessaly for the national cause, was dictated by the whole circumstances of the case, unless Thessaly had declared for the king from the outset. The position of Thessaly was no doubt an exposed one. Makedon was definitely a vassal state in the Persian empire, paying tribute and of course liable to service: the first brunt of the invasion would fall upon Thessaly in case of resistance; from the divided and competing interests in central and southern Hellas absolute security for loyal support and co-operation was not forthcoming. Had Thessalians medized as one man from the first, there would have been no great cause of wonder. But in the eyes of southern Hellas and of the Confederates at the Isthmos, the inclusion of Thessaly in the National League might mean the indefinite postponement of the invasion, the repulse of the invader upon the very threshold of Greece, and much more. An effort to secure Thessaly, the pledge

to defend Thessaly with the full forces of the confederacy, was therefore from the first demanded by patriotism and interest alike. The plan, indeed, as likely to involve a greater risk by land, called for a special effort from the land levies of the Greek states; but that prospect did not deter the Congress at the Isthmos from inviting or admitting the Thessalians into alliance. What calls for explanation is not the project for the defence of Thessaly against the Persian, nor the despatch of a considerable force for that purpose, but the hasty retreat of the expedition and the abandonment of the plan, without a blow struck upon this fourth and furthest line of defence.

§ 7. Several good reasons are reported in the actual tradition, or suggest themselves in the circumstances and antecedents of the case, to explain an action which involved the bloodless surrender to the king of the wealthiest of the Greek provinces. (1) Herodotus appears to imply that, only when the Greeks reached Thessaly were they informed of the immense scale on which the king's forces were organized, and that the evacuation of Thessaly was the direct result of the terror so inspired. The message of Alexander of Makedon delivered at this crisis might even seem the first information received by the Greeks that a Persian fleet was in being. But these implications are neither probable in themselves, nor consistent with other elements in the Herodotean story, which imply that the Greeks were early and well informed of the character and extent of the Persian mobilization. The rôle assigned to the phil-Hellenic Makedonian upon this occasion is only too well in keeping with other passages in the legend of Alexander's services to the national cause, and deserves little credence. It was not the discovery of the size and number of the Persian host, much less the consideration that fighting was to be done by sea as well as by land, which drove the Greeks to evacuate Tempe: the *rationale* of their action must be further fetched. (2) A second and explicit suggestion in the Herodotean record demands more attention: the Greeks discover, on their arrival at Tempe, that the position is not impregnable, but admits of being circumvented by a second pass or path. A topographical and strategic observation of this order commands respect. Unfortunately at this point Herodotus betrays a grievous shortcoming in his knowledge of Thessalian topography, and in his appreciation of the real strategic problem in the situation ostensibly described. The Gonnos path, whereby the position at Tempe might be turned, was a difficult route over the shoulder of Olympos, by which probably not a single Persian subsequently entered Thessaly. Had this mountain-path been the only alternative to the Tempe-valley route, arrangements might easily have been made to defend it: had that been all, the Greeks would not so lightly have abandoned the defence of Thessaly. But the entrances to Thessaly from Makedon are not limited to the valley-route *via* Tempe and the mountain-path *via*

Gonnos, by which the vale might be avoided. From Makedon (as nearly all the recent discussions of this subject have clearly recognized) two other passes pierce the Olympio-Kambunian range; these alternatives of course made Tempe indefensible, unless Petra and Volustana were each likewise to be defended by a myriad men. Can the Greeks have been so innocent as to suppose Tempe the only entrance to Thessaly from the north? Or, if Peloponnesians and southern Greeks may indeed have been in such darkness, can the Thessalians themselves have been so ignorant? The men of Larissa and of Triikka, if not the men of Pharsalos and of Pherai, must have known well enough that the northern ranges could be traversed at more than one or two points. Nor can we suppose that the problem was left in darkness before the despatch of the expedition under Evainetos and Themistokles. Doubtless the Thessalians on their matriculation in the national Symmachy had been examined as to the defences of their country, and what they themselves were prepared to undertake on its behalf. Presumably they were pledged, if the Greeks would occupy Tempe with an army, and defend the Pagasaian gulf with a fleet, to be themselves responsible for the defence of the other passes.

(3) Xerxes, as Herodotus avers, miscalculated the amount of support on which he could reckon in Thessaly, thinking that the Aleuads addressed him in 'the name of the whole nation.' The *Probouloi* at the Isthmos in 481 B.C. (or 480) may have been guilty of a corresponding miscalculation, and believed that an absolutely united Thessaly was prepared to espouse the pan-Hellenic cause. The ensuing winter must have been a season of rare intrigue in Thessaly, and not in Thessaly alone. Xerxes was at Sardes, and had with him the Peisistratidai and others, including no doubt emissaries, perhaps hostages, from 'the sons of Aleuas.' The prospects of Thessaly, if it was to become the scene of the mighty struggle between Persian and Greek, must have been eagerly and ceaselessly canvassed in the Thessalian cities for weeks and months before the arrival of Evainetos and Themistokles with forces, prepared to fulfil their part of the bargain. The confederate captains found Thessaly divided against itself, and their own partisans no longer able, nor even, perhaps, willing, to fulfil the whole of their pledges. Under such circumstances it could not take them many days to convince themselves—Themistokles before all—that the loss of Thessaly was a foregone conclusion. To defend Tempe, to fight a successful action on the skirts of Olympos, was hopeless, or idle, so long as the passes of Petra and Volustana were open to the Persians. Political division and rivalries in Thessaly made the situation still more desperate: to learn so much the Greeks may have had to visit Thessaly. The chief cause of the change of plan, involved in the evacuation of Tempe, is to be sought and found in the actual politics of Thessaly at the time; the fact of potential

and actual *stasis* is certain, however doubtful may be its exact extent or character. Probably there were hostilities between city and city, and divisions cleaving each city itself in twain. The Aleuads plainly aspired to uniting the whole country under their own sway. There was to be a large tyranny, or at least a monarchy, which could have but two pillars, the revolting *Penestai* and the Persian suzerainty, one or both. The foreign lord might make his count with democracy or with tyranny, as the Persians and other politicians discovered; nor was the Greek tyrant himself at daggers drawn with democracy. The double intrigue repeated itself thereafter at very Sparta in the career of Pausanias; Kleomenes, perhaps Demaratos, and assuredly the exiled Peisistratids, already afforded precedents. Who knows on which side the *Penestai* were ready to declare themselves? The Thessalians who joined the Greeks at Tempe were mounted men, aristocrats. The previous relations of Thessaly to Sparta, and to Athens, was no very favourable omen, for the present crisis.

(4) Some would see in the attitude of the Boiotians and other states of central Greece a further reason for the abandonment of the Thessalian campaign in the spring of 480 B.C. Misgiving and uncertainty there may have been, but this argument appears to antedate the medism of the middle states. The subsequent occupation of Thermopylai and Artemision, as a serious line of defence, rules out the suspicion for the most part. In central Greece as in Attica, and even in Peloponnesos itself, the evacuation of Thessaly must have increased apprehension, and have shaken loyalty to the national cause. Maliciously superficial is the judgement of Herodotus that, had Thessaly indeed remained in the Greek Alliance, the Phokians would have abandoned it for the standard of Xerxes; though the dictum may be valuable as a witness to the intensity of such local and ethnic rivalries, and as suggesting some consolatory reflexions, with which even the hellenizing Thessalians may have beheld the backs of the hoplites of Evainetos.

(5) Still less can the expedition to Thessaly be explained away as a feint, a make-believe, which was never intended to be a success. The possible argument for such an explanation lies merely, or mainly, in the casual and almost parergic character of the story; but the story is plainly, like so much else in the traditions of the Persian war, written under the influence of the historic sequel. In such cases you will sometimes have an episode magnified and transfigured into heroic proportions, as in the case of Marathon; sometimes the fact will have been distorted, diminished, discarded, as apparently in this very case under discussion. The true proportions and perspective of the expedition to Thessaly, and even its details, have been disturbed and lost, because the undertaking had so slight an effect upon the subsequent issue, was so totally eclipsed by the heroic failure at Thermopylai and the heroic successes at Salamis and at Plataia. Plainly the less said

about the Thessalian affair the better, from the point of view of later Greece. It was creditable neither to the diplomacy nor to the military leading of the day; but the Spartans at least felt, in the hour of subsequent triumph, that they had an account to settle with the Thessalians, who had espoused the cause of a monarchic democracy under Median auspices. Their attempt to balance that account proved again a bad investment, the full and true story of which was never told. Likely enough too many of the Peloponnesians had been lukewarm in the original undertaking, and Sparta herself sent her king to Thessaly four years too late. But the loss of Thessaly to Hellas in 480 B.C. can hardly to any appreciable extent be a reproach to the *Probouloi* at the Isthmos, or to the *Strategoi* at the front. Xerxes had already too many friends in the land; the Thessalians themselves were not of one mind; the strategic problem would not have been insoluble upon the Thessalian frontier had the political situation been tolerable. The proximity of Makedon, and the infection of its example, may also have told in the same direction.

§ 8. The subsequent action of the Thessalians on the king's side during the campaign proves that the Confederates had completely miscalculated the political position in Thessaly, or that it rapidly deteriorated, both before and after the despatch of the confederate forces to Tempe in the spring of the year. Abandoned by the southern confederacy the Thessalians threw in their lot with the king unreservedly, and did him 'yeoman service' throughout the subsequent operations. Xerxes—the anecdote is credible in its moral, if not in its details—visited Tempe unopposed, with no more escort than a modern, or an antique, tourist might require (what a lost opportunity for kidnapping a king!). The Thessalians set all the Amphiktyonic nations the example of 'unconditional surrender,' and enjoyed the especial favour and regard of the Persian. Men of Thessaly, so the Phokians averred, had guided the king through central Greece, and even directed the course and limits of his 'strategic devastations,' with a strict eye to their own partialities. Even after the defeat at Salamis Xerxes is as safe in Thessaly as in his own capital, and the Persian army occupies winter-quarters in that impregnable and wealthy region. No record of tributes or of unrequited exactions has been preserved; the Thessalians had apparently little or nothing to regret, from a material standpoint, in the Persian occupation. Thessalian cavalry fought in the ranks of the Persian before Plataia; the unmolested retreat of Artabazos through the land was ill explained afterwards by a too transparent fiction. The failure of the Spartans to avenge the medism of Thessaly, and the subsequent alienation of Sparta and Athens, left Thessaly for the most part in an independent but isolated position. The land and people paid in some kind the penalty of medism, and remained outside the main currents of national history, never achieving a satisfactory union at home, never pursuing a strong policy

abroad, never deserving to compete with the southern city-states for the Hegemony of Hellas.¹

§ 9. The evacuation of the first possible line of defence on the Thessalian frontier brought the Greeks of necessity back to the line marked by Thermopylai and Artemision, the advantages and disadvantages of which have been stated above. The occupation or non-occupation of this line, once Thessaly had to be abandoned, was hardly such an open question as the records in Herodotus may seem to suggest. The Greeks could not surrender Attica and central Greece without striking a blow, and the second line of defence was indicated more clearly than any other by natural features. But the abandonment of Thessaly and the occupation of Thermopylai-Artemision at once threw the main burden and brunt of the defence upon the naval arm. This military observation has been obscured under the isolated precedence accorded by Herodotus to the story of Thermopylai, in all its heroic details. The fact remains incontrovertible that it was the land defence which failed in the first two instances, by default in Thessaly, by defeat in Malis; but, in so far as a decisive victory for the fleet off Artemision might have stayed or turned the king's advance, the naval arm shares the responsibility for the Persian conquest of central Greece, including Attica itself. Still, at Thermopylai, and even after Thermopylai, the Greeks, or some good part of them, were looking for a victory by land to end the campaign. And verily, the event proved that without such a victory there was no full deliverance possible. Yet who can wonder if, after the fiasco at Thermopylai, the Peloponnesian forces failed to appear in Boiotia, and left the fleet to effect at Salamis what had been missed at Artemision? The victory in Attic waters was a disjointed victory, lacking its essential complement by land, until Pausanias at Plataia nearly a twelvemonth later crowned the work of Themistokles at Salamis. Meanwhile the naval victory enabled the Greek fleet to develop a most remarkable plan, at once political and strategic. The victorious fleet assumed the offensive, and carried the war over sea into the enemy's country, first in the expedition to Andros, which fell, however, far short of the design and ambition of Themistokles, and then, as the year came round, in the series of movements which culminated under the twin peaks of Mykale, and upon the strand of Sestos. The political intrigues of the Ionians in the winter of 480 B.C. are the complement and set-off to the political intrigues of the Thessalians in the preceding winter: the expedition under Leotychidas and Xanthippos to Ionia in 479 B.C. is a telling contrast to the expedition under Evainetos and Themistokles to Thessaly in 480 B.C. Thessaly had been lost and Ionia had been gained for the national cause in the interval of twelve or fifteen

¹ The case of Jason (Xenophon, *Hell.* Bk. 6, cc. 1, 4) hardly supplies an exception.

months, by the Spartan failure on land and the Athenian success on the water. The aggressive movement of the Greek fleet across the Aigaian made it more than ever incumbent upon Mardonios and the king's forces in Greece to win a decisive victory on European soil, and no doubt contributed to determine the tactical offensive at Plataia, which proved disastrous to the Persians. In this way the campaign of Mykale stands intimately related to the campaign in Boiotia. Moreover, the Greek fleet must have waited on the movements of the land-forces, and cannot have left the home-waters until Mardonios had retired, and was known to have retired, into Boiotia. But, in the first instance, the battle in Boiotia, though belated, is the natural complement to the battle off Salamis, while the battle of Mykale is a work of supererogation, rendered possible, indeed, by the previous victory of the fleet in the home-waters, and redounding to the salvation and subsequent welfare of Hellas. Back on to their last possible line of defence the Greeks were never actually driven. It was a line which covered Peloponnesos, and barely that, and moreover was likely to leave all real fighting to the fleet. The Athenians had power to dictate and to force the decision in this case. No doubt they decided wisely, from the purely strategic and tactical points of view, to say nothing of policy, even after they despaired of direct co-operation by the Peloponnesian army in Attica. But still, for a while after the evacuation of Attica, the Athenians must have believed themselves strong enough not merely to dictate the exact locality for the inevitable naval battle, but also to compel the Peloponnesians to advance and do battle with the Persian by land. The sequel proved that the Athenians had not over-estimated their strength, even in their extremity; albeit they had all but to play their last trump-card in order to force the Peloponnesians to the 'sticking-point,' and witnessed Attica twice occupied by the Barbarian before the grand army of the Peloponnesians would pass the Isthmos.

Looking back over the two campaigns in the light of their victorious issues, more than one Greek, especially among the Athenians, may have felt that, however satisfactory the results attained, they might have been achieved both earlier and more cheaply. To think that within eighteen months of the crossing of the Hellespont the fleet had attacked the Asiatic dominions of the king, and not a free Persian remained alive south of Othrys! Not the plan of campaign had been at fault, but its execution: success had been marred and made needlessly expensive to life and property, public and private, as well by military as by political blunders. Political reasons had, indeed, rendered the abandonment of Thessaly a measure more than excusable from every point of view; but the failure at Thermopylai was directly traceable to military misleading and shortcomings, nor had the fleet achieved all that might have been expected off Artemision. The evasion by the Peloponnesians for months of their treaty-obliga-

tions was attributable in part to the shock of their first defeat, and it completely upset the original plan of defence, by leaving the fleet to operate in isolation at Salamis; but the success of the fleet no doubt helped to breathe fresh courage into the land-forces and captains, and to revive their emulation. The broken plan was resumed and made good on the field of Plataia in 479 B.C. with a rider and development, contemplated indeed long before by the most far-sighted and courageous mind upon the Greek side, but only now rendered possible by the antecedent victory at Salamis. Thus Plataia synchronized not with its true and appointed complement, but with a consequence and product of that victory. Yet, though the decisive victory on Greek soil was thus belated, the early assumption of the offensive at sea was fraught with ulterior consequences, which more than made good to Athens all the losses and sufferings for which, as she might be pardoned saying, she had the Peloponnesians to thank as well as the Persians. In the long run, indeed, the Greek states, or at least the leaders, profited by their victories in proportion to their sacrifices for the national cause: Athens, whose destiny made the Persian war no doubt primarily an Athenian war, was repaid all her losses a thousandfold in power, wealth, achievement, beauty. Plataia was a Spartan victory, but from this point of view the losses of Sparta at Thermopylai were worth almost more than a victory. The story of Thermopylai became the consecrated legend of Spartan heroism, and gave Sparta a fresh lease of her life-principle, honour. But, at the time and in itself, the defence of Thermopylai was a failure, and left the mainland above the Isthmos for a while completely at the mercy of the Persian. The intellectual and moral force, which insisted upon the stand of the fleet at Salamis after the collapse of the army in central Greece, is perhaps the most admirable revelation in the whole story of the war.

§ 10. Upon the Persian side all went well enough, in a strategic sense, till the fatal hour of Salamis. The losses by the storm off Magnesia, no doubt considerable, were grossly exaggerated in the Greek traditions, which hasten to correct the exaggeration, almost as soon as uttered, by a fresh extravagance.¹ And, however great the Persian losses before Salamis, the course of events so far pointed to an ultimate and complete success for the Persian arms. From the inception of the undertaking right down to the capture of Athens the facts all bespeak a well-considered scheme and a competent war-office upon the Persian side. The elaborate preparations for the commissariat and the movement of the forces, the bridge-building, road-making, magazines, and so forth; the organized and large mobilization; the carefully-considered and well-worked-out route; the advance of the land-forces in three divisions on parallel roads; the uses made of the fears or loyalty of the Greeks within the empire,

¹ Cp. 8. 66.

and of the divisions and rivalries of the Greeks without ; last, not least, the measure of actual military success achieved on the king's part before the autumn of 480, all denote a not incompetent handling of the strategic and political problems of the case from the Persian point of view. Too much stress is, perhaps, laid on the king's error in mobilizing such enormous masses of men, a point very clearly made against him in the dialectic of the Greek tradition itself. The numbers are, to begin with, enormously exaggerated ; but in any case the criticism can scarcely be pressed very far, unless the critic is prepared to maintain that, with half or a quarter of his actual forces, the king would have achieved a final and complete success, or at least have done much better than he did in fact. With such forces, so equipped, as the king had to dispose of, numbers were the one remedy for all disadvantages on his own side, and advantages upon the side of the Greek. The numbers, moreover, were not without their effect both upon the minds and upon the actions, and inactions, of the Greeks ; nor did the actual numbers of the king's forces on land involve him in any disaster, or disadvantage, during the march to Athens. The steady advance, and the absence of any sign of starvation or shortcoming of supplies, speak well for the Persian organization and leading so far. At Salamis, indeed, the Persian fleet was impeded by its own numbers, and at Plataia, perhaps, the masses of Asiatic infantry may have stood in each other's way ; but these facts, if facts they be, point to tactical blunders in the leading and command, and leave the question open whether with better handling of the same forces a different result might not have been attained. The Persian side was bound to make use of its vast superiority in numbers and resources as the best chance of success, but it failed to make the best use of that advantage. The crucial defect in the Persian plan of campaign was patent to the Greeks themselves, possibly at the time, certainly afterwards and upon reflexion. The Persians failed to employ to the greatest advantage their vast superiority in numbers, especially at sea ; they adhered, too long and too rigidly, to the idea that fleet and army must remain in touch and co-operate directly ; they failed to seize the opportunity afforded by the non-appearance of the Greek army in Boiotia, and the consequent break-down of the Greek plan of defence. The Persians possessed a sufficient superiority of forces to have kept the Greek fleet cooped up in Salamis, and at the same time to have harried and raided the Peloponnese in a way fit to drive the Greeks to desperation. The attack upon the Greek fleet in Salamis was no doubt both a strategic and a tactical error. It was an error, superinduced on the over-confidence of the victorious Persians by an express ruse and stratagem from the Greek side ; but the main blunder of the Persians lay in their failure to detach a sufficient squadron for operations against the Peloponnesos. One effect of such an operation must have

been to force the Peloponnesian contingents at Salamis to make their way homewards, in which case they must have fallen an easy prey to the king's fleet off the island. The misadventure which had attended the despatch of the squadron round Euboia may have helped to discourage the Persians from attempting a movement directed against the Peloponnesos afterwards; political considerations may also have operated, and more powerfully, to lame the Persian initiative and leading; and the Persian fleet, made up of heterogeneous, of rival, and even of disloyal elements, could no longer be trusted out of sight of the land-forces, nor its several contingents be allowed to act independently of each other. The engagements off the Artemision, and to some extent the inscriptions of Themistokles at Histiaia, may have contributed to augment the distrust of the maritime allies, or rather subjects, of the king, naturally entertained in any case by leaders who were themselves primarily landsmen and cavaliers. All things considered, there is no doubt substantial truth in the candid verdict put by Thucydides into the mouth of his anonymous Korinthian, that the failure of the Barbarian was due to his own blunders; but the blunders were mainly strategic and tactical, and they were, to a great extent, made inevitable, not so much by the exaggerated size or scale of the forces, as by their political and ethical defects. In a military sense the ultimate Greek victory was due in the first place rather to tactical than to strategic advantages upon the Greek side, and in the second place to various antecedent conditions, including superiority in weapons, discipline, spirit, cause, which gave the advantage in tactics to the Greek side both by sea and by land. Viewed from the purely strategic standpoint the historic censure remains true that the leaders of Greece allowed the Barbarian to make his way from the uttermost parts of the earth to the very gates of the Peloponnesos without attempting any adequate means of staying his victorious advance.¹


¹ Thuc. 1. 69. 5.

APPENDIX V

ARTEMISION-THERMOPYLAI

§ 1. Strategic aspects of the line Artemision-Thermopylai. § 2. Character of the Herodotean tradition. § 3. Real causes of the failure at Thermopylai. § 4. Diaries of the Persian fleet and army. § 5. Reconstruction of the actual course of events. § 6. Immediate results.

§ 1. THE operations for the defence of Greece, in the year 480 B.C., upon the line of Artemision and Thermopylai, obviously formed one organic scheme, to which the services of fleet and of army were alike subordinate. Failure of either arm was to a surety fraught with ruin for the whole plan of defence upon the given line. If the Greek fleet had been driven from its position, or circumvented, or captured, or in any way put out of being, the position of Leonidas and the land-forces at Thermopylai became *ipso facto* untenable, the Persians having it in their power, as commanding the sea, to disembark any number of soldiers in the rear of the Greeks at Thermopylai. Their fleet itself might be directed against the Greek position, so as to aid from the water, at least by showers of arrows, if not by an actual landing, the frontal and rear attacks upon the Spartan king. A serious defeat of the Greek navy must have spelled retreat or ruin for the Greek army. The correlative proposition does not, perhaps, extend so far. The annihilation of the defenders of Thermopylai did not immediately threaten the Greek fleet with assault *a tergo*, except indeed that such a disaster might provoke medism in mid-Hellas; but, alike politically and strategically, the naval position at Artemision became useless and practically untenable, once the ways into central Greece were open to the Persian army. The capture of the land-passage was naturally, if not necessarily, a signal for the retirement of the Greek fleet from the first effective line of defence. These aspects of the campaign are now generally recognized by all students of the case. What has not been so fully or generally recognized is the theorem that the first line of defence, based upon the positions of Artemision and Thermopylai, devolved upon the naval side the chief share of the fighting, if the



defence was to be a complete success. A merely negative result was all that was necessary, or even possible, for the army of Leonidas, its position, its numbers, and the nature of the case considered—if a successful defence of the land-passage may be called a negative result. For a positive victory, upon the given line, which should compel the invader to fall back, the Greeks must have looked to the naval arm. A victory off the Artemision, such as the Greek fleet afterwards achieved at Salamis, seconded, of course, by a successful defence of Thermopylai, must have changed the whole situation, and brought about the king's retreat. A naval victory in Euboian waters would have threatened the whole line of Persian communications, and would, of course, have been immediately followed by revolts and emancipatory movements either side the Aigaian. On the further aspects of 'the might have been' it were idle to speculate. In the long run, things could hardly have turned out better for Greece at large, or for Athens in particular, than things in the actual sequel proved; nevertheless, no sane man courts adversity, no wise state disaster, for all the sweetness and the use of such experiences. The nett result of the actual fighting upon the line of Artemision and Thermopylai was disaster to Greece and victory to the king; and this result was due not to the destruction of the Greek navy off the Artemision, but to the failure of the Greek army under Leonidas to hold Thermopylai.

§ 2. (a) The causality just formulated is buried, in the traditional stories of the defence, under a mass of paradox, incoherencies, and apology. The apologetic tendency, or *pragmatism*, of the record is so complex and extensive that it will be more fully discussed below: the paradox may be more briefly dismissed. The Greek army is portrayed as a band of heroes, led by a hero and fighting like heroes; yet it is the army that fails, and lets the Barbarians into Hellas! The Greek fleet is a mob of poltroons, that upon the advance of the enemy beats a hasty retreat, and, having been brought back to its proper station, twice again contemplates flight; yet the Greek fleet holds its own victoriously, or not unsuccessfully, upon the water, until retreat for it becomes inevitable, by reason of the loss of Thermopylai! For such a paradox there is no excuse, unless the Greek fleet be made answerable for the whole failure, in that it had not effected a victory at sea, which should have put the Persian vessels completely out of action. To such a censure the reply might have been made that, had the land-force but held Thermopylai a little longer, the required victory at sea would have been forthcoming.

(b) If a paradoxical and apologetic tradition is also incoherent, what else could be expected? The tradition was not concerned with the simple strategic or tactical aspects of the actions so much as with their political and moral issues. In the pages of Herodotus the operations on land and the operations at sea are presented as two independent series of events, the presentments agreeing neither in themselves nor

with each other. Thus, the historian completely finishes off the story of Thermopylai, and even buries the dead and builds him their monuments, before developing the story of Artemision. Again, he represents the Greek navy as making, and as contemplating, movements which are inadmissible if army and fleet were co-operating and in conjunction. This apparent dualism in the action is artificially heightened for modern readers by the existing division between the Seventh and the Eighth Books, which tends further to isolate the two series of actions, those on land narrated in the Seventh Book, and those on sea narrated in the Eighth. Moreover, the Eighth Book makes a sort of fresh start, with a navy-list, and a record of the discussion, closed months earlier than the point here attained in the narrative, concerning the naval command, or *Hegemonia*; and this fresh start still further exaggerates the divorce between the stories, and consequently between the actions, of Thermopylai and of Artemision. Thus apology begets paradox, and paradox augments incoherency.

(c) Here, however, as elsewhere, the Herodotean record carries its own corrective. Imperfect as is the author's grasp of military problems, there is enough in his narrative to confirm, nay, to suggest, the view above formulated in regard to the present subject. Strategic and tactical observations, or hints, isolated indeed, and preserved in a medium to which they are foreign; an unusually full topography, explicit and implicit in the story; chronological data, which, when carefully synthesized, give a veritable diary of the actions for a whole week and more: all these are there. Paradoxical, incoherent, pragmatic, the stories of Thermopylai and of Artemision may, in their most obvious aspects, appear; yet, when the detected apology is duly discounted, the paradox reduced, the incoherencies harmonized, there remains a substantial balance to the credit of the truth. It is here worth while to verify this critique of the traditions, out of which alone can be rebuilt any concrete conception of the actual course of events.

To take, in the first place, those hints and indications throughout which postulate a complete interdependence of the engagements by sea and by land, off Artemision and at Thermopylai: the following items will fall under this head. (1) The account of the original decision of the Greeks to occupy Thermopylai-Artemision, the description of the localities, their relation to each other, albeit little or no stress is laid upon the naval side, or on the indispensable covering of the army by the fleet (7. 175-177). (2) The way in which the movements of the Persian fleet and of the Persian army are interlarded, or intercalated, one with the other, especially in the Seventh Book. Herodotus, indeed, throughout appears more conscious of the interconnexion between fleet and army upon the Persian than upon the Greek side: not fully realizing that the one involves the other, and that, if the Persian advanced *pari passu* on both elements,

the Greeks were bound to adapt their defence to this dual attack. Thus the record starts, so to speak, with the log of the fleet (c. 179), which is brought from Therme to Aphetai (cc. 179-196), encountering sundry adventures *en voyage*, before the king's march from Therme, or at least from Pieria (c. 131), is resumed, and conducted through Thessaly and Achaia into Malis, and so to Trachis and the very gates of Greece (cc. 196-201). (3) The arrangements for communication between the Greek army at Thermopylai and the Greek fleet at Artemision (8. 21) imply the fact, which is further confirmed by (4) the synchronism of the three engagements at sea with the three days' fighting on land (8. 15), albeit this synchronism appears to be regarded by the historian as purely fortuitous. (5) Finally, the instant retreat of the fleet, so soon as ever news of the disaster at Thermopylai reached it (8. 21), enforces the same conclusion, though Herodotus believes that the admirals had determined to retreat irrespective of the fortunes of the Spartan king at Thermopylai. All such hints are in themselves only the more valuable in this connexion for having an air of being mere *obiter dicta*; they are, in truth, points where the logic of facts breaks through the deposit of fortuitous, or fanciful, or even fraudulent tradition; and the logic of facts in this particular case signifies the deliberately planned leading and action of the Greek forces.

(d) The geographical defect in Herodotus in regard to Thermopylai and Artemision is relatively small, and easily corrigible, though not therefore devoid of significance, in its bearing upon the character and qualities of the narrative. Criticism is here upon ascertainable ground, and can pronounce a confident verdict. The landscape of Thermopylai has altered considerably since the days of Herodotus, or of Leonidas; but physiography can restore the antique conditions to a degree practically verifying and completely according with the Herodotean requirements, in all essentials. Where political geography, or choriography, comes in, there is naturally some room for discussion; but in the present case no essential point in the reconstruction of the true story appears to depend upon the exact location of Anthela, of Alpenos, of Trachis, or of Antikyra; though, as a matter of fact, the exact location of all these spots has been accomplished with all but certainty. Other and smaller discoveries in topography will be even more important for the story: the exact sites of the altar of Herakles, of the Phokian wall, of the temple of Demeter, of the sanctuary of Amphiktyon, of the Amphiktyonic Seats, of the Lion of Leonidas, of the other monuments. But the general topographical problem at Thermopylai lies within clearly defined and verifiable limits, and upon all essential points the data in Herodotus are fully acceptable. The chief wonder, indeed, lies in the accuracy of his topographical indications, forasmuch as his one cardinal blunder proves that he can hardly have visited the place before writing his account of it. No

one, least of all a Greek traveller, accustomed to orient his position in the open, had he stood at Thermopylai, and looked across the bay to the long line of Othrys, could ever describe the mountain behind him as lying to the west of the pass, and the sea in front of him as lying to the east. Herodotus commits this error, and makes the road, by implication, run north and south. But, except in this one respect, the description of Thermopylai could hardly be better, even had Herodotus himself traversed every inch of the ground. There is no other bit of topography in the whole work of Herodotus—not the battle-field of Plataia itself—more satisfactory to the travelling scholar of to-day. The same eulogium cannot be pronounced upon the curter and more vague description of Artemision, and of the position of the fleet. The precise determination of the site of the temple of Artemis would not in this case add much to our resources for deciding the tactical or strategic problem. Students have long been agreed that the name must be applied to a considerable stretch of shore on the NW. coast of Euboea, in order to harmonize the scene with the story of the fighting. In any case the description of the scene of the naval engagements was a more difficult task to accomplish, whether at first or at second hand. His personal experience may rather have hindered than have helped Herodotus in one respect. He failed to realize the full significance of the proximity of fleet and army at Artemision and at Thermopylai. If he visited the parts in question on a voyage, his shortcoming is the more intelligible. The station of the fleet, placed as near Thermopylai as is compatible with the actual operations described, cannot have been less than forty Roman miles distant from the camp on land. Fleet and army were far from being fully in sight or in touch of each other. This removal is, indeed, unconsciously reflected, and exaggerated, in the dualism between the stories of the two series of operations; but the suspicion that Herodotus himself had not considered the traditional stories of the battles on the spot is confirmed by the observation that there is no attempt, or even hint, at an estimate of the actual distance between the two positions.¹

(e) The remarkable accuracy and fulness of the Herodotean topography of Thermopylai, and, to a less degree, of Artemision also, second-hand though it all probably was, helps to explain, by proving the excellence of his sources in this section, a still more remarkable feature, the relatively full and acceptable chronology. Topography was, of course, a matter open to inspection and verification by all comers, in Herodotus' day, as in our own; for the chronological data Herodotus was of necessity dependent upon tradition, as we are in turn dependent on his report of tradition. The chronology, as above remarked, presents us at this crisis with a veritable journal: the week, the ten days, preceding the death of Leonidas, are almost as exactly and fully reported as the week, or ten days, preceding the death of Alexander

¹ On the topographical details cp. the Commentary *ad ll. passim*.

the Great.¹ The diary of Thermopylai and the diary of Artemision are preserved but incidentally; the remarkable synchronisms between them are treated as accidents; but incident or accident is additional guarantee of their respective authenticity. A perfect harmony, a completely satisfactory and convincing chronology of each event and action, is not, indeed, attainable; some readjustments in the apparent scheme are necessary in order to rationalize the story. Even the chronology of Herodotus at this crisis is somewhat incoherent. The multiplicity of sources for the various stories and items which make up the complex narrative, and the absence on the historian's part of a clear perception of the relation between the operations by sea and the operations on land, go far to explain the admitted incoherence, and to justify the attempted rationalization, of the traditional story. There are, indeed, some apparently precise data in the narrative which conflict with each other; there are data which almost require that their exact point of occurrence should be revised in the interests of the strategic and tactical theory of the actions. Such a procedure would be inadmissible in relation to a historian who had a definite and systematic method of chronologizing his narrative; no such bar exists to our rationalization of the looser texture of the Herodotean narrative. Moreover, the existence of the former class of discrepancies is justification of the method applied to the latter class of chronological cruces. Thus there is an apparent discrepancy in regard to the exact date of the arrival of the king before Thermopylai between two passages in the text.² This discrepancy may be overcome by a plausible interpretation; but the two data plainly belong to quite different cycles, or sources, of tradition, and are not in any conscious way harmonized by Herodotus himself. A variety of source and an unrationalized chronology are (as will be argued below) responsible for doubling the storm which played havoc with the Persian fleet; but on such a point unanimous agreement will hardly be obtained. Upon the exact dates of events, such as the appearance of Skyllias in the Greek camp, the retreat of the Greeks to Chalkis and their return to their proper station, the wreck of the Persian fleet upon the Hollows of Euboia, and so forth, the theory of the action would of course depend, if the given chronology were complete and coherent: in all such cases historical criticism will venture to readjust chronology in the interests of a real perspective. Such a procedure is not quite satisfactory; but in the absence of a full chronology it is inevitable, unless we are to despair of evoking coherent history from a discrepant medley of anecdotes and episodes. Certain land-marks, or rather time and tide marks, are to be accepted as regulative: the exact synchronism of the actual engagements at Thermopylai and at Artemision by land and sea is the basis of all. From this point,

¹ Arrian, *Anab.* 7. 25.

² Cp. 7. 196. 4 and the further remarks on *τριτάτος*, § 5, p. 274 *infra*.

and from this point of view, the diary of Thermopylai and Artemision must be reconstructed; the critical historian will work backward from Thermopylai to Therme, and not in the other, albeit the Herodotean direction. In the result our reconstruction of the chronology may be a little too compact. A margin of error, or of variation, is to be admitted for the movements chronologized, whether by sea or on land, as well as for the synchronisms established between the two series; but the margin of error cannot be large or very alarming, and practical convenience is consulted in drawing up the chronological schedule with the utmost precision permitted by the records, fairly examined. The result may be a regulative hypothesis which falls short of absolute authority, but indisputably brings order into what were otherwise a chaos, both chronological and causal. The wonder is that the Herodotean narrative, in view of its general characteristics, yields so much excuse and material for so bold a reconstruction. The attempt here to be made goes far beyond what is generally possible for the earlier portions of his narrative. It is no mere question of the year, or of the season of the year, or even of the calendar month, or approximate month, for the operations dated: on that larger chronology there is little doubt or obscurity. The question is to determine, within a period of three weeks, in the first instance, the daily movements of fleets and armies, the orders and conferences of generals and leaders. That the text of Herodotus contains a host of items to encourage and compel such an attempt speaks volumes for the comparative sanity and wealth of the traditions garnered by him for our belated consideration. Little more seems wanting, upon the chronological side, to raise this portion of the work of Herodotus from mere logography into history of all but the highest order. Were there still extant in the time of our author any documents or materials, open to his inspection, which could have enabled him to correct the discrepancies, or to supply the deficiencies, which are so easily detected in his narrative, just because it goes so curiously far in the direction of chronological completeness?

(f) Not, indeed, the weakness of its chronology, still less the defect in its topography, constitutes the chief offence, from a strictly historical point of view, in the Herodotean story: the main source of error, of confusion, and of shortcoming lies rather in the rhetoric and sophistry, whether for the good or evil cause, which the record in almost every part betrays. Panegyric and malice, scandal and apologetics, have usurped too large a place in the traditions preserved by Herodotus; where rhetoric and politics come in at the door science and history fly out at the window. The degree in which these characteristics of the narrative redound to the discredit of the writer himself is open to discussion. If the crude assaults of Plutarch on 'the malignity of Herodotus' are manifestly excessive and uncritical,¹

¹ Cp. Appendix I. § 14, p. 91 *supra*.

yet to acquit our author wholly of partiality and prejudice is not easy, to applaud his excessive and uncritical naïveté is impossible. Wholly uncritical Herodotus rarely, if ever, is; but in the majority of cases his good faith is preserved at the expense of his critical acumen, by carrying back the worst qualities in the narrative from the narrator to his primary authorities. After all, Herodotus was in a difficult position. Was there anywhere procurable a true unbiassed account of any single episode in the war? His narrative betrays both general and particular interests and prejudices. (a) There is a universal or general 'pragmatism' to be detected in the traditions. Barbarians blasphemed Greeks, and Greeks Barbarians, but the worst stories told of each other by Greek and Barbarian were hardly so bad as what Greek would tell of Greek, the patriot of the medizer, the Athenian of the Spartan, or Korinthian, or Theban, and the others of the Athenian, the partisan of his rival and opponent, and the mere scandal-monger and tale-bearer of all alike. Panegyric too played its corresponding part: self-assertion and self-glorification were the natural complement of jealousy and hatred. The materials at the disposal of Herodotus were deeply infected with political and moral vices. The marvel is that out of such materials there nevertheless results a fairly intelligible record of events. For this boon we are indebted to the Herodotean method, at once neither so artless nor so unscientific after all as it seems at first sight. To report in readable form the traditions of the Persian wars, as they were living on the lips of men, a generation or at most two generations after the event, rather than to synthesize the chaos of individual stories into a single self-consistent unity, was the task which Herodotus more or less consciously set himself, with this result (among others) for us, that we are in a position to reason with the cloud of witnesses, to go behind the personality of our treasurer, and to audit his accounts for ourselves. We can hardly expect to see the materials for a judgement augmented or enriched; but to the more and more intelligent appreciation of the traditional deposit there is apparently no prescribed limit.

(β) Criticism may further mark one broad contrast between the story of Thermopylai and the story of Artemision, the existence of which is incontestable, whatever its explanation may be. The story of Artemision is upon the whole not creditable to the Greek fleet and the Greek commanders; and although prizes of valour are awarded to the Athenians, neither they nor Themistokles, their general, come particularly well out of the record. This depreciatory tendency in the stories is all the more significant since the hard fact cannot wholly be denied or done away with, that the fleet only retreated finally when its position became useless and untenable owing to the failure of the land-forces to hold Thermopylai. This quality in the story of Artemision can hardly arise from the materials having been drawn from unmaritime, or anti-naval states in Hellas, or from

traditions among the Greek states at the time engaged upon the Persian side: on the contrary, a dominantly Attic provenience has been detected in this part. Possibly naval operations and naval battles are in their very nature more difficult to comprehend at the time, and to preserve or restore afterwards, than land-actions. Moreover, the Athenians, and the Athenian sources, with which Herodotus was primarily acquainted, were not greatly concerned to justify the memory of Themistokles. Yet still, the failure of tradition to appreciate the stand made by the fleet at Artemision remains a curious puzzle. In part, the glorious and immortal memory of Salamis may have obliterated the merits of Artemision. In part, the apologies for Thermopylai involved an injustice to the fleet at Artemision. In part, the splendid failure will always command the sympathy of human souls before the miserly success of him who fights and runs away. In part, the success of the fleet off Artemision was after all perhaps but moderate, and mainly of a negative character. An adequate victory at Artemision might have saved Thermopylai, and all the rest. Tradition takes its own method of enforcing that moral. Whatever the reason, the result is patent in the prestige and preference accorded to the failure at Thermopylai over the stand at Artemision.

(γ) The story of Thermopylai, as given by Herodotus, is highly composite, and by no means drawn from one simple source; it is, no doubt in consequence, incoherent, not merely in regard to the story of Artemision, but in itself, and this incoherency goes so far as to preserve three explanations, or 'apologies' for the disaster, which are more or less inconsistent, or alternative to one another, and any one of which might in itself serve, as certainly the most incredible of the three might serve (but for the existence of the two others), as an adequate excuse or explanation of what was undeniably a military and political fiasco. (i.) Thus one story, or rather one set of stories, explains the failure by the ignorance of the defenders, and the treachery of those who should have been their friends: a lame excuse, for the ignorance was inexcusable, if indeed true, and the treachery was an obvious and foregone conclusion. (ii.) A second and somewhat better argument was found in the alleged cowardice and desertion of the greater part of the forces under Leonidas; but this excuse, which, if a true one, would of course explain everything, is traversed not merely by the recorded and admitted courage of the Allies, throughout the first two days' fighting, but by the variant tradition which asserts that Leonidas himself sent the allied contingents away. (iii.) This variant relates itself to the third apology, at once the most adequate and the most easily refutable: the fiasco at Thermopylai was a deliberate act of patriotic courage and religious devotion on the part of Leonidas and his companions to secure a divine and supernatural intervention on behalf of their country. In itself such an act were perfectly credible, and of good precedent; nor is the explanation of the sacrifice of

Leonidas at Thermopylai, as an act of such devotion, wholly inadmissible, at least in a secondary sense. The death of Leonidas was, indeed, a challenge not merely to the Persians, but to the Greeks, to the Spartans, to exact justice (*φόνου δίκας*) from the Barbarian.¹ But, as a primary explanation for the facts, this account is open to one fatal objection: it implies that the defence of Thermopylai was never intended to be a success. That implication is wholly inadmissible. The defence of Thermopylai was intended to be serious and thorough, as is proved by the following observations. (1) The Greeks had most carefully considered the plan of defence and deliberately chosen the line of Artemision-Thermopylai as the best (c. 175). (2) The interdependence of fleet and army—obliterated by Herodotus—proves that the land-forces were to hold Thermopylai as long as the fleet held the Euboian channel. (3) The political advantages involved in this line of defence, which covers all central Greece, approve it. (4) The Greek army-list shows it (c. 202). The Greeks, even as reported by Herodotus, put a considerable force at Thermopylai, and Herodotus understates the actual forces posted there. (5) The proclamation of Leonidas, recorded by Herodotus, proves it; that is, one tradition in Herodotus disproves another (c. 203). (6) The manifest surprise at the failure of the enterprise proves it (7. 206); that is, again, one story in Herodotus is confuted by another. (7) And so the alternative stories to account for the failure prove it, for they imply that, but for ignorance and treachery in the one case, or but for cowardice and desertion in the other, there might have been a very different story to tell. (8) Last, and not least, the visible growth of the legend, especially in passing from Herodotus to Diodoros, that is perhaps only to Ephoros, proves it a fiction, due to afterthought, but a highly pleasing fiction withal.² It pleased more than the Spartans, for it cancelled, if once thoroughly established, the painful alternatives, or at least the second alternative above indicated. But, like many afterthoughts, it proved too much on the one side, it proved too little on the other: if it accounted for the death of Leonidas and his Spartiatai, it failed to account for other facts, which any attempt at a reconstruction of the real story cannot ignore: the equal devotion and fate of the Thespians, the detention and escape of the Thebans.

§ 3. The real causes of the failure at Thermopylai, involving the retreat from Artemision as well, are not after all very far to seek; they are inherent in the strategic situation, taken together with the indisputable facts preserved by tradition. Of the main responsibility the Greek navy must be acquitted: it was not the fault of Themistokles and his colleagues, including his official superior, Eurybiades the Spartan, that Thermopylai was lost, and Leonidas sacrificed. The fleet at least held its own. No doubt a decisive victory at sea might

¹ Cp. 8. 114.

² Cp. Appendix I. § 13, p. 67 *supra*.

have relieved, or removed, the pressure on land ; but on each element a separate, albeit cognate success was to be achieved, and the success on each element had to be separately accomplished. Possibly enough the Peloponnesian allies were hoping that the fleet, that is, mainly, the Athenians, would repeat on the water the success of ten years before on land. Leonidas was sent perhaps only to hold Thermopylai, while the fleet should achieve a decisive issue. If so, there was a fundamental flaw in the Greek counsels, which helps to explain the actual result. That result, however, in itself is immediately traceable to two closely related matters of fact. In the first place, the position at Thermopylai was liable to be turned, unless sufficient forces were sent to cover every adit through the narrow waist of the Greek peninsula, between the Malian and Korinthian gulfs. In the second place, sufficient forces were sent to hold only the main passage, that by Thermopylai and Hyampolis, while the second main route, the road between Trachis and Kytinion (and so forward to Amphissa and to Delphi), was left apparently out of account. This route, indeed, plays no part in the story of the attack and defence in the pages of Herodotus, and is ignored and treated as non-existent.¹ Most of the modern and even recent discussions of the case follow suit in this matter, and discuss the problem of the defence of Thermopylai, either tacitly or explicitly, as though the road by the sea-coast had been the only route, which a Persian force could have taken into the Kephisos valley.² But Herodotus himself in this as in so many cases supplies the missing evidence unconsciously and in another connexion, seeing that he actually records the passage of the Persian forces from Trachinia into Doris, and that withal as though the whole army had marched by this route, and left the coast-road through Thermopylai, and the pass by Hyampolis, altogether on one side (8. 28). Whatever the state and condition of the great north route from Delphi *via* Amphissa and Kytinion to Trachis and Thessaly at the time of the Persian invasion, it was evidently a strategic factor, which the Greek plan of defence ought to have taken into account, and perhaps did take into account, although all memory thereof seems to have disappeared from the Herodotean version. Herodotus, in fact, presents the strategic elements in the defence of Thermopylai almost as imperfectly as the strategic elements in the defence of Tempe.³ The fleet is, indeed, stationed at Artemision, in communication with the army at Thermopylai, but the full significance of this combination is far from being realized or represented in the Herodotean story. And just as the abandonment of Thessaly is made, by Herodotus, to hinge upon the possibility of Tempe being turned by the Gonnos path over Olympos, without a hint, in the

¹ Cp. Commentary, esp. to 7. 216, and Appendix I. § 15, p. 98 *supra*.

² Exception must now be made for G. B. Grundy's *Great Persian War*

(1901), and the subsequent discussions aroused by it.

³ Cp. Appendix IV. § 7, pp. 251 f. *supra*.

immediate context, of the existence of those major passes by which the Persians undoubtedly entered Thessaly : so the failure at Thermopylai is all explained, in the Herodotean story, by the Anopaia path, without reference to the real pass by which a large portion of the Persian forces actually entered Phokis, and completely turned the position at Thermopylai. To put the point shortly : Herodotus takes some cognizance of the tactical aspects and problems of the case, but ignores or betrays little appreciation of its larger strategic aspects. In fact Thermopylai is not, and never was, a position so strong and easily defensible as it appears to have been accounted. The defence can be turned not merely by sea, on the north, but by land, on the south ; and again, not merely by the path Anopaia, over Kallidromos, but by the passes between Kallidromos and Oita, from Malis into Doris. It is (at least in my judgement) highly improbable that the Greek confederates were so ignorant of the land-routes in Greece, between Delphi, for example, and Thessaly, as not to be well aware of the possibility of a Persian column penetrating by the Trachinian route into Phokis and the upper Kephisos valley. They might possibly have been ignorant of the mountain-path, Anopaia, albeit that supposition, or, if you will, that tradition, is not easily to be accepted. Kallidromos is by no means an impassable barrier : paths and routes over such a hog's back are matters of course, even to the mere tourist ; there were plenty of men in the confederate ranks well acquainted with the locality. For the sole defence of Thermopylai the forces under the immediate command of Leonidas were probably sufficient : the sequel proves as much. Provision was also made for guarding the mountain-track by which Thermopylai could be least circuitously turned. This provision was inadequate, albeit there is no knowing what a thousand resolute men might not have effected in such a situation, had the situation been so simple as the Herodotean story assumes. But to cover not merely Thermopylai-Anopaia, but also the pass from Malis into Doris, to say nothing of the route 'through the Ainianes,' the forces under the disposal of Leonidas were not sufficient. The question arises whether nothing was done, and that on either side. Did the Greeks leave this large door open, by which a Persian column might have penetrated into Phokis, into Boiotia, and as far as Delphi itself, while Leonidas continued to hold Thermopylai, and to keep the Persians in front of him at play ? Or did the Persians, with none to bar the main road west of Kallidromos, make no use of that open door, or use it first, after they had forced Thermopylai, and even (so Herodotus might seem to imply) then at last exclusively, and in preference to the route along the coast ? The story of Thermopylai, as told by Herodotus, is wholly concerned with the actions of Leonidas and the men immediately under his command : in that story, so preoccupied, the full strategic problem, inevitably raised by the consideration of the mere geographical data, is ignored. We are not

bound by the Herodotean convention, but rather are bound at least to state the problem in its entirety. Its solution, of course, is another matter. For a solution nothing short of definite tradition can be satisfactory, and a definite tradition is not forthcoming. But there are not wholly wanting hints in the Herodotean stories, which point beyond the Herodotean conception. If the forces under Leonidas were enough to hold Thermopylai, why were they proclaimed as merely the advanced guard, or van, of the confederate army? What was the main body to do when it arrived? If there was uneasiness and discontent in the contingent under Leonidas, were not these feelings connected with the unguarded condition of the Trachinian pass? Was that pass wholly and from first to last unguarded? Were none of the local tribes, already or still, pledged to its defence? If some of the forces under Leonidas were detached and sent away, was it homewards they were sent, in the first instance, and not perhaps round, or across, the hills, to Doris, and the opening of the Trachinian pass? Was there no fighting on that route, because none has been recorded by Herodotus? He drew his knowledge of the defence of Thermopylai mainly from Spartan sources: they were more concerned with the apotheosis of the three hundred than with the strategic lesson of the campaign. The position of Thermopylai was turned; it might have been rendered untenable by passing a Persian column over the western pass: the mere silence of Herodotus does not prove that no such operation was conducted, nor, in the absence of explicit tradition, can it now be categorically asserted. But the hypothesis agrees not merely with the general conditions of the case, but with some positive hints, some otherwise anomalous items, in the story, and at least deserves recognition among the rival explanations of the result.

§ 4. The problem of what actually took place at Artemision and Thermopylai may now be approached with better hope of finding a relatively convincing solution, undisturbed by reference to the remoter and unrecorded corollaries of the whole transaction. The initial requisite here is to establish the exact terms of the synchronism between the operations of the fleets and the actions of the land-forces, from the point of departure in Therme down to the Persian occupation of Thermopylai and Artemision. A sort of journal of events is presented by Herodotus in the natural order, and with Therme as the starting-point. But the synchronism on this method is imperfectly determined, for two reasons: first, the exact period of delay on the part of the Persian fleet behind the army at Therme is ambiguously stated; secondly, the exact point of rejuncture between army and fleet is open to dispute: at neither end, in fact, does a certain result emerge on this method. In short, the true synchronisms cannot be determined by comparing the independent diaries of the fleet and of the army: the given synchronisms must be taken as the point of departure for reconstructing the diaries throughout. On this scheme

we shall proceed from the better to the less ascertained, and from the later to the earlier stages. Let the fixed point of departure be the recorded fact that there were three days' fighting by land, and three days' fighting at sea, the *triduum* of each being one and identical. From this point it is easy to reconstruct the diaries of fleet and army, at least back to the day upon which the Persian fleet finally left Therme. Thus, the three days' fighting for the fleet are preceded by three days of storm, and the storm bursts upon the night immediately succeeding the passage of the Persian fleet from Therme to the Magnesian coast. In short, the log of the fleet alone comprises but a week of seven days inclusive, from the departure out of the Makedonian port to the third and final engagement off Aphetai, and may be represented in the following table:—

LOG OF THE FLEET

First day : Leaves Therme and reaches Magnesia.
 Second day : Storm.
 Third day : Storm.
 Fourth day : Storm.
 Fifth day : Moves to Aphetai : first engagement.
 Sixth day : Second engagement.
 Seventh day : Third and last engagement.

The certain synchronism between the fighting by land and by sea is the point of departure for the reconstruction of the diary of the army: that is, the fifth, sixth, and seventh days in the log of the fleet are identical with the last three days, the days of fighting, on land. But the first day of fighting by land is preceded by four days of recorded inaction, or pause. It follows that the second, third, and fourth of these days of inaction, or pause, in the diary of the army, correspond exactly with the three days of storm at sea, which figure as the second, third, and fourth days in the log of the fleet. While Boreas, or Hellespontias, was raging on the sea, and reducing the king's fleet to a negligible quantity, the king was at rest, with his army, in front of Thermopylai. There remains the first day, upon which the fleet made from Therme to the Magnesian shore. During this day the king was already resting in front of Thermopylai. This rest appears essential in the plan of campaign to give time for the advent of the fleet; but whether it is to be construed as a complete inactivity appears more doubtful. The natural presumption is that on this day, whereon the fleet left Therme, the king arrived at Trachis, and in front of Thermopylai. Like enough some part of his forces, perhaps a column, was there before him. His intention, presumably, was that the assault upon the Greek positions by land and sea should take place upon the following day. The storm arose and spoilt, or postponed, for three days the execution of this plan. Nothing

exposes more completely the true character of the Herodotean sources, and the Herodotean method, than the total absence of any reference in this narrative to the obvious connexion between the three days' storm and the apparent waste of time by the Persian army before Thermopylai—unless, indeed, it be the trivial and absurd motives ascribed to the Persian king for his inactivity. This inaction, however, extends back one day earlier—if inaction it was, and not a day upon which the king himself takes up his position in the Persian camp. How many days had elapsed since the king's departure from Therme, or Pieria, is not quite clear; but the point is comparatively trifling. For an appreciation of the strategic and tactical problems connected with the defence of Artemision and Thermopylai it is sufficient to have established: (i.) the exact synchronism of the three days of fighting; (ii.) the exact synchronism of the three days of storm at sea, with three of the four days' pause on land; (iii.) the exact synchronism of the first of those days of inaction on land, or more probably the day of the king's own arrival in front of Thermopylai, with the day of the departure of the fleet from Therme and its arrival at Magnesia. Thus the synchronous and interrelated action of the Persian army and fleet for the seven days immediately preceding the final catastrophe of the Greeks, on their first line of defence, is fully and clearly established. The shorter diary of the fleet from Therme to Thermopylai is indeed complete: the longer diary of the land-forces is almost a blank, and the exact interval between their departure from Therme and their arrival at Trachis open to dispute. Two chronological data are supplied incidentally, but neither is quite free from ambiguity. (a) Xerxes is reported to have arrived in Malis "on the third day" (τρίτατος), apparently before the arrival of the Persian fleet at Aphetai (7. 196); but on the above reading of the other evidences, the day of the arrival of the fleet at Aphetai is the fifth day of the king's presence in Malis. The term *τρίτατος*, however, admits of another explanation more in harmony with the diary of the fleet. The day in question is not the third day *before* but the third day *after* the date of some other event. Unfortunately that event, not being expressed, must be conjectured. The most obvious material considerations suggest that the *terminus a quo*, or starting-point, is the visit of Xerxes to Halos in Achaia, or his 'passage through Thessaly and Achaia' mentioned in the immediate context: that is, Xerxes reached Malis the day but one after he had reached Halos in Achaia. If this suggestion be accepted, nine clear days are accounted for in the diary of the king's movements, viz. the three days of fighting at Thermopylai, three preceding days of inaction on land (and storm at sea), and the three days again preceding, on the last of which Xerxes reaches Malis, on the middle one of which Xerxes was apparently at Halos, and on the first of which the king entered Achaia from "Thessaly," or rather perhaps from Pelasgiotis.

How many days had previously elapsed since the king, and at least the column with which he moved, had begun the march, is not quite clear. The answer turns upon the interpretation to be given to (*b*) the "eleven" days' start allowed by the fleet to the army in the advance from Therme (c. 183). Taking the eleven days as reckoned exclusively, and the day on which the fleet left Therme as the twelfth day in the *Ephemerides* of the army, and also as coincident with the day of the king's entrance into Malis, nine days will have elapsed since the first movement of the army into Thessaly over the northern passes, and the arrival of Xerxes in Achaia will be dated to the tenth. The harmonized diaries of the army and navy may consequently be exhibited as in the following table:—

PERSIAN DIARY, FROM THERME TO THERMOPYLAI

First day : Xerxes and the army-column start.	
Second–Ninth days : Xerxes and the army in Thessaly.	
Tenth day : (1) Xerxes enters Achaia.	
Eleventh day : (2) Xerxes at Halos.	
Twelfth day : (3) Xerxes enters Malis.	First day : Fleet leaves Therme.
Thirteenth day :	Second day : Storm.
Fourteenth day :	Third day : Storm.
Fifteenth day :	Fourth day : Storm.
Sixteenth day : First land engagement.	Fifth day : Fleet reaches Aphetai : First naval engagement.
Seventeenth day : Second land engagement.	Sixth day : Second naval engagement.
Eighteenth day : Third land engagement.	Seventh day : Third naval engagement.
<hr/>	
Nineteenth day :	Eighth day : King's fleet occupies Histiaia.
Twentieth day :	Ninth day : Visit of the Marines to Thermopylai.
Twenty-first day :	Tenth day : Visit of the Marines to Thermopylai.

In relation to this harmonized journal of the army and fleet several points are almost self-evident; the diaries are produced from the Persian and not from the Hellenic side; the journal of the Persian fleet is presumably the more authentic, exact, and primary: an observation quite in accord with the most probable provenience of the historian's sources in this matter. Possibly the naval journal is unduly compressed. Purely material considerations might suggest that the movements of the fleet would have so been timed that the ships of war should reach Aphetai, or the Pagasaian gulf, while the king was at Halos in Achaia; yet the diary shows that the fleet only

leaves Therme on the very day whereon Xerxes reaches Trachis. In view, however, of the formal precision and agreement between the two diaries, all the more authoritative because obviously undesigned by the historian, we are not at liberty to depart in this case from the strict evidence supplied by Herodotus. The above table might at least be accepted as supplying the best regulative scheme for the data in Herodotus, as well on the material as on the formal side.

The parallel journals, however, as so far reconstructed, leave out of account certain events and movements, especially at sea, the proper appreciation of which must be of the utmost importance for the reconstruction of the actual story of the operations. These items are imperfectly, or even erroneously, chronologized by Herodotus, at least if an intelligible account is to be given of the operations as a whole. Such problematical points concern chiefly the three following episodes: (i.) The retreat of the Greek fleet from Artemision to Chalkis (7. 183), and its return (7. 192). (ii.) The despatch of the squadron of 200 vessels round Euboea to take the Greek navy in the rear (8. 7). With each of these major episodes a minor episode is connected, viz. (i.b) the first encounter at sea between the ten advanced Persian vessels and the three Hellenic (7. 179–182), and (ii.b) the advent and report of Skyllias, the Diver, in the Hellenic naval camp (8. 8). There is also (iii.) an episode, viz. the capture of the fifteen ships forming the rear-guard of the king's fleet on its way to Aphetai (7. 194–195), which stands curiously unrelated to the material sequel. Upon the determination of the chronological position, and causal relations, of these episodes must largely depend our conception of the actual course of events, especially at sea, upon the occasion.

(i.) *The retreat of the Greek fleet from Artemision to Chalkis* is directly connected by Herodotus with (i.b) the advance of the ten ships, which form a flying and exploring squadron, and their success against the three Hellenic vessels which were on the look-out off Skiathos. News of the disaster to their three vessels is conveyed to the Greek fleet at Artemision by fire-signals, and the Greek fleet, in terror, removes from Artemision to Chalkis. This terror is simply caused, to all appearance, by the failure of their three vessels to make way in the open against the ten 'barbarian' ships. The whole Greek fleet apparently retreats before the flying squadron of ten vessels! The exact day upon which this retreat was effected is not precisely indicated, but might apparently have been some days before the king's fleet finally advanced from Therme to the Magnesian coast; for the ten ships, after losing three of their number on the Ant-rock between Skiathos and the mainland, return to Therme, and report their adventure to the Persian admirals. Nor was that all: the "barbarians" had time to despatch the same, or some other, squadron back to the Ant-rock, for the purpose of erecting a guide-pillar of white marble on the treacherous reef as a warning to the fleet; all which must

have taken time, and falls apparently into the ten days immediately after the king's movement into Thessaly. The Persians were not yet in possession of the pass of Tempe, or of Thessaly itself, or the Athenians, who beached their ship "at the outlet of the Peneios," could hardly have made their way by land through Thessaly to Athens. That these fugitives betook themselves "to Athens" and not to Chalkis, much less Artemision or Thermopylai, is not the least curious item in the story. The date of their arrival at home, the time spent on the way, are points not specified. The story, as it stands, is not credible, nor even plausible. The Greek fleet cannot have retired to Chalkis, or even contemplated such a retreat, so long as the Greek army was occupying Thermopylai. Least of all can the Greek admirals have retired simply on learning—by bale-fires—that two or three of their vessels had been overcome by the advancing Persian fleet, or its vanguard. The reality, though not perhaps the precise date, of the episode of the three ships can hardly be doubted; but the Greek fleet never retired "to Chalkis" in consequence. If the Greek fleet temporarily evacuated its station at Artemision, there was some other and sufficient reason therefor. The station is re-occupied apparently on the second day of the storm (7. 192) in consequence of the reports brought (to Chalkis!) by their scouts of the storm, and the havoc it was working on the king's fleet (cc. 183, 192). Why the Greek fleet should now have been in such a hurry to re-occupy a relatively exposed position, before the storm had spent its fury, is not obvious; but that the movement to and fro Artemision, if such a movement took place, should be connected with the storm, and not with the mere fortunes of the three ships on the outlook, is a more than plausible hypothesis. That the Greek fleet put right back to Chalkis is patent exaggeration: the guard of the Euripos did not require the whole force, nor could Thermopylai be left exposed on the sea side. The Greek fleet may have moved down the channel of Oreos to gain shelter from the storm; but, if so, this movement will only have taken place on the 13th day of the diary, above given, and many days after the misadventure of the three look-out ships—unless, indeed, this adventure itself is to be brought down and dated to the 12th, the day on which the Persian fleet left Therme and reached the Magnesian shore. In this case, indeed, the coherence of the argument is assured. On the 12th, early in the morning, the Persian fleet leaves Therme: ten of the swiftest and leading vessels encounter, off Skiathos, towards evening, the three Hellenic vessels on the look-out, and ultimately make prize of them, only the crew of the Athenian ship effecting their escape (ultimately, by who knows what roundabout route) to Athens. News of the advance of the whole Persian fleet is telegraphed to the Greek fleet at Artemision. That same night bursts the storm, which is to rage for three days, upon the Persian fleet exposed to its full fury in the open. The

Greek fleet shifts its moorings, or its strand, further down the channel, perhaps round the cape *Lithada* into the channel of *Atalanti*, to be out of the fury of the Hellespontias—that wind would blow full up the channel of Oreos. When the storm abated, and hardly before, the Greek fleet made its way back to its proper station: that is to say, probably on the morning of the 16th day.

(ii.) *The despatch of the 200 ships, to sail round Euboea and seize the Euripos, or even attack the Greek vessels in the rear*, is apparently dated by Herodotus exactly to the 16th, the day on which the Persian fleet reaches Aphetai. On the same day (ii.b) Skyllias arrives in the Greek naval camp and informs the Greek admirals of the shipwreck of the Persian fleet, and of the despatch of the squadron of 200 vessels round Euboea. The two points are not, indeed, harmonious. Such a ship-wrecking as Herodotus has described off the Magnesian coast, would hardly have left the Persians disposed to detach a squadron of 200 sail to go round Euboea. Moreover, a part of the news ascribed to Skyllias was utterly stale. The Greek admirals already *ex hypothesi* knew all about the storm from their own scouts (to say nothing of beacon-fires from Skiathos). Here again a fresh arrangement, another perspective for the data in Herodotus, is inevitable. The advent of Skyllias is, perhaps, post-dated; he reached the Greek fleet not on the 16th but on the 13th, bringing news, indeed, of the ship-wrecking on that first day of the storm, and also of the movement of a squadron of 200 ships round Euboea. This squadron too is destined to be wrecked, "off the Hollows of Euboea," and a second storm is raised to wreck it. But, if the squadron was despatched on the 12th, the storm, which destroyed it, is the same storm as fell upon the Persian fleet off the Magnesian shore, and the odd reduplication of the storm is simply accounted for by the variety and incoherence of Herodotus' sources. Or, even if the advent of Skyllias to the Greek admirals is correctly dated to the 16th, yet he may well have brought the first news of the despatch of the squadron round Euboea. Though its fate was still problematic, the Greeks must have reckoned on the possibility of its destruction in the storm, which had raged for three days. On the 17th the Greeks at Artemision are reinforced by the squadron of fifty-three Attic ships, in which we may well see the rearguard of the Greek fleet detached and sent back to form or to reinforce the guard of the Euripos against the squadron circumnavigating Euboea. This Athenian contingent brings news of the total destruction of the Persian squadron, a fact which had set them free to rejoin the main fleet for the defence of the channel of Oreos. Thus, in all these respects, compression appears to be necessary in order to obtain from the Herodotean story—itsself but a string of incoherent episodes—the true sequence and connexion of events. Nor is the process here quite completed yet. Besides the advent of Skyllias on the 16th to the Greek camp, two other events are dated to that day, for both of which

room can hardly be found in the already well-stocked journal: namely, (iii.) *the capture of the fifteen Persian vessels*, forming the rearguard of the fleet (7. 194), and (iii.b) the first engagement at sea off Aphetai (8. 9-11). The two episodes are manifestly to be placed upon the same day (the 16th), yet they are narrated at a considerable interval by Herodotus, and put into no sort of connexion with each other. In the one case fifteen ships fall, by an error, into the hands of the Greeks off Artemision; in the other case thirty ships are captured as the result of an engagement; but, oddly enough, the two sets of captured ships belong to the same division of the king's fleet. The one story is obviously from an Asianic source; the other story, no less obviously, from an Athenian. Allowing for the difference of the sources, it would not be difficult to harmonise the two versions, and to see in them various accounts of one and the same exploit. The explanation of these two stories as an unconscious doublet, the reduction of the two exploits to a single one, and one on the lesser scale, has the further advantage of bringing the achievements of the Greek fleet off Artemision more into accordance with the spirit of the tradition, which certainly rather depreciates the naval results.

§ 5. The foregoing observations and arguments involve a reconstruction of the whole story in journalistic form for some three weeks to the following effect.

First day, Xerxes and the army start to cross the passes into Thessaly, leaving the fleet still at rest in the bay of Therme. For eleven days, including the first, the fleet remains in the same position, giving the army-columns time to make their way into Thessaly and out of it again on the other side, before the fleet moves from Therme. During this pause the Persian fleet need not have been wholly inactive. The mission of the ten advanced cruisers, their encounter with the three Hellenic ships, their subsequent misadventure off the *Murmex*, the steps taken to buoy, or rather to land-mark, that channel, might be dated during the first week; but a more compressed perspective is here adopted in preference, and room found for all the action of the Persian fleet within the later and clearly marked week. For nine days the journal of the army is also a blank, while the army is undoubtedly upon the march through Thessaly. At least two, and probably all three, Persian columns, or distinct portions of all three columns, entered Thessaly, and no doubt by three distinct passes. Xerxes himself may have crossed the mountains by the Petra pass, seeing that he had been moving previously with the centre column; though it is surprising to find the king avoiding the easier coast-road. Two other columns, perhaps, entered Thessaly by the passes of Tempe and of Volustana respectively. Now, if not before, the king may have visited the Peneios gorge, and made the ingenuous remarks reported by Herodotus at an earlier point: now, in any case, the race-meeting must have been held, in which the Persian horses

and horsemen proved their vast superiority over the Thessalian cavalry. On the *tenth* day Xerxes marches out of Thessaly (Pelasgiotis?) into Achaia, and on the *eleventh* may have passed by Halos. Here at any rate Xerxes is moving by the coast-route; but there can be little doubt that another column crossed from Thessaly and Achaia into Malis and Trachinia, by the regular and main pass of Thaumakoi, over the Othrys range. One Persian column, perhaps the left or coast column, possibly remained behind in Thessaly, to secure the Persian lines of communication, and the fidelity of the tribes in the king's rear. On the *twelfth* day the king, moving by the coast route, enters Malis, and probably finds the right column already encamped upon the banks of the Spercheios. Xerxes had moved at no insignificant pace if he reaches Trachis "upon the third day" after quitting "Thessaly," or even after passing Halos. On this same day, at early dawn, the fleet had started from Therme, and by evening found itself off the "Ovens" of Magnesia. The flying squadron had headed the main body, encountered and captured the Aiginetan, Troizenian, and Athenian cruisers, and perhaps advanced as far south as the Ant-rock, in the channel between Cape Sepias and the island of Skiathos, to prepare the passage for the main fleet. Ere nightfall the squadron of two hundred sail had been detached to circumnavigate Euboia, and to secure the Euripos. That night the storm burst upon the Persian fleet off Magnesia, and upon the squadron that was making its way round Euboia. For three full days (13th, 14th, 15th) the storm raged, reducing the king to inactivity on land, and working destruction, doubtless exaggerated by report but still in reality considerable, upon the Persian fleet. In particular, the squadron off Euboia was virtually annihilated. The Greek fleet had retired before the storm into the more sheltered channel of *Atalanti*. Upon the abatement of the storm, i.e. *on the sixteenth*, the Greek fleet returned, as it was bound to return, to its former position, or at least to some position in the channel of Oreos, based upon Euboia. The tactical aim of the Greek fleet in this place appears perfectly simple and obvious. Its primary purpose is to prevent the passage of the king's ships through the channel. For that purpose the Greek fleet is not drawn up across the channel, a position wherein its left wing would have rested on the Achaian coast, already fully in the enemy's possession, wherein, too, the advance of the Persian fleet would have to be met front to front. The actual position of the Greek fleet was tactically far superior. The Greek lines extended along the Euboian strand, and enabled the defenders to attack the king's ships in flank, should the Persian admirals attempt to force a way down the channel. Early that same afternoon (16th) the Persian fleet was seen rounding Sepias, and making into the gulf of Pagasai for Aphetai. This movement was carried out without interference from the Greeks, who might, perhaps, have attempted to take the Persian fleet at a disadvantage during this

manœuvre. It is to be observed that the Greek admirals allow the passage of the Persian fleet, *ex hypothesi* sadly damaged by the three days' storm, to Aphetai without challenge or attack. The waterway was large; the Persian main fleet had not suffered so very grievously from the storm; the Phoenician, if not the Ionian, marine was still accounted superior to Athenian or Peloponnesian; a Lakonian was in command; the Greek admirals had not yet risen to a full sense of what was required of them; even Themistokles was, perhaps, still anxious to spare the resources of Athens. One limited success good-fortune brought the Greeks: a squadron of fifteen vessels fell into their hands. Among the commanders on board were Sandokes, a Persian, the governor of Aiolian Kyme, a man with a remarkable past; Aridolis, tyrant of Alabanda in Karia; the Paphian Penthyllos; and we may probably venture to add the Salaminian Philaon. To these dimensions may be reducible the "mighty sea-fight," too fully described in the Eighth Book. Now, on this evening, perhaps for the first time, the Greek admirals, be it from Skyllias or from Antidoros of Lemnos, the sole "deserter" (!) from the king's side, or from their captives on the fifteen ships, learned the despatch of the squadron of two hundred sail round Eubœia: in the narrative the point of time at which the Greeks heard of the despatch of the squadron may have been confounded with the point of time at which the squadron was despatched. A good part of that squadron had already gone down to the bottom, or on to the rocks of Eubœia, as the Greek admirals knew at latest next day; but they now detached, or thought of detaching, a portion of their own fleet to reinforce the rearguard, which had doubtless been left to hold the Euripos. Meanwhile, upon this same day, the first assault had been made upon Thermopylai, and had been successfully resisted. This event too was known doubtless ere morning to the leaders on the Greek fleet. The Medes, the Elamites, and the Persian "Immortals" were all engaged by the book at Thermopylai upon this day; but the fighting at Thermopylai is done too much *per schema*, or schedule, and little confidence can be placed in the details. Apparently on this, the sixteenth day of the whole journal, which is the fifth day of the Log of the Persian Fleet, and the first day of actual battle at Artemision and Thermopylai, the fighting on land was more serious and on a larger scale than the fighting at sea. A determined effort was made, by a frontal attack, to force the pass at Thermopylai. The exact scene of the fighting is in doubt, but probably should be limited to the space between the wall and the western gate of the pass, which Leonidas can hardly have attempted seriously to maintain.¹ The Persian fleet evidently made no effort to force the channel on this day, nor is it credible that the Greeks, after allowing the Persians to

¹ The King's men could easily have swarmed over the comparatively easy col, or spur, which forms 'the Western Gate.'

come to anchor, or to shore, at Aphetai, advanced, late in the afternoon, to draw the Barbarians out to battle, and to sample the sort of fighting to be expected from that quarter. The Greeks were content with their lucky capture of fifteen ships or so, and with the opportunity of magnifying this stroke of luck into a great victory.

On the *seventeenth* day (= the sixth, the second) some fighting apparently took place both by sea and land. The Persian fleet, indeed, remained inactive at Aphetai; but the Hellenes, reinforced by the arrival of fifty-three Attic ships, which apparently brought news of the fate of the Persian squadron off Euboea, are credited with an attack on the Kilikian ships, their destruction, and a victorious return to "Artemision." The account of this naval success is of a somewhat perfunctory order. No explanation is given of the means by which, while the king's fleet is doing nothing at Aphetai, the Greeks manage to become engaged with a considerable but apparently isolated contingent. The fate of the Kilikian squadron is also suspicious; it is all destroyed, no prizes taken, no figures given. Are these Kilikian ships haply the remnant of the two hundred ships that had been despatched round Euboea? Are they too cut off, as they are making their way back to the main fleet? Is this exploit another of the kind reported (in Bk. 7) for the previous day, and magnified again into a grand achievement? Possibly the achievement this time was not an Athenian one, or we might have had richer details. Anyway, neither the lost squadron, nor these unnumbered Kilikian ships, perhaps a section of it, ever rejoined the king's fleet; and we have no record of these adventures from the Asianic side. The account of the night and day at sea, even for the scenes laid at Aphetai, is obviously traceable to European sources.

Perfunctory as is the account of this day's doings in the fleet, the account of the fighting on land is even more so. Details are lost in a mere vague generalization. Fighting there may have been: the result will have disappointed the king. But this day was nevertheless for ever memorable as the day upon which the decision was taken, or acted on, to abandon the mere frontal attack upon Thermopylai, and to attempt a circumvention, by sending round a body of men, inland, to attack the Greeks from the rear. "About the time of the lighting of the lamps" Hydarnes set out from the Persian camp, at the head of the choicest troops in the Persian army, the myriad of "Immortals." Guided by a local man, they ascend the gorge of the Asopos, follow a track behind the cliffs of Kallidromos overlooking the hot springs, and descend, past the modern village of *Drakospilia*, by a good path, upon the rear of the "middle gate" of Thermopylai, and the Greeks posted there. The march was a night's stiff work. The path was no secret, and the possibility of some such attempt on the part of the Persians had been fully taken into account by the defenders. A thousand Phokians at least were posted near the top of the pass to bar the way.

Even if outnumbered, ten to one, who can say what a thousand resolute and well-armed men might not have effected, as far as this particular path was concerned? So far as the Herodotean story goes, there was some cowardice, or incompetence, on the part of the Phokians, who retired up to higher ground, perhaps expecting to be attacked, yet remained inactive, when the enemy gave them the go-by. The whole situation may not be fully represented in the Herodotean story: the ten thousand, who came round by the path Anopaia, may not have been all the men who had climbed the Asopos gorge; the head of a Persian column may already have pushed its way into Doris. In any case, the position of Leonidas at Thermopylai had been turned, and the fate of the defenders sealed.

Not until about mid-day—if we may trust the Herodotean horologe—was any movement discernible in the king's fleet. For two days the Persian vessels had remained at Aphetai, refitting, or what not, after their rough experiences. On the water the Greeks had so far taken the offensive; but the actual fighting has been reduced above to very modest proportions as compared with the ostentatious reports preserved by Herodotus. On the first day some fifteen ships, or so, had been cleverly isolated and cut off from the rear of the Persian fleet; on the second day the remnant of the wrecked and scattered squadron, previously detached to circumnavigate Euboia, had fallen into the hands of the Greeks. Now, upon the third day, the Persian fleet at last assumes definitely the offensive, and advances to attack the Greek. This point, a very significant one, appears clear in a narrative encumbered with the usual generalities. The Persian admirals no doubt had their orders. The definite assault was made on the Greek positions by sea and by land at the same time, or on the same day. Had not the Persian naval plan miscarried, a squadron would have been attempting, at this same time, to force the passage of the Euripos, or might already have achieved that action. The third day's engagement at sea is not claimed as a Greek victory: the Greek ships barely hold their own. The Egyptians are most highly distinguished on the king's side, and make prize of five Greek ships, crews and all. The Athenians among the defenders, and among the Athenians Kleinias son of Alkibiades, this day deserve the prize of valour—more by their sufferings apparently than by the damage they inflict, for half the Athenian ships are disabled or temporarily put out of action. Perhaps neither side was left in a position to renew the conflict on the morrow; but, meanwhile, the issue for the nonce had been decided on land.

The accounts of the third and last day's fighting on land seem superior to those for the preceding days; though it would indeed be strange if they left nothing to desire, or satisfied a moderately searching criticism. Leonidas had long known what to expect. As soon at least as the Greeks had reached Thermopylai, they had been

informed, by men of Trachis, of the existence of the pathway over Kallidromos (7. 175), and the Phokians had undertaken to defend it (7. 217). Leonidas must have foreseen that, sooner or later, the Persians would make an attempt to circumvent his post by this route, even if they did not turn the whole position by a longer circuit over the Trachinian pass into Doris. Now, upon this fatal day, the *eighteenth* since the Persians had quitted Therme, the seventh since Xerxes had arrived in Malis, the third since his fleet had reached Aphetai, a most determined assault was to be made on the Greek defence, as by sea, so by land, and the Spartan king was early apprised thereof. Whatever the indications read by the gallant diviner, Megistias, from the sacrificial entrails, the start of Hydarnes for the mountain was duly reported, under cover of night, by Greek deserters from the Persian camp. At daybreak their report was fully confirmed by scouts, hurrying on short cuts down the mountain-side to announce the near advent of the Persian force. In regard to the ensuing action of the Greeks there can be in the main little doubt. The forces at Thermopylai divided: the larger part retired, and made good its retreat, no doubt along the main coast-road, and over the pass of Hyampolis, into Boiotia, and so to the Isthmos; the smaller part remained, and met a gallant death, fighting to the last moment and the last man. Whatever the motive and design of this action, its immediate and even its remoter results are plain enough. The immediate effect obviously was to secure the retreat and escape of a large number of fighting men, who, had they remained, might indeed have raised the price of the Persian victory, but must themselves have shared the fate of Leonidas, or increased the number of prisoners, who surrendered to the victors. So obvious a result can scarcely have lain outside the design of the responsible commander, and those immediately about him. The heroes of Thermopylai went to their fate well assured that they were purchasing by their deaths the escape of their comrades. To this extent it is no exaggeration to say that, in the final scene, Leonidas and his men were fighting, of set purpose, a rearguard action, with the definite intention of covering the retreat of the main body; in this intention the action was, not merely justifiable, but completely successful. The retention of the Thespians and of the Thebans is also more intelligible from this point of view: the Boiotian contingent remained, perhaps well to the rear of Leonidas and his Lakedaimonians, and acted as further cover to the army in retreat. But whether the fate of the rearguard was already known to be desperate, when this resolution was adopted, is not quite so clear and certain. If, indeed, the main body evacuated Thermopylai only upon the morning of this day, and in consequence of the news that the position had been turned by the Persians on the path Anopaia, then Leonidas at least and the chief officers, as well those who departed as those who remained with him, must well have known that the case of

the rearguard was hopeless. Such is the conclusion forced upon us by the Herodotean time-table. On such a point, however, Herodotus is not quite convincing: the immediate context is riddled with inconsistencies of one kind and another. The resolution to evacuate Thermopylai may have been taken somewhat earlier, in consequence either of the previous fighting, or of the command of the whole position enjoyed by the Persian, in virtue of his possession of the road from Trachis over into Doris. The main body of the Greek forces may have had a somewhat longer start of the Persians than appears in the narrative of Herodotus: the Persian night-march by Anopaia may have threatened not the whole Greek force but only the rearguard, which had remained at its post. In either case a tactical problem must have presented itself to Leonidas and his staff: whether to offer front to the Persians descending from the mountain on their rear, or to advance and do battle with the Persian main force on their front. The exact course of the last action, and the precise details in regard to place, time, and circumstance, are open to dispute; but on the whole the probable course of affairs may be established. Apparently the Greeks, on this occasion, advanced further west to meet the Persian frontal attack than in the previous engagements, and may even perhaps have pushed out beyond the western gate.¹ If so, this advance was not the desperate attack of doomed men, anxious to shorten their inevitable fate, but rather a necessary part of the plan for gaining time for the retreat of the main forces undisturbed. But a point was reached when, from their losses and exhaustion, and by reason of the approach of the ten thousand on their rear, a concentration was naturally called for. The fighting had, indeed, been close and desperate: Leonidas was already slain, and among the many Persians who had fallen were two of the king's own brothers. The men of the rearguard were selling, and were still resolved to sell, their lives dearly. The position of their last rally and final annihilation is precisely and credibly marked in the narrative, no doubt in view of the monuments afterwards erected and therein described. The hillock on which the Lion of Leonidas was couched, in honour of the men who had fallen there in dutiful obedience to the laws of Lakedaimon, is doubtless one of the three large mounds immediately within the eastern gate of the pass, to the left of the road as you go towards Lamia.

The fact that the last stand of Leonidas and his men was a well-calculated stratagem with a definite tactical and ultimately strategic aim, in no way detracts from its heroic quality. The dead Spartiatæ at Thermopylai are among the true Immortals: the story of their passing is an everlasting possession for humanity. But the heroes of that day can hardly themselves have realized in their mortal agony the remoter results of their example, or the fame and profit that should accrue, before all others, to Sparta from the devotion of her

¹ Cp. Appendix I. § 13, p. 68 *supra*; but the authority is almost worthless.

sons. So it must have been in this, as in a score, an hundred, other similar cases. "Theirs not to reason why!" To the soldier, selected for that forlorn hope, or volunteering, it was enough to follow the call of duty, of honour, of loyalty—and to leave the issues on the knees of the gods. The leaders may have had a larger or more conscious outlook; but, of course, wherever the most gallant deed had to be done, the place of Leonidas and his bodyguard was there. Who would have stayed in Thermopylai had the Spartan king and his guards withdrawn? Policy, duty, devotion, honour, all pointed one way—not because under no circumstances was a Spartan permitted ever to give way before an enemy's force, but because, on this occasion, the smaller number had to be risked, or even annihilated, in order to save the rest; and because, had the leader retreated, taking with him his own men, a general stampede had ensued, and all alike would then have shared one and the same inglorious doom.

§ 6. The defeat at Thermopylai was destined to work out to more credit than a victory; yet none the less was it at the time a defeat for the Greeks, and a decisive military success for the king. Apart from the actual losses of the Greeks in the pass, the victory on land rendered the further efforts or resistance of the fleet in Euboian waters useless and impossible. Phokis and Boiotia were now completely at the king's mercy: Attica itself was doomed, unless the Peloponnesian forces had taken up a position to the north of Kithairon. The news from Thermopylai was hardly calculated to encourage so bold a line of conduct. The Greek fleet itself had been somewhat roughly handled in the final engagement off Euboia, and the loss of Thermopylai, and presently the discovery that there were no Peloponnesian troops north of the Isthmos, for the moment completely disconcerted its plans, and threw the scheme of defence out of gear. Now, if not before, Delphi abandoned all hope of the national cause, and uttered only counsels of despair. The immediate results of Thermopylai were, indeed, disturbing and apparently disastrous to the Greek cause. In process of time, when the memories of Salamis and of Plataia, and a long catalogue of successes won from the Persian within the traditional frontiers of the Empire itself, grew up to console and to rehabilitate the Greeks at the expense of the Barbarians, the stories of the first misadventures, of the early Persian successes, were retold in the light of later events; the petty engagements off Artemision were magnified into brilliant Greek victories: the incontrovertible failure at Thermopylai was explained away on various hypotheses, possessed of one common virtue, that they contradict each other. But, beneath the glamour of these contradictory apologies emerges the plain historic admission that upon their first well-chosen line of defence the Greeks had encountered disaster, and had beaten a retreat. Was that retreat to turn to flight, to surrender? Or was victory still retrievable in the national cause, upon a lower or inner line of defence?

APPENDIX VI

SALAMIS

§ 1. Strategic aspects of the battle of Salamis. § 2. Character of the records. § 3. The tactical problem (theories of Leake, Blakesley, Goodwin). § 4. Extent of the difference between Aischylos and Herodotus. § 5. Solution of the tactical problem (the six traditional items in the account). § 6. Verification of the proposed solution. § 7. Operations of the Persian army in connexion with Salamis. § 8. Failure of the Greeks to exploit their victory.


§ 1. ON the larger aspects, strategic and military, of the battle of Salamis there is hardly much room for serious difference of judgement. The whole series of operations, in which the Salaminian victory formed a cardinal crisis, involved strategic and tactical combinations by sea and land. Historical parallels and analogies are seldom, if ever, exact; but it may perhaps be said, by way of suggestive illustration, that the invasion of Greece by Xerxes combined against Hellas, and especially against Athens, the war methods (ὁδοὶ πολέμου) which, in the later struggle of Rome against Carthage, were divided between the first and the second Punic wars: albeit Duilius or Claudius was no more a Themistokles than Xerxes or Mardonios was a Hannibal! But, in such cases, the correlation of fleets and armies, on the one side and on the other, is rarely so complete and intimate as may have been intended. Something occurs on sea, or on land, if not on the one side, upon the other, to throw all that complicated machinery out of gear; exact co-operation gives way to isolated or alternate adventures, which may in the long run, but only at a greater expenditure of time and material, bring about decisive results. Such at least was the course of working among the secondary causes which determined the issue of the Persian war. In its fundamental aspects the war is a struggle on both elements, and, so long as the Persian maintains the offensive, upon both elements equally. This its fundamental aspect is fully presented in the operations upon the first line of contact. But the collapse of the Greek defence at Thermopylai and Artemision is followed by a strategic uncertainty and incoherence, which to some extent alters, or partially obscures, the real connexion of events. Salamis is, at least *prima facie*, a purely naval operation; and, although a great victory for

the Greek fleet, it remains in itself indecisive of a war which is a question of armies as well as of fleets. The complement of Salamis may, indeed, be found in the victory of Plataia, ten months later, which delivers ancient Hellas for ever from the danger of an oriental master. Upon the whole these two victories took place within predestined and appropriate scenes, linked together by an inner and essential relation. Plataia and Salamis viewed continuously represent the line upon which, as a matter of historical fact, the double victory of Greece, by land and sea, was accomplished. No better arena for the chances of the Greek fleet could have been selected than the straits of Salamis; and the northern slopes of Kithairon offered a most favourable station for the Greek army, if anything in the nature of a pitched battle was to decide the campaign. Yet it might seem as though Mardonios was allowed to select his own field in the one case, while in the other the Greeks had been first led by accident, and then compelled by a somewhat sinister cunning, to risk an engagement in the waters of Salamis. Hints and reminiscences in the traditions of the war, the natural relations of places and circumstances, the actual course of events, suggest a less accidental and more deliberately chosen connexion between antecedents and consequents. In all probability Salamis as a naval station for the Greek fleet not merely came to stand in a somewhat ideal relation to the position subsequently occupied by the Greek army upon Kithairon, but also had some real and definite relations to posts actually held by the Greeks on land at the time. Three such positions require consideration, namely, Salamis, the Akropolis, the Isthmos.

The island of Salamis itself undoubtedly was not merely a harbour and basis for the Greek navy, but an enclosure and portion of Greek soil, which would have been obstinately defended to the last, even had the Greek navy suffered annihilation in the Straits. The Peiræus was not yet built or fortified, or it would probably have been garrisoned and held by the Athenians, as no doubt Megara was actually held by its own citizens.¹ Athens itself was not at this time in a state to stand siege; but the mysterious story of the defence of the Athenian Akropolis has been held, by more than one critic, to conceal, or half-reveal, a serious military intention, the failure of which considerably disturbed the Greek commanders at Salamis.² The actual distance which separated the Greek navy at Salamis from the Greek army behind the wall across the Isthmos, was hardly so great as the interval which had parted the Greek navy off Artemision and the Greek forces behind the wall at Thermopylai. When the actual day of battle dawned, the Greeks at Salamis, or at least their leaders, perfectly understood that the operations at sea were as essentially protective of the Isthmos and the Peloponnese itself, as though the scene of combat

¹ Cp. 8. 85. 3, and p. 100 *supra*; also 9. 14. 5.

² Cp. 8. 51. 5, and p. 243 *supra*.



had been laid in the bay of Kenchreai. Thus, broken for the moment though the Greek plan of defence may have been by the collapse at Thermopylai, and the non-appearance of the Peloponnesian arms in Euboea, it is not necessary to regard the occupation of Salamis by the Greek fleet as fortuitous or lying outside the general plan of campaign. On the contrary, Salamis may be regarded as the pre-ordained station for the Greek fleet, if compelled to abandon Artemision: albeit the question of quitting Salamis, or remaining, appears to have been raised, perhaps more than once, in the sequel, as the result of other and not wholly foreseen developments.

Thus, when the fleet put in at the Athenian harbour and discovered that Attica was to be exposed to the full fury of the Persian invasion, an urgent question presented itself as to what course the Athenians were to adopt. The question was not simply a strategic one: political, moral, nay, religious issues were involved. Many good citizens believed that Athens was able and willing to save the city, or at least the Acropolis: the resolution to hold the Akropolis against the barbarian had in its favour the prospect of an advance by the Peloponnesian forces and the relief of the besieged. Now, if not before, recourse was had to Delphi for illumination; now, at this crisis, Delphic responses were sought, which, in truly oracular fashion, afforded equally divine encouragement to all three possible alternatives: wholesale flight, the defence of the Akropolis, the naval engagement in Salaminian waters.¹ These alternatives were not, indeed, necessarily or mutually exclusive, nor was any one of them inconsistent with the plans of Themistokles. All three were contemplated, and tried, in the sequel, albeit utter flight was used but as an argument, and that itself not quite the *dernier resort* of the Athenian statesman, to compel the Peloponnesians to fulfil their engagements to Athens.² The fall of the Akropolis, indeed, opened the question, which had first been raised by the unprotected state of Attica as a whole; for the Persian capture of the Akropolis; the actual advance of the Peloponnesian hoplites into Attica out of the reckoning. Only then, perhaps, did Themistokles demonstrate the strategic bearing of the naval position at Salamis upon the military defence of the Isthmos, and reinforce his demonstration by the threat of an Athenian secession, even if he did not force the hands of the Peloponnesian admirals by a ruse, which involved victory or annihilation for the Greek naval forces.

§ 2. Such are the broader strategic aspects of the real situation at Salamis, at least considered from the Greek side. They were hardly to be expected in the poetic brief of Aischylos; they are but more fully presented in the Herodotean stories, or even in the more wholly rationalized versions of his successors. But there are not wanting, in the traditions all through, materials for some such bold

¹ Cp. 7. 140 with Commentary *ad l.*

² Cp. 8. 62 and 9. 11. 9.

reconstruction; while the whole mass of positive evidence, fairly sifted and interpreted, gives a pretty full and intelligible account of the actual dispositions, tactics, and achievements which secured maritime predominance and deliverance for the Greeks. The story in Herodotus is, indeed, here, as elsewhere, made up of a host of traditions, anecdotes, records, items, traceable to various sources, drawn from both sides, infected with local and personal prejudices and interests, full of inconsistencies, improbabilities, fictions. The result, even when rationalized, can hardly be other than highly problematical. Here, as elsewhere, we desiderate a precise chronology, or horarium, which might decide so many doubtful points of motive and of action; nor can we even here regard the topography as quite clear and complete, although in this case the substantial landscape has not altered appreciably since the battle-day itself. More distracting even than chronological obscurities or topographical cruces are the irrationalities of motive, action, and event, freely predicated of both sides and of all concerned. A part, at least, of the historian's sins of omission can be made good from other sources, each of which, however, in its turn lies under some suspicion of one kind or another. To Aischylos belongs indisputable priority in this case; and, making all allowance for poetic treatment, and dramatic situation, Aischylos must remain the regulative witness in regard to the actual battle, of which he, and he alone, writes as a contemporary and eye-witness for eye-witnesses and contemporaries. In case of contradiction between Aischylos and Herodotus, in regard to matter of fact, and failing a harmony or explanation, the historian must succumb to the poet. The more reasoned unity of Diodoros, i.e. of Ephoros, is not to be rejected as a mere rationalism of Herodotus' inconsistencies; it may contain elements from subsidiary sources, and authors of the fourth century stood much nearer to the primary sources than those of any later age. Plutarch, and some other similar writers, are mainly valuable, of course, just in so far as they preserve scraps of tradition other than the materials supplied by Aischylos and Herodotus. To decide whether an item of apparent tradition, so far guaranteed, is much more than a very early inference, or act of reflexion, may not always be easy; but the point at which this rubicon is passed, and inferences, combinations, reflexions, hypotheses, have infected mere memory and pure tradition, lies already before the Herodotean composition, or even the Aischylean creation. Amid such a wealth of variants, possibilities, and rival stories, broken by pauses and silences as perplexing as the sharpest discords of tradition, a synthesis can hardly be obtained which will subsume all alternatives, or convince even all equally well-informed critics. Yet the argument of late has advanced quite steadily towards a more and more satisfactory conclusion. The latest theory of the battle of Salamis is not the virgin essay of an isolated genius, solely in contact with the traditional evidences, or the verifiable conditions; it is the product of a dialectical

process of reconstructive criticism, which has with growing clearness sifted fiction and fact, and related traditional fact to verifiable conditions, marking precisely more and more the scale of probabilities. The last word in such a critique may never be spoken; but what here follows may at least deserve a place of its own in the durable argument.

Chronological.—The year, and even the month, and part of the month, for the dating of the battle of Salamis, are not liable to much difference of opinion. The battle was certainly fought on some day in the last decade of Boëdromion, that is to say, September of the Attic year of Kalliades, Ol. 75. 1 = 480–479 B.C. It is possible to go somewhat further, and to propound a particular day: such a specification might be acceptable as a regulative idea, even if the evidence be not quite convincing, nor the argument quite conclusive.¹ But, even if such precision were admitted in regard to the precise day of the battle, the journalistic data do not give us quite so long, nor so clear and coherent a perspective in regard to Salamis as has been obtained for Artemision-Thermopylai. The events of the day of battle are, indeed, clearly marked by Herodotus and by the other authorities; the immediate antecedents of the battle can be re-traced less clearly through the preceding night and day. Back from that point the intervals to be allowed for the previous action are less and less clear: to co-ordinate, or synchronize, the movements of the king's fleet and army, or either series with the movements and action of the Greek fleet, is not easy. Several indications, indeed, occur in the Herodotean text, of a diarial character; but precise sequences, definite intervals, strict co-ordination, are wanting. How long was the Greek fleet at Salamis before the Persian army made its appearance in Attica, and invested the Akropolis? How much time is to be allowed for the siege of the Akropolis? What interval separated the arrival of the Persian king in Athens and the arrival of his fleet at Phaleron? How many days, or hours, elapsed between the arrival of the king's fleet at Phaleron and the actual day of, or day before, the battle? Exactly how long did the king's fleet consume in the voyage from Artemision to Phaleron? On the Persian side some precise statements are forthcoming upon these points; especially in regard to the navy there is some show still of a diary, such as has already been reconstructed for Artemision. Thus six days apparently elapse between the return of the Persian marines from Thermopylai to Histiaia and the arrival of the Persian fleet at Phaleron. It is not, indeed, quite clear whether the days specified are all reckoned inclusively or exclusively; but having regard to the actual events, and the magnitude of the movements in question, the days may reasonably be reckoned exclusively. According to this hypothesis, upon the 27th day of the journal, already projected for the synchronous movements of the

¹ Cp. 8. 64, 65, 83, and Appendix IX. § 9.

Persian forces from Therme,¹ the king's fleet reached Phaleron, by no means an extravagant estimate in either direction. The army may have moved upon the 21st or 22nd through Thermopylai, or the movement of the Persian forces through Doris, Phokis, and Boiotia may really have begun a day or two sooner. Five or six days, indeed, seem none too much to allow for the advance of the king from Thermopylai to Athens. The arrival of the fleet at Phaleron was presumably timed to agree with the arrival of the army in Attica; but in this case, as in the previous case, the Persian army is given a long start of the fleet, not merely because the fleet moves much more rapidly than the army, but also in order to enable the army to arrive and establish itself in the next position before the fleet advanced to its co-ordinate station. In ancient warfare, possession of a land-basis was doubly necessary for naval operations in presence of the enemy; in the present case the Persian fleet only left Histiaia, or at least Chalkis, when assured that there would be no more fighting north of Kithairon, or even, perhaps, outside the Isthmos. If the session of the King's Council (in itself largely fictitious), or the resolve to give battle to the Greeks, is to be dated to the same day as the arrival of the Persian fleet at Phaleron, both might be placed the day but one before the battle, which is also the day of the capture of the Akropolis. The day after the capture of the Akropolis, that is the day before the naval battle, is somewhat fully reported. This was apparently the day on which the Greek exiles held a sacrifice on the Akropolis; somewhat later Dikaïos and Demaratos may conceivably have had their vision on the Thriasian plain. The king's army was on the move towards the Isthmos—or at least towards Eleusis and Megara: the king's fleet was moving up from Phaleron to Salamis. A message, moreover, was received from Salamis at Persian headquarters, which apparently led to a further movement or development of the Persian fleet, occupying a great part of the night. Movements and events upon the Hellenic side have hitherto been left chronologically vague; but at this point it is possible to co-ordinate within limits the action on both sides. On the day before the battle the Greeks had already fully determined to fight, and on this day, while still the coast was clear, sent to Aigina to invoke the Aiakidai. During the night of that day Aristēides apparently reported a fuller development of the Persian position, and the report was confirmed ere morning by the Tenian vessel, which deserted the Persian for the national side. On the previous day the Greeks were, of course, fully aware of the capture of the Akropolis, and of the arrival of the Persian fleet at Phaleron; and the two events, especially the former, may have reopened the question of remaining to do battle at Salamis, or retiring to the Isthmos; but, if so, the decision was certainly again in favour of remaining.

¹ Cp. Appendix V. §§ 4, 5.

Perhaps only upon the previous day had Xerxes made his appearance in Attica; only then at least had the investment of the Akropolis begun. The precise marches of the king previously must be purely conjectural; but, in view of the diary of the fleet, and the approximate co-ordination of the movements on sea and land, the following table may be provisionally acceptable:—

Twenty-second day: Xerxes at Abai.
 Twenty-third day: Xerxes at Koroneia.
 Twenty-fourth day: Xerxes at Thebes.
 Twenty-fifth day: Xerxes at Tanagra: Fleet leaves Histiaia.
 Twenty-sixth day: Xerxes at Athens: Fleet under way.
 Twenty-seventh day: Fall of the Akropolis: Arrival of the Fleet.
 Twenty-eighth day: Day before the Battle (Boëdrom. 20).
 Twenty-ninth day: The Battle of Salamis.

The Greek fleet had certainly evacuated its position off Euboia on the night of the 18th day in the reconstructed Diary, and had probably made all haste round Sounion. It will have arrived at Salamis on the 20th, or at latest on the 21st, five or six days before the appearance of Xerxes in Attica. There is time for the measures, both political and material, to be taken for the evacuation of Attica, but not too much time, if Delphi has to be consulted, as no doubt Sparta, and if proposals have to be passed by the Athenian Council and Ekklesia before the material evacuation can take place. Perhaps the movements of the king's land and naval forces are unduly hurried and compressed in the above scheme: it may be taken as defining the least period that can reasonably be extracted from the records, conformably to material conditions, for the series of movements in question. Some nicer points, touching day and night, or the precise chronometry, must be reserved, until the quality of the records have been further considered.

Topographical.—The scene of the battle of Salamis is almost as well known, in its main outlines and landscape, as any such scene can be. From Cape Kolias to Eleusis the Attic coast is to-day substantially what it was on the day of battle in 480 B.C. Phaleron, Mounichia, Peiræus, Aigaleos, all the places named by Herodotus, are easily identified. The island of Salamis itself, the island of Psyttaleia, are still much what they were 2500 years ago. Only in two or three particulars is there anything problematic in the pure topography, as presented by our authorities for the battle. (i.) The exact identification of Keos and Kynosoura has been much debated, but may now be regarded as definitely settled in favour of the long projecting spit forming the south wall of the Bay of Salamis.¹ But this identification rather relieves the Herodotean text of a difficulty, than determines our theory of the tactics of the Persians on the

¹ Cp. 8. 76 (i. p. 478).

occasion. The tongue of land in question must have been an important factor in the battle, whether it can clearly be identified *nominatim* in Herodotus or not. (ii.) Again, the exact site of the temple of Athene Skiras has been much discussed. If the site were certainly identifiable (by epigraphic or similar evidence), we might have to discard, or to rewrite, the anecdote of the Corinthians in which the site figures. If the temple be placed on the coast of Salamis anywhere overlooking the bay of Eleusis, or the straits towards Megara—the further west the better—the anecdote may be well accommodated in a rational reconstruction of the movements during the battle. (iii.) Even less turns upon the identification of the Herakleion (not mentioned by Herodotus) in connexion with the site of the throne of Xerxes, overlooking the battle-piece. That throne, placed anywhere on the slopes of Mount Aigaleos, looking south, will fit well enough into every proposed theory of the piece. (iv.) Psyttaleia is the only one of the smaller islands, between Salamis and the mainland, which actually figures by name in the records. Its prominence may fairly be taken to signify that it was the only one which seriously entered into the actual tactics of the battle. (v.) The head of the mole, projected and begun by Xerxes from the mainland to the island of Salamis, may have been directed, in the first instance, on to the islet of St. George, unless, indeed, it followed still more nearly the line of the modern Ferry (SE. of the islet). In any case no question, in regard to the naval battle, turns on this point; though this location of the mole may be taken to confirm, or to square best with, the situation of the Greek fleet in the bay of Salamis.

Some quasi-topographical difficulties do arise in connexion with the exact orientation of the battle-lines, and the exact movements of the fleets. These difficulties, so far as soluble, are to be solved by reference to the actual topographical facts, open to verification. If not thus soluble, they may be charged as errors upon our authorities, but need not be made the ground of belief in any substantive change of the landscape, or in any irrational and absurd conduct on the part of either combatant. The sequel of this argument may succeed in reconciling these apparent difficulties with each other, and with the actual scene, without recourse to either of the hypothetical devices just indicated, and equally without any change or violence done to the received text. The exact position of particular vessels at special moments in the battle cannot, of course, be very precisely determined; but there is no insuperable difficulty in the way of reconciling the Herodotean and other traditions with the actual scene to-day; and this landscape, or seascape, is itself one of the chief factors by which to determine the significance and interpretation of statements, the real meaning of which may not have been always fully present to the minds of our first reporters.

Imperfection of the Record.—Far more serious difficulties are raised

by the incompleteness and incoherence, by the partiality and animus, displayed in the actual narrative, or series of anecdotes, into which the report made by Herodotus breaks up. Here are stories which betray such obvious prejudice as to be *ipso facto* inadmissible, at least in their primary form: such as the story of the conduct of the Corinthians, expressly discredited by Herodotus himself.¹ Yet a certain sense, a reasonable deposit of acceptable matter, may be extracted even from this story. A good part of the anecdotes of Themistokles, here as elsewhere, are open to grave suspicion upon similar ground: such as the inspiration by Mnesiphilos,² or the second mission of Sikinnos.³ Other matters are simply improbable, or incredible, as they stand: such as the report of the council of war held by Xerxes,⁴ and the advice given by Artemisia thereat.⁵ For the most part, however, the stories are rather incoherent, inconsequent, or inadequate than obviously malevolent, or partial, or wilfully misleading. This incoherency has been already exemplified by reference to the asymptotic chronology; it may be further illustrated by the problematical meetings and decisions of the Greek councils of war. How many such councils are conceived by Herodotus as held in succession? A council is apparently sitting at Salamis in c. 49, before the arrival of the king, or the siege of the Akropolis. This council is debating the question whether to make a stand at Salamis against the king's fleet, or to retire on the Isthmos: the majority of those present favour the latter course. This council is apparently still sitting, still discussing, a day or two later, when news of the fall of the Akropolis reaches Salamis. The king's fleet has not yet, at least in the pages of Herodotus, appeared at Phaleron. The council now decides to abandon Salamis for the Isthmos (c. 56). Themistokles returns in dejection to his ship, but is nerved and inspired by his mentor Mnesiphilos with a new (?) set of arguments, in favour of doing battle at Salamis. Themistokles appeals to Eurybiades: a fresh *Synedrion* is held: Themistokles makes use of the arguments of Mnesiphilos, and Eurybiades at least is convinced, and determines to remain. The inconsequence is here frappant. The advocates for remaining at Salamis must have used in the previous meeting just the arguments (by no means obscure or far-fetched) put into the mouth of Themistokles upon this second, or third, occasion. The decision now taken is in so far final that a *Theoria* is despatched to Aigina for the purpose of invoking the Aiakidai. And yet next day, upon the movement of the king's army and fleet, discontent breaks out afresh in the Greek *laager* at Salamis, and somehow an apparently popular and informal meeting (*σύλλογος*) grows, or dissolves, into a final meeting of the *Strategoi*, at which the old question is being debated afresh, while Themistokles steals out, under cover of night, from the council-room, and despatches the trusty Sikinnos to betray

¹ 8. 94.² 8. 57.³ 8. 110.⁴ 8. 67.⁵ 8. 68.

the intention of the Greeks to Xerxes, in hopes that the king will forthwith, by taking the appropriate manœuvres, force the Greeks to an engagement there and then. Everything turns out as designed by Themistokles. While the council is still sitting, Aristides arrives to report that retreat is now impossible—a report confirmed ere morning by the automolous Tenians. There is here plainly not time for the actions reported; or the council keeps sitting a most unconscionable time, and that too in the absence of the chief advocate of the unpopular action, to which *ex hypothesi* the majority of the council of war is opposed. Other and external evidences and probabilities further discredit the Herodotean story. Thus the message, sent according to Herodotus on the lips of Sikinnos under cover of night, is sent in Aischylos apparently by day, and sent not for the purpose of outwitting and forcing the hands of the Greek commanders, but apparently with their full knowledge and approbation.¹ Again, according to Herodotus, Aristides apparently makes his first appearance, since his ostrakism, in the Athenian forces on this very night before the battle, and one of the interviews *de règle* between him and Themistokles takes place, with a more than usually excellent moral. Some evidence and much probability support the view that Aristides was at this very moment one of the Athenian *Strategoi*, and had returned to Athens from exile, weeks or even months earlier. Small wonder, after these antecedent incoherences and improbabilities, if the Herodotean account of the battle itself, as a tactical achievement, should be unsatisfactory and obscure! But it by no means follows from the above observations that there was no justification in the actual course of events for the repeated councils, for the reported variation or reversal of plan, for the rôles ascribed to Themistokles, to Eurybiades, to Aristides, perhaps even to Adeimantos. The arrival of the Greek fleet at Salamis, to find Attica unprotected by the Peloponnesian forces, created an unforeseen and unintended situation, in which the question of remaining at Salamis may well have been reconsidered. The fall of the Akropolis, a few days later, created a fresh situation, even apart from the appearance, perhaps on the same day, of the Persian fleet round Sounion, in which the question of remaining at Salamis might very well have been again reopened. The aggressive movement of the king's fleet, and still more of the king's army, early on the day which proved to be the day before the battle, can hardly, indeed, have led to any serious debate on the previous question, already decided, perhaps twice, as above recorded; but it may have led to the despatch of a message from Themistokles, with or without the sanction of his colleagues, across the straits to the Persian king, who in consequence ordered a fresh movement, or development, in the disposition of his fleet, the true and full significance of which cannot be discovered in the pages of Herodotus. It is, in short,

¹ Aisch. *Pers.* 355 ff.

necessary, in reconstructing the tactical history of the battle of Salamis, to manipulate the narrative of Herodotus rather freely, in the light of the other authorities, especially his predecessor Aischylos, and in the light of the verifiable topography of the scene: the marvel finally emerging, that much which in the pages of Herodotus, taken by themselves, is incoherent and unintelligible, or even absurd, is seen to have a real relation to the probable course of actual events, and to admit of a satisfactory interpretation.

§ 3. *The Tactical Problem of the Battle of Salamis.*—Recent debate upon this subject has moved through three main positions, according as stress has been laid upon the testimony of Herodotus, upon the testimony of Aischylos, or upon the topographical argument. In all cases, of course, reference has been made to the whole range of testimony and evidence, literary or material; but considerable difference has nevertheless resulted from the relative attention given to each witness respectively. The attempt to reconstruct the battle-piece mainly from Herodotus, of course in relation to the actual topography, but in complete predominance over Aischylos and the later testimonies, resulted in a certain conception of the action, which for long held the field as the orthodox or at least established theory of the battle. Such was the conception of Leake, Grote, and others. There is still something to be said for it, at least from one point of view, as a scheme or theory of the ideal tactics, or of a part of the ideal tactics, pursued in the battle. The theory, however, was shattered by the growing appreciation of the superior authority of Aischylos, and of his report of certain tactical features in the engagement—an appreciation largely due in the first instance to the arguments of Blakesley. Blakesley first pointed out that the conception of the actual engagement based by Leake upon Herodotus—of course not without regard to the actual topography—was nevertheless irreconcilable with any theory of the battle that should do justice to the testimony of Aischylos. Of the alternatives thus presented neither was manifestly adequate, neither was preferable on its own merits. The discussion reached a further stage in Professor Goodwin's hands, when the military or naval topography was put in the first place, as that tribunal to which all theories alike must bow, and all the authorities submit themselves, carrying, as it does, certain elementary necessities and conditions in respect to the tactical ordering of the battle. Thus, for example, the whole situation prescribes the conclusion that the Persian admirals must have designed or projected a movement to cut off the retreat of the Greek fleet, through the bay of Eleusis and the Straits by Boudoron, as they had previously attempted to do in the case of Artemision, although no such design or movement is clearly ascribed to them, or recorded for Salamis, either in Herodotus or in Aischylos. But, further, Professor Goodwin claims to have reconciled the chief contradiction between Herodotus and Aischylos, by a remarkable

interpretation of the former, and so, indeed, to confirm the theory which he has himself propounded. It will be convenient to state and discuss the three main theses of the authorities just named, with a view to determining how far they contribute to a final solution of the problem.

I. *Leake's theory*,¹ derived from Herodotus (especially cc. 76, 85), represents the battle lines, in the actual engagement, as based respectively the Persian upon the coast of Attica, within the Straits, the Greek upon the opposite shore, or bay, of Salamis. This theory involves the assumption that the Persian fleet had entered the Straits during the night preceding the battle, and occupied a position, in a long line or lines, backed by the Attic shore. The ensuing battle takes place mainly in the waters between Salamis and Aigaleos, the lines being oriented as lying due east and west. Subsequently the Persian fleet, while escaping from the narrow waters out into the open bay, is compelled to do some fighting at the entrance to the Straits, and about the island of Psyttaleia, by a sort of development of its first intention and position, in short, only when it has actually taken to flight. This theory, however, though endorsed by Grote, Rawlinson, and others, is quite inadmissible for the following reasons. (i.) It conflicts with the indications of Aischylos, who places the main battle at the entrance of the Straits, and as the Persian fleet is attempting to enter, not within the Straits, or in the bay of Salamis, or as the fleet is attempting to escape. (ii.) The theory is inconsistent with some points in Herodotus' own account, and ignores others. Thus it leaves the occupation of Psyttaleia by the Persians unaccounted for, and it ignores the report of Aristides. The occupation of Psyttaleia, and the movement of Persian ships on the outside of the island of Salamis, stand in no clear relation to a battle fought out in the bay of Salamis. (iii.) Last and not least, the theory is in itself, and in relation to the narratives, tactically absurd. (1) If the lines of battle had been really oriented as on this supposition, the Persian fleet, when defeated, would have been driven back on the shore of Attica, under Mount Aigaleos, and not out through the Straits into the open sea. (2) Again, the theory assumes that the Persian admirals, drawn up in battle-array under Mount Aigaleos, allowed the Greek oarsmen and marines to embark in full view, undisturbed, and to advance to the attack, without attempting to anticipate or to disturb them. This assumption involves the Persians in a tactical error almost inconceivable. (3) Moreover, upon this theory, the Persians have fatigued themselves, by entering under cover of night the Straits, and taking up a position deliberately in confined waters, face to face with the Greek position, under circumstances which would give a great advantage to the Greeks, who have their night's rest undisturbed, and are to fight in

¹ Leake, *Athens and the Demi*, ii. Appendix. Cp. also the map in Grote, vol. iv. (1872), p. 223.

narrow waters. The Persian admirals had made no such error off Euboia: are they to be saddled therewith at Salamis, in view of the weakness and conflict of the evidence, and of other possibilities of explaining the case?

II. *Blakesley's theory*,¹ derived from Aischylos, represents the battle lines as extending not parallel but at right angles to the shore of Attica, and conceives the conflict as taking place not in the bay of Salamis, but just inside the narrow entrance of the Straits. That Blakesley was right in his negation of Leake's theory, the previous argument has just shown; that his main contention in regard to the point of contact is right, the testimony of Aischylos certainly demonstrates. Nevertheless his conception of the battle-array and tactical procedure is open to at least two decisive objections. In the first place, Blakesley's account of the Persian movements, antecedent to contact with the Greek fleet, is debilitated by his identification of Keos and Kynosoura with the island and the Marathonian promontory, and further, by an indistinct apprehension of the necessity the Persian fleet would be under of passing from line to column formation in entering the Straits. The second objection to Blakesley's theory concerns the supposed position of the Greek line. Blakesley conceives the Hellenic fleet as drawn up in line across from Salamis to the Attic shore, so that its left wing rested upon the Attic shore. On that supposition the result of contact is doubly perplexing: for a column of ships under such circumstances would probably succeed in cutting through a line, and throw it into some confusion, and at least the first success would have rested with the Persians. Moreover, the Attic shore was in possession of the Persian forces: Xerxes was sitting somewhere on Mount Aigaleos to see the sport. The extreme left of the Greek line would thus have been exposed to great embarrassment, and probably have been thrown into confusion by Persian missiles directed from the land side. Blakesley's theory is quite unacceptable in these particulars: his merit is to have been the first to emphasize the importance of Aischylos as a witness, and to have shown grave cause to doubt the theory of Leake, based on Herodotus.

III. *Professor Goodwin's theory*² is both an advance upon the preceding positions, and also to some extent a harmony, or resumption, of what is sound in them. It is based upon a more full and critical consideration of the topographical conditions than even Leake, prince of topographers though he was, had in this case achieved: it is based upon a fuller consideration of the literary traditions, not merely in the primary but also in the secondary sources, than had been accorded by the preceding theorists. On these lines Professor Goodwin's contribution to the argument is twofold. (1) In the first place, he has

¹ Blakesley, *Herodotus: Excursus* on viii. 76, vol. ii. (1854), 400 ff., a contribution curiously overlooked even in

recent disquisitions on the same theme.

² See *Papers of the American School at Athens*, i. (1885), pp. 239 ff.

enlarged and elucidated the topographical and tactical objections to Leake's theory, and in particular, emphasized the objection to assuming that the Persian fleet was drawn up, in a line, or lines, under Mount Aigaleos, parallel to the Attic shore, in full view of Salamis, and yet allowed the Greeks to embark undisturbed, to form in battle-array, a mile off, and then to assume the offensive, at their own will. (2) In the second place, Professor Goodwin has obviated a part of the apparent contradiction between Aischylos and Herodotus in regard to the tactical position of the Persian fleet by a suggestion which naturally occurred to one whose eyes were thoroughly familiar with the actual scene. The suggestion affects the interpretation of the phrases used by Herodotus to describe the orientation of the Persian lines. In the Herodotean account of the battle, and of the manœuvres preceding the battle, the expression "west wing" (*τὸ πρὸς ἑσπέρῃς κέρας*) is twice used (in c. 76, and in c. 85) of a portion of the Persian fleet. Leake and others naturally assumed that in these two places the same expression referred to one and the same wing, or end, of the Persian lines, that is, to the same lot, or division of ships. The chief merit of Professor Goodwin's critique is, to have shown that this interpretation is not inevitable, or even acceptable. The words may be referred in the first place to the one wing of the Persian fleet, and in the second place to the other—manœuvres having taken place in the meantime, which completely altered the disposition of the Persian vessels. To assume that Herodotus himself had clearly realized the position, or correctly conceived the manœuvres, which he reports, is not necessary to this interpretation. Had he done so, the obscurity and dispute would hardly have arisen over the question. Herodotus himself has not a clear conception of the tactics in the case, but Goodwin's interpretation makes it possible to reconcile Herodotus, in this instance, with himself, with Aischylos, and with the topographical conditions. This interpretation is therefore to be regarded as a permanent and luciferous contribution to the main argument. Nevertheless the whole theory of the battle as expounded by Professor Goodwin is not equally acceptable.

There are, in particular, five points wherein Professor Goodwin's conception of the battle may seem to require correction, or amendment; and these corrections must lead on, if accepted, to a revised conception of the whole proceedings antecedent to the actual engagement. (1) To take the smallest point first: Professor Goodwin, rightly enough, makes the Persian fleet, upon the morning of the battle, enter the Straits in column; but whether the column is a single file, or more, is a question not raised by him. The presumption seems to be that, in his conception, the column is a single file of ships. It will be shown hereafter that the column was in all probability formed of threes. (2) A more serious point arises in regard to the tactical disposition of the Greek fleet, which Goodwin (like Blakesley) apparently conceives

as extending across the Straits, so as to bar the progress of the Persian column, and as resting its left upon the Attic shore.¹ This conception is open to the objections already urged: it exposes the Greek line to be cut in two by the advancing Persian column; it exposes the left of the Greek line to the darts and arrows of the Persian force on land. Moreover, the exponents of this theory have not clearly stated, how and when the Greek vessels took up that position, face to face with the advancing Persian column. (3) Further, the theory supposes that the Persians were expecting to find the Greek fleet still in the bay of Salamis, and were intending themselves to form in line along the Attic coast, and then to deliver the attack: in other words, the battle was ultimately expected to adopt the lines upon which Leake conceived it actually to have taken place. But this assumed project is open to several specific objections. It leaves the occupation of Psyttaleia quite out of account, yet that occupation (Professor Goodwin supposes) is part of the developed plan of Xerxes. Psyttaleia could play no tactical rôle in an engagement within the Straits and the bay of Salamis itself. Moreover, this project ascribes to the Persians the assumption that they would be allowed to enter the Straits in column, and to reform in line, before the eyes of the Greek fleet in the bay of Salamis. But this assumption is no better than the assumption, which Professor Goodwin has censured in his predecessors, that the Persian fleet would have allowed the Greeks to embark, and to form at sea, while it was in a position to attack and prevent them. The Persians could not enter the Straits in column, believing the Greeks to be still in the bay of Salamis, and hoping to reform in line to attack them, or to resist an attack: such a movement and project would have been to court disaster with open eyes. The fact that the Persians entered the Straits is proof that they cannot have expected to find the Greek navy any longer in the bay of Salamis, unless, indeed, they were in possession of some knowledge, or assurance, that the Greek fleet was practically innocuous—a surmise which forms no part of Professor Goodwin's theory. (4) Professor Goodwin's theory hardly makes enough of the squadron detached to circumnavigate the island of Salamis, and block up the exit to the west: albeit his critique has associated this movement with the alteration, or development, in the tactics of the Persian fleet, brought about by the message from Themistokles to Xerxes. The circumnavigation of Salamis is plainly an essential part of the Persian plan: the occupation of Psyttaleia is also, perhaps, a significant act; but the relation of these two acts to each other, and to the manœuvre of the main Persian fleet, in entering the Straits, is not so plain. Nor is the exact relation between the movements of the Persian fleet and the message of Themistokles quite clearly established upon the theory

¹ Dr. G. B. Grundy shares Goodwin's view of the orientation of the Greek fleet; see his *Great Persian War* (1901), p. 384, map and plans.

now considered. (5) Finally, Professor Goodwin has undertaken to harmonize the record of Herodotus with that of Aischylos, but the discrepancy and conflict between the two authorities extends further than his theory appears to recognize. The ingenious suggestion in regard to the interpretation of the phrase "western wing," in the two passages of Herodotus in which it occurs, may fairly be taken to reconcile the statements of Herodotus with the actual topography, and so with himself: but can any ingenuity completely reconcile Herodotus with Aischylos, or Aischylos with Herodotus? The differences between them extend to the time, the purport, and the effects of the message of Themistokles, and the two authorities present two completely different conceptions of the transactions of the day and night before the battle. In regard to the mere battle-piece itself, their accounts may be capable of harmony; in regard to the events leading up to the battle, they cannot be harmonized in all particulars: one or other must be preferred as more probable in certain respects.

§ 4. *Difference between Aischylos and Herodotus.*—With Aischylos the date of the message, the purport and contents of the message, and the effects of the message, differ very considerably from the date, purport, and result of the message as reported by Herodotus. With Aischylos the message is the beginning and source of the whole mischief. It is sent off from the Greek camp and reaches the Persian king upon the day before the battle. Its purport is that the Greek fleet is about to make away, under cover of night, and scatter hither and thither, by various routes, and so avoid battle, or capture in Salamis. Its result is that the king issues orders to his navarchs, that when night arrives the bulk of the fleet, which is clearly not yet set in motion at all, is to move up and draw across the outlets and passages, by which the Greeks might attempt to escape, while other ships are to be posted round the island of Aias. These orders are carried out, after the fleet has taken its evening meal, and occupy the whole night. The Greek fleet, meanwhile, makes no attempt to escape. But on the next morning the Greek fleet advances to the attack, coming apparently out—of the bay, or of the Straits—to do battle. There are two slight hints in the Aischylean account to suggest that the Persians had entered, or were entering, the Straits. The word *ῥέῃμα* suggests a column-formation, which would be inexplicable except upon the supposition that the Persians were coming in, and the words *ἐν στενῷ*, in the immediate context, confirm the supposition. The notice of the exploit of Aristeides (of course not named) upon 'the little island-haunt of Pan' (Psyttaleia) forms a climax of the narrative somewhat isolated; nor is the seat of Xerxes, though mentioned, so clearly located as to throw much light upon the Aischylean conception of the battle. Simple and compact as the narrative of Aischylos is, taken in itself, there are two or three points where it is obscure, or suggestive of further question: (a) in regard to the ships

posted round the isle of Aias, (*b*) in regard to the exact scene of the battle, (*c*) in regard to the silent process by which three *στοῖχοι* become one *πέδιμα*, and (*d*) in regard to the relation of the landing on Psyttaleia to the rest of the Persian plan. With Herodotus, on the other hand, the message of Themistokles is apparently sent off from the Greek camp after the order to do battle had been issued by Xerxes, and after certain manœuvres had been already begun by the Persian fleet: in fact, night has apparently already fallen, when Sikinnos is despatched. The purport of the message again is substantially different to the report given by Aischylos: Sikinnos announces to Xerxes that not only flight but treachery is brewing in the Greek camp, and that if the Greeks are attacked, some of the forces will declare for the king, and turn upon their allies. The two elements in the message are indeed hardly consistent: flight provokes pursuit, treachery invites attack. The results are also different, in conformity with the difference previously observed. With Aischylos the night movement is the first movement, and the only movement, of the Persian fleet; its object is to prevent the Greeks escaping. The difference between the expectation of the Persians and the actual event is that, when the Greek fleet advances in the morning, it moves not in disorder, like a fugitive force, but in battle-array. With Herodotus the effect of the message received at night is to cause a further movement and development of the Persian forces and position as established the day before: this development in Herodotus comprises (1) the debarcation of a force on to Psyttaleia, (2) the movement of the western wing round Salamis, (3) the movement of the vessels off Keos and Kynosoura in a direction not clearly indicated, but in such a mode apparently as to block more effectually the water-way. When the accomplishment of these movements is reported by Aristides to Themistokles, the latter is represented as saying that they were his doing, and designed to compel the Greeks, against their will, to do battle. On the morrow, however, the Greeks go into action in the prose of Herodotus as cheerfully as in the verses of Aischylos himself. Undeniably there is a substantial difference between the two reports: a complete harmony is far to seek. The greater discrepancy concerns not so much, or at least not so clearly, the actual battle, as the events and actions of the previous night and day. If the representation given by Aischylos of the date, purport, and effects of the message received by Xerxes from the Greek camp be correct, then not merely must the council and interviews during the night, as described by Herodotus, in any case suspicious enough, be purely fictitious, but the account of the movements of the Persian fleet on the previous day must be erroneous. Those movements display a determination to do battle, as previously recorded, in the Herodotean story, which was itself only brought about, according to Aischylos, by the message in question. But, suspicious as many of the details in the Herodotean story may be—notably the whole account

of the council at night, and the interview between Themistokles and Aristides—we cannot simply cancel the first movements of the Persian fleet, recorded by Herodotus, or resolve them into a duplication, or anticipation of the movement later and more elaborately described, in favour of the Aischylean relation, for the reason already indicated that the story in Aischylos, simple and compact as it is, contains hints or suggestions that go far beyond its express tenor, and imply that a good deal has been omitted in the dramatic recital. For the supplement we must look in the main to Herodotus, and we may hope to reconcile, so far as a reconciliation is possible, our two main authorities, only by a more circuitous method, and by a somewhat elaborate critique. Herodotus must, indeed, be reconciled with himself, before he can be reconciled with Aischylos.

§ 5. *The tactical problems*, underlying the story of Salamis, do not appear in themselves obscure, or difficult to appreciate, in view of the topographical and material data. Both sides were willing, and even anxious, to do battle, each, of course, upon its own terms. The object of the Persians must have been to get the Greek fleet out into the open waters, and there to engage it. The object of the Greeks, demonstrated by express tradition and actual results, was to get the Persian fleet into the Straits, and there to attack it. Any and every theory of the steps, by which the actual engagement was brought about and the victory achieved, must accept and interpret the main elements, or factors, in the traditional deposit, at least as stated in their essential terms. Six such factors may be at once disengaged, as follows:—(1) The decision of the king to do battle at sea. (2) The despatch of a squadron with orders to circumnavigate Salamis. (3) The occupation of Psyttaleia by the Persians. (4) The movements of the main portion of the Persian fleet. (5) The message of Themistokles. (6) The Greek tactics, and the actual engagement. Under these six heads, which are each and all essential factors in the Greek traditions and in the military situation and result, the whole problem of the battle may be resumed—the action of the land-forces being treated as supplementary to the naval engagement, and preliminary to the retirement of Xerxes. The precise chronological sequence of the six items enumerated is in part open to discussion. Some liberty may be allowed in respect to the minor chronology, and even the causality, of a story, not completely nor coherently given in any one single authority. It is obviously more probable that exact movements of the Persian fleet are correctly recorded than that they are quite correctly timed, or quite correctly accounted for, in any of the authorities.¹ With this liberty granted, we may hope to resolve the sixfold problem.

¹ Dr. G. B. Grundy in *The Great Persian War* (1901), pp. 373 ff., contributes some important observations

under this head. I cannot think, however, that Hdt. agrees with Aischylos in timing the message of Themistokles

(1) *The decision of Xerxes to do battle with the Greeks at sea.*—(a) This decision is represented by Herodotus as anterior to and independent of the message received from Themistokles, and as taken by Xerxes in a council of war held at Phaleron, after the arrival of his fleet. Aischylos cannot be said to contradict Herodotus upon this point, but he certainly ignores it. The point is, however, of importance in regard to the reconstruction of the antecedents of the battle, including the movements of the Persian fleet, and other acts. If the king had decided to attack the Greeks in Salamis, a part at least of the movements during the day and night preceding the battle may be ascribed to this decision, and not to any resolution taken in consequence of the message from Themistokles, whatever the precise point of time at which that message was received in the Persian camp. The fact of such a decision is independent of the highly questionable details and circumstances with which Herodotus has invested the story of the king's council. The recorded decision is infinitely more probable than the reported circumstances and details, and would of course have been known to Greeks serving on the King's side. Was not some such decision, indeed, inevitable? The Persians were the invaders and the attacking party: their army had been completely successful so far: the destruction of the Greek fleet was a matter of the highest importance. That fleet was known to be cooped up in the narrow waters, or on the strand, of the bay of Salamis: a resolution to get at it by one means or other appears most natural. The record is incidentally confirmed by some secondary items, such as the movement of the Persian land-forces towards the Peloponnesos, the erection of a throne for Xerxes somewhere on the slopes of Mount Aigaleos, the accordance between a decision to do battle and some of the further movements presently reported. The decision to do battle is, therefore, to be accepted as historical, independently of any motive supplied by the message received from Themistokles.

(b) If the King decided to give battle by sea, he must have resolved on attacking the Greek fleet, by one means or another: he could not be expecting that the Greeks of their own accord should come out of their sheltered station, and attack in the open a force in numbers, if not in actual equipment and material, vastly superior to their own. The problem from the Persian point of view must have been to drive, or to draw, the Greek fleet into the more open waters, either east or west of the actual harbour then occupied by them. To use the land-forces in support of the naval arm would have been in accordance with the conduct of the campaign, as laid down and hitherto pursued upon the Persian side. In the given situation the Persian plan must have aimed at getting the Greek navy out of the Straits in the one direction or in the other; or else, at advancing upon it, simultaneously,

to "the late afternoon" (*op. c.* p. 377). despatched after nightfall, according to
Hdt. 8. 70 shows that the message was the historian's conception.

from both sides, and so completely hemming it in. To effect either such purpose the first condition obviously was to detach a considerable squadron, and send it round in order to approach the Greek position from the side of Megara and Eleusis. The bay of Salamis might have been entered with less danger from the west, or north-west end of the Straits, than from the east, or south-east. There was a prospect of driving the Greek fleet out to sea from the north-west to the east; but in any case there would obviously be a risk in assaulting the Greek position from one side alone, as the attack must in that case expose itself for a time to an assault *en flanc*. The problem of forcing a battle, under the circumstances, was obviously no easy one to solve.

(2) *The despatch of ships to circumnavigate Salamis.*—This movement is obviously one of the highest importance for the tactics of the coming battle, yet it is not clearly recorded by any writer before Ephoros (*apud* Diodorum).¹ Its identification with the stationing of vessels 'all round the island of Aias,' as reported by the Persian messenger in Aischylos, is to be rejected for two reasons. In the first place, the language of Aischylos describes a perfectly comprehensible manœuvre of an entirely different character, and with an obviously different tactical purpose. In the second place, the report made by Aristides to Themistokles (*apud* Herodotum) may be understood to refer to this manœuvre, rather than to the circumnavigation. Herodotus has been taken to report the circumnavigation of Salamis in another passage, describing the movement of the 'west' wing of the Persian fleet, though obscurely, after nightfall, as one of the results of the message of Themistokles. The movement to the west round Salamis, into the Megarian or Eleusinian channel, may have been undertaken, or developed, after nightfall, and even after the reception of the message of Themistokles in the Persian camp; but it can hardly have been a direct or special result of that message. The despatch of a squadron to close, or to pierce, the Eleusinian channel must have been part of the original Persian plan of attack on the Greeks at Salamis. It was an obvious device, previously employed on a larger scale, off Euboia: to have omitted it would have been to have left open a retreat for the Greek fleet westwards—an incredible omission under the circumstances. The ultimate purpose of the movement may have been to co-operate in drawing, or driving, the Greek fleet out of the bay of Salamis. The Egyptian squadron may have moved westwards after nightfall, in the hope of escaping detection by the Greeks; but the westward move-

¹ Cp. Appendix I. § 13 *supra*. I cannot share the view that Aischylos *Pers.* 368 (ἄλλας δὲ κύκλῳ νῆσον Αἴαντος πέριξ) clearly refers to the circumnavigation of the island: the verb is τάξαι. In order that ships should be posted, or stationed, round the island, ships would have to row round into position, dropping de-

tachments as they went; but this manœuvre is very different from a περίπλους. If a verb (πέμψαι) is to be understood out of τάξαι, the *periplus* can hardly be said to be clearly indicated. That the *periplus* in Ephoros is simply an inference, or development, from this line in Aischylos, were a disputable thesis.

ment of a portion of the fleet for the purpose of circumnavigating the island is an integral element in any plan conceivable for attacking the Greek fleet in the waters between the island of Salamis and the mainland. The hour at which this movement was developed may have led Herodotus, or his sources, to regard it as a result of the message of Themistokles.

(3) *The occupation of Psyttaleia by the Persians* may for similar reasons be regarded as misconceived, if not misdated, in the pages of Herodotus. As the Persian fleet entered the Straits next morning evidently in the expectation that any fighting, which might have to be done, would take place far west of Psyttaleia, the occupation of Psyttaleia stands in no apparent relation to the final advance of the Persian fleet. The occupation of Psyttaleia relates itself naturally to operations, the scene of which was to be laid immediately outside the Straits of Salamis, and to the east. It can be harmonized with the despatch of a squadron to circumnavigate Salamis, and with the movement of the main fleet up to the very mouth, or inlet into the bay of Salamis, but not so easily, if at all, with operations which were to take place within, or beyond the Straits, or bay of Salamis. Thus the occupation of Psyttaleia, even if correctly chronologized by Herodotus, a moment later than the reception of the message from Themistokles in the Persian camp, is not, on that account, to be reckoned among the results of that message. It belongs rather to the original Persian plan of operations, which was altered or modified *ex hypothesi* in consequence of the reception of that message.

The occupation of Psyttaleia appears in Aischylos late and incidentally, and without any clear organic relation to the Persian movements, which are by him referred only to the message of Themistokles: an omission easy to explain, if the occupation belonged to a previous plan of operations, developed and superseded after the reception of the message, the point at which Aischylos takes up the story. But the record in Aischylos suggests another possibility. Aischylos merely records, as an appendix to the actual battle, the exploit of Aristides on Psyttaleia; in Herodotus too that exploit appears as an afterthought. Was the occupation of Psyttaleia an original part of the Persian plans? Was the island only occupied in the course of the battle, in order to afford protection to Persian ships and men, as they backed out of the Straits, or struggled for life in the sea? Herodotus may have antedated the occupation of the island, and so brought it into artificial connexion with the original plan.

(4) *Movements of the main portion of the Persian fleet.*—(a) If the occupation of Psyttaleia was part of the first Persian plan, that movement of the Persian fleet, after nightfall, by which the water-passages, either side Psyttaleia, were blocked with Persian vessels, could hardly be ascribed wholly to the second plan. This movement appears to relate itself to the occupation of Psyttaleia, and both together might

have had no further purpose than to prevent the escape of the Greeks from Salamis into the open waters towards Aigina. The movement in itself, though an advance, is not necessarily an offensive movement, nor does it bring the Persian fleet within striking distance of the Greek. Had the Persians been expecting the Greeks to escape, or to attack them, this movement might have been made, with a view to bar the exits, and to secure some co-operation between the land-force, which had disembarked on Psyttaleia, and the naval line. But the movement of the ships up to this point does not in itself involve any further movement, much less actual entry into the Straits: it is quite consistent with a struggle, the scene of which was to be laid outside. This forward movement, still outside the Straits, supersedes and develops, according to Herodotus, movements of the fleet, which had occupied the whole, or the greater part of the preceding day. What could the objects of such movements have been? Did the Persians really expect, merely by cruising about in the open, to lure or to attract the Greeks out of the narrow waters into the bay? Or could the previous movements have been anything more than the necessary preliminaries, on the part of a huge fleet, for advancing to the outlet of the Salaminian Straits, and there, under cover of night, closing the exits, and preparing to withstand the onset of the Greek fleet, should it be drawn, or should it be driven, to essay a sortie on the ensuing day? But if the Persian fleet was already on the move, before the reception of the message of Themistokles, the king must already have had a plan of attack.

(b) The forward movement of the Persian fleet into the Straits of Salamis upon the morning of the battle is a further advance, implies an active offensive, and develops the attack. But it is, under the circumstances, so obvious and colossal a blunder as to call for some adequate explanation. Its inevitable result was to expose the Persian fleet, necessarily advancing now in column, to a flank attack from the Greek line, which easily cut off the head of the advancing column, and threw the remainder, outside the Straits, and imperfectly informed of what was taking place within, into desperate confusion. The advance of the Persian column into the Straits can hardly be explained, except on one or other of two suppositions. Either the admirals were satisfied that the Greeks had evacuated the bay of Salamis and were in full retreat, past Eleusis and the narrow Megarian channel (where the Egyptian squadron was coming to meet them)—in which case the movement of the Persian column was primarily a pursuit of the flying foe—or else the Persian admirals had reason to believe that the Greek fleet, though still at Salamis, was in no humour or condition to advance to the attack, as advance it actually did. The latter hypothesis is apparently favoured by Aischylos, who records the astonishment of the Persians on finding themselves attacked. But the bay and shore of Salamis was full in view of the opposite coast. With the whole

Attic shore in possession of the Persians, surely they must have been aware that the Greek fleet was still in the bay of Salamis, and cannot have supposed themselves advancing simply to pursue a flying foe. An explanation remains, therefore, to be discovered for the apparently infatuated venture of the Persian fleet, in exposing itself to a flank attack in the narrow waters between Salamis and the mainland, when the alternative apparently was to sustain the onset of the Greek vessels in conditions much more favourable to itself. The explanation can only be supplied by the message of Themistokles.

(5) *The message of Themistokles* is the most highly problematic of all the antecedents of the battle, both in its circumstances, its import or contents, and its exact effect upon the action of the Persians. The conflict of evidence and of conception, between Aischylos and Herodotus, here involves contradictory or alternative accounts of the immediate antecedents and rationale of the battle. According to Aischylos a message is sent from the Greek camp to the Persian, during the day-time, to report the projected escape of the Greek fleet from Salamis. The measures and movements of the Persians are all occasioned by this message, but are not inaugurated, or begun, until nightfall. There is no hint that this message was a trick played off upon the Greeks by one of their number: it is a ruse practised on the Persians alone. The deception lies in leading the Persians to expect that the Greeks were about to take to flight; whereas the Greeks, in reality, were thirsting for the fray; and, to the astonishment of the Persians, advance in the morning's light, obviously fully prepared to do battle. This account of the message and its effects is not merely contradicted by Herodotus, but is in itself unsatisfactory, and leaves various items, even in the context, or in the admitted facts, inexplicable. It does not explain the actual movement of the Persians into the Straits in the morning—a movement which is incidentally indicated or admitted in the context; it does not account for the occupation of Psyttaleia; it leaves the despatch of the squadron round Salamis altogether unnoticed. The whole story in Aischylos appears, at least in the light of other traditions, as over-favourable to the Greeks, especially in regard to the antecedents of the battle; and also fails adequately to account for the fatal movement of the Persians into the narrow waters: for why, so far as Aischylos goes, did not the Persians await the expected flight of the Greek ships from Salamis, or at least take care to verify the fact, that it had already taken place during the night?

The facts as presented in Herodotus are widely different. Xerxes has resolved on battle, and issued orders in accordance with that resolution. Movements have already been in progress to that end, the day through, albeit the expectation or design of the Persian operations is not revealed. Then, during the ensuing night, the message of Themistokles reaches the Persian camp, and leads to fresh movements, culminating in a decisive action. The contents and effect of this

message, as reported by Herodotus, are far from satisfactory, or convincing, and, indeed, ill accord with the facts as presented by him hitherto. The message of Themistokles, reported by Herodotus, exhibits two hardly consistent parts. On the one hand, the intention of the Greeks, to abscond from Salamis and avoid battle, is reported; on the other hand, Themistokles promises that, if the Greeks are attacked, the Athenians will turn against their allies and make common cause with the king. This pledge is to be found in the message only as reported by Herodotus: it constitutes a most startling addition to the contents as reported by Aischylos, and indeed by all the other authorities. The two elements of the message do not seem to invite quite the same kind of action on the king's part. The projected escape of the Greeks from Salamis would suggest the blocking of the channels at both ends of the Straits, between the island and the mainland. The promised medism of the Athenians would be an inducement to attack the Greek fleet at close quarters, and even to venture upon a somewhat risky movement in so doing, as was indeed shown in the sequel. But what could have been the object or design of the movements of the Persian fleet, during the previous day, unless they aimed at intercepting the escape of the Greek fleet, of cooping it up in Salamis, with a view to its ultimate capture, or surrender, with or without an actual battle?

In another important respect the ruse of Themistokles differs in the reports of Aischylos on the one hand, and of Herodotus and his followers on the other. With Aischylos the ruse is practised solely upon the Persians, and apparently with the full consent, or approval, of all concerned on the Greek side. With Herodotus, and others, the ruse is practised upon the Greeks by Themistokles with a view to forcing their hand, and compelling them to remain and fight against their will. This representation does not very well accord with the readiness and courage of the Greek mariners, on the following morning, to embark and to advance against the Persian ships; but, if conscience makes cowards, manifest danger may make heroes of unpromising material. Once the Greek position at Salamis was surrounded, or both exits from the Straits, east and west, effectively blocked, the Greeks were bound either to surrender, or to attempt to fight their way out to the open sea, and so make good their escape—a hopeless undertaking by the Megarian channel if blocked, as it might easily have been, even by a small squadron, unless indeed the Greeks had already secured command of it; and an almost equally forlorn hope, in face of the vastly superior numbers of the Persian fleet, through the channels either side Psyttaleia. If the Persians have already determined upon action, and been in motion half a day, or more, with a view to action, what action was in view, unless this very one of barring the exits, and so compelling the Greeks to surrender, or to fight? What need for a message to Xerxes, that the Greeks were contemplating flight, at a time when the Persians

have already been manœuvring to prevent such flight? How could such a belated message have been a ruse practised upon the Greeks, to compel them to remain and fight, when the king's fleet had been already manœuvring, and was all on the water, under orders to carry out that very same design? But the promise of Athenian co-operation gives a very different complexion to the message. Such a promise might induce the Persians prematurely to enter the Straits, counting upon the co-operation of the Athenian navy in the action that might then ensue. Otherwise, the obvious wisdom of the Persians was to block the Greeks up in Salamis, and to await their inevitable attempt to break out. As a matter of fact, the battle opened in the Straits. The point of contact was determined by the entrance of the Persian fleet in the morning. That movement appears to have been brought about by the message of Themistokles. An assurance that the Greeks were going to run away under cover of night, or even that the Greek fleet had actually under cover of night moved out of the bay of Salamis into that of Eleusis, and so through the Straits of Megara (*ex hypothesi* blockaded by the Egyptian squadron), could hardly in itself have been sufficient to induce the Persian fleet to enter the Straits of Salamis. From the Attic shore, from Mount Aigaleos, in the early morning, could it not be seen whether the Greek ships were still in the bay of Salamis, afloat or ashore, or whether they had rowed off, during the night, in the direction of Eleusis and Megara? Can the Persians have entered the Straits at daybreak, believing that the Greek fleet had already abandoned Salamis, and that they were simply pursuing a fugitive foe? Or would the Persian column have been sent forward, to expose itself to an attack in flank, unless the Persian admirals, or the king himself, had been convinced that they could count upon a diversion, a division, in the Greek navy itself in their favour, assurances of which had been conveyed to them, according to Herodotus, in the message received during the preceding night from Themistokles?

A complete harmony between Aischylos and Herodotus cannot be effected, but the harshness of the antithesis between them, in regard to the message of Themistokles, might be mitigated by the rather desperate supposition that there were, in fact, more messages than one passing between the Greek and the Persian headquarters. A message may have reached the king, on the day before the battle (as recorded by Aischylos), to the effect that the Greeks were intending to retreat, under cover of night, to the Isthmos. That some such suspicion, or conviction, was in any case implanted in his mind, the subsequent operations of the Persian fleet prove; for they are directed so as to prevent any such movement on the part of the Greeks. But that conviction by no means involved a direct attack upon the Greek fleet in the bay of Salamis: it was enough for the king to keep the passages and channel blocked (perhaps by relays of squadrons), and

to await the inevitable attempt of the Greeks to break out. The further resolve, to enter the Straits in the morning, marks a development of the former plan, and presupposes some special occasion. Such occasion may be found in the reception, during the night, of an assurance that, if the Greeks were attacked, the best part of them would turn their arms against their allies, and declare for the king. There is here, at least in conjunction with other considerations, such as the impatience of the victor, the difficulty of keeping the ships in large numbers continuously at sea, and so forth, an adequate explanation of what must otherwise appear the unbounded folly of the Persians in ordering an advance into the Straits. Their cause of wonder then was, not that the Greeks advanced in battle-array, instead of attempting to fly, but that both wings of the Greek fleet advanced with equal ardour and loyalty, and that the promised defection remained a promise, which had lured them into a tactical disaster.

Is it worth while to effect this partial harmony between Herodotus and Aischylos, at the expense of duplicating the messages of Themistokles, before the battle of Salamis, and in view of the differences remaining still unadjusted between them? Herodotus will still require of us not merely the determination of Xerxes to do battle, but the actual manœuvres recorded of the Persian fleet on the day before the actual fight. We should also be involved in the paradoxical conclusion that, of the two messages, one was sent without and the other with the consent of the Greek commanders, the one being the news of their projected flight, which produced the movements to prevent their escape; the other being the promise of Athenian medism, which encouraged the Persians to assume the offensive, and actually to enter the Straits. Why not be content to suppose that there was but one message, the one sent by night, which deceived the Persians to their fatal error? The suspicion that the Greeks might bolt from Salamis, the manœuvres intended to prevent that flight, and to compel them to do battle, on terms favourable to the Persian, do not appear far-fetched, or beyond the compass of Persian strategy: there is the express testimony of Herodotus in their favour, and they reproduce, on a somewhat diminished scale, the operations off Euboia. The narrative of Aischylos, on the other hand, though that of an eye-witness, is not a military or even an historical report: the action has been dramatized, that is, reduced to its barest terms, for recital on the stage. No clear hint of any change or development in the Persian attack is given; the most important feature in the whole action, the advance of the Persian fleet into the Straits, is not described, but merely implied. The priority of Aischylos here counts for little against his poetical and patriotic bias; and the obscuration of the actual services of Themistokles in the Athenian poet's report may not have been accidental.

Herodotus, on the other hand, cannot be fully followed in his representation of the message of Themistokles as a ruse played off upon the Greeks, to compel them to stand and fight. The circumnavigation of Salamis, the blocking of the channels, might have that effect; but these measures belong to the first plan of the Persians, and were independent of the message of Themistokles. The message of Themistokles induces the Persians to assume the offensive with fatal effect to themselves, just because the Greeks were prepared and resolved to do battle, and even to advance to the attack, before the Persian fleet had time to form out of column into line. The notion that Themistokles tricked the Greeks into fighting, when they would fain have fled, seems to belong to the legendary order of ideas, which delighted to represent Themistokles as the incarnation of duplicity, treachery, and unscrupulousness. In Diodoros (Ephoros) a distinction is suggested between the general mass of Greeks on the fleet and the commanders: a similar distinction is suggested, in a confused way, by Herodotus when the vague σύλλογος crystallizes into the formal συνέδριον, during the session of which the message is sent. The Admirals may well have known more than the Marines. Yet we may fairly hesitate, with Herodotus, to believe that Themistokles in this matter took any one into his confidence. His message was intended to induce the Persians to enter the Straits next morning, and it turned out successfully; but if it consisted in, or contained, a promise that in the event of a Persian attack the Athenians would desert the Greek side and declare for the king, the matter was almost too risky for any disclosures. Could such a message have been debated at the council, or confided even to the Navarch, without exciting a suspicion that the Athenians were, indeed, meditating surrender? Themistokles may have kept his own counsel; but this discretion falls far short of a trick played on the Greeks, nor was it devised in order to force them to battle, but in order to induce the Persians to assume the offensive. Possibly the Greeks had actually resolved to attempt to break out through the Persian blockade, and on seeing the Persians enter the Straits next morning, felt that the gods had delivered the enemy into their hands. The message of Themistokles was a purely military stratagem, even if he alone in the Greek camp at that time possessed the secret.

(6) *The Greek tactics*.—An interesting feature in the battle of Salamis appears to be that both combatants were acting, at the moment of contact, on the offensive. The explanation of this fact is not far to seek. The Persians were entering the Straits in column-formation, induced to this movement, involving a change of plan, by the message of Themistokles, when the Greeks advanced in line, out of the bay of Salamis, and fell upon the side of the advancing column. The manœuvre, by which the Persian fleet had been formed, or partially formed, into column, is also easily recoverable. On the

previous day, in execution of the original plan, the Persian fleet had been drawn up in three lines, extending from the neighbourhood of the Peiraeus across the open sea towards Salamis. It was there in a position to receive the Greeks, should they attempt to break away into the open sea southwards; and even the forward movement, closing the water-ways between Salamis, Psyttaleia, and the mainland, together with the occupation of Psyttaleia, may have belonged, like the despatch of the Egyptian squadron round the island, or the order for that movement, to the original plan of operations. The new development, under which the Straits were entered the next morning, must, indeed, have been contemplated from the first; for, had the Greek navy actually evacuated the bay of Salamis, and made past Eleusis, in the hope of escaping by the western channel, the main body of the Persian fleet would no doubt have entered the Straits, for the purpose of pursuit, in the very order actually observed on entering for the purpose of doing battle. The manœuvre by which the movement was to be carried out is self-evident. The right or eastern (NE.) wing, towards the Peiraeus, or the Attic shore, wheeled to the right and entered the Straits between Psyttaleia and the mainland, as head of the column, the three lines of Persian ships, as they had been the day before, and all night long, becoming three files. They had penetrated some distance into the Straits before realizing that the Greek fleet, far from being divided in counsels or loyalty, was advancing, an unbroken line, out of the bay of Salamis, with the apparent intention of attacking them. How long the Persian leaders may have cherished the hope of a split among the Greek contingents, and a defection or declaration for the king, there is no knowing: long enough, at any rate, to enhance the disappointment and confusion caused by their error.

The ruse of Themistokles was crowned with complete success. He had contrived that the engagement should take place in the Straits, the narrow waters, favourable to the Greeks. But not merely that. The tactical position was all to the advantage of the Greeks: they had but to advance and fall upon the side of the triple column to throw it, inevitably, into confusion. These were the same tactics which they had hoped to employ off Euboia, at least if the Persians attempted to force their way down the channel of Oreos; these were the tactics which the Athenians had used with success at Marathon; these tactics, equally applicable to a sea-fight, secured an equal success on the present occasion. The Greek right naturally reached the enemy first, and first became engaged; the head of the Persian column must have been cut off; the Athenians seem to have accounted for it. The Persians had been taken by surprise: the vessels, perhaps containing the chief admiral, were still outside the Straits, pressing forward in ignorance of the situation within. The attempt of those within to back out must have thrown the whole column into confusion. After a while Greek vessels began to emerge from the Straits into the open

water, and fell upon the disorganized Persian fleet. The conflict resolves itself more and more into a series of individual engagements, in which the "barbarians," disorganized and distraught by the complete failure of their plans and dispositions, are put more and more at a disadvantage. The celebrated exploit of Aristeides marks the sequel rather than the climax of the Greek victory: the Persian fleet is in retreat to Phaleron, or further. Meanwhile, nothing has been heard of the squadron that should have rounded Salamis: the Corinthians, and perhaps some other of the Greek contingents, might have been able to account for it. The movement of the Corinthians, which Athenian malignity afterwards represented as an ignominious retreat, may be explained as a tactical disposition to meet the onset of the Egyptian squadron, of whose movements the Greeks at Salamis cannot have remained ignorant. Whether the Corinthians encountered at the southern entrance to the bay of Eleusis, where perhaps is to be placed the temple of Athene Skiras,¹ the full onset of the Egyptian vessels may well be doubted: such an encounter could hardly have failed to leave a deeper impression upon the traditions of the fight.

§ 6. (a) The theory thus formulated, in regard to the main tactical aspects of the battle, and of the manœuvres on the preceding day, appears to embrace and account for the six elements in tradition as above enumerated. There is no pretence that the main authorities themselves have any conscious grip on the problem, as a whole. Aischylos, the earliest, says nothing of the squadron sent to circumnavigate Salamis, to take the Greeks in flank, or rear, or to bar their retreat. Herodotus says something which may be interpreted as referring to that squadron and its movement, but need not necessarily be so interpreted. In any case this squadron, its movement, and operation, though an essential element in the larger tactics of the case, was not visible within the landscape of the battle-field. Other movements of the Persians, the occupation of Psyttaleia, the message of Themistokles and its effects, the actual point of first contact, the general character and result of the battle, seem all preserved in the proposed reconstruction.

(b) Some further incidental matters may also be included. Thus, for example, the theory is justified of the fact that both fleets were moving forward when actual contact took place, to wit, the Persians in column towards the opening of the bay of Eleusis, the Greeks in line towards the shore of Attica. Even so small a point as the appearance of the Phoenicians, before the throne of Xerxes, harmonizes well with the above theory, for in it the Athenians are in a position to cut off and drive back the Phoenicians on to the Attic shore below Mount Aigaleos, and hard by the Herakleion. A place is also easily provided for the achievement of Aristeides. The Aristeia of the

¹ Cp. 8. 94.

Aiginetans, or even the excuse for it, remains more problematic, except that the Greek right wing was the first engaged, and that the Aiginetans were posted on the right. Possibly the Aiginetan squadron, which distinguished itself in cutting off retreating Persian vessels, arrived from Aigina during the action, and took the Persians in the rear. The retreat of the bulk of the Persian fleet to Phaleron is, of course, explicable on this theory, as upon the theories of Blakesley and of Goodwin. In short, only the omissions, or the transparent incoherencies of the traditional stories, or perhaps the minor chronology, refuse to accommodate themselves to the reconstruction and solution of the tactical problem here suggested.

(c) The foregoing reconstruction happily combines from the principal antecedent theories, which it is intended to supersede, elements, in which they appear severally to have done justice to various factors in the traditions. Thus Leake's conception of the position and orientation of the Hellenic forces at the opening of the battle remains uncontroverted, though his conception of the position and orientation of the Persian fleet is completely cancelled. Again, the suggestion of Blakesley that the Persian fleet was only just entering the Straits in the morning, and entering in column, is followed, developed, and defined; but the conception of the position of the Greek fleet, held by Blakesley and Goodwin, is here abandoned. Goodwin's appreciation of the importance of the movement of a squadron detached to circumnavigate Salamis, is here fully endorsed, and indeed magnified; but this movement, together with the occupation of Psyttaleia by the Persians, is referred to the first plan of Xerxes, and the movement of the Persian fleet recorded by Herodotus in c. 76, even if identical with the despatch of the squadron round Salamis, is wholly divorced from the message of Themistokles. A change, or development, in the Persian plan of action is here also accepted; but that change cannot have consisted merely in the despatch of the circumnavigating squadron, a movement which must have belonged to any Persian plan of attack. The great change consisted in the advance of the Persians into the Straits, which was due to a belief, established by the message of Themistokles, that if the Greeks were actually attacked, the Athenians would desert their confederates for the king. This view is indeed contrary to the representation of Aischylos, who neither recognizes nor suggests any change or development in the Persian plan and tactics; but on this head the testimony of Herodotus is preferred, because, without some such theory, the various elements in the traditions, including some preserved by Aischylos himself, cannot be synthesized. The omission in Aischylos can be accounted for by the dramatic situation, the necessity for compression in the narrative, and quasi-patriotic motives. Details in Aischylos are themselves hardly explicable without the supposition of some such development. The conception of a change in the Persian plan is fully

endorsed by Goodwin, but with him includes: (*a*) the detachment of the west wing of the Persian fleet to circumnavigate Salamis; (*b*) the movement of the main body of the Persian fleet forward so as to stop up the passages between Psyttaleia and Salamis on the one hand, Psyttaleia and Attica on the other. But, on that supposition, what could the original plan and movement of the Persian fleet have been intended to accomplish? The movement of a squadron round the island of Salamis, the stopping of the outlets, the occupation of Psyttaleia, all belong (it is here contended) to the original Persian plan, which aimed at taking the Greek fleet between two fires, and driving them out of the bay of Salamis, eastwards, or for the most part eastwards on to the main fleet, or westwards on to the Egyptian squadron. The change, the new development, comes in with the determination of the Persians to enter the Straits in the morning, under a belief that the Greek fleet can safely be attacked even in the bay of Salamis. Aischylos, who recognizes but one plan, and one continuous set of movements, ascribes the whole to the message, dates that message to the day time, though he dates the Persian movements wholly to the ensuing night, and limits the message to reporting a projected flight. The change of plan, the date of the message at night, its Themistoklean authorship, are to be found in Herodotus; but the change of plan consists (if the theory here advanced be correct) simply in the movement by which the Persians enter the Straits in the morning to attack the Greeks, instead of waiting for the Greeks to be pushed, or driven out upon them.

§ 7. *The Operations of the Army*.—There are four points, and only four, after the capture of Athens, at which the Persian land-forces are in evidence in connexion with the battle of Salamis: (i.) the occupation of Psyttaleia; (ii.) the move towards the Peloponnesos; (iii.) the building of a mole from the mainland to Salamis; (iv.) the evacuation of Attica, or the flight of the king. The first and second of these items have already been noticed in their connexion with the naval movements, and call for less discussion independently; the third is highly problematic, and requires some examination; the fourth is at once the most elaborate and the most easy to dispose of.

(i.) *The occupation of Psyttaleia* by a force of Persian infantry is (as above remarked) apparently relative to a plan of operation according to which the scene of combat would have lain outside the actual Straits, or just at the SE. entrance; and although the plan of operations was subsequently changed, or developed, by the entrance of the Persians into the narrows, yet, owing to the discomfiture and retreat of the king's ships, Psyttaleia became no doubt an important nucleus in the actual struggle. The exploit of Aristeides in clearing the island of the Persians can hardly have been undertaken until comparatively late in the day, when the tide of battle had already ebbed beyond the Straits: the position in which the episode is placed in the

narratives both of Herodotus and of Aischylos might suggest, or confirm, this suspicion. The actual numbers of men engaged are unfortunately not specified, but the numerous Athenian hoplites, shipped over, had been probably drawn up on Kynosoura, in the first instance, to resist the landing of the Persians from Psyttaleia, which would presumably have taken place had the fortunes of the naval engagement gone differently. In Psyttaleia the Persians are more than half-way across to the larger island of Salamis: the employment of these troops, actual and prospective, confirms the view that, when the occupation of Psyttaleia was ordered, the Persians expected to find the Greeks in Salamis, and hoped to drive the Greek vessels eastwards out of the Straits. But, at whatever point of time, and with whatever purpose undertaken, the occupation of Psyttaleia proved a disastrous move on the part of the Persians, comparable to the occupation of Sphacteria in 425 B.C. by the Spartans, though more excusable.

(ii.) *The movement of the Persian army*, or of some considerable portion of it, *towards the Peloponnesos*, is dated somewhat precisely by Herodotus to the night before the battle, the night, that is, of the day upon which, according to him, the movements of the Persian fleet began, for the purpose of bringing about an engagement at sea.¹ That the objective of the movement on land was the Peloponnesos is probably more than the historian, or his sources, could know for certain: a movement westwards of Eleusis was observed, or known to have taken place, and was interpreted, by the Greeks, as directed against the wall across the Isthmos and its defenders. Had Persian forces ever actually reached that point, the fact would certainly have been duly emphasized in Greek tradition; on the present occasion the Persians do not seem even to have attacked, or to have reached Megara, though the occupation of that town, and of its port, Nisaia, would surely have been a strategic undertaking of considerable importance for the development of the campaign. Megara, however, may have been well fortified, and no easy nut to crack.² The actual movement of the Persian forces in that direction need not have been a mere feint, to alarm the occupants of Salamis, least of all if it was conducted under cover of night; it rather relates itself to the despatch of the Egyptian contingent to circumnavigate Salamis, or to blockade the western outlet of the Straits towards Megara, a detachment on land being directed to support and co-operate with that naval squadron. There may, however, be some exaggeration in the Herodotean account of the movement upon land, apart from the supposed objective. The Persians were in possession of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain: one detachment at least will have come through the pass of Dryoskephalai, though Xerxes himself may have reached Athens from Oropos and Dekeleia. Herodotus seems to conceive the Persian army as all moving from Athens, but the supposed movement in this case may

¹ 8. 70.

² Cp. 9. 14. 5.

represent little more than the presence, at Eleusis as well as at Athens, of a Persian corps.

(iii.) *The building of the mole.*—There is a strong tradition, found not merely in Herodotus, but in Ktesias, and then in Strabo, Plutarch, and other tertiary authorities, to the effect that Xerxes had a plan, which was partially carried out, for throwing a bridge, or building a mole, across from the mainland to Salamis, and so attacking the Greeks in the island with his land-forces. Such an exploit offered comparatively little difficulty from the purely mechanical point of view; but the work could hardly have been carried out without interruption from the Greeks, especially when the *tête du pont* began to approach the shore of the island. The project, and the actual inception of the work, appear to be historical, and as facts must have a considerable bearing upon the plans of Xerxes and the tactical dispositions round Salamis. Here, as in all cases, much turns upon the questions of exact time, place, circumstance, and motive; and on all these points the authorities differ, nor can any one witness be unreservedly accepted as final upon them all. Herodotus (followed by Plutarch) puts the bridge episode after the battle: Ktesias clearly places it before the battle. The position of the episode in the tactics of the whole piece will obviously vary as the one or the other of these dates is preferred. Herodotus is the earlier and in general far the better authority—does not Ktesias, for example, date the battle of Salamis after the battle of Plataia, following the geographical order?—but, the account of the project in Herodotus leaving so much to be desired, and the account in Ktesias having in one or two other points an advantage, Ktesias might here be preferred in his ordering of events, save for more general strategic or tactical reasons. Xerxes would scarcely have set to work to build a causeway, or bridge, across to Salamis, at a time when his fleet was intact, prepared to do battle, and expecting a victory. Its erection would have been inconsistent at least with the first plan of operations by the Persians against Salamis, as above elucidated. Much less will the building have been begun before the arrival of the fleet at Phaleron. It remains to accept the date given by Herodotus and Plutarch, which places the inception of the building after the battle. If, however, Herodotus is to be understood to mean that the building was begun on the very day of the battle, a correction is called for. This fresh project can hardly under the circumstances have been undertaken before the following day, even if the battle itself did not last until sundown, as Aischylos asserts. The project, whatever its motive, seems to imply the failure of the fleet, and presents an alternative to the manœuvres by the fleet, the circumnavigation and the assault—at least, if the object really was to transport the army across to Salamis, and not merely to gain a *point d'appui* from which to harass the Greek mariners.

The exact site for the projected crossing is in no way indicated or suggested by Herodotus. Ktesias, and the authors who follow him, mark precisely the spot from which the building started, and this precision is a point in their favour. The bridge, or causeway, was to start from the Herakleion, a little to the east of Cape Amphiale, just where the channel was narrowest, only some four stades across—on the line, in fact, of the ferry. In the first instance the mole was, perhaps, intended to rest on the island of St. George, which might act as a bulwark or pier for the structure; and might serve as a fresh basis, whence to advance against Salamis. The victors in laager at Salamis were to be threatened from the north side now, as they might, perhaps, have been threatened from the south, by the soldiers on Psyttaleia, had the fortunes of the day at sea gone otherwise for Greeks and Persians.

The actual form and structure of the edifice are not clearly indicated in the authorities, an omission for which good excuse may be allowed in a case where the structure in question had never been completed, had perhaps hardly been begun, and at all events had long disappeared. If, however, the work was to be composed of ships, if in fact it was to be a bridge, or raft, such as had been thrown over the Hellespont, though here on a smaller scale, how were ships to be brought into the Straits for any such purpose, in the face of the victorious Greeks, who, a few hours before, had driven the Persian navy back in confusion to Phaleron? Herodotus, however, himself places the building of a mole (*χωμα*) before the construction (or constriction!) of the raft (*σχεδίη*), while Ktesias and his followers, including Plutarch, have nothing to say of a raft, and simply specify a mole. The construction of a pontoon of boats, inside the Straits, is almost an absurdity under the circumstances, and the construction of such a raft outside the Straits, in the hopes of floating it in (section-wise?) to its place between the Herakleion and Salamis, hardly less absurd. Perhaps the raft, or pontoon, in Herodotus, is a speculative hypothesis on the ultimate form of the projected structure, had it ever been completed: probably the structure, so far as accomplished, simply presented the appearance of a jetty, or dam, was in fact a mole, carried out a certain way into the waters of the Straits. The project was a failure, at least the actual structure was never completed, or employed for its ostensible purpose; the question, therefore, arises as to the cause of that failure, the reasons which led to the abandonment of the work. This argument is somewhat further complicated by the motivation of the king's action in Herodotus: the failure or success of the work, as a device of war, being obviously relative to the object with which it was undertaken.

In regard to the motivation of the work, as in regard to its precise date, the authorities are divided, Herodotus treating the undertaking as a mere stratagem, or ruse, intended to cover the king's retreat,

already determined ; while Plutarch and the Ktesias-group all treat the mole-building as a serious measure, begun at any rate with a view to an attack to be made by the Persian land-forces upon the Greeks in Salamis. The Herodotean theory has been adopted recently by Busolt,¹ and others, upon the ground that command of the sea was necessary for the building of such a structure (especially if it was to include a bridge of boats), and that after the Greek victory at sea, the Persians could not seriously have expected, or designed, to complete such a structure. But could they, then, have expected to beguile the Greeks with such an abortive stratagem ? Unless the mole was capable of being put to serious uses, or completed so far as to convince the Greeks that it portended a real danger, it was likely to be a mere laughing-stock to both sides alike. Plutarch, who dates the building, with Herodotus, after the battle, treats it as the outcome of a serious plan and intention of attack. Such an idea does not appear either psychologically or strategically improbable at the moment. The full extent of the victory at sea was not immediately realized in the Greek camp, and the Persians had still probably numerical superiority in ships to the Greeks. In any case the structure of a mole, or dam, across to Salamis might not seem at first an impossible undertaking to the power that had bridged Hellespont and canalized Akte. The undertaking was, indeed, abandoned, and this failure calls for explanation ; but the explanation is not far to seek. An actual mole all across the channel may have soon revealed itself as beyond the mechanical resources of the Persian engineers ; the king's ardour may have cooled, and less adventurous counsels prevailed ; last, and not least, a good tradition associates the retreat of Xerxes, which of course involved the abandonment of the mole-building, with a second message from Themistokles, which threatened the employment by the Greeks of their superiority at sea on a much larger scale than that involved in any operations in the straits of Salamis. The retreat of Xerxes, thus induced, fully accounts for the abandonment of the undertaking.

(iv.) *Retreat of the Persian army: flight of the king.*—The evacuation of Attica by the Persians, after the battle of Salamis, may be easily accounted for, on strategic and political grounds, without ascribing it to panic, or to loss of nerve. The army was still undefeated, but the supremacy and the advantage of the Persians at sea were gone. The fleet was bound to retire. Beside the losses, material and moral, incurred at Salamis, the service of the whole summer through had doubtless told heavily both upon ships and crews. The retirement of the navy involved, of course, the withdrawal of transports and grain-ships, so far as these had accompanied the advance. Under these circumstances, and at this stage in the campaign, it was natural to withdraw the land-forces also, even apart from political considerations, upon their bases and magazines in Thessaly and

¹ Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* ii.² (1895), p. 708.

Makedonia. There is no hint, nor any need to suppose, that the retreat was dictated by fear of an advance of the Peloponnesian forces from the Isthmos. The Persian army remained in Attica, after the defeat at sea, and so contained the Greeks at Salamis, long enough to secure the undisturbed retreat of the Persian vessels; but the strategic pause was not converted into a permanent occupation. Even on purely strategic grounds better winter-quarters were to be found in Boiotia or Thessaly.

The political results to be anticipated from the naval victory of the Greeks at Salamis must have constituted a further reason for the retirement of the army, as well as of the navy, from Attica, and of the return of Xerxes himself to Asia and to Sardes. The remnant of the fleet was needed on the Asianic coast, and the Persian army might be called upon to secure the adhesion of Boiotia and Thessaly. The loyalty of the Ionian and other Greek subjects of the king was all along suspect: the victory of Salamis must have excited apprehensions of a fresh revolt in Ionia, which were in fact to be verified immediately. Probably the cities and tribes of Thrake and Makedon, which had once already used the opportunity of an Ionian revolt to throw off their allegiance to Persia, were thought quite capable of using a fresh occasion to renew the attempt. The subsequent operations of Artabazos against Poteidaia attest the reality of the risk. The continued loyalty of Thebes, of Thessaly and Makedon, throughout the coming winter, suggests that more was expected of Mardonios and his army than had been achieved by the combined forces under the leading of his master.

Whether the king from the first intended to withdraw from the actual command of the army in Greece is a question; but there were good reasons, there was precedent, for such a withdrawal. Kyros had retired to upper Asia, after the capture of Sardes in 547 B.C., leaving the conquest of Ionia to be effected by deputy. Dareios, after his expedition across the Danube in 512 B.C., had handed over the further conduct of operations in Europe to his lieutenants, and had awaited the success of their efforts in the comparative ease of the palace at Sardes. The Persian king could not afford to be the organizer of disaster; it was still just possible to represent the capture of Athens as the crowning achievement of a successful campaign.¹ Genuine solicitude for the safety of the king's person and the supremacy of the Achaimenid house, and therewith of the Persian state and hegemony, may have co-operated with private ambitions to make the Persian marshals and council desirous to remove Xerxes from the front: the actual conduct of the war was not likely to suffer by his removal. The Persian land-forces were still undefeated, nay, hitherto victorious. Marathon had been avenged. The Peloponnesians had scattered from Thermopylai to rally behind the Isthmos-wall, without daring to

¹ Cp. Appendix II. § 6, p. 184 *supra*.

cross the path of the Persian again. Relying on the loyalty of Boiotia and central Greece, Mardonios, the commander of the forces, perhaps the satrap of the new province, took up winter-quarters, amid the comparative comforts of Thessaly, and employed his leisure in making pious overtures to various centres of the national religion, and tempting offers to the distracted Athenians, the transfer of whose fleet might still secure him an easy conquest of Peloponnesos.

The record of the movements of the Persian army is connected, but not identical, with the story of *the flight of the king*. Few episodes in the war have been more fully exploited by the Greek legend-mongers than the retirement of Xerxes after the battle of Salamis. Circumstances and motives have alike been made the sport of the fantastic and moralizing tendencies of victorious fabulists. Herodotus is neither the first nor the worst offender in this matter. Aischylos before him had already given the popular voice literary rank on the subject: writers of the Roman period were still improving the occasion with more prosaic moralities. The bare facts of the case no doubt involved a dramatic contrast. At Salamis the conquest had been stayed; the Persians had achieved their last success at the expense of Hellenic arms; the king himself disappeared from the scene; the sequel crowned Salamis with Plataia, and carried the war into the enemy's country. All this great *peripeteia* dated from the victory in the Straits, and the king's own exit was the symbol thereof. The symbol was duly exaggerated into a parable, and the parable presents the spectacle of a craven and ignominious flight, invested with every circumstance of disaster and humiliation. Only in the light of further and complete success can the immediate sequel of Salamis have been so grossly transfigured and caricatured by Greek tradition. The story contradicts itself, is at variance with the given situation, and is refuted by the record of the subsequent operations of the Persians on Greek soil. Herodotus himself, here as elsewhere, supplies the materials for his own correction. The pause in Attica, after the sea-fight, the building of the mole, the commission given to Artemisia, the easy and orderly retirement through central Greece, the reception of the Spartan herald, the commission to Mardonios issued in Athens and confirmed in Thessaly, the service of Artabazos, who escorts the king from Thessaly to the Hellespont with sixty thousand men, and returns to besiege Poteidaia—these are all items inconsistent with the representation of the king's return as a panic-stricken and disastrous flight. The existence, side by side, of two obviously exaggerated, contradictory, and absurd stories of the adventures in Thrake further discredits the general tradition. The comic *crescendo*, which obtains in the accounts of the king's passage of the Hellespont, betrays the spirit governing the whole. Aischylos allows Xerxes to recross by the bridge. Herodotus, perhaps correctly, takes him and his men across in the ships, which have duly reached the Dardanelles. Ephoros confines

the king in crossing to an open boat. The forty-five days' journey from Athens to Sestos may be a fossilized fact of genuine tradition; less acceptable are the strata of horrors and farce in which it is embedded. But all the fable is not inexplicable. Apart from the desire for poetic justice on the would-be conqueror, the lord of barbarous Asia—already fully developed in the pages of Aischylos—two suggestions go far to account for the Herodotean version. In the first place, Herodotus has to get rid of the colossal exaggeration in the numbers of the host of Xerxes. He accomplishes this duty by leaving thirty myriads of men with Mardonios, and destroying the remainder-majority in Thrake. In the second place, much of the hardships, sufferings, losses, and horrors of the march through Thrake may have been borrowed from the return of the remnant of the Persian forces from Plataia, some twelve months later, and transferred by anticipation to the companions of Xerxes. There might thus be some literal truth in the incidents, though directed to the wrong address. The admission, however, that Artabazos after Plataia led his 40,000 successfully home through Thrake, and crossed into Asia *via* the Bosporos, somewhat discounts the value of this apology.

One further point. In the *Persai* of Aischylos, with daring but dramatic propriety, the flight of Xerxes carries him incontinently home to Susa. Herodotus, doubtless in this particular more accurate, allows the king to winter at Sardes, but obtains a touch of tragic *katharsis* in the truly terrible story of the Despot's Amours, in which Xerxes disappears from the scene in a foul frenzy of lust and bloodshed.

§ 8. The Greeks apparently did not at once realize the extent of their victory; they were looking for a fresh attack on the following day. Even when apprised of the departure of the Persian fleet, the victors of Salamis were pinned for a while to their stations, by the enemy's continued occupation of Attica. A grand opportunity was there lost. Greater energy and courage at this crisis might have made a second campaign in Greece unnecessary, and have saved Attica from a second occupation. It was no glory to the Greeks that the king and his land-forces were allowed to retire unmolested at their own discretion. A vigorous initiative at the Isthmos might have utilized the moral effects of Salamis for the immediate discomfiture of the Persian army in Attica. A demand to that effect was probably addressed to the Spartans, though not recorded. A timely eclipse of the sun furnished the pious excuse for the inaction of the Peloponnesians. The inactivity of the Greek army at the Isthmos, when apprised of the victory at Salamis, confesses the formidable character of the Persian host, and attests the respect still entertained for the victors of Thermopylai by the compatriots of Leonidas. Had the Spartans that day been minded to demand of Xerxes in person vengeance for the slaughter of their king, they now had their opportunity. There was no pretending that the Peloponnesian army

had followed the retreating Persians ; but the anecdote of the Spartan mission to Xerxes in Thessaly served its turn. It belongs in part to the rehabilitation of Delphi, Delphi here again already acting on the national side : it serves to obliterate a lost opportunity, with a touch of Sophoklean irony, which anticipates the holocaust of Plataia.

The Greek fleet, as already shown, cannot have quitted Salamis, least of all the Athenian contingent, so long as the Persian army remained in Attica. But the victory opened up the possibility of an ultimate move against the Persian line of communications, of an attempt to break, at the Hellespont, the most fragile link in the chain between Salamis and Susa. A possibility so obvious must have been taken into account on the Persian side, once the extent of the naval disaster at Salamis became apparent. For that reason, presumably, the remnant of the Persian fleet made for the Hellespont and Aiolis, perhaps direct from Salamis. Had the Persian been blind to that obvious possibility, his eyes were opened, and his movements perhaps accelerated, by fresh information, which reached him from the Greek camp. Of the authenticity of this message there need be no insuperable doubt : Themistokles himself is our apparent authority for it :¹ but neither the Herodotean nor the Plutarchian version of the circumstances is quite acceptable. The message cannot have been conveyed by the same hand as had carried the previous message ; it will have been sent not from Andros, but, as indeed Thucydides avers, from Salamis : Themistokles no doubt was the author of the message, and he need not have kept it dark either to Aristides or Eurybiades. The object of the message may have been to liberate Attica from the presence of the Persian army, by accelerating the inevitable retreat of the king. Probably Themistokles did not employ this ruse, until convinced that no active service was to be expected of the Peloponnesian army. But, if the message was calculated to hasten the king's retreat, it was calculated also to liberate the Greek navy to quit Attic waters, and to carry out the very project which Themistokles is supposed to have pledged himself to the king to prevent. The course contemplated by Themistokles apparently included the pursuit of the Persian fleet, the completion of the naval victory, the destruction of the bridges over the Hellespont. Such a course was too adventurous for the Spartan Navarch, and little in accordance with ordinary Spartan conduct of victory. But was it, indeed, ever seriously contemplated by Themistokles himself ? Action cannot have been intended until the Persian army had evacuated Attica ; the season was advanced ; there was work for the fleet nearer home ; the message served its turn, if it had contributed to clear Athens of the presence of the enemy.

¹ *ap.* Thucyd. 1. 137. ἡ γράψας τὴν ἐκ Σαλαμῶνος προάγγελσιν τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως κτλ., with W. H. Forbes' note *ad l.* (*Thucydides*, Bk. I. Oxford, 1895).

APPENDIX VII

FROM SALAMIS TO SESTOS

§ 1. Immediate strategic results of Salamis. § 2. Traditional synchronism of the battles of Plataia and Mykale: its significance. § 3. Operations of the Greek fleet after Salamis. § 4. The disappearance of Themistokles. § 5. Condition of the Greeks during the winter of 480-479 B.C. § 6. Actual operations of the fleet in 479 B.C.

§ 1. THE victory of Salamis left the work of deliverance but half-accomplished. The Persian fleet had been put out of action, or at least reduced to act purely on the defensive. No further attack was to be apprehended from the sea. But the victorious Persian army was still in possession of Attica, of central Greece, and of Thessaly: the Persian dominion still extended continuously from the Hellespont to the Isthmos over-land, though Persian sea-power was for the time broken. Even the half-deliverance effected at Salamis did not at once reveal itself in its true proportions, if we may trust the tradition that the Greeks fully expected the renewal of the combat on the following day, the disappearance of the king's fleet from Phaleron coming upon them as a surprise.¹ That disappearance by no means left the Greek fleet free to act at once on the offensive, or to pursue the fugitive foe. So long as the Persian army remained in Attica the Greek fleet must have been required to cover Salamis, even though the Persian ships were no longer in evidence. The retreat of the king's land-forces will, however, have opened the eyes of the Greeks at once to the full extent of their victory, none the less if that retreat had been accelerated by a communication from Themistokles, conveying a threat of aggressive action by the victorious Greek against the Hellespont, or the Persian lines of communication.² The Peloponnesos was now safe from attack: Salamis had completely covered the Isthmos, and the whole coast and lands to the southwards. The strategy of Themistokles had more than justified itself from the Spartan point of view. The tactical blunder of the Persian in entering the Straits had but crowned his strategic blunder in rejecting

¹ S. 108.

² S. 110.

the plan for a direct descent upon the Peloponnesian coasts.¹ The Peloponnese was now virtually impregnable, provided always the loyalty of the Athenians stood firm, and the Athenian fleet in no case should pass over to the enemy's side.

With Athens and Attica, however, things stood very differently. The bare victory of Salamis left the question for the Athenians almost *in statu quo*, as in fact the second occupation of Athens ten months later proved. Salamis was decisive for the Peloponnesians, indecisive for the Athenians. The interests, and even the very existence, of Athens still as before demanded a forward and aggressive plan of action on the part of the Confederates. Attica could be saved only by a decisive victory on land, which should annihilate the Persian army at least as effectually as the Persian fleet had been annihilated at Salamis. The advantage of Salamis was that it rendered an aggressive action on the part of the Greek fleet possible, and possible even as an alternative to the campaign by land. Had the evacuation of Salamis been carried out even as a sequel to the evacuation of Attica; had the Athenian citizen body retired, on the invitation of the Peloponnesians, behind the Isthmos, the further and aggressive action of the fleet against the Persian lines of communication, against the Hellespont, against the Persian dominion in Ionia, in Asia itself, might have rendered a pitched battle on European soil for ever unnecessary. The separate interest of Sparta demanded, after the victory of Salamis far more than before that victory, the removal of the Athenians with bag and baggage into the Peloponnesos, and the employment of the Greek fleet in active and aggressive movements. The obstinate refusal of the Athenians in the second instance to abandon Salamis served a double purpose and result: it hampered the movements of the fleet, which had to be retained in the home waters, to cover Salamis, not from the Persian navy, but from the Persian army; and it involved the advance of the Peloponnesian army beyond the Isthmos, and an engagement, on offensive-defensive lines, if a solution was to be found for the complicated problem, consistently with the preservation of Athenian liberties.

Thus, from a strategic point of view, the victory of Salamis, though a maritime victory, and a victory complete in its own kind, by no means dissolved the solidarity of terraneous and maritime operations on the Greek side. While the relation between the operations by land and by sea upon the Persian side was shattered by the battle of Salamis, the correlation of land and sea operations upon the Greek side was maintained, and the movements of fleet and army were still interdependent. But this interdependence was rather now a voluntary than a necessary plan of operations, and was deliberately enforced by the policy and the passion of Athens. What appears to have been the Peloponnesian plan of campaign for the ensuing season might have been successful after Salamis. Had the

¹ 7. 235.

Athenians retired to the Peloponnesos, the Greek land-forces might have laughed Mardonios to scorn from behind the Isthmian wall, while the fleet, maintained at its full figure, might have undertaken such operations as must have recalled the Persians to Thrake, and ultimately to Asia. To pursue the possible results of the alternative plan any further were useless. The Athenians insisted upon maintaining their position in Salamis, and enforced a land-campaign beyond the Isthmos; albeit, to carry their point, they had to threaten the transference of their fleet to the king's side, and had also to take their full share of the actual fighting on land. Results quickly justified the Athenian policy from a strategic point of view; but nothing finally overcame the inherent duality of interests between Athens and the Peloponnesos, or ever welded the two powers into a real political union. The victory of Plataia, though perhaps unduly retarded, brought a decisive issue far more quickly, and upon a grander scale, than could well have been attained by any other process; but, though mainly a Spartan victory, it redounded far more to the advantage of Athens than to the advantage of Sparta. The victory in, and over, Boiotia left Athens the dominant land-power in central Greece, and liberated Athens for aggressive maritime movements, which had far-reaching results, strategic and political, just in consequence of the complete deliverance of Athens on the land side, by the destruction of the Persian forces, and of the medizing party, in central Greece. The battle of Plataia was not less essential to the naval supremacy, and ultimately to the naval empire of Athens, than the victories at Mykale and on the Hellespont. Thus, although the actual operations of the Greek fleet in 479 B.C. might seem to a superficial view an independent series, and the sole prelude to the subsequent foundation of the Athenian hegemony at sea, their correlation with the contemporary campaign on land must be restored, so to speak, at both ends, if the full significance of the concurrent campaigns is to be appreciated. On the one hand, the aggressive action of the fleet, the campaign in Ionia and on the Hellespont, is inconceivable and cannot have been undertaken, until Attica was evacuated by the Persians for the second time; the advance of the Peloponnesians beyond the Isthmos was an essential condition for the advance of the Greek fleet to Delos, and ultimately to Ionia. Again, and on the other hand, the destruction of the Persian forces on one day in Boiotia and in Ionia set the Greeks, and especially the maritime powers among them, free to carry the war, for revenge, profit, or any larger ambition, into the enemy's country. It was not an accident that Pausanias, the victor of Plataia, was the first commissary of such an undertaking by the confederate Greeks; and his victory had previously made possible that independent action of the Athenians on the Hellespont, which no doubt secured to them the reversion of the separate naval hegemony.

§ 2. A perception of these organic relations between the actions of the confederate Greeks by sea and by land may be indirectly attested by the asserted synchronism between the battles of Plataia and of Mykale, the latter of which, though not strictly a naval battle, was still rendered possible only by the uncontested superiority of the Greeks at sea. But, if the exact synchronism was indeed a matter of historical and attested fact, its assertion by tradition is to be ascribed to the fact itself, and not to a perception of its strategic significance. The synchronism is not in itself impossible, or even very unlikely; there is time enough and to spare, between the evacuation of Attica by Mardonios and the finale at Plataia, to carry the fleet from Salamis to Delos, from Delos to Mykale, and an undesigned coincidence in time between the two battles is not *ipso facto* incredible. The chief reason for doubting it is the report of the Plataian victory, which spread among the ranks of the Greeks at Mykale on the same afternoon. If authentic, the report implies that time had elapsed between the two events; if unauthentic, or a strategic device to encourage the men, the false report might itself be accountable for the recorded synchronism. So much at least may be taken as granted, that the victory at Mykale did not precede in time the victory at Plataia, though, had it done so, the strategic relations of the two actions would have been in no respect impaired. Plataia renders Mykale, not Mykale Plataia, fruitful; nay, Mykale is not even conceivable without the antecedent movements which brought Greeks and Persians face to face in Boiotia. But of these correlations little or no consciousness is betrayed by Herodotus, who seems to treat the movements of the Greek fleet in the spring and summer of 479 B.C. as an wholly independent series, determined by conditions of its own, and culminating, by a curious accident, in a startling synchronism, significant for him of a divine interposition, and for us at least of a causal correlation.

§ 3. If the movements of the Greek fleet in 479 B.C. be thus correctly correlated with the situation upon land, the representation of affairs immediately after the victory of Salamis given by Herodotus cannot be accepted as it stands. The visitation of Andros, the division and dedication of spoils, the award of prizes, as described by Herodotus, are all under some suspicion. (a) The Greek fleet cannot have advanced to Andros until the Persian army had evacuated Attica. The advance to Andros cannot have been in pursuit of the Persian fleet, which had some days' start of the Persian army in the work of evacuation. The Persian fleet must have made good its retreat unmolested and unpursued: the advance of the Greeks to Andros is a substantive attempt to reap the first-fruits of the Salaminian victory by detaching the Kyklades from the Persian cause. The operation is manifestly a confederate undertaking, but its political and military significance is completely obscured and distorted in Herodotus by the

'malignity' of his sources, and their manifest perversion of the facts to the discredit of Themistokles. The stories of the council of war held at Andros, of the interview between Themistokles and Eurybiades, of the advice of Themistokles to the Athenians, and of his second message to Xerxes, have already been discounted and corrected, so far as correction may be possible. Placed in their present context they involve manifest absurdities, and conflict with other and, in some ways, more probable traditions. The record of the corruption of Themistokles is discredited partly by the involved assumption that Themistokles has a free hand to direct the action of the confederate fleet, and partly by the tendency, which it shares with other and similar stories, already discredited, to damnify the memory of Themistokles. The astounding fact remains that Andros defied successfully the efforts of the confederate fleet; a fact which confirms the suspicion that the full significance of the victory of Salamis was not immediately apparent. Even maritime states might still be feeling that the war in Greece was far from being decided by a single naval engagement.

Unacceptable as the story of the debate at Andros is, the question may have arisen among the *Strategoî* before Andros, whether they should go further and seek out the remains of the Persian fleet on the Asianic side or on the Hellespont, and endeavour to cut off the retreat of the king by land, and the over-sea communications of his army with Asia. Possibly Themistokles at this crisis advocated the operation if undertaken by the confederate fleet, and opposed a separatist action on the part of the Athenians alone. Tradition obstinately emphasizes the connexion of this idea with the name of Themistokles, and three or four times expressly ascribes to him the design of carrying the fleet to the Hellespont¹—a design only finally achieved after his temporary disappearance from the rôle of protagonist. So here, at Andros, Themistokles pacifies the Athenians by the pledge that in the spring he will lead them to the Hellespont and Ionia. But the fictions in the story of Andros may well cover the whole debate. The conduct of Themistokles towards the Athenians is involved with the reported mission of Sikkinnos and the motives assigned for it, which are completely to be discredited. Moreover, was any Athenian at this crisis prepared to go so far from home, instead of returning home to restore things in Salamis and in Attica? Or, who were the Athenians who at this point presumed to dictate to Themistokles the plan of action? The discussion, if not the blockade of Andros itself, at this point is probably a pure anachronism. The Greeks, months later, considered Samos 'as far off as the Pillars of Herakles': were the Athenians included, who now are anxious to

¹ (i.) Cp. Plutarch, *Themist.* 7 ὡς προσωτάτω τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀπαντᾶν τῷ βαρβάρῳ κατὰ θάλατταν. (ii.) *ibid.* 16 γνώμην ἐποιεῖτο λύειν τὸ ζεύγμα ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐπιπλεύσαντες εἰς Ἑλλήσποντον

"ὅπως" ἔφη "τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ λάβωμεν" (cp. Hdt. 8. 108). (iii.) Hdt. 8. 110 (message to Xerxes). (iv.) Thuc. 1. 137. 4 (letter to Artaxerxes).

sail to Hellespont? Without prejudice to the falsity of that anecdote, the inconsequence, or at least the contrast it involves with this, attests at once the fictile character of Herodotus' sources, and his own lack of self-criticism in reporting such inconsistencies.

(b) How unconcerned Herodotus is about the 'mint and anise' of chronology is further illustrated, in the immediate context, by his record of the division of the spoil, and the offerings to the gods in honour of the victory at Salamis. If the trophied triremes were set up at Sounion, at Salamis itself, at the Isthmos, before the confederate fleet broke up for the winter, yet the tithes cannot have been sent to Delphi while Mardonios was still in Greece, nor can the works of art described have been made and dedicated, or the Aiginetan offering set up 'in the corner near the Krater of Kroisos,' until months, perhaps years, after. Herodotus betrays no sense of time or perspective in this passage, wherein we may fairly be allowed to see an evidence of the process of rehabilitation rendered necessary, or expedient, for the Delphic oracle by the ambiguity of its utterances, and the too fortunate escape of its treasures, during the Persian occupation.

(c) The award to the Aiginetans of the prize for the battle of Salamis remains one of the unexplained paradoxes of the war. The *Aristeia* may have been not in accordance with deserts: certainly, if sufferings were to be considered as well as services, no maritime state could justly compete with Athens. But the award suggests a further incompleteness in the records of the actual fight. The invocation of the Aiakids, even their actual presence in the day of battle, will hardly have entitled their island to the prize for valour on that day; but the notice of the Aiginetan service, in cutting off the retreating Persians in the Straits, may cover a much more valiant and signal achievement than appears in the bald and phil-Athenian stories of the fray. The Aiginetan ships, wanting in the navy-list, may have been foremost in the fight, whether at one or other end of the Straits. The Athenians themselves can hardly be said to have directly contested the justice of this award, except by re-telling the story of Salamis all to their own advantage.

§ 4. A much greater paradox remains to be discussed in the triumph of Themistokles and his instant disappearance. A fact apparently implied in Herodotus is expressly recorded elsewhere, that Themistokles was deposed from the *Strategia* in Athens, that is, was not re-elected *Strategos* in and for the coming year (479-478 B.C.). The two most prominent members of the strategic college in the second campaign are Aristides and Xanthippos, the quondam rivals and opponents of Themistokles, the one supreme in the army, the other in command of the Attic fleet. Themistokles is unnamed and unnoticed. Herodotus and the ancient authorities explain this paradox after their own manner. Themistokles had rendered himself unpopular with the Athenians by accepting the honours lavished on him at

Sparta : his corruption also had leaked out, and he had given himself insufferable airs as the saviour of the State. In short, a jealousy, not wholly undeserved, much less unnatural, had broken out against him and contributed to his downfall : the good qualities of his opponents were notorious.


Modern scholars, justly ill-content with such purely personal and hardly rational motives, have had little difficulty in discovering for the disappearance of Themistokles more significant and plausible reasons in the political and strategic situation of the moment. The policy and plans of Themistokles had indeed been finally successful in the first campaign, but at what an enormous cost to Athens ! Without a decisive battle by land the safety of Athens could not be secured. The fall of Themistokles and the election of his rivals, accomplished at Athens only after ardent debate and a violent party struggle, signified a protest and a demand—a protest against the idea that the war was to be conducted purely at sea ; a demand addressed to the Peloponnesians, and to Sparta, that the ensuing campaign should be energetically conducted on land, so as to cover Attica from a fresh invasion, and to push matters to a decisive and victorious issue against the Persian army. The heroes of Marathon had less respect for ‘the Medic dress and the men clothed therewithal’ than had the survivors of Thermopylai.

Before accepting in their entirety either the ancient or the modern solutions of the paradox, there is still room to ask whether the apparent facts are so incontrovertible as has been assumed. Is it absolutely certain that Themistokles was completely shelved for the ensuing year, and shelved as the result of a party vote and a struggle between two alternative policies ? Themistokles is not expressly named among the *Strategoi* of the year 479–478 ; his two former opponents, Aristeides and Xanthippos, are the most prominent members of the college for that year. But the list of *Strategoi* is very incomplete ; and even if Themistokles was displaced from the leading position, he may have remained nevertheless a member of the board. The assumption that Themistokles opposed the policy which demanded that the Peloponnesians should advance in force to the protection of Athens, and should even, if possible, engage the Persian land-forces north of Kithairon, is anything but inevitable. Themistokles was identified with the attempt to meet the Persian invasion in Thessaly, an attempt which, as above shown, involved presumably the greater exertions, and possibly a pitched battle, on land. The defence of Thermopylai was, of course, a part of his strategy, and Themistokles had never intended that the Persians should set foot in Attica. His resolute refusal to evacuate Salamis, or to remove the Athenians *en masse* behind the Isthmos, involves the defence of Attica, by land as well as by sea, or its recovery. The words put into his mouth by Herodotus after Salamis, and

addressed *ex hypothesi* to the Athenians, though of very doubtful historical authority, are interesting in this connexion as implying that Attica was not to be again occupied or ravaged by a Persian host: an implication which would practically commit Themistokles to the subsequent policy, which is supposed to be the special preserve of his opponents. And further: that policy being the sound and right policy for Athens to pursue under the circumstances, did Themistokles, of all persons, fail to understand the situation, or believe that Mardonios and the Persian forces could be kept out of Attica, unless the Peloponnesian forces advanced beyond the Isthmos? More likely no one else in Athens so clearly understood the strategic and military necessities of the case as Themistokles. How, then, account for his disappearance? Possibly he was regarded in Athens, and regarded himself, as no longer the man best fitted, or most likely, to persuade Sparta and the Peloponnesians to fulfil their pledges and to do the needful. After all he had failed, in the previous year, to get Kleombrotos and the Peloponnesians to advance even into Attica. The honours with which he had been received and despatched by Sparta may have made it less easy for him, in his own eyes as well as in the eyes of his fellow-citizens, to bring the full pressure to bear upon the Spartans that might be required for the coming campaign. The magnanimity of Themistokles did not date from his deathbed. The patriotism and self-denials of Athens in this very war were his inspirations. The feud with Aigina had been composed, the claim to the naval hegemony had been waived, by Themistokles in the common interests. Who but Themistokles had recalled the Athenian exiles, Aristides and Xanthippos among them? Generous rivalry between the two great leaders, as to which of them should most benefit his country, had already begun: what but the pragmatic and malignant motivation of the Greek gossip-mongers of the day entitles us to suppose that personal feud and rivalry had already broken out afresh? Within a year Aristides and Themistokles are found again co-operating in a most delicate and subtle intrigue against the manifest and declared interests of Sparta for the fortification of Athens. On that occasion Themistokles is apparently taking the intellectual lead. The event falls well within the official year of Aristides and Xanthippos: is it so certain that Themistokles too is not one of the *Strategoi* of the year? If Themistokles was a private person during the year 479-478 B.C. until appointed ambassador to Sparta, was he present in the ranks at Plataia? He may equally well have been present there in a strategic capacity, albeit Aristides was undoubtedly the commander-in-chief. A few months later again and Aristides, as *Strategos* at Byzantion, is promoting the ideas of Themistokles by securing the naval hegemony of Hellas for Athens. The politicians of ancient Athens were not precluded by the dearly-purchased party system of modern states from advocating the particular measure

which at the moment might be manifestly to the interest of their city; and we cannot be too careful to avoid corrupting our vision of the inner history of the ancient state by misleading analogies from modern politics. In fine, the supposed disappearance of Themistokles from office in 479 B.C., and his conversion into a 'Leader of the Opposition,' may be an exaggeration and an illusion, due primarily, no doubt, to the vicious condition of our sources of knowledge. Leading *strategos*, or commander-in-chief, he certainly was not; and that fact is no doubt significant in view of his position during the previous year; but that he completely dropped out of the *Strategia* is more than we are justified in assuming, until a complete list of the *Strategoï* for the year can be produced without him. Still less are we justified in assuming that he was opposed to the policy of Athens, as shown in the campaign of 479 B.C., or at variance with the men whose names are especially associated with its execution: the immediate sequel shows the very reverse of such a division. It is more reasonable to conclude that the Athenian policy of 479 was the policy still of Themistokles, even if the hands chiefly charged with its execution were those of Aristides and Xanthippos.

§ 5. There is unfortunately little or no direct evidence of a satisfactory kind in regard to the minds and actions of the Greek states and statesmen during the winter immediately succeeding the victory of Salamis. This chapter of history is, therefore, largely conjectural—an inference, or series of inferences, from the given situation, and from the later and ascertained course of events. The winter must have passed amid an ever-growing appreciation of the results of the great victory just won, and a growing confidence in regard to the campaign still impending. The islands, with the possible exception of Andros, within the Delian circuit, had been won for the national cause, or at least detached from the Persian. The king's residence in Sardes, and the measures taken to safeguard Ionia and the Hellespont, were doubtless known in Sparta and in Athens. That nothing was to be expected from the north but a fresh invasion must also have been well understood: the news of the successful resistance of Poteidaia to the Persian blockade was assuredly reported in Korinth and Athens. There were no signs of a reinvasion of Greece by sea; the king's fleet had been partly disbanded, and the remainder restricted to guarding the Hellespont and Ionia. But, as the war was plainly not over, the question must constantly have presented itself to the Greek leaders, how the further defence was to be conducted. The defeat of the Persians at Salamis had opened up the possibility of carrying the war into the enemy's coasts or country; but it would be rash to ascribe to Sparta any such definite purpose or project; and although the Greek fleet is early on the move, in the ensuing spring, its movement is in the first instance purely defensive in character. Before the fleet mustered the Peloponnesians were again definitely pledged to advance



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beyond the Isthmos, and to cover Attica from a second invasion. The position thus implied must be the position subsequently taken on the northern slopes of Kithairon. The Greeks never dreamt of advancing against Mardonios into Thessaly; it is more surprising that no hint occurs of any projected re-occupation of Thermopylai. The medism of Thebes and of central Greece, and perhaps the presence of Persian or Makedonian garrisons in the principal cities, may help to account for an omission which the recent associations of the spot would in themselves have failed to justify: otherwise, against the forces of Mardonios, especially if the Hellenic fleet had again occupied a corresponding position, Thermopylai might surely have been successfully defended, and the death of Leonidas have been avenged on the very spot where he had fallen. But the fulfilment of their pledges by Sparta and the Peloponnesians was postponed, until the postponement involved them in a flagrant breach of faith, and afflicted Attica with a second Persian occupation. A second time the Athenians crossed *en masse* to Salamis, but only to Salamis, which remained an outpost, challenging relief by a Peloponnesian advance, and almost forcing a battle in defence, or rescue, of the Attic soil.

The extreme reluctance of the Peloponnesians to advance or risk a battle is indisputable, and, from the purely Peloponnesian view, not hard to understand. What is not so easy to understand is the Lakonic assumption that the Athenians would suffer again the spoiling of their goods, and all the loss and misery of a second migration, without seeking to come to terms with the Persian, or carrying out their threat of the previous year. The story of the embassies to Athens, from Mardonios and from the Spartans, during the winter, though it supplies a solution of the problem all too glorious to be strictly historical, points to real possibilities, and risks, of Athenian secession, then and later, which Sparta boldly discounted. Sparta may have believed that Athens was too deeply compromised with the king to hope for genuine favour or mercy, whatever promises were held out: too passionately attached to the Attic land to make good the threat of a permanent and distant migration. Sparta may have been waiting on events in Ionia and in the north, not without hopes that Mardonios would be recalled, and that a third campaign might be indefinitely postponed. Can it be said that such hopes were entirely exaggerated? If the story of Mykale be not a colossal fable, would the occupation of Greece have been long maintained, or the invasion soon repeated, after that victory? Doubtless other considerations may be cited in extenuation of Peloponnesian policy. The attitude of Argos was all along a great drag upon the free action of Sparta. The disaster at Thermopylai had not yet been transfigured into an heroic and politic sacrifice. Perhaps Sparta and the Peloponnesians viewed with no great regret the losses and sufferings of Athens; albeit, if so, their *Schadenfreude* was a gross miscalculation, as the event proved. Nay,

might men not have foreseen that the repeated invasion of Attica could do nothing to diminish the importance of the Athenian navy, but rather might tend—as no doubt it availed in the sequel—to throw the Athenians more and more upon the sea as the sole safe basis for their power?

Whatever may have been the calculations, or miscalculations, of Sparta at this crisis, the fact may be regarded as certain that only the final and fatal threat of medism, wrung by Peloponnesian perfidy from the deeply humiliated Athenians, at last put an end to Spartan shuffling, and drew the Peloponnesian forces out from behind the wall across the Isthmos. Is not that threat in the manner of Themistokles? Was it not one of the grounds of the later charge against him?¹ Even now the Peloponnesians allow Mardonios to retire into Boiotia, and to choose his own laager and battlefield: a permission which must be interpreted as an error in the Greek strategy. For, if Mardonios was anxious to get into the more favourable plain of the Asopos, and so much nearer to his main base in Thebes, and his single line of communication with Thessaly, it was obviously the interest of the Greek commanders to entangle and engage him in Attica, where the strategic advantage was with them.

§ 6. (a) The assumption is safe, although neither Herodotus nor any other of the ancient authorities expressly supports it, that until Mardonios and the Persians were ascertained to be clear of Attica, the Greek fleet cannot have left the home waters. The second retirement of the Athenians to Salamis is almost as inconceivable without the support and cover of the fleet as the first, even though Mardonios had no Asiatic ships at his disposal. With the Greek fleet at Delos, or even at Aigina, the Athenians in Salamis would have been exposed to assault from the Persians and medized Greeks in occupation of Attica, and some means would easily have been found for crossing the Straits. Whether a second Hellenic, or at least Athenian, fleet was at the time in commission; or whether the Greek, or at least the Athenian, squadron moved back from Delos, for the protection of Salamis; or whether the whole Greek fleet was originally at Salamis, not at Aigina, in the spring of 479 B.C.—by one means or another Salamis must have been covered. In the absence of express testimony, and in view of the log of the fleet as given by Herodotus, perhaps the first of the alternatives above stated may be accepted as most probable; for the numbers of the fleet under Leotychidas and Xanthippos fail to account for the Attic ships, and others, which must have been harboured somewhere. We might even be tempted to place this forgotten fleet under the command of the forgotten admiral, Themistokles. But, whatever

¹ The idea of medism was deeply associated with the name of Themistokles long before his final condemnation, by his messages from Salamis (cp. Appendix VI. § 5, p. 309 *supra*),

by his championship of the medizing States in the Delphian Amphiktyony (Plutarch, *Them.* 20), and perhaps by the threat referred to in the text (Hdt. 9. 11).

the dispositions made for the safe-guarding of the Athenians in Salamis, the fleet under Leotychidas and Xanthippos cannot have advanced to Samos and the Asianic main so long as the Persians were still in large numbers in Attica, and while an attack upon the Isthmos, if not upon Salamis, was a daily possibility. The retirement of Mardonios not merely drew the Peloponnesians into Boiotia, but set the Greek navy free to cross to Ionia.

The naval results of Salamis were, indeed, immense. Ten years were to elapse before a Persian fleet ventured to face an Hellenic fleet at sea, only to be defeated again: six and eighty years had passed away before a Persian fleet again appeared within sight of Athens.¹ The marine initiative and aggressive in the Aigaian had been transferred at one stroke to the European Greeks; but it could not be put into operation so long as Attica remained in the hands of the Persian forces. The evacuation of Attica by Mardonios thus set the Greek fleet free at last to utilize the advantage won at Salamis, and to strike a blow on the Asianic side for the deliverance of Europe. The hazard and daring of this adventure need not be exaggerated: there were numerous precedents and examples, from the days of Kyros onward, to encourage such an undertaking, and the positive risk to be encountered upon this occasion was not great. The Greeks had the most pressing invitations and assurances from the two great islands off the Ionian coast, and in the first instance at any rate the projected intervention may have been limited to the island of Samos.² Doubtless the forward movement of the fleet was fully approved by the Spartan government, and the application of the Ionians was sure of a favourable hearing and support in Athens, or among the Athenians at Salamis. The further move from Samos to Mykale, and the actual resolution to attack the Persians upon the mainland, is more surprising; but the whole story from first to last is related by our authorities in a way to excite some suspicions, and it is possible that fuller and more accurate records would throw a somewhat different light upon the operations of the fleet. The engagement at Mykale was not, perhaps, in itself an affair comparable to the defeat of Mardonios, as a military operation; but it was a brilliant strategic move, it led to further developments important both in a political and in a military sense, and its story was told in a way to console the Athenians for their shortcomings in Boiotia!

(b) Neither the exact number nor the composition of the fleet is ascertainable. Herodotus gives the total as 110, but without specifying any items, or naming the separate contributaries. These omissions are the more striking, in view of the character of his navy-lists for Artemision and Salamis. The navy was, however, certainly composed of Peloponnesian contingents and of an Athenian squadron. Incidentally we learn, from the account of the battle of Mykale, that

¹ Xenophon, *Hell.* 4. 8. 9 ff.

² *Hdt.* 8. 132, 9. 90.

beside Lakedaimonians there were present contingents from Korinth, Sikyon, and Troizen. A fleet of 110 ships would have mustered some 22,000 men at most among the crews, while 3300 hoplites might be added as a liberal estimate for the *Epibatai*. That such a force could have accomplished the feat ascribed to the Greeks at Mykale, against the vastly superior numbers of the Persian fleet, supported by a considerable army to boot, is hardly credible. Possibly the figures for the Greek side are under-estimated, the figures for the Persian side exaggerated, and the part played by the Ionians, and Greeks nominally on the Persian side, quite inadequately rendered. Diodoros gives the number of the Greek fleet at Delos as 250.¹ The figures in Herodotus are for Aigina, some weeks or months earlier. Between the muster at Aigina in the spring, and the start from Delos to Samos, after midsummer, the numbers of the Greek fleet may have been doubled, or more than doubled. If there were five or six thousand hoplites at Mykale the exploit becomes more intelligible; but even so, the active co-operation of the Ionians, the division and mutual mistrust of the Persian leaders, the memory of the defeat at Salamis, and a terror, or panic, inspired by the daring aggressive of the Greeks, are all required in order to make the achievement at Mykale intelligible.

(c) The actual story as told by Herodotus is curiously precise and exact; but precision and exactitude are not always the marks of a true history. There are several grounds in the present case for suspicion. The description of the actual battle is a reproduction, *mutatis mutandis*, of the battle-piece at Plataia. At Mykale, indeed, the Greeks are the attacking, at Plataia the defending, side; but in other respects, apart from chronological or topographical coincidences, there is a too curious resemblance between the parallel stories. The right and left wings of the Greek army have again somewhat similar difficulties: the Lakedaimonians are advancing over higher and broken ground, the Athenians below in the plain. Again there is the Persian rampart-wall of shields, and the flight to the fortified camp, when the shield-wall is broken through. Again the fortified camp is the scene of an obstinate struggle, and the contest is finished on the arrival of the retarded Greek wing. The literary parallel is, perhaps, sufficiently close to justify the suspicion that the account of the battle of Mykale has been moulded to some extent on the traditions of Plataia, with due allowance for the undisputed Athenian *Aristeia* on Ionian soil. Other items in the story are not less suspicious for one reason or another. The actual result can hardly be explained, without assigning to the action of the Ionians far more importance than is assigned to it in the accounts, presumably from Attic sources, given by Herodotus. The exact synchronism and the double presence of Demeter may pass as facts, without justifying Herodotus' moral; but the 'rumour'

¹ Diodor. 11. 34. 2.

(*φήμη*) and the 'Herald's staff' (*κηρυκῆιον*): what is to be made of them? Are we to rationalize them away, as Ephoros plainly did? Or to regard them as imported afterthoughts into the story? Such a product the synchronism must have been, whether true or false. We can hardly credit the other items as they stand; and such incredulity tends to disqualify the whole narrative.

(*d*) The scene next laid at Samos has too often been allowed to pass unchallenged as good history. After their astounding victory on the mainland the 'Hellenes' return to Samos, and hold a deliberation, in which the Peloponnesians propose to evacuate Ionia, and transfer the Ionians bodily to Europe, finding room for them by the expulsion of the medizing Greeks: this project is, however, vetoed by the Athenians, with the result that the Samians, Chians, Lesbians and other islanders present are admitted to the Hellenic alliance, under all solemn formalities. This whole episode, as related by Herodotus, is improbable in itself and hardly consistent with other indications in the context. Thus the Samians have already been solemnly admitted to the Greek alliance by Leotychidas at Delos; and again, the Hellenes have fought at Mykale with the full consciousness that the islands (Samos, etc., included) 'and the Hellespont' were the prizes of victory. Again, such a matter could never have been settled by the Peloponnesian and Attic officers serving on the fleet, without reference to the home governments. Authority to admit Ionians, Nesiotas, Hellespontines into the alliance Leotychidas and Xanthippos might have had, but hardly authority to transfer the Ionians to Europe, and the medizing Greeks to Asia. Moreover, neither of these operations was a very simple one, or to be accomplished without opposition; and what meanwhile was to become of the Hellespontines, and other Greeks, under Persian rule? The question thus debated by the commanders of the fleet at Samos, after the first victory on Asianic soil, would have been better debated before advancing to Mykale at all, nay, before admitting the Samians to the alliance: not at Samos, or at Delos, but rather in Sparta, and in Athens. In short, if any such suggestion was ever seriously made, or discussed, it belongs to the antecedents of the naval movement across the Aigaian, and was discussed, between Athens and Sparta, before the opening of the campaign of 479, and is misdated and misplaced by Herodotus.

(*e*) The adjournment to the Hellespont cannot have been in doubt, nor is it reported to have been in doubt, after Mykale. It was one thing to sail to the Hellespont after Salamis in order to cut off the retreat of Xerxes and his still uncompromised army, and a very different thing to sail thither a year later after the victory in Ionia, in order to cut off the retreat of the remnant of the broken host of Mardonios. Assuredly before they headed for the Hellespont, if not before they made for Mykale, the Greek admirals knew of the great victory in Boiotia. But, if the Hellespont was a part of the prize at

Mykale, the Hellenic fleet did not sail from Samos to Abydos simply to break down the bridges. Their very destination seems to imply that the Hellespontine towns were already to some extent in revolt, or prepared to revolt from the Persian. The mere destruction of the bridges would, perhaps, have been rather a bar to a fresh invasion than a serious impediment to the escape of the Persian remnant still in Europe; and as a matter of fact Artabazos crossed from Byzantion without difficulty. But the Peloponnesians were not prepared to remain into the winter on naval service, and thus it came about that from the siege of Sestos, if not from the council at Samos, dated that separate action and protectorate of the Athenians, which quickly became the reason for their maritime hegemony. There were of course old relations between Athens and the Chersonese, which help to explain the action of the Athenians upon this occasion; but from the political point of view Leotychidas and the Peloponnesian captains gravely compromised Spartan interests by their acquiescence in the action of Xanthippos and his colleagues. Spartans were not fond of sieges, and Sestos was strongly fortified and held. More was expected of Athenians. When the siege proved obstinate and the Athenian privates wearied of it, the *Strategoi* did not venture to raise it without orders from home: was there not in Athens an acute and severe critic of their action!

(f) The complete unity, between persons and parties, if we can rightly speak of parties at Athens, was indeed being attested, while Xanthippos lay before Sestos, in the conduct of Athenian policy towards Sparta. The victory of Plataia had secured the joyful return of the Athenians in Salamis to their homes and city; and no time was lost, nor labour spared, to make good the effects of the two Persian occupations. Neither Sparta nor Athens felt as yet convinced that no fresh Persian invasion was possible, or to be feared; but the two governments had very different plans for meeting the prospective danger. Sparta still clung to the idea that the Peloponnesos should be regarded as the one akropolis of Hellas, and that the Athenians might contemplate with equanimity a third, presumably a fourth evacuation of their land, and the fresh and repeated occupation of their city by the Persian, when he came again and again. The *naïveté* of this proposal is quite South-African! If the story had stood in Herodotus, and not in Thucydides, one might have been tempted to doubt its historical accuracy, or to regard it as a pragmatic persiflage upon Spartan pretensions from an Athenian source. The Athenians naturally were resolved never to repeat, if they could help it, the experiences of the past two years. Athens had been unable to stand a siege in the Persian invasion: the land defence, for which Sparta was responsible north of Attica, had twice broken down, with disastrous results to the Athenians, who were now resolved to put their city in a condition to stand a siege, as Poteidaia had just triumphantly

done. But Spartan representations could not be met with a direct negative, nor could the Athenians hope to convince the Spartans by debate. The wisest among them distrusted Sparta, and perceived that the walls, raised against the Persian, were likely to be used against the Lakedaimonian. Themistokles and Aristeides were at one in this matter, and the righteous man lent himself fully to the ruse, by which the worldly wiseman outwitted the Spartans, and earned their fatal enmity. It is almost ludicrous, in view of this episode, to suppose that a twelvemonth earlier, or indeed less, Themistokles had been removed from the *Strategia* as likely to be too subservient to the special interests of Sparta.

When Xanthippos returned to Athens, bringing with him the cables of the Hellespontine bridges, he found the walls of the city already raised high enough to defy Persian, or Greek; and ere ever another twelvemonth came round Aristeides had exploited the pride and mimic tyranny of the victor of Plataia to effect the transfer of the naval hegemony of the Greeks from Sparta to Athens. Thus was the unity of Athens purchased by the division of Hellas, and political wisdom, in the persons of Aristeides and Themistokles, there too was justified of her children.

APPENDIX VIII

PLATAIA.

§ 1. General aspects of the campaign. § 2. Character of the Herodotean narrative (Chronology, Topography, Figures, Motivation). § 3. Sources of the Herodotean narrative. § 4. Summary of the Herodotean narrative. § 5. Failure of the Herodotean narrative (twenty *crucis*). § 6. The two fundamental problems. § 7. (A) The tactical positions occupied in succession by the Greek forces. § 8. (B) The actual battle, and the Greek victory. § 9. The plan and its author. § 10. Summary of the reconstructed narrative. § 11. Chief points in the reconstruction. § 12. Subsidiary authorities (Diodoros, Plutarch).


§ 1. THE general aspects of the campaign of Plataia have been already in great part anticipated.¹ Of its supreme military and political significance there can be as little doubt as of its actual occurrence, approximate date, and scene. The significance of the victory is, however, much more manifest than the exact conditions and circumstances under which it was achieved. Plataia was truly a decisive battle, putting an end once for all to the Persian scheme for the conquest of European Hellas. Neither was the victory dearly purchased, nor apparently very difficult of achievement, when it came. The problem rather is, to determine why the day of judgement was so long postponed. The victory gained over Mardonios in 479 might, to all appearances, have been gained over Xerxes in the same place a year before.² Attica need never have been occupied, much less twice occupied and twice devastated, by the Persian host. The battle of Salamis might have been anticipated, and rendered unnecessary, by a victory over the Persians on the Asopos. The feebleness and inconsequence of the Greek, that is, of the Spartan leading after the disaster at Thermopylai, bear the best witness to the extent of that disaster. It cost the Athenians for the time being their land and city; but it cost the Spartans in the long run their hegemony. Without speculating in detail on the results for Sparta and the rest of

¹ Cp. Appendix VII. §§ 1, 2.

² Ktesias, *Pers.* 56; Blakesley *Hero-*

dotus (1854), ii. 495 ff. Cp. notes to

8. 40 *supra*.



Greece, had the victory of Plataia been anticipated by a twelvemonth, broadly speaking, at least, the position of Sparta would have been such as she never attained in actual history. After Thermopylai, indeed, such an achievement was too much to expect. The Greek plan of defence practically broke down, only to be painfully restored, piece by piece, and not according to the original intention. Salamis remained an isolated and incomplete achievement. The question of the subjugation of Greece was still an open one at the beginning of the ensuing campaign.

The victory of Salamis, however, though indecisive for Athens and central Greece, had virtually secured the Peloponnese from attack, provided Athens remained loyal to her allies. The Persian fleet had practically disappeared, or was reduced to a 'negligible quantity,' so far as aggressive measures were concerned. From behind their fortifications on the Isthmos the Peloponnesians could defy the army of Mardonios for an indefinite time. With Athens the case stood otherwise. Athens was still fully open to attack, invasion, and re-occupation from the land side, so long as a Persian force remained in being south of Thermopylai; nothing but a pitched battle by land and a decisive victory over Mardonios and his Greek allies could permanently secure the safety and liberty of the Athenians. Even a naval expedition to the Hellespont, or to Asia, could at most, in the first instance, only provoke the Persians in Greece to a more vigorous aggressive. The best way for Mardonios to provide against any attempt on the part of the Greeks to operate over sea against his ultimate base, or against his communications, was obviously to keep them fully occupied at home. Nevertheless, an inequality of interest and a difference of opinion was naturally developed between the Athenians and the Spartans in relation to the ensuing campaign. The Athenians were urgent that the Peloponnesian army should cross Kithairon, or, failing that, should move into Attica, and there do battle with the Persians.¹ The Peloponnesians were reluctant to come forward. The attitude of the two leading states towards the question of naval operations is not quite so clear. We are scarcely justified in crediting Sparta with an original and positive plan to bring about the evacuation of Greece by an attack on the Persians in Asia, by fomenting revolt in Ionia, by threatening the islands and the Hellespont. Still less are we entitled to represent the Athenians as opposed to any such plan. But two conclusions may be declared inevitable. First, some strategic connexion existed between the operations on land, culminating at Plataia, and the operations over sea, which culminated at Mykale. Secondly, the Greek fleet could hardly have assumed the offensive, or abandoned the home waters, until Mardonios had evacuated Attica the second time.² If

¹ Cp. 8. 144, 9. 7.

² The Greek fleet will have waited on the operations of Mardonios rather


than Mardonios on those of the Greek fleet (*pace* Delbrück, *Perserkriege*, 102). Cp. p. 329 *supra*.

the Athenians could have been brought to consent to abandon Attica and Salamis completely, and to retire into the Peloponnesos, behind the Isthmian wall, the fleet might, indeed, have undertaken a forward and offensive movement on a large scale. The resolute refusal of the Athenians in the previous year to adopt that course was not likely to be reversed after Salamis. Nevertheless the patent division of interest between Athens and the Peloponnesos was so wide that apparently the positive threat of medism on the part of Athens was required to force the hand of Sparta, and compel the Peloponnesians to cross the Isthmos.¹ This episode was indeed a humiliating one for all parties concerned, and goes far beyond the worst threat extorted from Themistokles before the battle of Salamis. Yet of its substantial accuracy there can hardly be any doubt: what other motive could the Athenians have brought to bear upon the Spartans to compel them to adopt a forward movement? The battle of Plataia was fought to save Athens from a permanent occupation by the Barbarian. But there was a second motive operating more directly on Sparta. The active medism of Thebes and of Thessaly, the fear, perhaps, of an Argive revival under Persian auspices, the alienation of Delphi, must have helped to reconcile Sparta to the military necessities imposed upon her by the obstinate refusal of the Athenians to evacuate Salamis, and the final threat of the Athenians to join the Persian, unless the Peloponnesians came to their rescue. All the same it is remarkable that, after the evacuation of Attica by the Persians, Pausanias should have taken his army into Boiotia. This move was more than Kleombrotos had faced in the previous autumn, and might seem to be going beyond the bare necessities of the case. But the defence of central Greece had lain in the original plan of campaign; the Spartans had been pledged to appear north of Kithairon from the first. Moreover, the frontier of Attica had apparently been moved so as to include the northern slope of Kithairon. Apparently Pausanias had not advanced beyond the technical boundary of Attica, until he crossed the Asopos in pursuit of the Persians, who had taken refuge in their fortified camp.² Once the Greek and the Persian forces stood face to face upon the banks of the Asopos a battle became inevitable, and the questions arising in the given situation are mainly tactical. The reluctance on both sides to come to a decisive issue is remarkable. Perhaps either side, or both sides, waited to some extent upon the development of events elsewhere. Yet Mardonios can hardly have expected any great disaster to the Greek fleet, and the Greeks can hardly have expected that the immediate action of Mardonios would depend on the success or failure of their naval enterprise across the sea. The tactical problem at Plataia in fact, once given, demanded a purely local solution. Nor is the solution obscure. Each side desired to fight a defensive action; or perhaps, putting the case more accurately, the Greeks were

¹ 9. 11.² Cp. 5. 74, 6. 108, and Plutarch, *Aristeid.* 11.

EUROPE according to HERODOTUS

P. *Panticapes* R.
H. *Hypacyris* R.



B.V. Barbiskire, Oxford, 1912

determined not to venture across the Asopos, on to ground where their phalanx might easily be circumvented, or taken in flank, by the Persian cavalry; while Mardonios, naturally desiring before all things to draw them down from the high and rough ground on to the plain, postponed as long as possible an attack in force upon the Greeks in a position which gave them cover from his cavalry. In the end, by accident or by design, the battle was joined rather on the Greek than on the Persian terms, and with a result, of the most favourable character at the moment, of the most far-reaching influence in the sequel, for the patriotic Republics of Hellas.

§ 2. But, while the broader strategic and even politic aspects of the battle of Plataia are thus fairly obvious, to appreciate in detail the movements and actions of leaders and forces concerned is a task beset with difficulties, owing to incompleteness and errors in the record. Alike the antecedents and the actual course of the battle itself are largely matters of conjecture, that is, of almost hopeless disputation. We may exercise a critical faculty, or amuse a learned leisure, upon the problems presented by the subject; but we can hardly hope to attain any solution which will be of universal obligation. The evidence is too scant in amount, too poor in quality. Whether we attempt to determine details of time, place, causality, motivation, or aim merely at describing the bare action or event, we are baffled by failures, obscurities, self-contradictions, absurdities in the record. The discovery of the historic event more and more resolves itself into a literary evaluation of the evidences: what should have been but a means to the historian's end asserts itself as the end in itself. Not but what the dialectical process of criticism, now for long applied to the matter in hand, has made some progress in elucidating probabilities, and especially in placing the cardinal or pivotal points of the argument in an ever-growing light. But the more articulate statement of the problems, or even the plausibility of this or that solution here and there, is far from giving us a concrete story, or a complete reconstruction. No particular theory can harmonize all the evidences, for the evidences are in part self-contradictory and absurd; nor is it to be expected that any particular theory of the events will silence rival hypotheses where none can admit of actual verification. Enough if each contribute a solid point or two to the argument, and render the scholar's grasp upon his materials at once more firm and more elastic.

This tentative conclusion is likely to be all the less convincing to novices in that there is no other battle described by Herodotus with so much fulness as the battle of Plataia. Thus chronologically, apart from the general sequence and indications for the date, he furnishes apparently a diary of the operations, or of a part of them, which lends an air of verisimilitude to the events narrated. The topography is indicated not merely by a number of incidental items more or less

capable of verification, but also by precise and express descriptions of a series of positions which, lying in a comparatively well-known Greek landscape, might justify hope of a material basis and certainty for the framework of the action. The army-lists, given for both sides, comprise not merely ethnic titles, but precise figures for the various contingents, and that more especially on the Greek side. Of the motives and causes assigned for the principal changes in position, some at least possess a distinctly military character, and few, if any, are so improbable, or intrinsically irrational, as to demand summary dismissal on the ground of physical or psychological impossibility. Finally, under whatever drawbacks and obscurities, certain tactical positions and dispositions are indicated by Herodotus for the forces in action, which have been generally accepted in all reconstructions of the probable course of events. Yet, in spite of these merits in the Herodotean narrative of Plataia, which doubtless give it a very high, perhaps the highest, place in any attempt at a classification of Herodotean stories, according to their intrinsic worth and historical value, the story of Plataia nevertheless breaks down again and again at each important crisis, and there remains at the end a great gulf between the sum of acceptable items, or even the general underlying scheme, to be found in Herodotus on the one side, and every modern attempt upon the other, to obtain an adequate and coherent view of all the circumstances. A closer specification under each of the heads above indicated will justify this opinion in more detail.

Chronology.—The date of the battle of Plataia may be regarded as fixed, even by Herodotus, at least within a range of about thirty days. This result is, relatively speaking, satisfactory, though it might easily have been more precise. It is determined by two or three elements in combination. (a) The diary for the period during which the Greeks occupied the (supposed) 'second position' before Plataia, to the thirteenth day of which the actual battle is expressly dated by Herodotus.¹ (b) An interval preceding this period, sufficient for the action in 'the first position' (or previous position), and the antecedents back to the despatch of the Spartan forces from Lakedaimon, and the evacuation of Attica by Mardonios. The duration of this interval is not specified, but a *terminus a quo* is incidentally supplied by the notice of the *Hyakinthia*, which are presumably over before the departure of the Spartans from home.² Still, some slight variation in the estimate can hardly be avoided in relation to this interval, and an element of uncertainty at once arises.³ (c) A more precise indication appears to be contained in the express assertion that the invasion of Mardonios took place 'ten months' after the first occupation of Athens

¹ 9. 33 (τῇ δευτέρῃ ἡμέρῃ); 39 (ἡμέραι . . . ὀκτώ); 40 (ἐτέρας δύο ἡμέρας); 41 (ἐνδεκάτῃ); 44 (νύξ); 47 (ἡώς); 52 (τὴν ἡμέρην πᾶσαν· νυκτός); 56 (ἡώς).

² For date of *Hyakinthia* cp. note to 9. 7.

³ The eight days in c. 39 might cover the whole period so far in Boiotia.

by Xerxes;¹ but, apart from other difficulties of interpretation in this passage, the indication lacks precision in two directions. First, it is not clear whether the ten months are to be reckoned as nominal calendar months, or as full periods of thirty days; secondly, the exact duration of Mardonios' occupation of Athens remains in any case indefinite. As to the first point, probably the months are taken from the Attic calendar, and the actual interval between the two events was appreciably less than three hundred days. As to the second, the pause in Attica remains an elastic section, which may be prolonged or reduced by the modern investigator as theory seems to require; but the chronological exactitude of the whole story is thereby invalidated. The precision of the data, as far as they are precise, is indeed in itself suspicious. Not merely does the exact synchronism asserted for the battles of Plataia and Mykale arouse suspicion,² but the recurrence of the conventional reckoning by decades of days, that is, by Greek calendar weeks, suggests the artificiality of the temporal perspective.³ Yet, although confidence in the journal of Plataia is thus shaken, the limit of error in the calendrical date is comparatively small, and the Herodotean scheme may be allowed to pass, for regulative purposes, as the best working hypothesis at our disposal.⁴ Far more serious is any doubt as to the material sequence of events, and the validity of the order, in which they are presented. The character of Herodotus' sources, the idiosyncrasy of his methods, leave it too often an open question whether a particular story, an individual episode, is presented in true sequence and temporal order. There are several points where such a doubt is legitimate in regard to the story of Plataia and its immediate antecedents. (1) *The Athenian negotiations with Sparta*, and the action of the Spartans. Elements in the story for the year of Plataia (479 B.C.) might seem intrinsically to belong to the previous year. An appeal of the Athenians for assistance, or rescue, in Attica must surely have been addressed to Sparta in the previous campaign, although Herodotus makes no mention thereof in its proper context. In the Ninth Book the appeal, dated to the spring of 479, is *ex hypothesi* heard in Sparta before the completion of the Isthmian wall;⁵ but the fortifications at the Isthmos cannot have been still incomplete at that time. Herodotus, indeed, involves himself in a chronological inconsequence

¹ 9. 3; cp. notes *ad. l.* ² 9. 90, 100.

³ 9. 8, 41, 86. Cp. Busolt, ii.² (1895), 726 n.

⁴ Busolt *l. c.* dates the battle (i.e. the 13th day) 'about the beginning of August'; Duncker vii.⁵ (1882) 333 n. 'towards the end of September.' Plutarch is precise but self-contradictory; *Aristeid.* 19 gives Boëdromion 4; *Camill.* 19, *Mor.* 347, Boëdr. 3. E. Gresswell, *Or. Kal. Hell.* i. (1862) 406, decides for

the latter, and identifies it with Sept. 2, 479 B.C. Boeckh identified Boëdr. 3 with Sept. 25, but himself preferred Metageit. 26 = Sept. 19. Afterwards he transferred the date from the victory to its celebration (*Monde.* 67, cp. Duncker *l. c.*). Busolt's date seems too early for Hdt. 9. 3, but the battle was probably earlier than the anniversary of Salamis, or we should have had a story to cap 8. 65.

⁵ 9. 8, cp. 9. 10.

here, and supplies the means of his own refutation. The wall was apparently complete before the eclipse of October 2, 480, yet it is unfinished at the time of the *Hyakinthia* in 479! A second in-consequence lies in the exaggerated duration of the *Hyakinthia*, which Sparta is apparently celebrating on or before the arrival of the Athenian envoys, and is still celebrating on the eve of their departure ten days later. The latter difficulty might easily be explained away as due to a mere rhetorical trope; the former is more obstinate, and both alike go to show that the Herodotean sequence of events breaks down at this point, and consequently cannot be taken as the basis for the causal connexion of actions and events. (2) A second instance lies in the story of the lynching of *Lykidas*,¹ though its discovery is due to the conflict of external evidence with the Herodotean sequence. There is, anyway, the inconsequence that at the moment when the Athenian envoys are threatening the Spartans with the medism of Athens, the Athenians should be stoning one of their councillors, with his wife and family, for suggesting the actualization of the Athenian threat to Sparta! The apologist may indeed be at no loss to explain away such an apparent anomaly: the one transaction takes place in Sparta, the other in Salamis: the one is a threat addressed in secret to the Spartan executive, the other a practical suggestion for the Athenian people, and so on. But what were the Spartans to make of the threat, assuming it failed of its immediate effect, when the news of the fate of *Lykidas* was forwarded to them? The approximately synchronous acts of the Athenian envoys and of the Athenian Council remain a gross inconsequence; and the best way to save whatever truth there may be in the story of *Lykidas* is to redate it to some other point in history. Its present place in Herodotus must be taken to show that his chronological sequences are not always safe clues to the causal connexions of events, as a true chronology must ever be.²

The two instances examined belong to the antecedents of the campaign, rather than to the actual operations around Plataia. Other cases of chronological difficulty, that is, of more or less probable anachronism, arise in connexion with the actual story of the campaign. These instances can hardly be discussed here, in their chronological aspects, without anticipating other aspects of the operations in question to be hereafter developed. The time-condition is essential to the appreciation of strategic and tactical movements. Suffice it, then, to say here that reasons will subsequently appear for suspecting the precise date, or chronological point in the diary of Plataia, (3) of the dispute between the Athenians and Tegeatai for precedence; (4) of the visit of Alexander of Makedon to the Athenian lines. More

¹ 9. 4.

² The fate of *Lykidas* is in keeping with the psephism of *Aristeides* reported

by *Plutarch*, *Aristeid.* 10; but the psephism itself, if authentic, were better dated earlier.

serious than these comparatively trifling instances is (5) the doubt to be urged in regard to the duration of the Greek occupation of the advanced position upon the Asopos, and (6) the omission of any indication for the time spent in the position previously occupied. These possible errors and omissions affect deeply the conception to be formed of the battle itself, the antecedent movements on the field of battle, and the actual plans and policy of the leaders. Some of the operations recorded by Herodotus, with amazing *insouciance*, such as the double exchange of front in the Asopos-position, involve *inter alia* time-conditions, which are sufficient in themselves to disprove the Herodotean report; and it will appear, in the sequel, that the whole diary which Herodotus gives for the Greek occupation of the Asopos-position involves what may be indifferently regarded as a tactical impossibility, or an anachronism by transfer. In other words, Herodotus may allow, or indicate, sufficient time for the Boiotian campaign as a whole; but he cannot be trusted to have distributed the time at his disposal correctly, or always to have correctly marked the exact date, or sequence, of particular acts and events.

Topography.—From the nature of the case we are on safer ground when we pass from the chronology to the geography of Herodotus. Topographical errors are less probable in themselves than chronological; and ancient geography and choriography admit of a kind and degree of verification unattainable in relation to ancient chronology. The explicit, and still more the implicit, topography of the ancient historians is, as a rule, the most certain and reliable element in their works. The landscape of Greece is approximately the same to-day as it was two thousand years ago: mountains, rivers, plains, are not substantially altered, or the alterations can be detected and allowed for. The sites of cities and of edifices, sacred and profane, can be identified with more or less assurance. The battle-field of Plataia, as described by Herodotus, is easily to be verified within certain limits, and the details of the possible and actual scene of operations can be filled in with some confidence. The general features of the scene, mountain and plain, hills and streams, are constantly indicated, and the catalogue is enriched by a large number of definite names of objects in various kinds. Yet, notwithstanding these comparative advantages, the topography of the battle-field, and its relation to the operations narrated, remain largely problematical. For this unsatisfactory result Herodotus is only in part accountable. Any one of his contemporaries, with the text of Herodotus in hand, might perhaps have evolved a consistent and rational theory of the action, in conformity with the account of the historian: he would at least have come much nearer to such a result than any modern can now hope to do. The ancient student might easily have identified cardinal features in the landscape and in the narrative, about the equivalence of which moderns can scarcely come to any agreement. Certain fixed points, lying outside the battle-field,

albeit related to it, are not in doubt, Plataia, Thebes, Tanagra, Eleusis; but the exact sites of Skolos, of Erythrai, of Hysiai, which, with Plataia itself, furnish the very framework of the battle-field, are more or less in dispute. The great natural features, mountain, plain, river, hills, are still substantially the same; and the application of the greater names, Kithairon, Asopos, Oëroë, are not in doubt; but the precise attachment of other titles, vitally important in the narrative, Gargaphia, the Moloeis, the Island, the Argiopian place, are involved in dispute and obscurity; while the exact sites of the three buildings, the identification of which would go far to determine a true theory of the operations, the Heraion, the Demetrium, the Androkrateion, are not ascertainable with complete assurance. Nor can Herodotus be acquitted of all blame in this connexion. He might fairly assume the position of buildings which were standing in his own day; but it is no feather in his cap to have left the position of the Persian camp so much in doubt that some have placed it on the one, some on the other bank of the Asopos, while others again have combined the positions by placing the camp astride the river! Again, possibly Herodotus has confounded more than one building under one title; certainly he has failed to warn his readers that there was more than one temple of Demeter, within the area covered by the military operations before Plataia.¹ We have also to suspect in Herodotus the mensuration of space as of time. His chronological decades reappear in his decimal system of mensuration, and the artificiality or conventionality of the method seems to discredit the result for serious purposes. But by far the gravest flaw in the Herodotean topography is his failure to recognize the existence of more than one pass over Mount Kithairon within range of the Greek and Persian strategy. No recent contribution to the argument more tends to the good than the clear recognition of the various possible routes over Kithairon behind Plataia; conversely, no topographical defect in Herodotus' narrative better accounts for its incoherency, and the want of rational causality and motivation, than his neglect of this cardinal feature in the topography.²

¹ There was a 'Demetrium' for Plataia, for Hysiai, for Erythrai, to say nothing of similar sanctuaries at Skolos and at Potniai; cp. notes to 9. 57. 8.

² The mountain barrier of Parnes-Kithairon was traversed or turned by six routes or passes. In order from E. to W. they run: I. Dekeleia-Oropos; II. Phyle-Skolos; III. Eleusis-Eleutherai-Erythrai-Thebes; IV. Eleutherai-Hysiai-Plataia; V. Megara-Plataia; VI. The Oëroë valley and Aigosthena. It is quite possible that all of these six routes were used during the campaign of 479 B.C. Hdt. recog-

nizes clearly I., cp. 9. 15; III., cp. 9. 19; less clearly IV., cp. 9. 39. II. he never indicates. V. may be behind the narrative in 9. 51, but Hdt. betrays no knowledge of it. It has been suggested that the Persian cavalry returned from the Megarid (9. 14) into Boiotia by VI.; but that pass, like V., was hardly available for cavalry (cp. Xenoph. *Hell.* 5. 4. 16 f.), and it is much more likely that they returned by III., which, as far as Dryos Kephalai, was identical with IV. It has also been suggested (Duncker vii. 344) that Pausanias, in his final retreat, was intending to base himself on VI.

Figures.—With the question of *the numbers* available for the general engagement we pass beyond verifiable facts into the region of testimony. Yet numerical statements have a real character. Figures, if ascertainable, are, indeed, facts to rank with conditions of time and space in military matters: all three are essentials to the *Sach-Kritik*. The numerical data of Herodotus for the battle of Plataia are exact enough, but unfortunately in several respects erroneous. A gross exaggeration is manifest in his estimate of the slain;¹ and this estimate is based in part upon what may have been a great exaggeration in the number of the combatants. The figure of thirty miliads (300,000) for the Persian forces, i.e. the Asiatic army,² comes over to Mardonios, or rather to Herodotus, from the army-list of Xerxes; but it makes no allowance for the wear and tear of the campaign, previous to the final battle, nor for the soldiers on garrison duty between Thebes and Makedonia, nor for the army-corps of Artabazos, which formed at starting at least one-sixth of the whole force; nor for the hypothesis that the army of Mardonios was but a selection from the forces of Xerxes. We have no real means of controlling the figures for the Persian forces at Plataia. If the actual strength of Mardonios was even half his nominal strength, his forces were still immense, in view of the difficulties of supply for man and beast. Much is made in tradition of the disproportion between the Greek and the Persian forces at Thermopylai; little is made of any difference of numbers before Plataia. Mardonios shows some apprehension of the growing numbers on the Greek side: the anecdotes of the depression in the camp of Mardonios tend to diminish the supposed numerical advantage of the Persians. The number of Greek allies on the Persian side is admittedly a pure conjecture of Herodotus' own. Makedonians must be included in it; but, even so, 50,000 is a too liberal estimate, safely to be divided by not less than two! Admitting that the force under Artabazos took absolutely no part in the action, the number of men engaged on the Persian side would not be over-estimated perhaps at 125,000.³

For the numbers under Pausanias and Euryanax the historian had apparently more exact and more authentic evidence.⁴ But the army-list is, on the face of it, more or less of an ideal. The figures are all round numbers: the *cadres* would not in all cases be full: no allowance is made for losses during the campaign, which the additional

This is improbable, as the position would have been exposed to the cavalry; the Greek position was probably based on IV. and V. Düncker also (vii. 331) makes Mardonios retire into Boiotia 'over Kithairon,' i.e. by III. It is possible that II. was also employed on the retreat: but it seems unlikely that Mardonios attempted to circumvent the

Greeks by that pass subsequently (Delbrück, *Perserkriege*, p. 117). See further notes to *U. c.*

¹ 9. 70.

² 9. 32.

³ i.e. one Persian army-corps, with cavalry and Greek allies. Cp. Appendix II. § 5, p. 160 *supra*.

⁴ 9. 28, 29.

details will hardly have made good. The precise point, or moment, for which the figures are to be taken as valid is hardly indicated. One item especially challenges criticism. The enormous number of light-armed men with the Spartan forces forms a blot on the whole story, for it generates a problem, which Herodotus himself was bound to formulate and solve: why was no use made, or at least no service recorded, of this light infantry, the very kind of soldiery required under the circumstances? Instead of any such statement of the problem, Herodotus involves himself in a flagrant inconsequence by recording a request despatched by Pausanias (to Aristides) during the last engagement for the loan of the Athenian Archers! Modern historians, who treat the 40,000 *Psiloi* on the Greek right wing as a serious and acceptable item, should reconstruct their theories of the battle so as to give due weight to the service of the light infantry! But Plataia as a victory won for Sparta by the Helots will not do: they would in that case have overthrown more than their Barbarian enemies. On the Greek side only the Hoplites and the few hundred Athenian Archers are to be counted among the combatants proper; of duly equipped and qualified light-armed troops the Greeks were as bare as of cavalry. Such troops, indeed, would have required not less but more training than the Phalangites. The political conditions of Greece, in the fifth century B.C., prevented the employment of native light-infantry, even if there had been, at that time in Greece, any native commander capable of employing light-armed troops efficiently in combination with heavy infantry.¹ The immense figure reported for the Helots at Plataia must, however, have had some sense and justification. Such may, perhaps, be found by allowing one unarmed attendant to each Spartan and Lakedaimonian hoplite, and by relegating the remaining thousands to the army service, or commissariat trains. Apart from this serious error, and apart from a minor miscalculation in detail, the estimate of the Greek forces is not unacceptable, in round numbers, and has generally been accepted as approximately correct and officially authentic.² The remark that only a rough estimate of the Greeks on the Persian side could be made, as no official enumeration of them had been attempted, though designed primarily in reference to the number given for the Barbarians—itsself a mere total—would be a trifle sophistical, if exactly the same statement should have been made of the national forces.

Causality and motivation.—The permanent similarities of what may be called 'psychological verification' render the motivation or rationale of events, as given by any historian, amenable within limits to 'real' criticism. In the record of the Plataian campaign Herodotus frequently adopts, or suggests, a motivation, or a rationale, for the historical process, both true to nature, and suitable in the particular

¹ Was Gelon the exception? Cp. 7. 153.

² Cp. notes *ad H. c.*

case; yet, here as elsewhere, he prefers to emphasize the accidental, the separable, the trivial occasion, and to displace or ignore the essential and ultimately efficient antecedents of actions and events. Here, as constantly in Herodotus, the recorded act must be distinguished from the motive assigned; sometimes the historic fact may be recovered behind the factitious moral. On the whole, no story, or set of stories, in Herodotus lends itself to a modern rational critique more easily or more advantageously than the story of Plataia.

The Supernatural, which in the last resort will, of course, account for everything and anything, is never far distant in the Herodotean rationale of events; yet it plays a relatively slight rôle in his account of the Plataian campaign. The legend of Marathon is incomplete without its divine epiphanies and heroic resurrections. The island and straits of Salamis are suffused with the memory of miraculous manifestations. The heights of Mykale are haloed with 'the light that never was on sea or land'—a testimony to the surprising character of that victory and the Attic provenience of its record. The immediate mark of the theocratic dispensation is limited, in the story of Plataia, to a few jejune and beggarly examples. The presentiments of disaster on the Persian side reveal the touch of fate, or of foreknowledge, yet hardly rise above the normal range of moral prejudice or afterthought.¹ The turn of battle coincides with the prayer of Pausanias to Hera.² No barbarian entered the precinct of Demeter.³ That is all. The diviners in both armies play, indeed, a somewhat important rôle in determining, or excusing, by their extispications, the tactical immobility of the armies, on the Persian side perhaps in a sense contrary to the wishes of the commander-in-chief.⁴ But in all cases alike the apparent dictates of piety coincide with a definite political or strategic motive; and the *Diabateria* on the battle-field of Plataia were probably as little the real determinants of military action, or inaction, as the *Hyakinthia* had been of the previous politic quietism in Sparta, for which Herodotus himself suggests a less ideal motive.⁵ The absence of authentic signs of exalted religious feeling in connexion with the Boiotian campaign, both in the actors and in the narrators, may be taken as signifying in part that this 'fairest victory' was no such great surprise to the victors; in part that Athenian memories were not primarily interested in the victory. Plataia left the Greek imagination, and imaginative literature, comparatively cold, because the military situation at Plataia was by no means unfavourable to the national forces, and because the victory was not one to which the Athenians primarily could lay chief claim. The Herodotean record may even do less than justice to the degree in which religious fervour was aroused, and to the extent to which the resources of the national religion were called into action before

¹ cc. 16, 42.² c. 62.³ c. 65.⁴ 9. 36 f., 61.⁵ c. 8.

the battle of Plataia.¹ This comparative hush on the part of a writer so prone in general to emphasize the large, and even the trivial, aspects of the supernatural element in human history, argues consciousness of a strong case, in regard to the Plataian campaign, for a rationale of the action based on secondary causes.

Personalities.—Human will and passion count for a good deal in political and military matters; but, though the personal factor appeals as none other to Herodotus, you will not easily discover how much, in the actions round Plataia, should really be ascribed to the personalities of the nominal agents, Mardonios, Artabazos, Pausanias, Aristides, Alexander, Timagenidas. The characters of the leading *dramatis personae* are not really drawn on clear or consistent lines. Modern writers can alternately and plausibly represent Mardonios and Pausanias as men of great military capacity, playing the game of war with consummate skill, and as vain incapables, blundering alike into victory and into defeat. Something is clearly to be allowed for the personalities on both sides, especially in the relations of Mardonios and Artabazos; but Herodotus himself fails to assign a clear value to the personal co-efficients, and might seem to underestimate in this case the importance of factors, to which he is generally prone to attach even undue importance. If the attitude and conduct of Artabazos be truly set forth in the pages of Herodotus, then Artabazos alone might well bear the whole responsibility for the Persian defeat on the banks of Asopos. Such a moral is far from the intention of Herodotus. But, in this as in other cases, the facts themselves are not quite free from suspicion. As reported by Herodotus they point to rivalries and divisions on the Persian side, which would go far to account for the ultimate disaster. Herodotus himself, in reporting them, seems hardly to appreciate their full bearing in this connexion.

Natural causation.—The comparative eclipse of the supernatural and the diminished stress laid by Herodotus on merely personal motives introduce, in the story of Plataia, a more than usual recognition of reasons in the nature of things for reported actions, and a comparatively intelligible rationale of actual results. In some instances Herodotus disarms suspicion, or at least bespeaks trust, by a clearly indicated perception of the existence of a problem in regard to the causation of an event, be it the apparently heartless delay of the Spartans,² or the recorded trial of the Phokians.³ In the one case Herodotus' own suggestion is obviously inadequate; in the other, the whole anecdote has the air of a misconception concerning, it may be, a perfectly friendly proceeding. None the less acceptable is the interjection of a critical formula in each case, as evidence that Herodotus moves in a rational world, in which acts and events, to be

¹ Cp. Plutarch, *Aristeid.* 11.

² 9. 8.

³ 9. 17 f. With this incident might

be compared the story of Mucianus and his dealing with the Vitelliani, Tacitus, *Hist.* 4. 46.

creditable, must be intelligible. Madness and miracle are, of course, among the possible explanations of mortal conduct, but either only as an *ultima ratio*. The reasons given by Herodotus for the Greek, and specifically the Spartan, victory at Plataia, are of the most matter-of-fact order, but none the less acceptable on that account: a vast superiority in weapons, in military and tactical skill, more than compensated (Herodotus himself clearly sees) for any real or supposed inferiority in mere numbers.¹ What he does not apparently see is that this clear and cool rationale of the victory reacts very detrimentally upon his report of some of the antecedents: such as the raven exchange of positions,² the distracting insubordination of Amompharetos,³ and so forth. Greeks had not to wait for the victory at Plataia to learn the superiority of their own equipment, discipline, tactics, to those of the Persian infantry: on the contrary, we may safely allow for that knowledge in our own reconstruction of the story.

The reasons which Herodotus gives for the actual manœuvres on the field of Plataia, though mainly military and therefore rational reasons, are inadequate; but their shortcoming will better appear in connexion with the critique and reconstruction of the story. A safer instance of good causality is to be found in the reasons alleged for the evacuation of Attica by Mardonios.⁴ Though here, too, the facts are probably not fully stated, the form of argument could scarcely have been improved. Mardonios evacuated Attica because it was not a country adapted to cavalry (and Boiotia was); because in case of disaster his retreat would have been difficult, and the passes easily locked; because he had in Thebes an allied city and a good basis. Evidently his invasion of Attica is harder to explain, and here the old Herodotean rationale recurs in the personal caprice and vanity of Mardonios.⁵ But the narrative also suggests the true reasons: the desire to force or to induce the Athenians to join him; failing that, in any case, the design to lure the Peloponnesian forces from behind their fortifications, dictated to Mardonios the reoccupation of Athens, and even the raid on Megara.

There are two or three facts which, if correctly reported by Herodotus, would be important elements in elucidating the action and explaining the result. Thus (1) *the question of supplies*, on the Persian side, is raised, and its solution might be of some significance. But contradictory statements on the subject are put into the mouths of Alexander and Artabazos respectively.⁶ The contradiction is not resolved by the remark that Herodotus, in reporting inconsistent statements of third parties, is not committed to either; for it behoves the military reporter to resolve the doubt he thus generates. Nor in the statements be reconciled by the observation that Alexander's assertion might refer to the Persian *Laager*, while the assertion made

¹ 9. 62.² c. 46.³ c. 53.⁴ c. 13.⁵ c. 3.⁶ cc. 41, 45.

by Artabazos is expressly referred to Thebes; for this difference, under the circumstances, is unimportant. Moreover, the condition of the Persian camp after its capture by the Greeks is at variance with that harmonistic evasion. On the whole the probability is that the question of supply was not urgent upon the Persian side. The statement put into the mouth of Alexander is, in short, a falsehood. Is it authentic? Makedonian monarchs were not miracles of truthfulness, as a rule; but in this case the falsehood is more probably an evidence of the carelessness of the historian than of the duplicity of the king, for in the king's mouth the lie is a blunder: the failure of supplies would constitute a reason for hastening, not for postponing the attack.

Again, there are (2) the *indications of apprehension and distrust on the Persian side*, which, if accepted, would have an important bearing on our estimate of the military situation. Alexander reports the fact; and the advice of the Thebans, the opposition of Artabazos, point in the same direction. Two other anecdotes set forth the same moral still more emphatically. (3) The story of the *Banquet of Attaginos*¹ implies an early and profound depression in the ranks of the Persians themselves, a conviction that their cause was foredoomed to failure. This anecdote has an extraordinary degree of verisimilitude given to it by the precision with which Herodotus cites his authority, and the apparently unexceptionable character of the witness; and yet few critics will doubt that the memory of Thersander was more or less affected by the actual course of subsequent events, while the reported conversation bears more than one internal mark of unauthenticity. (4) A second anecdote, the *Chresmology of Mardonios*,² extends the pessimistic depression to the ranks of the Greek allies, and would be even more demonstrably incredible, as it stands, albeit the context incidentally confirms the good faith of Herodotus, if there were any truth in the story of a Persian assault on Delphi in the previous year.³ Of course, both stories, which account for the preservation of Delphi throughout the war, may be false; if we are to choose between them, this anecdote of Mardonios obviously has the greater verisimilitude. Even if Herodotus were right, and the oracle cited by Mardonios was misapplied, that would not in any degree discredit the anecdote as it stands: who knows not a hundred misapplied predictions! On the whole, however confident Mardonios may have been, or thought it well to appear, his Greek allies may very well have had a considerable respect for the confederate army in front of them, and their apprehensions may well have been augmented, if they were aware of serious rivalries and dissensions among the Persian leaders, such as are implied in the difference reported as arising between Mardonios and Artabazos.

(5) A third story enforces the same moral, and also conveys a censure on the policy of Mardonios. *The reported critique of the*

¹ c. 16.

² c. 42.

³ 8. 35-39.

*Thebans*¹ upon the proper plan of campaign to pursue agrees with the proposal ascribed to Artabazos to avoid a pitched battle, and to try the effect of bribery and corruption upon the leading men in the confederate cities.² Such a proposal implies a great respect for the military prowess of the confederate army, and heavily discounts any confident expectation of victory upon the Persian side. Yet this report too is not quite free from the suspicion of presenting rather a criticism after the event, than a policy explicitly advocated beforehand. Whether as forethought or as afterthought the wisdom of the Thebans should not be allowed to pass too easily unchallenged. There is good ground for doubt whether such a plan, if adopted, would have had the desired result. The loyal co-operation of the Greek allies had been raised to a very considerable height before the passage of Kithairon. The supposed plan seems also to ignore the operations of the fleet, which was now acting on the offensive. Moreover, neither among the Athenians, nor yet among the Spartans, at this time was there any reasonable prospect of seducing the leading men: though possibly, had the plan been tried—the implication is that it was not tried³—bribes might have been accepted, without making any difference to the conduct and policy of the recipients. Not merely is the story open to these general or intrinsic objections, it seems to conflict with the record in the context of the zeal of the Thebans in the actual initiation and conduct of the Persian assaults on the Greek position.⁴ The passage is, indeed, unfavourable to the courage of the Thebans, and exalts that of the Persian cavalry at their expense, and in so far lays itself open to suspicion in turn.⁵ Cavalry skirmishes are one thing, indeed, and a pitched battle, in which the infantry was to be involved, another; while the Thebans furthered the one, they might well view with apprehension the probable effects of the other. But, to recur here to the more general argument, the Theban interest was not likely to be most effectually furthered by a purely pacific solution. The policy of bribery and corruption could only be worth pursuing up to the point of creating some degree of treachery, desertion, and confusion in the ranks of the Greek army in the actual event of battle. No such suspicion was thrown upon the absentees, real or reported, in the sequel. Meantime, if the numbers of the loyal Greek forces were, indeed, making daily accretion,⁶ whether supplies in the Persian camp were failing, and depression in the Persian ranks or in the ranks of the Greek allies was spreading, or not, Mardonios had a reason the more for wishing to force a battle.

In the cases last cited statements of fact, which if true would have an important bearing on the rationale of actions and events, have to be heavily discounted, as open to doubt, or even as erroneously in-

¹ 9. 2.² 9. 41.³ But cp. Diodor. 11. 28. 3.⁴ Hdt. 9. 40.⁵ Cp. c. 67.⁶ c. 38.

terpreted by the historian. There are other and happier cases in which the historian is irreproachable.

No rationale of events is more effective than the simple narrative of their actual order, in which the subsequent can be clearly seen *ipso facto* as the result of the antecedent. In a certain sense every true history, even if a mere chronicle, conveys this kind of rationale; but great is the art of juxtaposition, and Herodotus has practised it at times with signal success. For instance, the account of the cavalry operations against the Greeks in their 'first position' is especially rich in this quality of reasonableness, constituting verisimilitude.¹ There are eight or ten distinct items introduced merely with the temporal conjunction, yet forming in their coherent sequence a perfectly reasoned account of the whole action. Such, indeed, is ever the quality of the best kind of narrative. Perhaps no disputations would ever be necessary for an historian whose facts were all true, sufficiently numerous, and presented in strict chronological sequence.

§ 3. The consideration in some detail of the *Sources*, from which the Herodotean story of Plataia must have been derived, will further elucidate the value of the records. Herodotus was perhaps not the first author, not even the first prose-writer, who tried to present a connected story of the campaign, a coherent account of the battle; yet his narrative has, it must be admitted, very much the ring of the *vox viva*, and his debt in purely narrative passages to his literary predecessors is probably small. *Written sources*, of one kind or another, underlie his composition, but the passages most obviously based upon documents are not those constituting the real drama. The legends to which Tegeans and Athenians appeal in support of their opposite claims,² had a long literary history, but hardly touch the subject proper of the campaign. The oracles of Bakis,³ of Musaïos,⁴ of Apollo himself,⁵ doubtless reduced to writing, have hardly any bearing on the military situation. Aischylos had referred to the battle of Plataia,⁶ but no dramatist had described it in such detail as Aischylos himself uses of the battle of Salamis. Elegies and epigrams were extant, not a few, celebrating the events of 479 B.C.; but, as Plutarch points out, Herodotus appears to ignore them.⁷ There are hints of a literature on the Persian war in the note on the name of Masistios,⁸ and Athenian *Skolia* have been suspected in the Aristeia of Sophanes, the Dekeleian hero;⁹ but these *personalia* hardly concern the main movement of events. Official documents, or memorials, might be suspected in the army-lists; but Herodotus is too much artist to reproduce the mighty description already given of the Barbarian host. The list for Plataia is but the somewhat confused

¹ cc. 20-23.

² cc. 26, 27.

the Delphic Response reported by Plutarch, *Aristeid.* 11.

³ c. 43.

⁶ *Pers.* 805 ff.

⁴ *ibid.*

⁷ *Mor.* 872 f.

⁸ Hdt. 9. 20.

⁵ *ibid.* But Hdt. knows nothing of

⁹ Stein, *ad* 9. 74.

selection of the previous year thrown into battle-array.¹ Behind these summaries looms the great compilation of Book VII. with its sources ; but, as Herodotus asserts for the forces of Mardonios a total which represents the maximum admissible even for the hosts of Xerxes, the exaggeration and confusion were perhaps present in the literary record long before Herodotus took it in hand. For the Greek army-list² something like an official document may be conjectured as ultimate source, all the more in that Herodotus himself does not fully realize the significance of the document, nor perceive that the embattled Greeks are enumerated in four main divisions, each forming a separate tactical unit. The list may be accepted as an authentic record, even though we cannot name the contemporary document upon which it was ultimately based, nor specify the exact medium to which Herodotus owed it. The list cannot have been compiled simply from the Delphian tripod, with the addition of conjectural numbers from the historian's own hand ;³ for the Delphic and Plataian lists do not agree, and the military order and organization underlying the Herodotean list disappear in the monumental ; nor can there be reason for doubting that Herodotus had access to such materials before ever he set foot in Greece proper.

Inscriptions no doubt Herodotus consulted upon occasion, and for the Plataian story such evidences hardly existed outside European Hellas. Herodotus doubtless saw at one time or another monuments and inscriptions in Athens, in Sparta, in Delphi,⁴ perhaps in Plataia itself,⁵ bearing upon the events of 479 B.C., though the monuments themselves were probably less instructive or eloquent than the oral traditions and stories associated with them. Such evidences to some extent underlie the anecdotes, which form an appendix to the battle-piece itself ; but there is not much sign of their presence in the stories of the actual battle.

The assumption generally made that Herodotus, before committing the campaign to writing, had visited the field of Plataia, and was well acquainted with the landscape and the local monuments, might long ago have been challenged. No doubt in its present and final form the work of Herodotus has profited from first to last by such personal experiences ; nevertheless the story of Plataia lacks conclusive evidences of a careful *autopsy*, and contains indications difficult to reconcile with such an hypothesis. The failure to envisage clearly the various routes and passes on to the field, the apparent confusion between several distinct temples of Demeter, the exaggerated prominence assigned to Gargaphia, the obscurity and confusion in regard to the final position of the Greek forces, the error concerning the tombs

¹ Or is 8. 113 a reflexion of 9. 31, 32 ?

² 9. 28-30.

³ Cp. Beloch, *Bevölkerung*, pp. 8, 9.

⁴ 9. 81.

⁵ 9. 85. But he does not mention the Plataian monument ; cp. Plutarch, *Aristeid.* 20.

of the slain, are among the more manifest obstacles to be overcome, before the author can be credited with having based his narrative very largely upon his own observations. If Herodotus ever visited Plataia (as he certainly visited Thebes), the visit has not stamped itself so conspicuously upon this portion of his work as might have been expected.¹

But, whatever the element of autopsy in the narrative may be, the clear impress of the contemporary *oral source*, or sources, cannot be gainsaid. For a knowledge of the Plataian campaign Herodotus could hardly rely on his fellow-citizens, or other Asiatic Greeks²; but the story of the Persian disaster in Boiotia was doubtless told in Ionia by medized exiles, or traitors, by Athenian, or philo-Athenian guests, and Herodotus may have heard it again and again. One such possible authority he expressly indicates in the person of Thersander of Orchomenos,³ to whom far more may be due than has hitherto been recognized. There is no sufficient reason for postponing the acquaintance between the Halikarnassian and the Orchomenian to the date of Herodotus' visit to Thebes; on the contrary, a medized Boiotian was as likely to be met with abroad as at home. Thersander is certainly a man, or at least a moralist, after Herodotus' own heart: had the younger man sat as a pupil at the elder's feet in Halikarnassos, or elsewhere, and heard many a truth, embodied in a tale, from his lips? Nor were strictly Asianic sources wholly wanting. The mystery about the burial of Mardonios is surely not the only problem of the Boiotian campaign which Herodotus had discussed or heard discussed with the men of that generation; the presence of Pausanias, of Themistokles, of other heroes of the Persian war, in Asianic parts, must have stimulated the interest in the traditions of the great expedition. Perhaps some slender 'Mysian,' Lydian, Karian, Egyptian sources flowed to swell the stream; and long before Herodotus had visited Thebes, or even Athens, he was familiar with stories of the campaign in Boiotia. Beside such 'Persian' authority as might ultimately be responsible for correct nomenclature, army-lists, and so forth, a more living *Persian source* has been suspected in the curious good-will with which the performances of Artabazos are followed.⁴ Artabazos and his house were at home in the Hellespontine satrapy; but the historian need not be brought into direct personal relations with the family in Daskyleion, much less in Babylon, in order to explain the phenomena, unless, *per contra*, every sign of 'malignity' in the Herodotean story is to be traced to similar personal antecedents. Nor need it be supposed that for all transactions on the Persian side

¹ 9. 85 looks like autopsy, but cp. notes *ad l.*

² 9. 85 implies that an Ephesian had been present at the battle; cp. notes *ad l.*

³ 9. 16.

⁴ 9. 66, 89, etc. As the medizing Greeks applauded Artabazos, his record might come in part from Boiotian or similar sources.

Herodotus had recourse to Persian, or even to medizing sources: the action of Mardonios was largely observable from the side of the Hellenic camp, and such observations and inferences have left their impress on the traditions.¹ Probably not the patriotic but the medized Greek sources were most unfavourable to Mardonios and his tactics. His Theban and Thessalian friends will have been severer critics than Athenian or Spartan enemies. A sane and reasonable Mardonios is recognizable in the Greek traditions of the campaign. The infatuated and foredoomed commander may be a product of the minds which had medized and been disappointed. In short, though Herodotus was born a Persian subject and may have had friends and acquaintances in Persian circles, there is very little, even in the scenes laid in the Persian camp, which comes from a Persian, or even a 'barbarian' source.

In all that concerns Alexander of Makedon, a philo-Makedonian Greek source or a phil-Hellenic *Makedonian source* may be suspected, and that of relatively recent provenience. The incoherence of the chief episode at Plataia in which Alexander figures² confirms the suspicion that it conceals an addition to the earlier strata of the story: the paltry rôle allotted to the Athenians prohibits its assignment to a purely Attic source. This instance sets us face to face with the problem of the native or European *origines* of the story as a whole.

The greater part of the story of Plataia is undoubtedly told from native sources, which can be more or less plausibly localized, although not always securely characterized. The relation of Herodotus to such sources is a question inevitably mixed up with the problems of his European travels and the gradual genesis of his work. The element of 'autopsy' in his account of Plataia has been somewhat diminished above; and if the analysis of the story enables us to trace various sections ultimately to different 'peoples' or localities, the inference need not forthwith be drawn that Herodotus collected the local story himself at the local fountain-head, or even in all cases originally upon the European side. Every theory of the composition of the work of Herodotus recognizes that the latter Books in their present form are of late composition or retraction: the mere internal criticism of the result scarcely enables us to reduce the Herodotean story of Plataia to its original elements or outlines. The story, as a whole, bears evidence of some 'contamination' of various local traditions, effected on somewhat eclectic principles, and not always on the most obvious lines. Thus, though Plataia was primarily a Spartan victory, and though Spartans figure largely in the narrative, there is very little in the story which can be ascribed to a purely *Spartan source*. Though there were at Delphi monuments of the war, a *Delphian*, or even a *Phokian*, tradition hardly shows its head in this part of the history. On the Greek side the chief source for the Herodotean account of the

¹ Cp. note to 9. 15.

² 9. 44, 45.

operations in Boiotia is, mediately or immediately, *Athenian, or quasi-Athenian, tradition*. Not merely is there a great deal in the story which betrays a distinct bias in favour of Athens, but the Attic provenience of the material helps to explain some remarkable omissions. Thus the only passes or routes recognized in the story are passes leading into Attica. The all-important route, or routes, to Megara obtain no recognition. The disappearance of the Greek centre in the final engagement shows that Herodotus draws his information with regard to the action of the Peloponnesians neither from Peloponnesian nor even from local Plataian sources. The story of the movements in Attica,¹ and of the Athenian embassy in Sparta²; of the operations in the 'first' position³; of the Atheno-Tegean dispute⁴; of the exchange of positions between the Spartans and Athenians⁵; of the retirement of the Greeks,⁶ the engagement on the left,⁷ the assault on the Persian camp,⁸ the *Aristeia*,⁹ one and all betray a strong 'Attic' interest. Still more remarkable is the detection of the Attic source for the story of Amompharetos¹⁰: such a story could never have been current in Sparta. The insubordination of the 'Lochagos' would have been severely censured; a cardinal error in regard to the military institutions of Sparta would have been impossible. Such a story was perhaps wanted to cover a corresponding blunder in the Athenian retreat on the left wing: the 'psephos' of Amompharetos was picked up in Athens!

Herodotus may have visited Plataia and surveyed the battle-field; but if so, his account of the operations owes all too little to that opportunity. The scandal retailed against the Aiginetans may be due to a *Plataian*, if not to an Attic source¹¹; the curiosities of the battle-field might have been gleaned on the spot; round the tombs and memorials some stories may have gathered, which Herodotus has used. But a visit to Plataia could hardly have left him in ignorance of the award of the *Aristeia*: Plataians would have impressed upon him their rights and privileges, as guaranteed by Sparta and confederate Greece. It might delight us to picture Herodotus present at the *Eleutheria*, and taking part in a discussion of the merits of Aristodemos, and the other Spartan worthies interred in Plataian soil; but, if the scene of that discussion is to be laid at Plataia, Herodotus himself can hardly have been present on the occasion, or he would not have failed to record the institution of the festival. If Herodotus ever traversed the field of Plataia he was not much concerned to revise his materials in the light of Plataian memory or of local considerations.

¹ cc. 3-5.² cc. 6-11.³ cc. 19-24.⁴ cc. 26, 27.⁵ cc. 46, 47.⁶ cc. 52-57.⁷ c. 67.⁸ c. 70.⁹ cc. 73-75.¹⁰ cc. 53-57.¹¹ cc. 78-80, 85.

SCHEDULE OF THE SOURCES FOR BOOK 9, CC. 1-89.		
cc. 1-3	Advance of Mardonios: re-occupation of Athens	'Thersander' + Attic
4, 5	Mission of Mourychidas: fate of Lykidas	Attic
6-11	Athenian embassy to Sparta: <i>exodos</i> of the Spartan army	Attic
12	Medism of the Argives	Spartan (?)
13-15	Retreat of Mardonios, and encampment	Attic + Theban
16	Banquet of Attaginos	'Thersander'
17-18	Trial of the Phokians	'Thersander'
19-24	Greeks in the first position . .	Attic
25	Move to second position	Attic
26-27	Athens-Tegean dispute	Attic
28-30	The Greek army-list	Documents (?)
31-32	Persian battle-array	Boiotian ('Thersander')
33-35	Story of Teisamenos: a digression .	Delphi (?)
37	Story of Hegesistratos: a digression .	(?)
38-39	Advice of Timagenidas	'Thersander'
40	Sufferings of the Greeks	Boiotian
41, 42	The Council of Mardonios	'Thersander'
43	Bakis, Musaïos, oracles	Literary, HDT.
44, 45	Alexander's Hellenism	Makedonian (?), Delphi (?)
46, 47, 48	The exchange of posts between Athenians and Spartans	Attic
49-51 (cp. 40)	The sufferings of the Greeks in the second position	Attic
52-65	The third position	Attic
53-57	Story of Amompharetos	Attic
58	Mardonios and the Aleuadai . . .	'Thersander'
59-65	The battle	Attic
66	Retreat of Artabazos	'Thersander,' Daskylean (?)

SCHEDULE OF THE SOURCES FOR BOOK 9, cc. 1-89, <i>cont.</i>		
67	Engagement between Athenians and Thebans	Attic
68	Persian and Boiotian cavalry . . .	Attic
69	The efforts of the Greek centre . . .	Attic
70	Assault and capture of the camp : numbers of the slain	Attic
71, 72	The Aristeia	HDT. (a suppression)
73-75	Sophanes the Dekeleian	Attic
76	Pausanias and the Koan lady . . .	(Koan ?)
77	Mantineans, Eleians, too late ! . . .	Attic (?)
78-79, 80	Scandal against Aigina	Attic (cp. c. 85)
81	The Anathemata : division of the spoil	Delphi, etc. (?) <i>οὐ λέγεται πρὸς οὐδαμῶν !</i>
82	Persian pomp and Lakonic poverty . .	HDT.
83	Curiosities of the battlefield . . .	HDT. (at Plataia ?)
84	Disappearance of the corpse of Mardonios : a mystery	HDT.
85	Tombs and memorials	HDT. (at Plataia ?)
86-88	Siege of Thebes : fate of Attaginos and Timagenidas	'Thersander'
89	Escape of Artabazos	Asianic (?)

§ 4. From his sources, whatever they were, Herodotus compiled an account of the land campaign which, reduced to its bare elements, might read as follows:—

In the spring Mardonios left Thessaly, and marching, with his forces, through central Greece, re-invaded and re-occupied Athens, the Athenians having again taken refuge in Salamis, some ten months after the first occupation by Xerxes. The Persian made overtures to the Athenians, which came to nothing: the Athenians, by the threat of medism, prevailed on the Spartans to advance, with a very large army, to the Isthmos. On the advance of the Spartans Mardonios prepared to fall back on Boiotia, and took his whole force by way of Dekeleia and Tanagra to Skolos, after having ravaged all the country south of Kithairon, including the Megarid. At or near Skolos he constructed a fortified stronghold, a mile square, but the

Laager for his immense army extended much further along the Asopos. There he awaited the advance of the Greeks, in a position carefully selected with a view to the evolutions of cavalry, and in proximity to Thebes, hoping to bring matters to a pitched battle (9. 1-18).

The Peloponnesians advanced to Eleusis, formed a juncture with the Athenians, crossed Kithairon to Erythrai, and took up a position on high ground above the plain. In this position they were attacked by the Persian cavalry, but gained a decided success, chiefly owing to the heroism of the Athenians, who slew and obtained possession of the body of Masistios, the commander of the cavalry, second only in position to Mardonios himself (cc. 19-24).

Encouraged by this success, and to obtain a better water-supply, and other conveniences, the Greeks decided to move down from Erythraian to Plataian ground, and accordingly left Erythrai, passed by Hysiai on to a position, on some low hills, near the fountain Gargaphia and the Androkrateion (c. 25).

This position they occupied for some twelve days ensuing, and in order of battle, which was here determined after a dispute between the Tegeatai and the Athenians for the possession of the left wing. The Lakedaimonian army decided the question, after debate, by acclamation, in favour of Athens (cc. 26, 27). The order of battle, comprising two wings and a centre, was made up of contingents from twenty-two different states, and comprised 38,700 hoplites, and 69,500 light-armed attendants, or 110,000 men in all, including 1800 Thespians, who were unarmed.¹ The Persian forces were drawn up in battle-array over against the Greek lines, to the number of some 350,000 fighting men, all told (cc. 31-33). The Asopos divided the armies, and neither side would advance across the river to deliver an attack, the sacrifices on both sides alike being unfavourable to offensive movements (cc. 33-37).

This situation had been maintained already for eight days without change or adventure, when, by the advice of Timagenidas, a Theban, the Persian cavalry was sent to cut off a large convoy in the pass of Dryoskephalai: this service was successfully accomplished (cc. 38-39).

The cavalry also harassed the Greek army considerably, but without bringing on a general engagement (c. 40). Mardonios became impatient, and determined, in opposition to the advice of Artabazos and of the Thebans, and in spite of the depression visible among his Greek allies, to attack the Greeks in their position (cc. 41-43).

This determination was betrayed to the Athenians by Alexander of Makedon (cc. 44, 45) and by them communicated to Pausanias, who thereupon caused the Spartans and Athenians to exchange positions on the right and left wings, and then a second time restored the original posts respectively. The first of these movements was dictated by a desire to avoid pitting the Spartans against the Persians: the second, by the observation

¹ So cc. 28-30. But Hdt. has omitted Helots *ex hypothesi* in attendance on the the 800 Athenian Archers, and 5000 'Lakedaimonians'; cp. notes ad l. c.

that Mardonios had made a corresponding change in the disposition of his own forces, which frustrated the Spartan's design. In the end the status quo ante was restored on both sides, Mardonios again following the Spartan lead (cc. 46, 47), and subsequently sending across a challenge to Pausanias for a duel between equal numbers of Persians and Spartans, to which no reply was vouchsafed (c. 48).

It was now the twelfth day on which the armies had faced each other in battle-array, without coming to close quarters. Mardonios employed the day for a renewed and more successful attack by the Persian cavalry upon the Greek position: the water-supply of the Greek forces was destroyed, and their position rendered untenable. A council of war summoned by Pausanias decided to retreat under cover of night to 'the Island' in front of Plataia: 'the half' were to be sent to open up the road for the supply-train (cc. 49-51).

Next morning Mardonios, having discovered that the Greeks had disappeared under cover of night, advanced in some haste and disorder across the river to pursue them. A great battle, or rather two separate engagements, took place between the wings of the two armies. Mardonios and the Persians overtook the Greek right wing on the Argiopion, the site of the Demetrium, hard by the river Moloeis. There an obstinate struggle took place (both the Persian horse and foot were engaged), in which Mardonios was himself slain, and the Persians completely routed (cc. 58-65). On the left, and lower ground, the Athenians were engaged with the Persian right wing, consisting of the medized Greeks, and routed it (c. 67). While the two Greek wings thus gained the victory, the majority of the army (οἱ πολλοί, c. 52), which had retreated in the night on Plataia, took little or no part in the fighting, one section, with the Corinthians, having gone up the road 'towards the temple of Demeter,' the other section, including the Megarians and Phleasians, having advanced down on to the plain, where they were roughly handled and repulsed by the Theban cavalry (c. 69).

The Persian right fled back to Thebes (c. 67). Artabazos led his 40,000 off the field without striking a blow, or attempting to support the forward movement of Mardonios. The Persian left (and the rest of the barbarians) took refuge in the fortified camp, which was promptly attacked by the Lakedaimonians and Tegeans, but successfully defended, until the Athenians came up and effected a breach, through which the Tegeans were the first to enter. An immense slaughter of the barbarians ensued. Of the army of Mardonios, except for the 40,000 men under Artabazos, not 3000 remained alive (c. 70).

This great victory was gained notwithstanding the complete break-down of the plan resolved upon by the Greek council of war the day before the battle. The break-down was due to two chief causes: the misconduct of the Greek centre, which fled to Plataia instead of retiring to the island (c. 52); and the misconduct of Amompharetos, a Spartan officer, who refused to retreat at all, and delayed the Spartans, until at last they abandoned him to his fate, whereupon he thought better of it, and rejoined the main forces on the Argiopion (cc. 53-57).

§ 5. Even as thus boiled down, or reduced to its barest skeleton, this story is far from being coherent, or acceptable. The following list comprises only the major and more obvious defects, difficulties, or *aporiai*, visible in the Herodotean argument, some twenty in number.

(1) *Movements of Mardonios in Attica*.—Can Mardonios have taken his forces into and out of Attica by one pass only? Or will he have harked back, as he was leaving Attica by the Dekeleian road, in order to catch the Spartan advance-guard west of Eleusis, and to ravage the Megarid? Probably Mardonios took only a part of his forces into Attica. Even in that case two or three passes will have been used; in particular, the cavalry, which overran the Megarid, will have made their way into Boiotia by the best and nearest route (Dryoskephalai), while Mardonios made his own way to the Asopos by the road from Dekeleia to Tanagra. The point is important as showing the extent to which Herodotus may overlook the simplest strategic necessities.

(2) *The site of the Persian camp* is not clearly indicated, a regrettable omission. On which bank of the Asopos did Herodotus conceive it as placed? The reference to Skolos seems to leave it on the right; the course of the narrative seems to imply a position upon the left. The latter alternative is preferable also for strategic reasons; but, whether the camp was astride the main road from Dryoskephalai to Thebes, or somewhat further to the east, is debatable. That road must have been strongly held by Mardonios, and the bridge over the Asopos was doubtless in the Persian hands, and fortified. The Persian centre might, perhaps, be placed on this road, in the first instance; in which case the main road will probably have run right through the Persian camp. Or the camp may be moved further east (to bring it more within range of Skolos); in which case the camp, or the fortified portion, will have commanded the road in flank. But the Persian laager seems to have extended along the bank of the Asopos west of the main road, and the reference to Skolos may be rather misleading. Was Mardonios himself on the extreme left of the position? His route from Attica, and his final encounter with the Spartans, favour that view. The cavalry, on the loss of Masistios, rode back to Mardonios (c. 23), but the exchange of positions (see below) points to other possibilities. The position of Artabazos on the field is obscure (see below).

(3) *The first position of the Greek army* is not quite clearly fixed, still less the respective stations of the several contingents, or the length of time which elapsed in this position. Were all the troops already in position when the Persian cavalry assaulted the Megarians? Possibly the whole Greek army did not reach the position by the same route, or even on the same day. To deploy a marching column of upwards of 100,000 men by one mountain-road would be a difficult and lengthy manœuvre. Possibly the whole army was never in this position at all, and as soon as sufficient forces had made their way over Kithairon, by

this and that pass, the Greek position must have been extended and may have been pushed forward, almost as a matter of course. But in any case the mustering of the army in a 'first' position would have occupied more time than was required for the forward advance to a 'second' position. Moreover, such an advance presupposes a definite disposition of the forces on the march, and in the 'first' position.

(4) The story of *the fighting in the first position* has been already noted for its Athenian bias. The heroism and services of the Athenians upon this occasion are plainly exaggerated. By a curious inconsequence no reference is made thereto in the subsequent speech in favour of the Athenian claim to the left wing. The Athenians are represented as volunteering to take the place of the Megarians, when the latter were hard pressed by the Persian cavalry, and the other contingents one and all hung back. In the first order of battle the Athenians were on the extreme left (with the Plataians), and the Megarians were in the next post towards the right. Had not the Athenians and Megarians crossed Kithairon first of the Greek forces, and posted themselves at Erythrai, upon the main road to Thebes, which ran exactly through the Megarian position? In any case the Athenians were probably the nearest and the proper force to support or to replace the Megarians. Pausanias is apparently already on the spot: if so, the whole army would already have been in position when the first attack was delivered by the Persians—an improbability.

(5) *The advance* from the 'first' to the 'second' position, or, to speak more carefully, from a position on the *Hyporea* to a position on the Asopos, is inadequately explained. Two reasons are given: (a) the position occupied was ill supplied with water; the position to be occupied was in this respect a great improvement. (b) The success against the cavalry emboldened the Greeks to advance and occupy 'a more convenient' position. These reasons may be not so much wrong in themselves as inadequate, and out of true focus. The successful stand made against the cavalry and the desire to obtain a better water-supply may have been co-operant motives; but more explicit reasons of a strategic and tactical nature are demanded. The Greeks apparently desired to fight a battle. They could not expect that the Persian forces, other than the cavalry, would cross the Asopos to attack an enemy posted upon broken heights, some two miles distant from the river. If the Greeks wished to offer battle they were bound to advance on to lower ground, and within reasonable distance of the Persian lines. An alternative view, that the Greeks were really worked out of the 'first' position by the Persian cavalry into one still more disadvantageous and exposed, is unacceptable, as doing too much violence to the traditions. We may rather ask: did not the Greeks find the Persian cavalry less formidable, on a first acquaintance, than might have been anticipated? The advance to the Asopos-Gargaphia-Androkrateion position appears to have been a voluntary advance,

undertaken with a view to bring on a general engagement. Whether made by day or by night is not specified. As it appears to have been unopposed, it may perhaps have been made under cover of darkness, or at earliest dawn. *The dispute between the Athenians and the Tegeatai* must be ruled out, at least at this crisis. Placed here, it is—as before observed—an anachronism. Such a dispute is inconceivable in the presence of the enemy; and is further inconsistent, as just observed, with the post and services of the Athenians in the ‘first’ position (at Erythrai), which, indeed, in case of such a dispute, would have constituted the most recent and vivid claim to honour, and yet are not so much as mentioned in this connexion. The Greek order of battle, as of laager, must have been determined before the forces broke up from Eleusis to cross Kithairon.

(6) *Length of time spent in the advanced Asopos position.*—Can we believe that for eight days the two armies faced each other in battle-array, without any active hostilities taking place? What was the Persian cavalry about all this time? Perhaps Herodotus intends his readers to understand that for these eight days, and for the four days that follow, all the time the Persian cavalry was riding round the Greek position, or at least assaulting it, although it was only on the twelfth day that the Persians finally succeeded in rendering the position untenable. But such an assumption, or such a perfunctory notice, will not do in this position. Certainly, if the Greeks were really for twelve days on the Asopos, the Persian cavalry will have been operating all the time; but no less certainly, if the Persian cavalry was operating, the Greeks cannot have maintained such a position so long. The time has been unduly lengthened, or events of this octave have been forgotten, or the manœuvres have been unduly compressed or ‘telescoped’ at the end. The long delay in this position is incredible.

(7) *The Persian occupation of Dryoskephalai.*—On the eighth day, or rather night, according to Herodotus, the Persian cavalry rides up to Dryoskephalai, and cuts off a large convoy on its way to the Greek laager (c. 39). This affair appears, however, an isolated episode, although later on the cavalry is still keeping supplies from reaching the Greeks (c. 50). Herodotus does not understand apparently that, with the Greeks in their advanced position, the Persian cavalry rides up and down the road to Dryoskephalai, and even perhaps all round the position, at pleasure. The road from the Asopos bridge (not mentioned by Herodotus) to *Oak Heads* is clear of Greeks; the Greek army is no longer astride this road, no longer commands it. If, at a later stage, communications with the Peloponnesos are cut, the Persian cavalry must have not merely commanded the main road, but at least threatened the descents from the other pass, or passes, as well; the obscurity here is specially due to Herodotus’s failure to recognize the three passes and their relations.

(8) *The Greek lines of communication.*—Owing to his failure to specify the various passes over Kithairon Herodotus takes no clear account of operations, which may have had reference to the secondary passes. The memory of such movements may be dimly present in his narrative, but, if so, they will rather tend to confusion, from not being definitely referred to their proper objectives and purposes. It thus remains an unresolved problem whether the operation referred to in c. 51 *ad f.* is to be directed towards Dryoskephalai or towards the Plataia-Megara pass.

(9) *Absence of the Persian cavalry.*—These last two objections may be enlarged, or supplemented, by the observation that mere generalities in regard to the services of the Persian cavalry take the place of precise details at more than one point where such details are sorely needed. (a) The generalizations in cc. 40, 57 ill accord with the pause of eight days in c. 39, or with the supposed maintenance of the Greek advanced position (on the Asopos). (b) The Persian cavalry is not really accounted for on the final day of battle; it disappears from the scene, but its disappearance is not explained. It cannot have been annihilated in the fight.

(10) *Action of Mardonios.*—Herodotus involves Mardonios in an inexplicable inconsequence. The Persian commander resolves (on the eleventh day) to cross the Asopos and do battle the next day: but, instead of carrying out his resolution, he marks time by an (incredible) manœuvre and exchange of positions between his wings; though he has still time that same day, not merely to send a challenge to Pausanias, but at last to render the advanced position of the Greeks untenable, by cutting off their water-supply, and harassing them generally with his cavalry.

(11) *Exchange of positions between the Athenians and Spartans.*—According to Herodotus a single exchange of positions is effected between the two wings of the Greek army, numbering respectively 11,500 hoplites on the right, 8600 on the left, to say nothing of the hosts of light-armed men! This exchange is easily and quickly effected in the presence of the enemy, the army being in an advanced and confined position, and in battle-array, upon the Asopos. How the centre of the Greek army (numbering 18,600 hoplites) comported itself during these evolutions is not stated. On the failure of the manœuvre to effect its supposed object it is repeated in the reverse direction, and the *status quo ante* is restored. The story is incredible and absurd. Conditions of time, space, numbers, tactical situation, and motivation are all alike defied. The Spartans, with the halo of Thermopylai forming round their heads, are supposed to shrink in fear from facing the Persian infantry, and to yield the post of honour to the Athenians, in full recognition of the heroics of Marathon! Had the valiant and ambitious Tegeatai nothing to say to this arrangement? Did the obstinate and gallant Amompharetos acquiesce

without a protest in this surrender? What could Aristodemos and the other braves think of this exhibition of the white feather? The story is inconsistent as it stands, not merely with the real conditions and with Spartan honour, but with its own context. Its philo-Athenian provenience and malice might surely have struck Herodotus himself. At the same time the record can hardly be a pure invention: some manœuvre to excuse or justify this portentous growth of Athenian self-glorification must be provided by any theory which undertakes to rationalize the story of Plataia. Some evolution upon the field of battle lent itself to this interpretation in Attic memories. The direction, in which a solution of the problem may be found, is fairly obvious. Doubtless the Greek army, in passing from one position, or formation, to another performed a manœuvre, or series of manœuvres, which Athenian vanity misrepresented as above. The exact nature and occasion of the manœuvre in question must here be reserved.

(12) *The Greek retreat.*—The appearance of an argument, combined with a diminution of solid reason, marks the apology offered for the abandonment of the Asopos position by the Greeks, in contrast to the account of their original occupation of it. The need of water is again emphasized; but, as this extremity has only been created by the military advantages gained by the Persian, it looks like a half-hearted confession of a tactical defeat. The fact that other supplies were also wanting seems to admit that virtually the position had been rendered untenable by the operations of the Persian cavalry. That admission is doubtless the simple truth for once. Yet presently the refusal of Amompharetos to budge discredits the tactical and military reasons given, or admitted, and in themselves well adapted to account for the evacuation of the position. Thus inconsequent does the method of Herodotus appear in these matters. The occurrence of military reasons for a military movement is not a thing to emphasize in view of an effective or humorous anecdote!

Further, be it noted that *the plan of retreat* ascribed to the Greeks is incoherent and self-contradictory. They are compelled to evacuate their position 'on the Asopos': they determine to retire to 'the island': yet 'one half' is to go up Kithairon, for the purpose of relieving a baggage-train, which is hemmed up in the mountain (by the Persian cavalry!) and unable to descend. 'One half' of what? Of the whole army? Or of some portion of the army? We are left in darkness. Apart from all topographical questions, these obscure and conflicting orders are sorely perplexing. Unless we may deal very freely with the situation thus presented, and with the terms in which it is presented, we shall hardly make sense of this item.

(13) *The retreat of the Greek centre* is also an ill-digested story. The centre holds out all day, but takes to its heels at night. It is ordered to retire, but its retirement is characterized as a flight. This flight, however, is arrested and terminated by a perfectly regular

bivouac. Subsequently this disorderly and routed force parts into two apparently compact divisions, and each attempts good and loyal service. The manifest animus with which its movements are described, discounts heavily the discredit attached to it, and justifies an attempt to rationalize the story in relation to the actual result, that is, the Greek victory.

(14) *Story of Amompharetos*.—If the cowardly flight of the Greek centre is suspicious, the heroic insubordination of Amompharetos is no less out of place, inconsistent as it is with Spartan discipline, with ordinary Spartan tactics and warfare, and with the indications in the immediate context; for, after all, Amompharetos finally does what he is determined not to do, he retreats in the presence of the foe. There are subordinate inconsequences in the story, which need not be unduly pressed, the rather as this problem, of all the extravagances in the Herodotean battle-piece, admits of the simplest and most convincing solution.

(15) *The conduct ascribed to the Athenians*, who in the most foolhardy fashion break their contract to retire, and remain in splendid isolation far on the left, lest the Spartans might have been playing a double game and bested them, is a crying absurdity. The beauty of it is that the Athenians are quite right, in consequence, not indeed of the duplicity of Pausanias, but of the heroics of Amompharetos. In relation to both items Herodotus has abandoned, or perhaps never attempted, any intelligible conception of the tactical problem. No wonder, then, that he has no very clear indication of the reasons for which the Athenians, who should *ex hypothesi* be retiring on the 'island,' and apparently converging on one point with the Spartans, are marching away in the opposite direction, into the plain! He has apparently not harmonized incoherent reports which have reached him, but incoherencies still admit of some sort of intelligible harmony. Doubtless this story, too, covers some real manoeuvre, or episode, of the battle, of which it did not suit Athenian tradition to give a very clear account.

(16) A minor inconsequence is involved in the record of *the assault upon the Persian camp*, where the Athenians effect the first breach, and the Tegeatai are the first Greeks to enter. Such a division of labour, or credit, is improbable. The men who breach a fortification are the first to enter through the breach; and those who first enter have surely effected the breach. But this item is important not so much for the actual reconstruction of the true story of the battle, as in marking the quality of the historian's sources, and his own uncritical attitude in the presence of *ex parte* traditions.

(17) The comparative disappearance of the Persian cavalry in the final stage of the conflict, or story, has been already noticed above; it remains to signalize the even more complete failure of *the Persian centre* to put in an appearance at the supreme moment. The

Athenians are engaged on the Greek left with the right wing of the enemy, consisting of the medized Greeks; the Spartans on the right are equally engaged with the 'Persians'; the Greek centre has *ex hypothesi* fled beyond range of weapon, or assault: what becomes of the centre of the 'barbarians' which had been so carefully disposed over against the Greek centre, in battle-array, and comprised the Medes, Baktrians, Indians, and Sakans? Did the Persian centre throw itself, together with the Persian left, upon the devoted Spartans? If so, the fact should have been specified by the historian, for other alternatives are not excluded, as will appear anon.

(18) *The position and conduct of Artabazos* furnish not merely one *cruz*, but a whole crop of thorny problems. The exact nature of his commission; the exact composition of the force under his command; his relation to Mardonios; his actual post on the battle-field, or in the theatre of the campaign; his apparent abandonment of Mardonios and the bulk of the army to its fate, without striking a blow: one and all are perplexing, although not all inexplicable. In a way the opposition and rivalry between Mardonios and Artabazos is in itself one of the most valuable hints for the explanation of the Persian defeat; but, if the conduct of Artabazos is at all correctly reported, he was a traitor to his king and cause, and his reception at home is not easy to explain. In any case the story of his retreat, with 40,000 men (or more), through Phokis, Thessaly, Makedon and Thrake, is full of absurdities. Considerable latitude is to be allowed in dealing with the Artabazos episodes.

(19) *The conduct of Alexander of Makedon* might give rise to more than one reflexion upon the co-efficients of the Greek victory, if only the story, or its details, were acceptable. But the story is inconsequential in several particulars, and its 'tendency' is all too obviously to justify the ways of Makedon to Hellas. Besides its obvious moral the fable involves an absurdity, an inconsequence, an improbability, and an omission. The absurdity lies in the Makedonian's warning the Athenians not to be surprised, when Mardonios attacks them on the morrow: a surprise under the circumstances was surely out of the question. The inconsequence ensues when, notwithstanding the declared intention of Mardonios, no attack takes place. This objection may seem to have been anticipated in the story, for the possibility of a postponement is contemplated, but with the result of landing the narrator in the improbable statement that the Persians were short of supplies. Finally, the interview between Alexander and the anonymous Athenian *Strategoi* is a very one-sided affair: no question, or reply, is reported on their behalf. They would hardly have closed the interview without an appeal to Alexander to attest his phil-Hellenism on the morrow by overt and decided action. No such appeal, no such action is recorded; and the omission is further evidence of the purely apocryphal nature of the story. Plataia is the

third occasion upon which Alexander figures as a well-wisher, or envoy, to the Greeks in the story of the war.¹ His special relations with the Athenians are confessed. That communications passed from him to them on the battlefield is not improbable. Whether their nature and occasion are rightly recorded is another question.

(20) Finally, Herodotus himself signifies an omission, which nevertheless remains a blot upon his record, and a slur upon his authority. The story of the *Aristeia* for Plataia was unknown to him; something sealed the lips of his evangelists. As he reports the *Aristeia* for Artemision, for Salamis and for Mykale, the failure at Plataia is all the more extraordinary. *Aristeia* must assuredly have been awarded; and a knowledge of the award might have an important bearing upon our estimate of the action, and the chief heroes of the action. The omission in Herodotus is made good elsewhere. Plataia was indubitably a Spartan victory, though Herodotus' sources would not allow it. His incompetence in the presence of this *aporia* justifies a very free treatment of his testimony.

§ 6. This round score of difficulties, or knots of difficulties, in the Herodotean narrative of the campaign of 479 B.C. in Boiotia might easily be increased; but further instances would not affect the reconstruction of the battle, and may here pass *sub silentio*. Nor are the twenty items in the foregoing list all of equal importance for the tactical or military problems here to be stated and, if possible, solved. Certain members force themselves into prominence above the general level of tangled and incoherent logography, like tall trees outstanding in a jungle of brushwood. Such are (1) the engagement with the cavalry in the 'first' position; (2) the dispute between the Athenians and Tegeatai for the left wing in the battle-array; (3) the reported exchange of positions between the Lakedaimonians and Athenians, in the position 'on the Asopos,' and, perhaps, (4) the communication from Alexander of Makedon, which led to that exchange; (5) the long immunity from attack enjoyed by the Greeks, and the ease with which their position was rendered untenable, when once Mardonios took up the matter; (6) the strange and independent action of Artabazos, and so forth. But to discuss these several items over again would be tedious.

At this stage of my argument the tactical and military questions present themselves in more generalized forms. The whole string of difficulties may be subsumed under two heads, each group covering a fundamental problem. First (*A*), what positions were occupied, and for what periods respectively, by the Greek forces in Boiotia? What events, manœuvres, or actions took place in those several positions, previous to the final engagement? Secondly (*B*), how did an army, which was apparently broken, worsted, and even in part fugitive, nevertheless extricate itself from its desperate position, and win a supreme victory? The first group of problems covers the action of

¹ Cp. 7. 173, 8. 140.

Greeks and Persians in Boiotia down to the day of the final and decisive battle. The second group is concerned with the fortunes of that last eventful day, and with the manœuvres of the preceding night. The two groups viewed together obviously comprise the whole course of the campaign, so far as the scene was laid in Boiotia; in other words, present the battle of Plataia with its immediate antecedents. Under these two heads, then, the argument, at once critical and constructive, may now be conducted to its natural conclusion.

§ 7. (A) *The positions occupied successively by the Greek forces.*—The uniform practice of modern writers on Greek history has been to resolve the actual movements of the Greek forces at Plataia under three heads or stages. Of these, the third has been described as the position, or positions, actually occupied by the Greek forces on the day (the 13th) of the final struggle and victory on which the Greek army was apparently broken up into three, if not four sections, widely separated. The Lakedaimonians held the right or east wing on high ground; the Athenians were away on the left, down on the plain in front of Plataia; the centre far to the rear, near the Heraion, to which it had incontinently retreated during the night, apparently divides and takes separate action—or rather, the one half advances to the support of the Athenians, with disastrous results to itself, while the other turned and marched up the road ‘towards the Demetrium’: with what purpose or with what result Herodotus omits to mention!

This (‘third’) position, or series of positions, is conceived as *de facto* occupied by the Greeks quite contrary to the original intentions, plans, and orders of the commanders, in lieu of a position, marked by ‘the island,’ to which the whole army, according to the plan of the Chiefs in Council assembled, was to fall back. The ‘island position’ can be topographically identified with almost complete assurance, although *ex hypothesi* never actually occupied. Its description, or at least the intention of the commanders in regard to it, as reported by Herodotus, is, however, slightly complicated by the proviso that a part of the forces, in falling back upon this position, was to be detached for special service up Kithairon. But any way, and in short, behind the *de facto* ‘third,’ or supposed third, position rises an ideal fourth position, which should, so to speak, have taken its place, although neither Herodotus nor any of his commentators hitherto believes this ‘fourth’ position to have been occupied by the Greeks at any stage in the course of their movements over the field.

In front of the ‘fourth’ and ‘third’ positions rises a ‘second’ position, very clearly marked in the Herodotean narrative by the Asopos, Gargaphia, and the Androkrateion—a position *ex hypothesi* occupied by the Greek forces for twelve days. The identification of the locality is not gravely in doubt, but some of the moderns credit the Greeks with a certain restlessness in this ‘second’ position, by

which their lines are transposed from side to side of the trough of Gargaphia. To this position, before the order of battle is settled, Herodotus transfers the punctilious dispute between Tegea and Athens for precedence; to this position, after order of battle has been definitely developed, he refers the incredible exchange of stations between the right wing and the left wing; from this position, as his narrative admits, the Greeks were finally compelled by the Persian cavalry to beat a retreat. For eleven days the cavalry allows them to occupy this position unmolested; then, in the course of one day, from the moment the assault on the water-supply begins, the position becomes untenable. I take issue again upon this point. It is incredible that the Greeks were allowed for ten or eleven days to occupy this position unmolested; it is therefore incredible that they continued to occupy it so long. The period which Herodotus assigns to the occupation of this position (Androkrateion) must really belong to some other and presumably earlier stage in the operations. Mardonios might leave the Greeks a day or two in possession of the Asopos-ridge and the water-supply behind it unmolested, in the hope of their crossing the river to do him battle on ground of his own choosing; though, in any case, he might have used his cavalry to advantage on their rear in order to urge them across the stream; but the Persian, eager as he was to bring on an engagement, will never have faced the Greek army, in position just beyond the Asopos, for upwards of ten days without any hostile demonstration against it. Probably the Greeks occupied this 'second' position barely twenty-four hours before they fell back to the hypothetical 'third' position above described. The advance of the Greeks to the Asopos-ridge is a clear offer of battle to the Persian, if he is willing to cross the river to attack them; but it leaves their rear and their water-supply, as the experience of one day is more than enough to show, completely at the mercy of the Persian cavalry. If Mardonios will not cross the Asopos with his infantry to attack them, and they will not cross the Asopos to attack him, there is no alternative left them but to fall back upon a fresh or, it might be, a former position.

According to the received theory, the Greeks had advanced to the Androkrateion position from a 'first' position, in which they had successfully repulsed the attacks of the Persian cavalry under Masistios, and immediately after that success. That 'first' position must have been at, or in front of, the debouchure of the main road, by which they had come from Eleusis, where it left the mountain-pass of Dryoskephalai, probably hard by the village of Erythrai. But the Greek forces must have come right out of the pass and mountain-road, not indeed before they were subject to assault from the Persian cavalry, but before they could fall into line, or advance unmolested from the 'first' position to the 'second,' or any other. Herodotus appears to take the Greek army direct and without pause, after the

repulse of the cavalry, from the 'first' position, at or near Erythrai, to the position marked by Gargaphia, the Androkrateion, and the Asopos, generally called the 'second' position. But he mentions Hysiai in passing as a station, or at least a landmark, upon their route.¹ Was it merely that? May not Hysiai mark a real 'position' in the Greek manoeuvres, or at least such a development of the 'first' position as almost deserves to be separately envisaged and enumerated? The Greek forces can have reached Erythrai only in marching column: did they put themselves in battle-array only whenas or whenafter they marched down to Gargaphia and the Androkrateion? At this point on the way, so to speak, from Erythrai to the Androkrateion, Herodotus places the dispute between the Athenians and the Tegeatai for the occupation of the left wing: the matter is heard and decided by the whole Spartan army! The Spartan army will have been in position somewhere. A marching column must have an order; and the order of the marching column is surely relative to the order in line of battle. As the various Greek contingents debouched from the pass of Dryoskephalai they must have taken up stations in a definite order. It is not quite clear whether the Greeks ever occupied a position right across the road from Dryoskephalai to Thebes, but they may have done so. In that case the right wing would be to the east of the road, close under 'the High Bastions,' and completely protected on the flank from cavalry attack; but the centre and left would extend westwards beyond the road, and the Athenians cannot have been in occupation of the left wing when they repulsed the Persian horsemen. Three clearly distinct stages are marked in the narrative of Herodotus during the cavalry skirmish (*ἱππομαχία*), and before any question of precedence arises between Tegeatai and Athenians. (a) The Megarians are attacked by the Persian cavalry, and for some time sustain the assault unaided; finally, they demand support. (b) The Athenians come to their assistance, and take their place, with better success; although, before the fighting is done, (c) they had been further supported by the main body. Is there here anything more than a dim reminiscence of the arrival of successive contingents of the Greek column at Erythrai, or at the north entrance of the chief pass across Kithairon, and of their struggle to emerge on to the *Hyporea*? In this undoubtedly 'first' position were the Greek forces ever definitely extended in line, or in battle-array? The Atheno-Tegean dispute, which supervenes, implies the contrary; but we may safely continue to describe as 'the first position' of the Greek army the position in front of the main pass, marked by Erythrai, during their occupation of which some skirmishing with the cavalry took place, which was afterwards claimed as a great victory for the Athenians.

A deployment of the marching column in front of Erythrai, or

¹ 9. 25 παρὰ Τρύας.

along the *Hyporea* of Kithairon, to the west, is next almost a military necessity; and here I make bold to suggest that between the position marked by Erythrai on the Eleusis-Thebes road, and the position marked by the Androkrateion, Gargaphia and Asopos, the Greeks occupied an intermediate position, which may for the sake of convenience be described as the Hysiata position. Hysiai appears to have dominated the second pass, or road, from Plataia to Dryoskephalai, and so forth, even as Erythrai commanded the road from Thebes to Dryoskephalai. This 'Hysiata' position would then be, in truth, the 'second' position of the Greek forces, and the position subsequently, on the Asopos-ridge, a third position. To go a step further: this second position may be recognized as substantially identical with the ideal or 'fourth' position, marked by the *Nesos*, and possibly the Demetrium, to wit, the Plataian Demetrium. The position perhaps extended from the Demetrium westwards through the *Nesos* to the Heraion. In this 'second' (or 'fourth') position the Greeks, for eight days or so, enjoyed comparative immunity from the assaults of the Persian cavalry. From this position they descended, no doubt in battle-array, to take up a more advanced station upon the Asopos, expecting perhaps that the Persians would assault them in front: to this position, or to one almost identical, they purposed to retreat, and, with exception of the Athenians, did retreat, when their advanced position upon the Asopos-ridge proved untenable. The comparatively lengthy tenure of this second position has been 'telescoped' in the traditions of the battle-field, owing partly perhaps to the absence of any stirring action meanwhile, partly to the transfer or loss of episodes, or of mere time, belonging to this position and stage in the operations, to the preceding, and still more to the succeeding position.

To the first question, then, above proposed, the answer here suggested is that the Greek forces occupied at least four positions in succession: I. A position at Erythrai, seized by them as they emerge from the pass, and possibly developed by the inevitable transition from column to line formation. How long this position was occupied there is nothing to show clearly; but if all the Greek forces marched by the same route (by no means a probable hypothesis), it would take some time for an army of 100,000 men to deploy out of the pass. In Herodotus' narrative the cavalry action might all take place on a single afternoon; but two or three days may really be covered by the action of the story in this part. As long as any of the Greek forces remained actually on the road in front of the pass they would certainly be subject to the assaults and missiles of the Persian cavalry; and notwithstanding the claim advanced on behalf of the Athenians to a victory over the cavalry in this position, one reason for evacuating it may have been a desire to get on to ground less exposed to direct assault by the Persian mounted men. II. A

position in front of Hysiai, along the high ground below Kithairon, and well above the trough of Gargaphia—a position in which their left at least would be on or about the *Nesos*, if not still further west, while the centre and right may have extended over Ridge 2, as far as the modern village of *Kriekouki*, ground that in ancient times may well have belonged to Hysiai. In this position the Greeks would be in front of the second pass, or loop-road from Plataia to Dryos-kephalai, and also and more completely cover the third pass, through which the difficult route to Peloponnesos went *via* Megara, and by which reinforcements were reaching them daily. To this position the long delay is to be referred: in this position a dispute may have arisen between the Athenians and Tegeatai on the point of honour, and no doubt the final order of advance was decided. This position the Greeks abandon in order to move down on to the Asopos-ridge. The question arises, what induced them to abandon this comparatively strong and safe position for the exposed Asopos-ridge? The answer is not far to seek. Broadly, after waiting ten days or so, there seemed no chance of a general Persian attack on this position, and the Greeks were prepared and anxious to fight a defensive battle. On the Asopos-ridge they might fairly hope that the Persian infantry would cross the stream to attack them, especially if they knew, or suspected, the desires and necessities of Mardonios. They had perhaps precise information and further inducement. To this point might be transferred the message of the Makedonian, whatever it stands for—albeit Herodotus, who has carried the Greeks down to Gargaphia days before, inevitably associates the Alexander episode with the Asopos position. Another inducement, too, the Greeks may have had to move. On the night of 'the 8th' the Persian cavalry appeared in their rear, and had cut off their supplies, at least by the more direct route. To this point finally might be referred the manoeuvre which has been transfigured in the phil-Attic source into the exchange of positions between Spartans and Athenians. The new position to be occupied lay to the west and north of the position to be evacuated: the advance of the Greek forces *en échelon* may have given rise to observations which ignorance and partiality afterwards converted into the absurd story preserved by Herodotus. The reference of the story to manoeuvres in this position explains the corresponding movements recorded of the Persian forces, which would not have taken place merely in response to the Greek development from the position at Erythrai to the position at Hysiai. III. The position marked in Herodotus by the Androkrateion with Gargaphia (near the Spartans) and the Asopos (near the Athenians) becomes by this hypothesis the third distinct position occupied by the Greek forces on the great field of Plataia, but their occupation of this position is reduced in duration from days to hours. The position was an exposed and an isolated one: no competent observer upon the Greek

side can have had any illusions on the subject. Even if the Persian cavalry had not hustled the Greeks off the main road on to the *Hyporea*, and pressed them forward down the *Hyporea* on to the Asopos-bank, yet mounted men could obviously ride round and round the new position at pleasure. The success of the Greek advance to the new position depended upon its inducing the Persian infantry to deliver an attack. If that were assured, the position was not ill-chosen. The Persian cavalry could hardly charge up the hillsides: the Greeks on the top could present an unbroken front to every quarter: if once the Asiatic infantry came within spear's length, Thermopylai and Marathon had taught the Greeks their own immeasurable superiority. But in this advanced position, on the Asopos-ridge, the Greeks were cut off from their base, bereft of supplies, and unable even to secure a permanent access to water. The position could not possibly be maintained for long under such circumstances. If Mardonios still would not attack them, they must either cross the river or make good their retreat.

These considerations dispose of the long delays, the exchange of positions, and other fabulous or romantic items in the Herodotean account of events in this position. There is no need to devise modifications and movements of the troops, except to the rear, nor is there room for such manoeuvres on the ground. The chivalrous challenge of Mardonios is not quite incredible, but is perhaps superfluous. The message of Alexander can be better used in the earlier situation. The supposed exchange of posts between the Spartans and Athenians has been already explained and utilized. But the Greek council of war, the last, though surely not the only one, may well have met and deliberated on the alternatives open to the Greeks—advance across the Asopos to the attack, a desperate venture with the Persian cavalry about, or retreat to 'the Island,' that is, to their previous (or 'second') position, or somewhere thereby. 'A council of war never fights'—unless, indeed, the deliberations in this case resulted in a plan which must be inferred, not from the express report, but from the event and results.

§ 8. (B) At this point the argument passes naturally to the second problem above formulated: viz. how did the Greek army, on the final day of battle, when apparently broken into at least three different units, in retreat, if not partially already in flight, nevertheless rally, hold its own, convert retreat into advance, and finally put the pursuing host in turn to flight, snatching victory out of the very 'jaws of death'? Closely connected with this inquiry is the determination of the exact position, or positions, occupied by the Greek tactical units, in the final engagement, and the manoeuvres by which they came to occupy those positions (regarded broadly) after their evacuation of the Asopos-ridge: in other words, IV. what was the 'fourth' position occupied by the Greeks on the field of Plataia, in which they actually

gave battle and won the victory? It is but rarely, and under the direct inspiration of a great captain's genius, that a broken and scattering army can recover *moral*, and convert defeat into victory.¹ Are we to credit Pausanias with the personality of Alexander, of Caesar, or even of Frederick the Great? Or are we to suspect the fidelity and coherence of the narrative, boldly challenge the character of the evidences, and reconstruct the probable course of events in the light of the result, controlled by our knowledge of the ground, and conditioned by psychological and military possibilities? The story, as it stands, is too fragmentary, incoherent, and improbable to be accepted. There is no alternative but to abandon all effort to make the Greek victory intelligible, or else to have recourse to *Sach-Kritik*, 'real' considerations, a constructive criticism, or a critical reconstruction of the story. But to operate without regard to tradition were idle. Every such reconstructive attempt will be rightly judged as more or less successful in proportion as it, so to speak, absorbs a greater or smaller proportion of the traditional deposit. The present essay claims to advance the discussion by furnishing an intelligible theory of the battle conformable to the material conditions, while leaving no considerable item in the traditional story, or stories, unassimilated, or unexplained.

On the morning of the 13th the advanced position on the Asopos-ridge, occupied on the previous day by the Greeks, was seen to be empty. The national army had fallen back upon a new line of defence. This line has now to be discovered, or reconstructed. The traditions may here be accepted as proving that the line actually occupied by the confederate forces on the morning of the 13th was a long and a broken one. The Greek right was in one place: the Greek centre was in another place: the Greek left was in a third place, all three separated by intervals. The traditions imply that the actual positions occupied were in no single case the positions which the Greek divisions had been intended and commanded to occupy: some one, it seems to be admitted, had blundered. Nevertheless, perfect order appears to prevail. The three divisions are in communication with each other, if not in actual touch. What, then, was the exact emplacement of the battle-lines? How far did it really differ from the intention of the commanders?

The several positions of the Greek divisions must obviously be considered *seriatim*. (a) The precise position of the Spartans and Tegeatai on the right is unfortunately obscured by the ambiguities of the Herodotean nomenclature. Where was the Argiopion? Which of all the streams coming down from Kithairon bore the name Moloeis? Which of the various Demetria on the battle-field was included at this point in the Spartan lines? The Island has been given as the proper destination of the forces. The story is of Athenian provenience.

¹ *Pace* the words of Themistokles, 8. 109.

The Island may have marked the position for Athenian purposes, but the whole of the Greek forces assuredly were not to be cooped up in the Island. The Island is described as ten stades distant from Gargaphia. Pausanias is expressly recorded to have retired ten stades and then halted. He did not reach the Island. But the presumption is that he reached his appointed station. If the Moloeis be identified with O.1 or with A.5, the Demetrium in this passage with the Plataian Demetrium, and the *Argiopiis locus* with Ridge 2, we obtain a position for the Greek right which fully accords with the Island as the centre, or possibly the left, of the new (or fourth) Greek position.

(b) The position of the forces which had formed the Greek centre is more clearly defined in the narrative: they are now laagered at the Heraion, in front of the city of Plataia. This position, though hardly 'twenty stades' distant from Gargaphia, was perhaps more nearly that distance from the post previously occupied by them upon the Asopos-ridge. Their halt and orderly occupation of the new ground, as well as their subsequent action and advance, entirely disprove the transparently malicious tradition which represents their retirement as a flight. But, in the new position they appear to be upon the extreme left of the Greek line, and so to be occupying a post held by the Athenians in the earlier formations. The Greek centre has in fact become the left wing, and a serious gap has arisen between the two wings, right and left. This gap might have been filled by the interposition of the Athenians; and the question presents itself: whether this very manœuvre was not intended all along and ordered, though delayed, and only very tardily and imperfectly carried out? Indications in two directions are not wanting to support this suggestion. (1) The Athenians are in direct communication with Pausanias during the night of the 12th; they are urged and summoned by him, on the morning of the 13th, to close up; finally, they actually take a part, or claim to have taken a part, with the Tegeatai and Spartans in the assault on the fortified camp. This supposition also puts some sense into the curious claim of the Athenians to be specially qualified to face the Persian levies: standing in the centre they might have been opposed to the Medes, Bactrians, Indians, and Sakans. Moreover, if the Greeks, as is probable, had reason to believe that their medized countrymen on the Persian right would take very little part in the morrow's battle, there might have been a good reason the more for an exchange of posts between the left wing and the centre in the battle-array. But, if so, Athenian tradition ignored the assignment of the left wing (in the fourth position) to the Megaro-Peloponnesian contingents, and explained the ultimate junction of Athenians with the right wing by a clumsy fiction. (2) Conversely, the retirement of the Greek centre upon Plataia accords with the special service probably assigned to it, or rather to one of its two divisions, of conveying, or extricating, the baggage-train from its embarrassments in Kithairon—

especially if the baggage-train was making its way over the mountain by the Megaro-Plataian path. The 'half' charged with this service in c. 51 was not half the whole forces, but only half the centre, i.e. one of its two subdivisions—a point plainly not understood by Herodotus.

(c) In short, the position and the conduct of the Athenians on the morning of the last battle in Boiotia are most difficult to define and to defend—and the Athenians have had the telling of the story! The traditions at this point have plainly some miscarriage, or failure, on the part of the Athenians to justify; the apology takes the form of a charge of cowardly desertion against the centre, and of notorious duplicity against the Spartans on the right wing. But what has really happened? The Greek centre has gone back to its appointed quarters at Plataia, and the right wing has fallen back in perfect order to its new position on the Island, or rather to the east of the Island, on to the Argiopion and the Plataian Demetrium; the Athenians, who should have filled in the gap by falling back on the Island, have failed to carry out their part of the plan. Better excuses may perhaps be suggested for this failure than the Herodotean apology, which consists in abuse of the plaintiff's attorney! In the first place, the manoeuvre was a more complicated one than a simple retirement. It would be necessary to allow the two great divisions of the centre to clear out to the south-west before the Athenians could move across their track to the south-east. Again, from the Androkrateion to the Island was considerably further than the 'ten stades' to be traversed by the Spartans. Finally, the Athenians may have been expected to cover the movement of the centre, and a rearguard of Athenians that of the main body, performing a service corresponding to that performed on the right by Amompharetos. This rearguard may have become too deeply engaged, and so arrested the Athenians' movement, or even compelled them to return on their steps downhill. Thus continuity was never, perhaps, completely established in the new position between the wings and the centre, and it was possible for spectators, or even combatants, to regard the whole manoeuvre as a failure, and the Greek army, on the morning of battle, as a 'broken' force.

How then did a victory for the Greeks result? For one thing, the Greek army, though not all fully ensconced in the position intended, was not in any part or sense a beaten army, as the sequel proved. On the west, where the situation was more serious, the quondam centre, or rather one of its two divisions, advanced gallantly down from Plataia to cover the Athenian left, and enabled Aristides to extricate his men from a serious embarrassment. On the right, where the Spartans were drawn up in perfect order, awaiting the foe, the issue was never in serious doubt. The performances of the Persian cavalry on this part of the field can hardly be genuine: the Spartans could never have advanced to attack the Persian infantry if the Persian cavalry had been on their flank. Some other distraction must be

provided for the mounted men that morning : they were away on the Dryoskephalai road, or engaged with the 'Korinthians and Phleiasians,' while the Spartans were free to deal with the flower of the Persian infantry alone. Finally, no doubt the cavalry was recalled and employed to screen the Persian retreat. The course of this engagement is tolerably clear. It comprises four scenes.

(i.) The Persians crossed the Asopos, and advanced up the slopes of the *Hyporea*, then halted within bow-shot of the Spartans, fixed their wicker shields in the ground, and from behind their frail rampart discharged showers of arrows upon the Greek ranks. For a while the Spartans sat unmoved under their shields beneath these missiles, until their commander judged the moment opportune—a lull in the hail of weapons or what not—and at a word the ranks arose and charged, quickly covering the fifty yards between. Then was seen the majesty with which the Spartan hoplites fought. (ii.) The Persian gerrha hardly stayed the advance of these heavy warriors : a close hand-to-hand battle ensued, and doubtless, as at Thermopylai, they sworded the strangers in shoals. The Persians broke and fled down the hill, and along the little stream-valleys, to the Asopos. (iii.) Where the hills again rose, hard by the former station of the Spartans, above the trough of Gargaphia, a fresh stand, a rally, was attempted : there Mardonios fell, and with him disappeared the last hope of a Persian success. (iv.) Large numbers of the fugitives took refuge in the camp, and here the Athenians at last come into touch with the Greek right, and bear a hand in the butchery within.

The ruin of Persian hopes on the right, and the timely support of the Megaro-Phleiasian division, had secured for the Athenians an easier victory on the left. Even Boiotians hardly thought of pushing their advantage in that quarter when they knew the Persian cause already lost. And the Boiotians apparently alone of medized Greeks had made any serious effort in this last battle on the king's behalf. The rest of the Greek allies, if they went into the battle at all, of a surety broke and fled, so soon as they were ware of the Persian disaster on their left. Doubtless the Athenians owed Alexander of Makedon a deep debt of gratitude for his action, or his inaction, on that day. The Athenians had the telling of the story, and they repaid the Makedonian king after their kind. But the supreme cause of disaster on the Persian side was surely the misconduct of Artabazos. Had Artabazos thrust his *corps d'armée* into the gap left in the centre, of the Greek line by the Athenian miscarriage, what might he not have effected ? The treachery of Artabazos may explain why nothing is heard of the Persian centre during the actual fray. If he commanded the centre he may have withdrawn it, or never allowed it to cross Asopos. Certainly he failed to support Mardonios at the critical moment, as he failed to avenge him. Upon Artabazos apparently devolved the chief command on the death of Mardonios. Artabazos

contented himself with using the cavalry to cover the retreat of his men, who, if Herodotus is to be trusted in the matter, had not struck one single blow in the action. Herodotus betrays no consciousness of the appalling significance of the crimes imputed to Artabazos. Whatever the jealousies and divisions upon the side of the confederate Greeks, they sink into insignificance beside the rivalries, the cross purposes, the intrigues in the camp of the Persian. The serried ranks of the Barbarians on the left bank of Asopos concealed far deeper divisions and causes of defeat than the tripartite, or quadripartite, Greek army. On the field of Plataia the Greeks were as never again united, and animated by a lofty loyalty to the common cause. Plataia was in every way the grandest, fairest, most decisive victory of Hellas. The jealousies and malignities which appear on the Greek side, in the Herodotean story of the battle, are largely the product of afterthought and reflexion, and belong to a time when the spoils were divided, the prizes awarded, the meed of valour assigned. What remained was the struggle for fame with posterity. The story, drawn, as it happens, mainly from Athenian, or phil-Athenian sources at a later time, when local interests have ignored and obscured the real courses and connexions of events, not merely has failed to reproduce the unity of plan underlying the action, but has grossly exaggerated a tactical miscarriage, on the morning of the battle. For that miscarriage the Athenians were primarily responsible. It made little or no difference in the event, but it might have completely ruined the Greek cause. If the centre of the Greek army disappeared for a time, and the Athenians failed to replace it, the Persian centre never put in an appearance at all. The superb steadiness of the Spartans, the gallant efforts of the quondam centre, one half of which advanced to cover the Spartans, while the other went down to extricate the Athenians from their predicament, and it may be a mighty effort by the Athenians themselves, more than made good the threatened disaster. Still, there had been a *mauvaise quart d'heure* for which the Athenians were responsible. It was not altogether a pleasant memory. When reflexion supervened on action, frank criticisms were no doubt forthcoming, mutual reproaches were soon heard, and a whole crop of recriminations, misunderstandings, and self-contradictory apologetics was the inevitable result. Under this flood of dialectic the simple narrative was lost, and it may even be suspected that Greek traditions, and even Athenian legends, did not more but less than justice to the heroes of Plataia. A further advance in the hypothetical reconstruction of the story may be admissible.

§ 9. If the plans and actions of the Greeks were to be credited with the confusion and incoherence with which they are invested in the narrative of Herodotus, the victory would appear a stroke of luck, a gift of chance, or at best the result of errors and treachery on the Persian side, added, perhaps, to the heroism of the Spartan spearmen.

But there are not wanting general considerations to suggest a rationale of the victory more flattering to the victors, and many particular hints, or incongruities, in the narrative fortify those general considerations. Strange paradox, that a broken and retreating army should rally and overwhelm its victorious pursuers! The story attributes a definite plan to the Greek retreat, though it assumes that plan to have been frustrated. The question arises whether the plan is fully revealed, or apprehended, in the traditions. The fact abides that the Greeks fought a winning game upon ground of their own choosing. Plainly the great question throughout the operations in Boiotia was, which army should cross the Asopos, manifestly to its own disadvantage. In the end Mardonios, not Pausanias, accepted that disadvantage. Presumably the Persian was outwitted and out-manceuvred. The Greeks were acting throughout on inner lines, and never really lost their concentration. The description of the final day's battle seems to imply that there was a huge gap in the centre of the Greek front; but the enemy does not succeed in piercing this gap, or inserting himself between the Greek right and left. If any such gap really existed, was it only for a time, and during a period, when the Persian commander could not avail himself of the opportunity? Were not the tactics of Marathon reproduced on the field of Plataia? Was an artificial and temporary weakness in the centre of the Greek line, or the appearance thereof, part of the inducement offered Mardonios to draw him, in fancied pursuit, across the fatal river? However that may be, the dominant conclusion of the preceding argument comes to this: the Greeks at Plataia fought out the decisive issue on their own side of the stream, on ground of their own choosing, on the most advantageous terrain in the whole possible area of conflict, and fought practically upon their own terms. At the psychological moment their passive resistance, their purely defensive attitude, is exchanged for the offensive, a forward charge which sweeps the lighter Persian infantry before them down the hill and over the Asopos, in a confusion doubly confounded by the meeting of fugitives and fresh men advancing to the fray. The charge at Marathon is not more indubitable than the Spartan advance at Plataia. The superior tactics on the Greek side were furthered by other forces which the narrative of Herodotus explicitly recognizes—an immense superiority of weapons, once fighting came to close quarters, superior intelligence, superior discipline, and (we may add) the better cause. The official superiority of numbers on the Persian side has already been heavily discounted; and, even if still within limits allowed, numbers, under such conditions, are but sheep led to the slaughter. But the superiority in tactics, discipline, and arms upon the Greek side was undoubtedly seconded to an indefinite extent by desertion, treachery, misgiving, and other fatalities, active and passive, on the Persian side, in themselves enough to account for the result. The victory of Plataia is not hard to under-

stand: in reality it was all along a foregone conclusion, if the Greeks could but engage the Persian infantry at close quarters, and they knew it! Evidence of this knowledge may be found in the purely naturalistic tone of the traditions of Plataia. The battle of Marathon quickly passed into a legend palpitating with divine and heroic incidents: Salamis and little Mykale had their apparitions, telepathies, theologies; but on the field of Plataia Herodotus is hard put to it to provide an epiphany, a special providence, a supernaturalism, a curiosity. Spartan victories were more merely mundane and prosaic than Athenian! The story of Plataia is moralized in a series of anecdotes which strike a purely human note.¹ There is thus a good deal to be said for the view that the victory of the Greeks at Plataia was largely the result of intelligent strategy and tactics; not merely the better cause and the better army, but also the better leading won the day. The question remains: to whom in particular the credit of this leading belongs? *Prima facie* Pausanias is the hero of the campaign. Pausanias is commander-in-chief, to all appearances:² Pausanias himself afterwards took credit for the victory:³ Herodotus appears to allow his claim.⁴ But Herodotus is uncritical; and, as usual, there are indications in his narrative which contravene its dominant or express verdict. The Spartans cancelled the Regent's assumptions, without, however, acknowledging the proper author of the victory.⁵ The supreme position of Pausanias at Plataia is titular, hereditary, official: the intellectual guidance might have to be sought elsewhere. It was indeed wonderful, if the young and untried Regent, placed in command of the largest Greek army which ever operated on Greek soil, proved himself a strategist and tactician worthy of mention beside the best. Strange that the jealous traditions, which have furnished Themistokles with a mentor in Mnesiphilos at Salamis, and robbed Kallimachos to pay Miltiades at Marathon, make so little of the Herakleid captain, Euryanax, associated with Pausanias in the supreme command. Such an arrangement was a not infrequent Spartan device for reinforcing or controlling the probable shortcomings of a youthful commander placed by conservative custom in a position which was likely to prove too much for him. Had we merely to choose between the probable merits of Pausanias and Euryanax, we might be sorely tempted to invest the elder Herakleid with the laurels of Plataia; nor would the discreet and ungenerous silence of Sparta be difficult to explain, even if the disappearance of Euryanax from the scene were to suggest a domestic tragedy. But the transcendent abilities of Euryanax, the son of Dorieus, are after all an unknown quantity, even if his association in the supreme command is *pro tanto* in his favour. Athenians would perhaps have succeeded, if left to

¹ Hdt. 9. 76-82.² 9. 10.³ Thucyd. 1. 132. 2.⁴ 9. 64 νίκην ἀναιρέεται καλλίστην ἀπα-

σέων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν Πανσανίης ὁ Κλεομβρότου τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδew.

⁵ Thucyd. 1. 132. 3.

themselves, in resolving the victory at Plataia into a soldiers' battle; or have called the supernatural into manifest operation; or, perhaps, have allowed some credit to the collective counsels of the Greek commanders. But a council of war at best endorses the plan which some captain of real ability submits to it. Was Aristides, then, such a strategist, or so apt in the handling of large masses of men? The Athenian had, indeed, the advantage of experience, eleven years before, in the Marathonian campaign, and traditions of the Ionian revolt may have left their military lesson on Athenian minds; but, if we look fairly round Hellas at this moment, we are almost bound to conclude that, of known men, there were only two qualified by ability, force, and character to devise and push through the great plan, strategic and tactical, which underlies the campaigns of 479 B.C., and culminates on the field of Plataia. Those two men were Gelon and Themistokles. The former is in the particular case *hors de combat*; while Themistokles in the records is truly conspicuous by his absence. Is it a very rash hypothesis, that will see in Themistokles at least the intellectual author of the plans, both naval and military, pursued by the Greek forces in 479 B.C.? To some extent those plans may have been laid before the Spartans in the winter of 480-479, and Themistokles may perhaps have assisted at their realization at Plataia in the ensuing summer. What other suggestion so well explains the high quality inherent in the strategy and tactics of the Greeks on that field? The Boiotian or Asianic sources available for Herodotus would not have known the authorship, or been concerned to recognize the quality of those plans: the native sources, whether Spartan or Athenian, would deliberately have ignored the claim of Themistokles. The recovered plan speaks for itself and for him: if there was any such masterly lead, who else was as well qualified as he to give it?¹

§ 10. To resume the whole story in brief. The battle of Salamis had not completely decided the fate of Greece and its invaders. The Persians were still in possession of Thrake, Makedon, Thessaly, and central Greece north of Kithairon. It was thoroughly understood, at least in Athens, that a great effort by land would be necessary to secure the complete victory of the patriotic cause. Even the Peloponnesians and Sparta could not acquiesce in the permanent medism of all continental Greece beyond the Isthmos, for such a situation would be a permanent danger to their own independence. A definite plan of campaign was concerted, during the winter, for the defence and liberation of Greece. The fleet had already performed its part at Salamis; there was nothing serious to apprehend from over the sea. Even if at Sparta, or elsewhere, it was suggested that the mission of the fleet to Asia or the Hellespont might have the desired effect, the inconclusiveness of such a policy by itself cannot have been

¹ The formula for the tactics of Plataia (and Marathon) is potentially given in the words of Themistocles 8. 109. 8.

overlooked. The fleet might injure the Greek subjects of the Persian in Asia, but could never penetrate sufficiently into the mainland to ensure a decisive result. In any case the clear determination of Athens in the matter put such a plan out of court. The fleet was reduced to dimensions sufficient for purely defensive purposes, and sufficient, as it afterwards proved, to second the operations on land in Europe by a bold demonstration upon the Asiatic coasts; more, or even so much, was hardly expected of it.

The proper field of battle was deliberately forechosen by the Greek commanders. The medism of Boiotia made the reoccupation of Thermopylai impossible, even if such a step could otherwise have commanded approval. The northern slopes of Kithairon presented the fairest field from the Greek point of view. The Persian cavalry might there be safely defied; and, if only a general engagement with the Barbarian foot-soldiers could be brought on, the Greeks counted beforehand on a victory. Attica had been invaded and devastated once; but there was no reason why the enemy should pass Kithairon a second time.

But, to secure such results, it was necessary that the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies should cross the Isthmos in full force; and such a movement Sparta never dared undertake unless secure on three points of constant anxiety: the quiescence of her vast serf-population, the loyalty of her allies and the neutral cities, and, above all, the neutrality of her secular foe and rival Argos. Mardonios had not been idle during the winter. Not merely had his emissaries secured the fidelity of the Boiotian cities, and tempted the fears or the ambition of Athens, but had even visited some of the Peloponnesian cities, and assured him of the active sympathies at least of Argos. The Spartans devised employment for the Helots which relieved the state of the most intimate danger: the response to its levy on the Peloponnesian cities convinced it that no danger was to be expected from the side of Arkadia, or Elis, or Achaia; but the attitude of Argos was to say the least ambiguous, and might excuse some delay in Sparta's advance. Sparta must finally have had such assurances from Argos as satisfied her: they were due, perhaps, in part to the mediation of Athens, Tegea, and other of the loyalist cities.

The delay had cost Athens dearly, and was afterwards regarded there as a case of Spartan perfidy. Mardonios, when repeated overtures in Athens had proved unavailing, reinvaded Attica, and wreaked a final vengeance on the most obstinate foe of Persia. From Salamis the Athenians, behind the securer rampart of their 'wooden walls,' beheld their homes and temples a second time in flames. Was not the threat of 'medism'—a Themistokles would be capable of that—required to put an end to Spartan hesitation? The report of the Peloponnesian advance into Megara convinced Mardonios that the Greek forces were likely to offer him battle; and he retired with his light column and

cavalry—all that had re-entered Attica—for good strategic reasons into Boiotia to his base and main forces. Thus it came about that the Greeks too crossed Kithairon, weeks later than had been originally intended, and at a time when bolder leading from the Peloponnesos might have scored an advantage south of Kithairon. But, if the great bulk of the Persian forces had not entered Attica at all, if Mardonios' force in Attica consisted mainly of mounted men, Pausanias and Euryanax may have been well enough advised.

Once assured of the evacuation of Attica, of the formation of a base and fortified camp on the Asopos, the Greeks abandon their hesitation. The bulk of the Peloponnesian forces were joined by the Athenians at Eleusis; and the column advanced up the pass by Eleutherai to cross the mountain-range, a part of the forces making its way, perhaps, by more direct but difficult routes. The army, all told, will have numbered some thirty-five to forty thousand hoplites, with an equal number of hypaspists, attendants, and light-armed troops. Not less than two days' march separated Eleusis from Erythrai.

The head of the Greek column on emerging from the pass was attacked and harassed by swarms of Persian cavalry, which charged freely up the main road leading from Thebes to Dryoskephalai. By degrees, however, the Megarians, who must have headed the column, or occupied the station athwart the road, supported first by the Athenians, and subsequently by the rest of the force, made good their occupation of Erythrai, or the Erythraian position. Whether the Greek army was ever formed definitely in order of battle in this position is doubtful; but the place where actual contact with the enemy was first obtained, and at least a skirmish with the cavalry ensued, may conveniently, and in strict conformity with the Herodotean account, be designated as 'the first position.' The Athenians claimed, not wholly without justice, special credit for service in this position: probably their archers had most to say to the retirement of the Persian cavalry; but the frontal attack on the head of a single Greek column could hardly have been expected to lead to definite results, and was perhaps premature.

A development of this position, or rather a distinct move to the west, appears to have been made as soon as possible. This movement brought the Greeks on to Hysiatan and Plataian territory, and in front of the roads from Plataia to Dryoskephalai and from Plataia to Megara. Perhaps the whole army first congregated in this place, the column which had come by Erythrai here joining forces, which had arrived by the other passes. In this position, which must now be described as 'the second position,' the Greeks doubtless occupied a definite line and order of battle. The Athenians and Plataians on the left were probably in Plataian territory, and may even have been posted about the Heraion. The 'Island' may have been occupied by the centre, while the Lakedaemonians and Tegeatai on the right held

the ridge or ridges of the *Hyporea* in front of the Plataia-Dryoskephalai pass, probably not far from the Plataian Demetrium, and even perhaps on the Argiopios, and beside the river Moloeis. The right wing of the Greeks would here be in front of Hysiai, or on Hysiatan territory. In this position the forces remained for eight days or so, until a variety of circumstances urged them to advance down to a more exposed station. Their chief tactical purpose was to offer battle at closer quarters, and to induce Mardonios to cross the Asopos with his infantry; but they may also have had assurances of co-operation, or at least of a benevolent neutrality, from the mass of the medized Greeks; they may have known something of the dissensions at Persian headquarters; they may have been suffering from the occupation of Dryoskephalai by the Persian cavalry; they may even have had assurances that the Persians would cross the river to attack them in the new position. They therefore resolved to advance.

'The third position' occupied by the Greek troops was about a mile and a quarter in front of the second, and must probably have been occupied under cover of night. It lay between the Asopos and the well-heads covered by the name Gargaphia, and is more precisely marked by the Androkrateion, i.e. the church of St. John. Perhaps an outpost, or the extreme right, held the hill now occupied by the church of St. Demetrium, then the site of the Hysiatan temple of Eleusinian Demeter. A better water-supply is not the motive by which to explain the advance of the Greeks to this position; but a water-supply was no doubt essential. They looked to be attacked forthwith by the Persians: that the Persian operations against them in this position were still confined to cavalry skirmishing was a disappointment, and involved a miscarriage of their plans. As the cavalry could completely ride round this position, the Greeks were not only cut off from the water, but from all supplies, save what they had brought with them. As they were determined not to cross the Asopos—a proceeding which would have led to their complete discomfiture by the cavalry—no course was open but to retire, not perhaps without the hope that the Persian would at last follow them.

This hope was realized. Perhaps the Greek commanders had again at this point express assurances, upon which they relied. At any rate they determined to retire, under cover of night, to the position, Hysiai-Island-Plataia, in which they had previously offered battle. But a retirement in presence of the enemy is a more ticklish and complicated movement than an advance. Forces were detached to cover the retreat; also apparently in the new order of battle the Athenians and the centre were to change places, so that the Athenians should come into direct touch with the Spartans, and be able to engage the Barbarian centre. Moreover, one of the two divisions of the Greek centre was to move further back up Kithairon, apparently

for the purpose of holding the Plataia-Dryoskephalai pass against a possible attack of the Persian cavalry, or else to convoy the supplies *en route* from Peloponnesos. But something went wrong with these elaborate dispositions, and for that miscarriage the Athenians, if any, were to blame. The Spartans plainly carried out their instructions exactly; they retired ten stades, on to the Moloeis and the Argiopion, and were there rejoined by their rearguard, under Amompharetos. Meanwhile the centre likewise had carried out its instructions: one of its two divisions was already posted, ere day broke, in front of the Heraion at Plataia, while the other had moved right up the pass, to cover the rear of the whole position. Only the Athenians had failed to make good their retreat, and were down on the plain when they ought to have been up on the Island. In that position they were exposed to the attack of the Thebans, who perhaps again had been the first to perceive the alteration in the Greek positions, and alone of the medized allies had their heart in the work. Fortunately for the Athenians, the Makedonians, the Thessalians, and others took little or no hand in the fray; fortunately, too, the division of the Greek centre posted at the Heraion, observing the situation, advanced quickly to the support of the Athenians, diverted the brunt of the Boiotian attack on to themselves, and thus extricated Aristides from a very awkward situation. Meanwhile the battle on the right had been won by the Spartans; and the Persian host was already in rout, its centre having apparently marched off the field without striking a blow.

§ 11. The chief points in which this representation of the battle differs from any hitherto propounded are the following:—

(i.) The recognition of the four positions occupied in succession by the Greek army.

(ii.) The identification of the second with the fourth of those positions (substantially).

(iii.) The transfer of the delay of eight, or twelve days, from the third (Asopos) to the second (Nesos-Argiopion) position, together with the suggestion that the estimate of days covers the whole period of the operations in Boiotia.

(iv.) The observation that the Greeks at Erythrai were in column, and the suggestion that the fighting at that point was with the head of the column.

(v.) The recognition that on the final day, the Spartans and the two divisions of the Greek centre had carried out accurately and fully their parts in the general plan of operations.

(vi.) The recognition that the Athenians alone (whose stories Herodotus has followed) failed to execute the orders and compact: a failure fortunately rendered practically innocuous by the victory on the right wing, the loyal support and services of the centre, the voluntary neutrality or inaction of the majority of the Greek allies on

the Persian right, and the conduct and leading of Artabazos, the second in command on the Persian side.

In this reconstruction the points of most vital importance are—(1) the clear topographical grasp upon the four successive Greek positions; (2) the clear chronological grasp on the true distribution of the days to the occupation of the several positions, and particularly the reduction in the time allotted to the occupation of the advanced Asopos position; (3) the clear critical grasp upon the animus and bias of the Athenian, or phil-Attic *sources*, and the reconstruction of the story in view of that critique. Compared with these fundamentals, the exact parts played by Alexander, by Artabazos, by the Thessalians, are of quite subordinate import; nor does the theory depend, in essentials, upon the exact nature of the fighting in the first position, nor upon the absolute identity of the second and the fourth positions, much less upon the intellectual authorship of the Greek plan, or the precise merits of particular leaders or contingents.

§ 12. Besides the work of Herodotus there are two and only two other considerable attempts at a narrative and description of the fighting at Plataia in 479 B.C., the earlier by Diodoros, the later by Plutarch. Both accounts are to a greater or less extent based upon Herodotus, that is, drawn from sources more or less indebted to Herodotus. Diodoros indeed here,¹ as elsewhere, gives very little beyond a rationalized and rhetoricized version of the Herodotean story, with much of its best elements omitted: such a version as we have learnt to expect from his chief authority, Ephoros. Such a version is not devoid of value: it forms at least a criticism of a kind upon the Herodotean account; but in the absence of any clear sign of recourse to independent sources, its value is almost confined to that, and its thin facility leaves its value even as criticism rather low. (a) The figures in Diodoros are exaggerated and self-contradictory: the original levy of Mardonios amounts to not less than 400,000; to these more than 200,000 are added for the medized Greeks: this whole force Mardonios takes with him into Attica! yet the actual number finally engaged is 500,000. The barbarians who fell he estimates at only 100,000 or more. The number of Greeks is given as 100,000. Of these above 10,000 fell and were buried. This last item is at least a corrective of the egregious under-estimate in Herodotus. (b) The topography and local colour in Diodoros is poor. Mardonios might have passed the winter in Boiotia: the camp is noticed, but its location is not defined; the various positions on the field of battle are reduced to two, except indeed that the Athenians are finally advanced to the very walls of Thebes, where their success over the Thebans is won²:

¹ 11. 29-33.

² The idea that the Greeks pushed forward their left wing with a view of crossing the Asopos, and attacking Thebes, appears to me untenable: the

wing or column would have been taken *en flanc*, the Persian cavalry would have made game of it, and Thebes, moreover, was a fortified city (cp. Hdt. 9. 86-88); the authority of Ephoros will not save it.

the victory of the Greeks is ascribed to the confined space (*ἡ τῶν τόπων στενοχωρία*), as though not the Asopos but the vale of Tempe, or Thermopylai, were the scene of battle. (c) The chronological indications are similarly curtailed, except for the truly Ephorean touch that the first engagement was fought at night. There are no signs of delay on either side. The advance of the Greeks to a second and final position and the ensuing battle takes place at once, after their first success. (d) Strategic and tactical problems and reasons, suggested by Herodotus, are ignored and disappear. The retirement of Mardonios from Attica is unexplained; the Persian cavalry is never engaged after its first defeat; the second battle, with the infantry, is commenced by the orderly advance of the whole Greek line, which is placed between a lofty hill on the right and the river Asopos on the left; the Persians likewise advance, and in the engagement are defeated and broken into three sections; the majority take refuge in the fortified camp, the medized Greeks retire on Thebes, while the remainder, upwards of 40,000 men, are led off into Phokis by Artabazos. The first set is pursued by the Spartans; the last by the 'Korinthians, Sikyonians, and Phleiasians,' while the Athenians come up with the medized Greeks at Thebes and win a great victory: after which they return to assist the Lakedaimonians at the camp! This account is a miserable parody of the Herodotean reports. (e) Diodoros gives no hint of opposition or rivalry between Artabazos and Mardonios, and never names Alexander at all. The former omission may be a deliberate criticism of Herodotus; the latter may be due to the *makedonizing* tendency of the fourth-century source, and not, like other omissions, to mere carelessness. (f) Additions there are also to the Herodotean story, but they hardly carry conviction with them. (1) The decision of the Greek *Synedroi*, if victorious, to found a festival in honour of Freedom is an impudent afterthought, though the express decision to go to Plataia and there fight a battle is *ben trovato*. (2) The oath of the Greeks assembled at the Isthmos is unauthentic, and posthumous. (3) The 'No quarter' order issued by Pausanias is perhaps an inference from the absence of any mention of prisoners in the original record. (4) The assignation of the *Aristeia* to Sparta, as city, and to Pausanias, as man, marks a real lacuna in the Herodotean story, but conflicts with a rival supplement in Plutarch. It is, however, entirely acceptable. In fine, there is extraordinarily little to be found in Diodoros which we can prefer to Herodotus, or even accept as valid criticism of his narrative. The chief result of a comparison between the two is the zeal and interest with which the modern historian must return to the consideration of the Herodotean logography on its own merits.

With Plutarch the case is rather different. Plutarch gives both a direct criticism of the work of Herodotus, and also a systematic account of the Boiotian campaign, which at least compares favourably

with Diodoros. The *De malignitate*, though a captious and essentially uncritical production, succeeds in spotting some real defects in Herodotus' story, and also performs the better service of putting in some fresh evidences in refutation of the false report.¹ The criticisms on the rôle assigned to Chileus in determining Spartan policy, on the absurdity of ascribing to the Spartans a reluctance to face the Persians, on the award of the victory to three cities to the exclusion of the others, and the appeal to the tombs, memorials, epitaphs and so forth, are valid, as far as they go. But the complaint that Herodotus puts down the Spartan victory merely to a superiority in armature, and that his recognition of Persian courage is inconsistent with what he elsewhere reports of the Barbarians, is criticism in the worst style of the Antonine sophistry. A much more serious contribution is made to the subject, or to our materials, by the *Life of Aristeides*, which contains a long and reasoned account of the operations in which Aristeides took a leading part.² Plutarch was himself at home in Boiotia, and had even attended the celebration of the *Eleutheria* at Plataia: his topography should be of the best. Plutarch, however, is not a military historian, but a biographer and a moralist. This character is not altogether a disadvantage. If it leads him to exaggerate the merits or doings of his heroes, and to tell the story for the greater glory of the gods and the Greeks, yet it leaves him free to follow the older narrative of the campaign without attempting to rationalize tradition in a merely tactical interest. Above all, Plutarch is a really learned man, with a large command of the available 'sources,' and his methods in relation to them resemble somewhat the methods of Herodotus, and compares favourably with the methods of Diodoros and his chief authority. Plutarch, within limits, allows the sources to speak for themselves: we can at least still see, or infer, to a great extent, their provenience, and allow therefor. The chief source here, mediate or immediate, is clearly Herodotus, even if he were not expressly cited; but Plutarch shows that in his time there were other fountains of tradition, or quasi-tradition, available. He names Idomeneus; he names Kleidemos; he draws from other authors; he has been to Delphi, and not in vain; he makes use of monuments, inscriptions, cults, calendars, and what not. Nothing is more significant of the character of his materials than his three express citations of 'psephisms' of Aristeides, unless it be the two great stories to the credit of Delphi, or the conspiracy in the Athenian camp itself to overthrow the democracy. All these are additions to the story in Herodotus. Evidently, also, the Herodotean story has been revised and rationalized, partly in a strategic and partly in a dramatic interest. The forces have their rendezvous, not at Eleusis, not at Erythrai, but at Plataia; and no fighting is recorded until that position is abandoned. The 'second' position is marked by the Androkrateion and the

¹ cc. 41 ff.² cc. 10-21.

(Hysiatan) Demetrion, and is apparently occupied before the *Hippomachia* takes place. The long pause in bringing about the battle is preserved from Herodotus, and the final resolution of the Greeks to retreat is recorded, but very inadequately motivated. The account of the retreat goes even beyond the Herodotean story in its unblushing 'Atticism.' Not merely is the retreat of the centre converted more explicitly into a disorderly flight, but the Athenians are represented as going back, in good order, until their movement is arrested by a request from Pausanias. Apparently the Lakedaimonians are to blame, and their delay, coupled with their commander's forgetfulness or absence of mind, all but involved the Greeks in a great disaster. The battle between the Spartans and the Persians is articulately described on the Herodotean lines, but with some interesting additions. Meanwhile the Athenians are halting to await the arrival of the Spartans! A fresh message from Pausanias causes them to start to his support, but on the way they are attacked by the medizing Greeks. How at this point, consistently with the rest of his story, the Athenians come to be "upon the plain" Plutarch does not pause to consider. The rest of the day proceeds much upon the Herodotean basis, with additions which reveal tertiary, or in one item even primary, sources: Plutarch, in view of the precise lists of the slain, refutes the statement of Herodotus that the Greek centre took no part in the fighting, without, however, describing the part to be assigned. Again, in the records of the great quarrel over the *Aristeia*, and of the founding of the *Eleutheria*, and the provisions for the maintenance of the Alliance, Plutarch adds items of the highest importance to the Herodotean story, with which we could ill afford to dispense.

On the dramatic and personal side the action of after-thought rather than of the better or even the supplementary source is even more apparent. Aristides is throughout the hero of Plutarch's narrative. Aristides goes in person to Sparta to urge despatch, though Plutarch can quote Aristides himself against that story. Aristides proposes and carries, at Athens and in the Allies, the psephisms of loyalty and liberty. Aristides sends to Delphi, and secures Plataia to Athens for ever. Aristides deals with consummate wisdom and tact with the traitors in the Athenian ranks. Aristides determines the position to be occupied by the Greek army. Plutarch has not eliminated the strife between the Tegeatai and the Athenians for the left wing; nor the interview of Alexander and the Athenian generals; nor the proposed exchange of positions between the Spartans and Athenians on the eve of battle; but in each case he, or his preferred authorities, have vastly improved the occasion by the argument put into the mouth of Aristides; and the eloquence of Aristides is invoked once more in a patriotic appeal to the medizing Greeks, alas! this time in vain. The ethical interest with Plutarch predominates

over the historical ; but, owing to his other merits, this preoccupation does not prevent his preserving incidentally valuable or suggestive items of tradition : his record contrasts favourably with that of Diodoros, and even the Herodotean devotee need not disdain to draw a supplement from Plutarch or Plutarch's authorities.

NOTE.—The thesis by Henry Burt Wright, Ph.D., entitled *The Campaign of Plataea*, New Haven [U.S.A.], 1904, 8vo, pp. 148, might seem to have left little for those who come after to say on the subject ; my own work was too far advanced to be much affected thereby, and I hail rather a co-operator than a creditor in the Yale Professor. Mr. H. Audrey has favoured me with some additional notes (1905) to his paper in the *Annual of Br. Sch. at Athens*, i. (1895), which are welcome as emphasizing difficulties in the hypothesis that Thebes was the objective of the Greek forward movement (cp. p. 393 *supra*). To Prof. Woodhouse's paper in *J.H.S.* xviii. (1898) pp. 33 ff. I may have owed a keener perception of the *Atticizing* tendency in Hdt.'s account of Plataia. That the victory was the result of deliberate strategy on the part of the Greeks was suggested in my *Hdt. IV.–VI.* (1895) ii. 247, note.

APPENDIX IX

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR

§ 1. Three chronological problems presented by the subject. § 2. The period, or duration, of the war. § 3. The epoch of the war, or its reduction to the Christian era. § 4. Difficulty of determining the order of events within the period. § 5. Chronological resources of Herodotus. § 6. Synchronisms, consequences, and successions. § 7. Chief *crucēs* and shortcomings. § 8. The supplementary authorities. § 9. The chronological perspective reconstructed. § 10. Kalendarial tables of the two years' war.

§ 1. THE chronology of the great Persian war has been to a great extent anticipated and involved in the Commentary on the text, as well as in the Introduction and Appendices, contained in these volumes.¹ Nevertheless a brief yet more explicit examination of the subject seems natural in view of its intrinsic importance, and the scale and method of this work. We are not here concerned with the dates of events, which were ancient history to Herodotus himself; nor, again, with the chronology of the *Pentekontaëteris*, for the events of which Herodotus is a contemporary authority. The present task is limited to the chronology of the main story in the last three Books of Herodotus, that is, the invasion of Xerxes, and its repulse, from the king's departure out of Susa, or of Sardes, down to the capture of Sestos, and the return of the Athenian forces under Xanthippos homewards—the last event recorded in the continuous story. Three chronological problems, or groups of problems, present themselves for solution in regard to this story.

I. The temporal length, duration, or period of the story from first to last is to be ascertained.

II. The epoch, or date of the story according to our era, that is, its proper place in the series of years before the birth of Christ (with the equivalents according to the Olympian reckoning, and the Archontic anagraph), is to be determined.

III. The chronological order of the events recorded, including the

¹ Cp. Introduction § 11 (xi.); Appendices V. § 4; VI. § 2, pp. 291 ff.; VII. §§ 2, 3; VIII. § 2, pp. 346 ff., § 5 (6), p. 369; Index IV., *sub v.*

successions, intervals, and synchronisms in related series of actions or occurrences within the whole area or theatre of the narrative, is to be elucidated.

These three problems, or groups of problems, are by no means equally easy of solution. The first and second may be quickly disposed of, and with complete assurance. The third involves a much more complicated and obscure investigation, and may end by leaving many chronological points still undetermined. This investigation will, therefore, be conveniently postponed to the ascertainment of the period, and the determination of the epoch, of the events as a whole in question.

§ 2. I. The duration, or period, of the war incontestably comprises some two years, reckoning the campaigning season to begin with the spring. Thus Xerxes leaves Sardes, after passing the winter there, and advances towards the Hellespont in the early springtime (*ἀμα τῷ ἔαρι*, 7. 37). The time occupied in crossing the Hellespont is variously computed,¹ but the narrative of the king's invasion of Europe and of Hellas proceeds in a continuous and consecutive fashion, and after passing Thermopylai about midsummer,² Xerxes reaches Athens "three months" after leaving the Hellespont (8. 51). A winter follows upon the battle of Salamis, clearly marked both for the fleet (8. 130) and for the army (8. 133). The ensuing spring (8. 130) opens the second year of the war. The ninth Book records the events of this second year in two parallel and synchronous columns, so to speak, one for the armies in Greece (cc. 1-88), the other for the naval forces on the Asianic side (cc. 90-107), culminating in the synchronism of the battles at Plataia and Mykale, in the late summer, or early autumn. The chronicle is carried forward to the end of "the year," that is, to the dawn of another spring, by the story of the Athenian siege of Sestos (cc. 114-121). This matter is so clearly presented by Herodotus that there never has been any doubt as to the actual duration of the war, however problematic the precise dates of the beginning and ending may be, to a month or a day, and however disputable the inner sequences, intervals, and synchronisms of the events lying between those terms may appear.

§ 3. II. The epoch of the war, that is, the reduction of these two years of campaigning to the notation of the Christian era, involves a recourse to external evidences, but otherwise offers hardly any difficulty, or ground of dispute. The established equivalences between the Olympiads and our reckoning of years B.C. may of course be assumed, as likewise, in the main, the annual correspondences with the Attic list of Archons. The epoch of the Peloponnesian war is a certainty, and the ascertainment of earlier dates in the fifth century B.C. proceeds upwards from Thucydides and his verifiable chronology through the

¹ Cp. 7. 55, 56; 8. 51.

² Cp. 7. 206.

Pentekontaëteris to the Persian war, and so forth. It is, therefore, certain that the Persian war took place "about fifty years" before the Peloponnesian,¹ that is, about fifty years before the spring of the year of the Attic Archon Pythodoros, which was the year extending from midsummer 432 B.C. to midsummer 431 B.C., and was practically identical with the first year of the 87th Olympiad. Two clear indications in the text of Herodotus prove that the first year of the war covered an Olympian Festival (7. 206, 8. 26). This Olympiad could only be the 74th, 75th, or 76th, allowing the greatest possible margin of variation. But the name of the Attic Archon for the year of Salamis, to wit, Kalliades, is incidentally preserved by Herodotus (8. 51). This Archon's name is attested in a number of ancient authorities²; and though all the notices do not admit of reduction to the same year, still upon the whole the weight of evidence is in favour of the identification of his year with Olympiad 75. 1. Moreover, Olympiads 74. 1 and 76. 1 are already provided with Eponyms. Above all, the chronology of the *Pentekontaëteris*, however disputable in points and places, practically requires the identification of the two years comprised in the last three Books of Herodotus with the years 480-479, 479-478 B.C. The antecedent chronology, notably of the Peisistratid régime, of the Lydian monarchy, and of the sixth century, back to Solon—full of problems and of disputable points though it be—nevertheless is to be reconstructed on the basis of the identity of Ol. 75. 1 with the year of the invasion of Xerxes, and forms in a way a further verification of that identity.

The fullest and most immediate verification of this epoch for the Persian war would be found in the dating of the eclipses recorded for the period: a method of verification which is fully applicable to the chronology of the Peloponnesian war as given by Thucydides. Two eclipses of the sun are recorded by Herodotus in connexion with events of the war. The first occurred as Xerxes was leaving Sardes for the Hellespont (7. 37), that is, *ex hypothesi*, in the spring of the year 480 B.C. The other is adduced as the cause for the retirement of Kleombrotos, the Spartan Regent, from the Isthmos, together with the army, which had been engaged in building the wall that was to keep the Persians out of the Peloponnesos (9. 10). This eclipse must, therefore, have taken place after the death of Leonidas, and before the death of the Regent Kleombrotos, and the succession of Pausanias to the Regency. Materially, or by the logic of events, the natural date for the retirement of Kleombrotos from the Isthmos would coincide with, or immediately follow, the retirement of Xerxes from Athens and Attica: that is, falls on a day shortly after the battle of Salamis. Two solar eclipses should therefore be forthcoming, one in the spring, the other in the autumn of 480 B.C. Unfortunately

¹ Thucyd. 1. 118. 2 (where ἡ Ἐπέξου ἀναχώρησις is the point of departure; but see 1. 89. 2). Cp. Diodor. 12. 1. 4.

² Cp. § 10 *infra*.

only one such eclipse is verifiable, and known. An eclipse of the sun took place on October 2, 480 B.C., which suits exactly the requirements of the eclipse of Kleombrotos.¹ But the only solar eclipse, visible at Sardes, anywhere about the given date in spring was an annular eclipse, which took place on February 16, 478 B.C.² The astronomical verification of the Herodotean chronology falls, therefore, short of a complete coincidence and assurance. But can any competent critic, versed in the methods of Herodotean historiography, hesitate to strike the balance here in favour of the reality of the eclipse of Kleombrotos? The eclipse of Xerxes may easily pass into the same category as the other portents recorded to have marked the king's ill-omened departure from Sardes, or from Sestos, for the invasion of Hellas.³ The invention, or the transfer, of this portent to the spring of the year 480 B.C. may have been facilitated by the actual occurrence of an eclipse, visible at Sardes, two years later, possibly just as Xerxes was leaving the old Lydian capital in order to return to Upper Asia. But the sheer invention of so appropriate a portent was hardly beyond the licence of Hellenic logography; and, in any case, the October eclipse visible at the Isthmos, and fitting in admirably with the perspective of Salamis and its sequel, remains an irrefragable support to the proposed equation of the year of Salamis with Ol. 75. 1, or 480-479 B.C., and the legitimate conclusion of the whole argument in this section is, that we may endorse, with complete assurance, the proposed, and generally accepted, dates, according to our era, for the *biennium* of the great Persian war.

§ 4. III. When from these broad and general conclusions we advance to the attempted solution of the many problems connected with the exact order of events recorded for the two years in question, we may soon lose our bearings amid manifold alternatives and conflicting possibilities. The standard and resources of Herodotus were not adequate to an exact chronology of the operations and occurrences of the period. The supplementary authorities do very little to improve his results. It will be well before attempting to reconstruct in outline, and to present in tabular form, a chronology for the two campaigns, that we should take stock of the chronological resources of Herodotus, and mark the chief *cruces* which the errors and shortcomings of his chronological apparatus have left on our hands. We shall then, perhaps, be reasonably disposed to acquiesce in a chronological perspective which leaves not a little to be desired. The defect of the apparatus, and the poverty of the devices to which the historian was driven to make good that defect, will be seen to leave the nicer determination of the time-values largely hypothetical.

§ 5. A precise and correct chronometry is the basis of accurate chronology; but the chronometry of Herodotus was not complete nor

¹ Cp. note to 9. 10. 13.

² Cp. note to 7. 37. 7.

³ Cp. notes to 7. 57. 1, 7.

exact. The divisions of night and day, of month and year, based upon astronomical considerations are familiarly employed by him, but neither precision nor system is attained in the use of these natural divisions. The most elementary distinction in time is, of course, supplied by the succession of light and darkness¹; but Herodotus is content with somewhat vague indications for the subdivisions of day and of night: daybreak, dawn, sunrise, forenoon, mid-day, early afternoon, late afternoon, sunset, are rather obvious than exact indications²; the 'full market time' and 'the time of the lighting of the lamps' are rather picturesque than precise³; there is no attempt to utilize the dial or gnomon, or the twelve segments of the day which the Hellenes, as Herodotus elsewhere affirms, had borrowed of the Babylonians, in the records of military operations.⁴ Night, the kindly time of repose, required, perhaps, less precise subdivision than the day, as a rule; but in warfare vigilance was exercised, and we find, though rarely, indications of more precision for the night-time than for the day in the narrative of Herodotus.⁵ Such indications suggest that the historian's methods hardly reproduce with fidelity the practice of the age, which was less haphazard than might be inferred from the records.

Multiples of days appear both short of the month, and in excess.⁶ An ambiguity arises in some such cases from the doubt whether the figures are to be reckoned inclusively, or exclusively. The conventional Hellenic week may sometimes underlie a seemingly precise indication,⁷ and in one case, perhaps, the conventional Semitic week insinuates itself.⁸ But the precise and consecutive diaries for Artemision-Thermopylai, for Salamis, for Plataia, and for other episodes,⁹ challenge serious attention as bases for a real reconstruction of the story. The 'forty-five' days for the 'flight' of Xerxes would look

¹ Cp. for *νύξ*, 7. 217 (*πᾶσαν τὴν νύκτα*); 8. 12, 13, 56, 76; 9. 10, 51, 118, etc.; for *ἡμέρη*, 7. 183 (*πανημερόν*), 219; 8. 14; 9. 11, etc. etc.

² e.g. *ἥως διέφαινε* 7. 217, 8. 83, 9. 47; *ἄμα ὄρθριον* 7. 188, *ἄμα ἡοῖ* 7. 219, *ἄμα ἡλίῳ σκιδναμένῳ* 8. 23, *ἡλίου ἀνατείλαντος* 7. 223, *ἄμα τῷ ἡλίῳ ἀνιόντι* 8. 64; *πρωὶ ἔτι τῆς ἡμέρης* 9. 101; *κατὰ μέσον ἡμέρης* 8. 15, *μέχρι μέσον ἡμέρης ὕδ.*; *περὶ δειλὴν πρωτὴν γυνομένην* 8. 6, *μέχρι δειλῆς ὀψίης* 7. 167, *δειλὴν ὀψίην γυνομένην τῆς ἡμέρης* (*φυλάξαντες*) 8. 9, *περὶ δειλὴν* 9. 101; *πρὸ δύντος ἡλίου* 7. 149.

³ *ἐς ἀγορῆς κον μάλιστα πληθῶρην* 7. 223, *περὶ λύχρων ἀφάς* 7. 215.

⁴ Cp. 2. 109 *πόλον μὲν γὰρ καὶ γνώμονα καὶ τὰ δώδεκα μέρεα τῆς ἡμέρης παρὰ Βαβυλωνίων ἔμαθον οἱ Ἕλληνες*. The use of *ὥρη* in 8. 14, 9. 56 is remarkable.

⁵ *εὐφρόνη* 8. 12, 14, etc., *πρόσω τῆς νυκτός* 9. 44, *νύκτα μέσσην* 8. 9, *μέσαι νύκτες* 8. 76, *δευτέρη φυλακή* 9. 51 (see note *ad l.*). 3. 104, 4. 181 take Hdt. all round the clock.

⁶ *ὑστεραίη* 7. 54, 212; 8. 22, 26; 9. 15, 93; *δευτέρη* (= *ὑστεραίη*) 7. 192; 8. 54, 55; 9. 33, 84; *δύο ἡμέρας* 9. 41; *τρίτῃ* 8. 15, *ἡμέρας τρεῖς* 7. 191, 8. 66, cp. *τριταῖος* 7. 196; *τετάρτῃ* 7. 192, *τέσσερας ἡμέρας* 7. 210; *πέμπτῃ* 7. 210; (*ἔξ* 8. 66); *ἑπτα* 7. 56; *ὀκτώ* 9. 36; *δέκα* 9. 8, 40; *ἐνδεκα* 7. 183, *ἐνδεκάτῃ* 9. 41, 86; *εἰκοστῇ* 9. 87; *ἐν πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ἡμέρησι* 8. 115; *ὀλίγας ἡμέρας* 8. 113; *ἡμέρησι οὐ πολλῇσι* 9. 17.

⁷ Cp. 7. 183; 9. 8, 41, 86, 87.

⁸ 7. 56.

⁹ But hardly 7. 8–19; cp. Introduction, § 3, p. xv; Appendix II. § 2.

more like a genuine fossil-fact, if it were not just exactly half the period of his advance.¹

The 'month' unfortunately is employed but rarely by Herodotus as a division of the year, or a unit of chronometry, and that without kalendarial title or specification. It remains doubtful whether his months are official loans from this or that state-record, or merely rough-and-ready modes of reckoning from point to point for periods of eight and twenty, or thirty days. Thus the Barbarians spent 'one month' in the passage of the Hellespont, and in 'three months more' appeared in Attica.² The siege of Poteidaia by Artabazos lasted upwards of 'three months.'³ The recapture of Athens by Mardonios took place 'ten months after' its capture by Xerxes.⁴ These estimates do not advance the precision of the chronology to any appreciable extent. Still less do the notices of the varying 'seasons' of the year enable us to date the events of the season precisely. Such notices are valuable for the general outline and structure of the chronology of the war, but leave the events of each spring, summer, autumn, and winter, to be chronologized by simple sequence, or other considerations.⁵

Nor is the Herodotean 'year' itself quite free from ambiguity. For the actual story of the war, indeed, this ambiguity is almost a matter of indifference: the 'years' may be taken as campaigning years, beginning with 'the spring,' and the spring may be supposed to begin with the Attic month Elaphebolion.⁶ But in cases where Herodotus, in the course of his narrative, or in digressions, has occasion to exceed the limits of the campaigning *triëteris*, or *biennium*, the distinction between official years and point to point years, between full years and nominal years, complicate and obscure the chronology of events, while the absence of any method of fixing the particular 'year' leaves us in doubt and difficulty. The 'thirty-six years' of the reign of Dareios apparently carry back to the death of Kambyzes, and are taken ultimately from an official Persian source.⁷ The Herodotean chronology of the interval between Marathon and the Great Invasion, probably based on Greek materials, leaves much to be desired, but fortunately can be controlled from other sources.⁸ The Sikeliote chronology comes to very little with Herodotus, outside the history of the war itself.⁹ The items of ancient history casually preserved, or introduced, in the Army and Navy Lists, and elsewhere, lie quite

¹ 8. 51, 115. ² 8. 115. ³ 8. 129.

⁴ 9. 3 *δεκάμηρος* (perhaps only nine months).

⁵ ἄμα τῷ ἔαρι 7. 37, ὥρην τοῦ ἔτους καλλίστην 7. 50, ἔαρος δὲ ἐπιλάμψαντος (πρώιος κτλ.) 8. 130, τὸ ἔαρ γινόμενον 8. 132; τῆς ὥρης μέσον θέρος 8. 12; ἐτησιέων ἀνέμων 7. 168; ἀνωρίη τοῦ ἔτους πολυμέειν

8. 113, φθινόπωρον 9. 117; χειμερίσας 7. 37, χειμερίζοντος 8. 126, ἐχειμέριζε 8. 130, ἐχειμέρισαν *ibid.*, ἐχείμαζε 8. 133.

⁶ Cp. δευτέρῳ ἔτει τούτων 7. 80; καρπῶν ἐστερηθῆτε διξῶν 8. 142.

⁷ 7. 4.

⁸ 7. 1, 20. Cp. Appendix III.

⁹ 7. 154, 155.

beyond the present argument¹; but the want of a recognizable and current chronometry is deplorable in relation to the events of the *Pentekontaëteris*, wherein chronological precision would have been authoritative on the part of Herodotus.² There is not one single precise date given by Herodotus for the events of that period, unless the mere hearsay 'ten years' in the scandal against the Aiginetans is to be accounted such.³ Nor can the author's references to his own present, or his own date, be precisely fixed within his generation.⁴

§ 6. But to return to the war, which is here the immediate subject of investigation. The absence of precision in regard to months and days notwithstanding, there is a certain degree of chronological satisfaction rendered in the orderly narrative of events as serial, and the express or implied synchronisms between different series, or different incidents. A synchronism, at least when marked as such, implies a reckoning and a time calculus; and even the mere temporal sequence of events, when represented in a consequential narrative, enables us to realize the time-conditions just in proportion as it is full and coherent upon the material and effective side. A great deal of the chronology of Herodotus in the last three Books, and there more than elsewhere, fulfils these less formal conditions in the mere structure and design of his narrative. Synchronisms, of more than one order, are marked, or occur, again and again in the record; while the story as a whole, and the minor episodes which go to make it up, are generally presented in the eventual order of succession. Internal synchronisms supplied by Herodotus are of three orders, corresponding roughly to a diminishing scale of probability. There are (i.) the broad general synchronisms of action upon the Persian side and upon the Greek side, or, again, upon sea and upon land, or generally between independent series of actions and events occupying considerable sections of time; and these larger synchronisms underlie the general structure of the narrative. So, for example, the whole account of the preparations on the Persian and Greek sides—in other words, the first and second parts of the seventh Book—present two series of events, transacted in different theatres, but broadly of contemporaneous occurrence. A similar synchronism obtains between the invasion of Hellas by Xerxes and the invasion of Sicily by Amilkar; or, again, between the campaign of Plataia in the second year of the war and the operations of the fleet in Ionia, though this synchronism can hardly be regarded as in any sense a mere coincidence. These larger and general synchronisms, however, advance the argument but a little way. More problematic and more profitable are (ii.) the synchronisms asserted or implied for

¹ Apart from these a considerable number of items are simply dated *πρότερον τούτων*, or similarly; cp. 7. 106, 150, 164, 194; 8. 27, 96; 9. 37.

² Cp. Introduction, § 8.

³ 9. 85. 15. Cp. note *ad l.*

⁴ *νῦν* 7. 108, 123, 129, 170, 176, 178, 225; 8. 33, 73; *εἰσι* 7. 111, 200; *πέμπεται* 7. 106; *ἔτι καὶ ἐς τότε* 7. 107, 123, 193; 9. 73; *ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἡμέας* 8. 39; *ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ* 8. 121; *κατ' ἐμὲ* 7. 170; *τὸ μέχρι ἐμεῦ* 7. 111, 115.

minor passages, and periods, within the general action, such as (1) the movements of the Persian fleets and armies from the Hellespont to Doriskos, from Doriskos to Akanthos, from Akanthos to Therme; (2) the engagements at Artemision and at Thermopylai; (3) the retreat of Xerxes and the blockade of Andros, etc., to say nothing of the numerous operations on the various battle-fields, where the synchronous actions of the two sides are involved in the continuous narrative. Further, there are (iii.) particular and precise synchronisms at various points, which help to space the narrative, but can seldom be treated as indisputable, such as the date for the expedition to Tempe, 'whenas Xerxes was at Abydos' (7. 172, 174), the Delphic utterance, 'what time the Persian was in Pieria' (7. 178), the occupation of Thermopylai while the king was in Thessaly (7. 208), the coincidence between the Olympian Festival and the defence of the pass (7. 206, 8. 26), an objective and not merely a relative indication. Most precise of all are the synchronisms of Salamis and Himera (7. 166), of Mykale and Plataia (9. 90), albeit neither can be regarded as indubitable, nor does either in itself supply an objective fixture to the chronology of the war.

Among the most valuable aids to the determination of the true chronology are the records expressly designed, or incidental, of (iv.) the synchronism of military operations, or other events, with festivals and holy days, the places of which in the Greek calendars are ascertainable and so reducible to our notation, such as the Olympia just named, the Karneia (7. 206, 8. 73), the Eleusinia (8. 65), the Hyakinthia (9. 7, 11). Yet the citation, or the equivalence, between the holy day and the event is seldom so precise and definite as to serve an exact chronological purpose: the notices rank as general confirmations of the season, and succession, of reported incidents, without enabling us to reduce the dates to months and days. It is far more certain that the invasion of Greece took place in the year 480 B.C. than that the defence of Thermopylai exactly synchronized with the Olympic *Agon* of that year: the battle of Salamis assuredly took place in the year of Kalliades, and in the month Boëdromion, but whether on the twentieth day of that month must remain an open question, even after the external authorities ancillary to Herodotus have been examined. As the visit of the Athenian envoys to Sparta, in the spring of 479 B.C., lasted apparently upwards of ten days, and the *Hyakinthia* to which it is dated was but a three days' festival, the synchronism is obviously only approximate.

Divided but by a hair's breadth from such synchronisms on the one hand, and from the ordinary succession of acts and events, as presented in a coherent narrative, on the other, are some cases of (v.) immediate combination where antecedent and consequent are expressly related as cause and effect, such as the evacuation of Artemision and the fortification of the Isthmos, consequential upon the fall of Thermopylai (8. 21, 71); the capture of the Athenian Akropolis and the projected

flight of the Peloponnesians from Salamis (8. 56); or the second retirement of the Athenians to Salamis as a result of the advance of Mardonios (9. 3). But for the most part the causal nexus of events is left to be inferred from (vi.) the sequence, in which the events are narrated, and the order of narration, within the various sections or passages of the story, is assumed or intended to be chronological. Frequently the chronological order is incidentally confirmed by geographical considerations, as in the record of the movements of fleets and armies; but, except for the journals and the other express and incidental notes of time, already specified, exact periods or intervals are not ascertainable. To exhibit in detail the chronological quality of the narrative, as a record of serial action and event, would involve rewriting the whole story, as has indeed been done times without number: let it here suffice to emphasize once more the merit of Herodotus as a mere story-teller, whereby the order, in which the actions are made to succeed one another in time, carries with it a suggestion of their real connexion, dispensing with tedious formulas and with reflective digressions.

§ 7. But the narrated order of events, unless based upon accurate and adequate materials, such as were far beyond the range of Herodotus even for the history of the Persian war, is bound to give way, more or less constantly, at the critical moment; hence the long list of chronological *crucis* in the Herodotean *Logoi* of the war, wherein the real connexion of events is largely a matter of argument, and the chronological becomes a deduction from the causal sequence. Such cases are the following: (1) the Delphic Responses to Athens before Salamis; (2) the Congress at the Isthmos; (3) the vow to 'betithe' the 'Medizers'; (4) the application and admission of the Thessalians to the Confederacy; (5) the attempted circumnavigation of Euboia by a Persian squadron, and sundry other preliminaries or details connected with the engagements off Artemision; (6) the fortification of the Isthmos; (7) the mission of Sikinnos, the movements of the Persian fleet before Salamis, and other incidents of the engagement; (8) the building of the mole; (9) the blockade of Andros; (10) the diary of Plataia, including important incidents, such as 'the dispute for precedence,' 'the message of Alexander,' 'the exchange of positions,' and so forth. These are but leading examples of questions that perplex the student at every turn.¹ And the problem is not so much to obtain an objective date for the given event, as to determine whether the event is placed in its proper order in the historic series. True, more than the mere chronological order is generally in question; the event is suspect, not merely in its date, but in its circumstances, in itself. But its anachronistic appearance is often one of the chief reasons for condemning its historical character; and the bare fact may

¹ Specially interesting is the chronological problem raised by 7. 158 (πρότερον).

often be preserved for history by redating its occurrence. Such recourse to other methods for correcting the chronological defect, or error, can seldom, if ever, carry the full assurance of an ample and authentic chronicle. Had it occurred to the Attic historians—Thucydides and Xenophon, for example—boldly to date contemporary events by the months and days of the Attic kalendar, we should now be in a vastly more favourable position for the reconstruction of the history of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Such a demand, if addressed to Herodotus, who was neither Athenian, nor contemporary with the main course of events recorded by him, would be a hypercritical censure. None the less we have to deplore the absence of any precise standard or method of chronologizing the story; and we have to make the best of the express synchronism, of the mere succession, of the undesigned coincidence, of the occasional and somewhat arbitrary journal, of the more explicit chronological note, here and there, not always free from a suspicion of artifice. Worse still, we are at times driven to make the chronology a function of the causal connexion, real or supposed, between events. The freedom with which Herodotus in his narrative moves from side to side, equally at home, as he appears to be, in Susa and in Syracuse, on Attic or Asian ground, aggravates the chronological chaos. His alternating excursions with the fleets and armies, whether Persian or Greek, complicate the synchronistic problems. True, the whole matter moves within narrow limits. Given the two years for the two campaigns, we can hardly ever be more than a few days, or a few weeks, out of the true reckoning for the sequences and the synchronisms of the events recorded. But in such cases, notably in military matters, a day or two, an hour or two, more or less, may throw the whole machine out of gear, and distort the whole perspective. The rationale of events depends upon their order, the credibility of movements upon their duration. The precise synchronism of the battles of Himera and Salamis makes little or no difference to our appreciation of the events; but a few days' interval between Plataia and Mykale would open the door wide to rational explanations of the conduct and speech of Leotychidas. Again, looking beyond Herodotus, we shall not accept the *hysteron proteron* by which Ktesias inverts the whole perspective of the war after Thermopylai¹; but we may well feel some doubt whether Herodotus has correctly timed all the antecedents of the victory of Salamis as against Aischylos. Apart from any conflict of authorities, the lack of an exact and consistent chronometry in the prime authority for the story of the war leaves us again and again the prey of conflicting hypotheses, precludes too often the ascertainment of the true relation between events, and even throws doubt upon the reality of this or that occurrence, or transaction, however minutely recorded or described.

¹ Appendix I. § 5, p. 25 *supra*.

§ 8. There is, unfortunately, very little in the subsequent authorities which goes beyond combinations and inferences deducible from the Herodotean record itself; nor is there any additional precision forthcoming until we reach Plutarch's *Lives* and *Moralia*. The gross *hysteron proteron* in Ktesias already noticed involves, of course, a chronological blunder of the first order. The *Marmor Parium*¹ confirms the period and epoch, but works on too small a scale to chronologize details. Diodoros,² with his apparatus of Olympiads, Archons and Consuls, has, in spite of his aberrations and carelessnesses, effected something for ancient chronology as a whole; but, for the precise chronology of so short a period as the Medic war, his data are almost negligible. He specifies, indeed, its biennial duration expressly, and he distributes the main events of the two years in the Herodotean order; but, as the Consular year does not correspond to the Archontic, nor the Olympian to the Herodotean war-year, he is only saved from serious confusion by the limits of the subject, and his obvious preference for the rhetorical presentation of history. Thus, his reduction of the engagements off Artemision to two days, his oblivion of the synchronism with the fighting at Thermopylai, his apparent date for the awards of the Salaminian *Aristeia* and the embassies at Athens to the year of 'Xanthippos' (479-478 B.C.), carry no weight. His recognition of the synchronism of Mykale and Plataia is a homage to the Herodotean tradition, the more remarkable in view of the temptation which he, or his authority Ephoros, apparently felt to rationalize away the mysterious rumour of victory into an invention of the Commanders, a process surely more easily accomplished by denying the synchronism; his transfer of the synchronism with Himera from Salamis to Thermopylai is a transparent *Sicilianism*, probably taken over from Timaios and perhaps intended to justify the inference, expressly drawn, that the victory of Gelon was an encouragement to the national confederacy at home. There is, in fact, little to be gained for the critique of Herodotus, in regard to the reconstruction of the precise chronology of the war, from the Library of the Sicilian. One datum in Diodoros is, however, of more apparent promise: according to the terms of the vow, to which the foundation of the *Eleutheria* is traced, the Festival should mark the exact day of the battle of Plataia: if that be so, a supplement from Plutarch clinches the point. Plutarch,³ indeed, preserves what at first sight appears precise information regarding the exact days to which the battles of Salamis and Plataia may be dated; but unfortunately he gives variant, though precise, dates for each event. Thus he dates the battle of Salamis in one place to the twentieth of Boëdromion, and in two other places to the sixteenth of Mounychion, a wholly unseasonable date. The former may be an inference, and possibly a correct inference, from

¹ Appendix I. § 11, p. 57 *supra*.

² Appendix I. § 13, pp. 66 ff. *supra*.

³ Appendix I. § 14, pp. 87, 89.

the story of the Eleusinian vision in Herodotus¹; the other is almost certainly an erroneous identification of the Commemoration-day with the anniversary of the actual battle. The variation in regard to the day of Plataia is puzzling from its very insignificance, ranging only over twenty-four hours. If the statement quoted from Diodoros be correct, and Plutarch be right in dating the *Eleutheria* to the fourth of Boëdromion, a definite point is gained for the reduction of the chronology to our notation. The alternative suggests itself of dating the battle to the third, and the Festival in its honour to the fourth. But a material objection arises from the fact that the defeat of the Persians was not the end of the campaign, nor were the Greeks quite at liberty to institute the Thanksgiving before the fall of Thebes, some twenty days later; a formal objection arises from the analogy of other cases, where the *Eucharisteria* for victory are rarely, if ever, celebrated on the precise anniversary of the event.

§ 9. The conclusion of the whole matter is not altogether flattering to the ambition of your student of antiquity. Relatively satisfactory as the chronology of the Persian war appears, it falls far short of modern standards, and methods nowadays practised as matters of course. There is but one event recorded in the last three Books of Herodotus which can be dated with absolute accuracy, to wit, the eclipse of the sun in the autumn of 480 B.C. Even the action of Kleombrotos associated therewith may have followed after an interval of a day, or more, and cannot therefore be so precisely chronologized. The battle of Salamis will have taken place upon a day before that eclipse, and after the vision of Demaratos, and Boëdromion 20 is an acceptable date, at least for regulative purposes, say, September 22; but absolute certainty has already given place to approximative conjecture. The precise interval between the battle of Salamis and the engagements at Artemision and Thermopylai is still more problematical: it can be inferred with certainty neither from the diaries of the army and fleet for the interval, nor from the alleged synchronism between the defence of Thermopylai and the Olympian Festival. For the operations of the Persian army and fleet during some three weeks before the fall of Thermopylai, Herodotus furnishes an ostensible journal, possibly based upon Ionian log-books, and in any case acceptable as an artistic perspective, carrying the movement back to Therme. Certainly the better part of three months (90 days) is thus accounted for. For the march through Thrake and Makedon precise indications are wanting, but it must have been rapid, if three months covered the whole time from the start at Sestos down to the arrival of Xerxes in Athens, about the middle of the month Boëdromion, and some days before the actual battle. A month is

¹ It must be remembered that the Attic 'day' began (like the Hebrew) with sunset, and therein differed as well from the Roman as from our own.

expressly assigned by Herodotus for the passage of the Hellespont; and if three weeks are allowed for the march from Sardes to Abydos, and twenty days for the pauses at Doriskos and in Pieria, there is no great difficulty in bringing back the start from Sardes to the middle of the month Elaphebolion, the right time for such undertakings.

'Ten months' after its occupation by Xerxes Athens was reoccupied by Mardonios. The usual difficulties recur in dealing with this estimate. The ten months in any case cover the autumn, winter, spring, and part of the summer of the years 480-479 B.C. Xerxes may have reached Sestos on his return journey about the middle, and Sardes before the end, of the month Maimakterion. The three months' siege of Poteidaia just occupies the winter; the events in Greece recorded in the last part of the eighth Book fall into the winter and early spring.¹ Mardonios must have reached Athens before the Attic new year, at latest in the month Skirophorion, the tenth month reckoning inclusively from the previous Boëdromion; but the mention of the *Hyakinthia* might point to the previous month, and, if insisted on, would press back the date of the King's entry by a nominal month. In any case, time can be found for the journals of Plataia before the fourth of Boëdromion, or even, divorcing victory and celebration, before a day towards the end of the previous month, Metageitnion. We may allow the synchronism with Mykale to pass, without undertaking to cast the log of the fleet during the interval since its muster in the spring. The events of the autumn and early winter, so far as recorded by Herodotus, fall into easy perspective: the siege of Sestos began apparently some time before the autumn, and no doubt before the end of the month Boëdromion; it may have surpassed in duration the siege of Poteidaia in the previous winter; and the exact date of the return home of the Athenian fleet remains one of the unresolved problems in chronology. Upon the lines of these considerations and rough estimates the following tables have been constructed, hypothetically, and merely for graphic purposes.²

¹ By a curious *hysteron proteron* the spring movements of the Greek fleet (8. 131 f.) are preposited to the winter concerns of Mardonios (8. 133 ff.).

² The equivalence between the Attic and modern months is assumed as merely approximate.


§ 10.—FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR

OL. 74.4 = 481-480 B.C.	PERSIANS	GREEKS	<i>Archon</i> : Hypsichides, 'Αθ. π. 22. 8 <i>Strategos</i> : Themistokles, Hdt. 7. 173
Elaphebolion : March	Xerxes leaves Sardes, 7. 37		
Mounychion : April	passage of the Hellespont, 7. 54	expedition to Tempe, 7. 173	
Thargelion : May	muster at Doriskos, 7. 59		
Skirophorion : June	pause at Therme, 7. 127		
OL. 75.1 = 480-479 B.C.			<i>Archon</i> : Kalliades, Hdt. 8. 51 ; <i>Mar. Par.</i> 51 ; Diodoros 11. 1. 2 <i>Strategos</i> : Themistokles, Hdt. 8 <i>passim</i>
Hekatombaion : July	reaches Thermopylai, 7. 196, 198	defeat at Thermopylai	
		evacuation of Artemision, 8. 21	
Metageitnion : August	Xerxes in Athens, 8. 51		
		evacuation of Athens, 8. 40	
Boëdromion : September	b. of Salamis, 8. 65, 83	victory at Salamis	
Pyanepsion : October	Xerxes in Thessaly, 8. 114	expedition to Andros (?), 8. 111	[partial rebuilding of Athens]
Maimakterion : November	Xerxes reaches Sestos, 8. 117	meeting at the Isthmos (?), 8. 123	
Poseideon : December	siege of Poteidaia, 8. 126-129	Themistokles in Sparta, 8. 124	
Gamelion : January	„	Alexander in Athens, 8. 140	
Anthesterion : February	„	[plan of campaign ?]	

SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR

Ol. 75.1 = 480-479 B.C.— <i>continued</i>	PERSIANS	GREEKS	
Elaphebolion : March	Mardonios in Thessaly, 8. 131, 133 ; 9. 1	the fleet at Aigina, 8. 131	
Mounychion : April	passes Thermopylai	the fleet at Delos, 8. 132	
Thargelion : May	Mardonios in Thebes, 9. 2	evacuation of Attica, 9. 3	
Skirophorion : June	reoccupies Athens, 9. 3	[the fleet at Salamis]	
Ol. 75.2 = 479-478 B.C.			<i>Archon</i> : Xanthippos, <i>Mar. Par.</i> 52 ; Diodoros, 11. 27. 1 ; Xanthippides, Plutarch, <i>Aristeid.</i> 5 <i>Strategos</i> : Aristeides, Hdt. 9. 28, etc.
Hekatombaion : July	retires into Boiotia, 9. 13	the fleet at Samos, 9. 96	
Metageitnion : August	battle of Plataia, 9. 56	battle of Mykale, 9. 100	
Boëdromion : September	retreat of Artabazos, 9. 89	siege of Sestos, 9. 114	
Pyanepsion : October	Artabazos in Thessaly, 9. 89	„	Fortification of Athens : Thuc. 1. 90
Maimakterion : November	Artabazos in Makedon, 9. 89	„	
Poseideon : December	Artabazos in Thrake, 9. 89	„	
Gamelion : January	passage of the Bosporos, 9. 89	capture of Sestos, 9. 118	
Anthesterion : February	(reaches Sardes)	return of the fleet, 9. 121	

CENTRAL GREECE



INDICES

- I. *LECTIONUM*
- II. *VERBORUM*
- III. *NOMINUM*
- IV. *RERUM*
- V. *AUCTORUM*

The references in Index I. are to Book, Chapter, and Line. In the other Indices the Roman figures denote pages of the Introduction. Arabic figures, with an a or b added, denote the left and right columns respectively of the Commentary in Vol. I.; without any addition, the pages of Vol. II. [] denote that the word does not occur *in l. c.* or in Herodotus.

INDEX I

LECTIONUM

(The references are merely to notes in the Commentary.)

BOOK 7

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. 4 ἐποίεε | 40. 10 μέγα | 136. 4 ὠθεύμενοι |
| 7 παρέχειν | 42. 5 Ἀδραμύττειον | 137. 11 τοὺς ἐκ Τίρυνθος |
| 8 καὶ πλοῖα | 58. 14 λίμνην | 18 μετὰ δὲ—ἀνὴρ |
| 2. 5 Γοβρύεω θυγατρός | 61. 2 τιάρας καλεομένους | 139. 4 τὸν ἐπιόντα |
| 6. 9 ἀλλ' εἰ | 4 lacuna | 21 ἀμαρτάνοι τὸ |
| 17 ἀφανιζοῖατο | 63. 8 τούτων δὲ μεταξὺ | ἀληθές |
| 8. 16 τε | Χαλδαῖοι | 23 ἐλόμενοι . . ἐπεγεί- |
| 29 ἀπικόμενοι | 64. 3 ἀγχότατα | ραντες |
| 32 τά | 4 οἱ Σκύθαι | 140. 5 ἐς |
| 10. 31 τῶν γεφυρέων τοῦ | 76. 1 lacuna | 13 ρεοῦμενοι |
| Ἰστρου | 1 ὠμοβοῖνας | 141. 3 κεκρησμένον |
| 60-65 δ δὲ . . κακὸς | 2 λυκιοεργέας | 9 μένομεν |
| εἶναι | 77. 4 εἴματα ἐνεπεπορ- | 143. 5 ἐόντως |
| 11. 8 <καί> . . <τοῦ Κύρου> | πέατο | 14 εἰπεῖν |
| 15. 1 καλέοντα | 81. 5 <οἱ> | 144. 4 τῶν ἀπὸ Λαυρείου |
| 4 ἐσωφρόνεον | 86. 8 Κᾶσπιοι | 6 διηκοσίας |
| 16. 17 ἐώντά | 88. 3 ἐπὶ . . περιέ- | 7 λέγων |
| 36 δεδόκηται | πесе | 11 αὐταί τε κτλ. |
| 18. 11 συστρατευσάμενος | 90. 2 ἐστάλατο | 145. 7 ἐγκεκρημένοι |
| 21. 6 ἄμα | 96. 2 τούτων | 17 οὐδαμῶν . . μέξω |
| 22. 1 πταισάντων | 97. 7 τριηκόντεροι . . | 152. 10 παντάπασιν |
| 8 ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων | τρισχίλια | 153. 15 καὶ τοῦτο |
| 25. 7 σίτον | 98. 3 Σιρώμου | 154. 5 lacuna |
| 26. 6 ἄρα | 101. 11 μὴ ἐόντες ἄρθμοι | 157. 10 <γάρ> . . μεγάλως |
| 29. 11 ἐπιδέες | 14 χρήσωμαι | 158. 18 Ἑλλήνων |
| 31. 7 μελεδωνῶ ἀθανάτω | 104. 5 τυγχάνω . . ἐκεί- | 162. 6-11 'manifestum |
| ἀνδρὶ | nous | scholium' |
| 35. 4 στιγέας | 109. 8 ἰὼν | 164. 5 παρὰ |
| 10 θολερῶ | 13 Πίστυρος | 165. 8 Ἀννωνος |
| 36. 7 Πόντου | 111. 8, 9 οὗτοι . . ποικιλώ- | 170. 13 ἀντὶ δὲ εἶναι |
| 8 ἀνακωχεύη | τερον | 17 οὕτω |
| 9 τῆς ἐτέρης . . | 115. 8 καὶ τῶν . . οἰκεόν- | 171. 7 ἀπὸ |
| 9 ζεφύρου | των | 9 νέμεσθαι κτλ. |
| 11 τριηρέων | 119. 13 ὁμοσιτεύουσι | 172. 1 ὥς διέδεξαν |
| 20 τοῦ νόου | 15 ἔσκε κτλ. | 2 ὅτι οὐ σφι ἦνδανε |
| 39. 1 ἀμείβετο | 121. 6 lacuna | κτλ. |
| 5 αὐτῇ τῇ γυναικί | 122. 5 ἀπιέμενος | 173. 11 οὐ |
| 40. 3 σύμμικτος . . δια- | 123. 1 Σιθωνίη | 17 σημαινόντες κτλ. |
| κεκρίμενοι | 129. 26 φαίνεται | 176. 9 ἐόντας ἐόδσα |

- | | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 181. 2 Ἀσωνίδης | 194. 14 <περι>έσεσθαι | 228. 4 ποκά τᾶδε τρια- |
| 186. 3 ἀκάτοισι | 197. 3 τὰ περὶ . . Διός | κοσάιαι |
| 187. 6 ὥστε . . [παρί- | 205. 16 ἄλλα φρονέοντες | 8 ὃ ξεῖν' κτλ. |
| σταται] | 212. 10 [εὐρισκόν] | 229. 13 λιποψυχέοντα |
| 8 εὐρίσκω γὰρ κτλ. | 215. 1 <οί> | 14 ἴαλογήσαντα |
| 13 lacuna | 216. 5 λήγει κτλ. | 237. 7 τῇ σιγῇ |
| 191. 6 γόησι | 220. 5 τὴν γνώμην πλεῖ- | 12 πέρι |
| 193. 2 Ποσειδέωνος . . | στος εἰμί | 238. 19 ἀκεῦνται |
| νομίζοντες | 23 μούνων | 239. (the whole) |
| 194. 4 τῶν κτλ. | 223. 14 lacuna | 1 τὸ |
| 12 ἐργασμένος | 228. 1 lacuna | 3 δὴ |

Book 8

- | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. 1 lacuna | 69. 6 ἀνακρίσι | 109. 11 ἀνωσάμενοι |
| 2. 2 εἴρηται κτλ. | 11 παρεσκεύαστο | 17 ἀλλ' |
| 5. 11 πληγέντες | 73. 11 ἐκδεδωρίενται | 18 νῦν μὲν . . ἐπι- |
| 6. 9 φεύξεσθαι | 12 τοῦ χρόνου | μεληθῆναι |
| 8. 11 τούτους | 74. 2 [δρόμου] | 111. 10 θεῶν χρηστῶν |
| 10. 1 ὀρώντες | 76. 6 [τὴν] Κυνόσουραν | ἤκοιεν εὖ |
| 15. 1 τι | 77. totum cap. | 113. 11 ἄλλην |
| 9 παρήσουσι | 12 [ἐς] | 14 ἐν |
| 16. 8 ἀγωνιζόμενοι | 80. 7 ὡς . . ταῦτα | 115. 3 τὸν πόρον [τῆς |
| 19. 2 βαρβάρου | 81. 2 <δι>εκπλώσαι | διαβάσιος] |
| 20 (the whole) | 84. 4 Παλληνεύς | 15 καὶ ἐν Μακεδονίῃ |
| 20. 3 προσεαἶξαντο | 85. 12 οἱ δ' . . περσιωτί | 116. 4 τὸ δρος τὴν Ῥοδόπην |
| 21. 4 παλήσειε | 90. 18 τὸ καλέεται Αἰγιά- | 119. 2 ἄλλως |
| 25. 4 καὶ Θεσπιέας | λεως | 120. 8 μάλλον . . Στρώ- |
| 27. 15 τέρας | 20 προσεβάλετο | μονος |
| 28. 1 πολιορκέοντας | 20 τι | 121. 9 ἐστήκεε . . ὁ χρύ- |
| 31. 6 ἡ περ ἦν κτλ. | 20 <Ἴωσι> | σεος |
| 35. 5 Διοκιδέων | 93. 4 πλέοι | 128. 17 καταπλήξαι |
| 37. 7 Προναίης | 9 ὡς πρότερον εἴρηται | 130. 14 σταθμεύμενοι |
| 40. 1 κατίσχει | 10 ἦσαν . . Φαλήρω | 131. 8 Εὐρυφῶντος |
| 43. 5 Πίνδου καὶ | 94. 11 ὀρησαι | 8 <τοῦ Σόου> |
| 44. 7 τὴν περ αἴην | 96. 7 καὶ Μουσαίω | 11 ἐπτά |
| 49. 8 εἰ νικηθῶσι | 11 ἐλελήθεε | 132. 17 καταπλώσαι |
| 50. 2 ἐληλύθεε | 12 φρύξουσι | 133. 2 Εὐρωπέα |
| 53. 2 ἔξοδος | 98. 3 ἀγγαρήιον | 135. 1 τόδε |
| 56. 1 ὡς | 13 τοῦτο . . ἀγγαρήιον | 9 lacuna |
| 3 ἀποθευσόμενοι | 99. 4 θυσίησι | 136. 7 Ἀλάβανδα |
| 60. 1 [πρός] | 6 κατηγορεῖξαντο | 137. 9 ἦσαν γὰρ . . χρή- |
| 5 κατηγορέειν | 100. 1 γενόμενον | μασι |
| 11 βαρυτέρας | 11 ποιεῦ | 138. 5 ποταμὸς . . σωτήρι |
| 22 περιέχεσθε | 104. 3 οἱ δὲ Πηδασέες . . | 140. 10 ἀντίον |
| 31 <κατὰ νόον> | ἐγένετο | 142. 8 ἀρχήθεν |
| 65. 28 μεταρσιωθέν | 105. 6 ἐκταμὼν ἀγωνέων | 9 ἄλλως τε τούτων |
| 67. 9 βασιλεύς | 108. 11 ἐργάσαιτο | ἀπάντων |
| 68. 4 εἰπεῖν | 109. 8 [νενικημένους] | |

Book 9

- | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. 6 χαλεπούς | 15. 8 <βουλόμενος> | 27. 24 μονομαχῆσαντες |
| 9 ἰσχυρά | 10 τεταμένον | 28. 21 Παλέες |
| 4. 7 εὐόσης | 22. 1 τῶν παρόντων | 32. 4 Φρυγῶν τε καὶ |
| 5. 5 προσφέρει | 17 ἐπόθεσαν | Μυσῶν |
| 6. 11 ὅτι . . ὡς | 23. 8 ἀποστήσαντες | 6 οἱ τε . . μάχιμοι |
| 13 ξείνους . . βαρβάρους | 25. 6 ταῦτα ἐποίουν | 11 ὡς καὶ πρότερον |
| 11. 17 τῶντ' αὐτοῦ ἐποίουν | 26. 12 ἀγορεύσασθαι | δεδήλωται |
| 14. 2 πρόδρομον | 27. 22 ἐστί | 33. 7 γόνου |

- | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| 34. 2 αἰτεομένους | 70. 20 κατειλημένοι | 93. 23 τοὺς προφήτας |
| 35. 2 πάντως | 71. 7 ὅς . . ἀτιμίην | 94. 16 δεινὰ ἐποίηε, τὸ |
| 5 μῶνοι . . πολιῆται | 10 ὁ Σπαρτιήτης | 96. 2 Καλαμίσοισι |
| 10 Ἴσθμῷ | 18 τῶν . . μάχῃ | 12 <ἀνὴρ> |
| 37. 24 σὺνγκεκυρημένον | 19 βουλόμενος ἀπο- | 97. 2 <ποταμὸν> |
| 39. 11 οὐ φειδόμενοι . . | θανεῖν | 7 παρεσκευάδατο . . |
| ἀνθρώπου | 78. 14 τετιμωρήσεται | παρεσκευάζοντο |
| 41. 8 πάντα τὸν στρατὸν | 81. 13 τάλαντα | 98. 17 ὧντος . . Ἑλλήσι |
| 45. 19 ἐξαίφνης | 82. 6 καθὼς | 100. 7 συμπιπτούσης |
| 51. 15 [Ἠερόη] | 83. 3-84 | 102. 5 ἔτι |
| 53. 12 ταῦτ' ἀναινομένου | 4 ἐπὶ | 15 οὕτω |
| 54. 6 τε εἰ | 85. 3 τοὺς ἱρένας | 104. 8 δὴ ἔφερον |
| 56. 2 ἀνακρυσσόμενος | 86. 3 αὐτῶν | 105. 2 Εὐθόινου |
| 57. 2 γε | 88. 6 διωθέεσθαι | 106. 14 ἐμπολαῖα |
| 64. 5 τῶν . . ἐόντες | 90. 2 lacuna | 107. 10 φρασθεῖς |
| 65. 9 τὸ ἱρὸν | 92. 2 οἱ μὲν . . ποιεύ- | 109. 7 τῇ δὲ |
| 66. 9 κατηρηγμένως | μενος | 110. 7 <ὁ> |
| 70. 5 Λακεδαιμονίων | 93. 3 παρὰ [<Χῶνα>] | 111. 25 κου |
| 11 ἥριπον | ποταμὸν | 116. 23 ἀφύκτως |

INDEX II

VERBORUM ET GRAECITATIS

<p> <i>ἄβατος</i> 578 b <i>ἀγαθός</i> 817 a <i>ἀγαλμα</i> 588 b, 590 a <i>ἀγασθαι</i> 593 a, 760 b <i>ἀγαυρότατα</i> 78 b <i>ἀγγαρήμιον</i> 511 b <i>ἀγγελίη</i> 377 b, 580 b, 615 a <i>ἄγγελος</i> 2 a, 6 b, 197 a, 203 b, 208 a, 224 a, 226 b, 250 a, 252 b, 303 b, 441 a, 564 a, 572 a, 584 a, 781 a <i>ἀγέεσθαι</i> 463 b <i>ἀγειν</i> 150 a, 206 a, 290 a, 391 a, 506 b, 508 a, 526 a, 603 a, 610 a, 661 a, 671 b, 790 a <i>ἀγεσθαι</i> 9 a, 813 b <i>ἀγινέειν</i> 521 b <i>ἀγκυρα</i> 52 a <i>ἀγνωμοσύνη</i> 598 a, 599 b <i>ἀγορεύειν</i> 643 a <i>ἀγορή</i> 36 b, 329 a <i>ἀγριος</i> 375 b <i>ἀγχιςτα</i> 764 a <i>ἀγχιστροφή</i> 23 a <i>ἀγχοῦ</i> 410 b, 697 b, 795 b <i>ἀγών</i> 391 b, 527 b, 585 a, 644 b, 670 a, 724 a, 777 b <i>ἀγωνίζεω</i> 644 b <i>ἀγωνίζεσθαι</i> 374 a, 379 b <i>ἀδαήμων</i> 455 b <i>ἀδαής</i> 691 a <i>ἀδάμας</i> 190 a <i>ἄδεια</i> 684 a <i>ἀδεῶς</i> 815 a <i>ἄδην</i> 678 a <i>ἄδυνασις</i> 251 a <i>ἄδυνατόν τι</i> 725 b <i>ἄδυτον</i> 188 a <i>ἄελθον</i> 802 b <i>ἄελλος</i> 293 b <i>ἄείρειν</i> 172 b, 443 b, 505 b, 581 b, 705 b, 723 a </p>	<p> <i>ἄελπτέειν</i> 239 b <i>ἄζηλος</i> 187 b <i>ἀθάνατος</i> 107 b, 314 a, 539 a <i>ἀθέμιτος</i> 589 a <i>αἰγιαλός</i> 797 a <i>αἰδέεσθαι</i> 604 a <i>αἰεῖ</i> 135 b, 527 a, 804 a, 824 a <i>αἰθρίη</i> 57 b, 278 a <i>αἱμασίη</i> 83 a <i>αἰνέειν</i> 130 b, 551 b <i>αἰνῆ</i> 536 b, 622 a <i>αἰρέειν</i> 107 b, 250 a, 252 a, 786 a, 804 a, 830 b <i>αἰρέεσθαι</i> 651 a <i>αἰσμος</i> 686 a <i>αἰσχροῦς</i> 589 a <i>αἰτέειν</i> 814 b <i>αἰτή</i> 175 a, 179 b, 513 b, 685 a, 747 b, 748 a <i>αἴτιον, τό</i> 160 b, 557 a, 606 a, 788 a <i>αἴτιος</i> 318 b <i>αἰχμῶλος</i> 756 a <i>αἰχμή</i> 210 a <i>αἰών</i> 625 b, 646 b <i>αἰωρέειν</i> 514 b <i>ἄκατος</i> 274 b <i>ἀκέεσθαι</i> 350 a <i>ἀκήρατος</i> 15 b <i>ἀκινάκης</i> 76 a, 547 a, 762 b, 811 a <i>ἀκοντιστής</i> 498 b <i>ἀκούειν</i> 375 a, 503 a, 755 b, 761 a, 768 b, 772 a, 790 a, 796 b, 810 b <i>ἄκρη</i> 79 a, 153 b, 154 b, 286 a, 524 a <i>ἄκριτος</i> 551 a <i>ἀκροβολίζεσθαι</i> 453 a <i>ἀκροθίνια</i> 548 a <i>ἄκρον</i> 401 a, 810 b <i>ἀκρόπολις</i> 417 b </p>	<p> <i>ἄκρος</i> 6 a, 141 a <i>ἄκρωτήριον</i> 321 b <i>ἄκτῆ</i> 47 b, 480 b, 507 b, 827 a <i>ἀλλαγαμός</i> 412 a <i>ἄλέειν</i> 36 a <i>ἄλέκειν</i> 310 b <i>ἄλέξης</i> 626 a <i>ἄλευρον</i> 149 a <i>ἄλεωρή</i> 602 a <i>ἄληθείη</i> 343 b, 777 b <i>ἄληθώς</i> 774 b, 779 a <i>ἄληθής</i> 587 a <i>ἄλής</i>, 387 b, 803 b <i>ἄλην</i> 176 a <i>ἄλσκεσθαι</i> 450 a, 521 a, 578 a <i>ἄλκη</i> 626 a, 744 a <i>ἄλλά</i> 13 b, 365 a, 451 a, 530 a, 583 a, 597 b, 693 b <i>ἄλλος</i> 73 b, 150 a, 239 a, 279 a, 308 b (<i>ὅτις</i>), 442 b, 539 a, 545 a, 547 a, 615 b, 741 b, 762 a, 765 a <i>ἄλλοτριος</i> 470 b <i>ἄλλ' οὐ</i> 602 a, 645 a, 688 a <i>ἄλλως</i> 399 a, 544 a, 546 a, 552 a, 585 a, 630 a <i>ἄλμυρός</i> 50 a <i>ἄλογέειν</i> 339 a, 544 a <i>ἄλογίη</i> 311 a <i>ἄλς</i> 384 a <i>ἄλσος</i> 296 a, 734 b <i>ἄλυκτάζειν</i> 744 a <i>ἄλφιτον</i> 149 a <i>ἄλωπέκεος</i> 99 b <i>ἄμα</i> (<i>adv.</i>) 377 b, 438 a, 605 a: (<i>prep.</i>) 387 b, 442 b; also 33 a, 56 b, 146 a, 278 a, 323 a, 622 a, 634 a, 688 b, 754 a <i>ἄμα μὲν . . ἄμα δέ</i> 538 a, </p>
--	--	--

- 572 b, 598 a, 602 a : ἄμα
δέ 603 a
ἄμαξιτος 647 b
ἄμαρτανειν 605 a
ἄμαρτάς 289 a, 580 b
ἄμαυροῦν 609 a
ἄμαχητί 596 a
ἄμειβειν 445 a, 446 b, 484 b,
756 b
ἄμεινω, τά 627 a
ἄμήνιτος 789 a
ἄμηχανίη 535 b
ἄμιλλα 66 b
ἄμοιβή 223 b
ἄμπλος 42 a
ἄμπωτις 557 a
ἄμυνειν (-εσθαι) 438 a, 474 a,
587 b, 803 b
ἄμφι 192 b, 193 b, 308 b,
478 b, 657 b, 718 b, 740 a,
741 a, 820 b, 825 b
ἄμφισβασίη 486 a
ἄμφισβατέειν 753 b
ἄν 131 b, 161 a, 226 a,
240 a, 275 b, 504 a, 517 a,
573 b, 582 a, 737 a, 747 b,
819 a : ἄν omitted, 725 a,
773 b
ἀνά 272 a, 457 a, 550 a,
762 a, 773 b
ἀναβαίνειν 19 b, 307 a,
321 b, 742 a
ἀναβάλλειν 605 b
ἀνάβασις 329 a
ἀναβοᾶν 349 b
ἀναβολή 385 a
ἀνάγειν (-εσθαι) 128 b,
464 b, 478 a, 488 b (bis),
790 b, 793 b
ἀναγεννώσκειν 8 b, 532 b
ἀναγκάζειν 132 b, 245 b,
523 a
ἀναγκαίη 120 b, 126 a,
183 b, 184 b, 324 a, 618 b,
623 a
ἀναγκαιώς 581 a, 590 b,
645 b
ἀνάγκη 178 b, 188 a, 251 a
ἀναγράφειν 492 b
ἀναδιδάσκειν 452 b
ἀναδραμεῖν 315 a
ἀναζευγνύναι 447 a, 681 b
ἀνάθημα 404 a, 409 a
ἀναινέσθαι 710 b
ἀναιρέειν 666 a (bis), 732 a
ἀνακαλεῖν 383 a
ἀνακαλέειν 782 b
ἀνακείσθαι 396 b
ἀνακρίνεσθαι 714 a
ἀνάκρισις 464 a
ἀνακροῦναι 489 b
ἀνάκτορον 735 a
ἀνακώς 530 a
ἀνακωχεύειν 51 b, 128 b,
239 a, 613 b
ἀναλαμβάνειν 213 a, 340 b,
528 b, 638 b, 704 b,
708 a
ἀνάλωτος 438 b
ἀναμάχεσθαι 528 b
ἀναμένειν 718 b
ἀναμνησκειν 583 a
ἀνάξιος 13 b
ἀναξυρίς 84 a, 89 a
ἀναπεπταμένος 447 b
ἀναπεταννύναι 607 a
ἀναπλάσσειν 530 a
ἀναπνέειν 375 b
ἀνάπυστος 814 a
ἀναρπάζειν 397 a, 723 b
ἀναρρίπτειν 71 a
ἀνάρσιος 673 b, 816 a
ἀναρτέσθαι 12 a
ἀναρχίη 635 a
ἀνασκολοπίζειν 760 a
ἀνάσπαστος 104 b
ἀνάστασις 807 b
ἀνασταυροῦν 288 b, 351 b
ἀνασχετός 585 b
ἀνατείνειν 96 a, 261 a
ἀνατινέναι 247 a
ἀνατιμᾶν 667 b
ἀνατρέπειν 450 b
ἀνατρέχειν 443 a
ἀναφέρειν 203 b, 399 a,
410 a, 412 a, 457 b
ἀναχωρέειν 5 b
ἀναχώρησις 385 a
ἀναψύχειν 81 b
ἀνδάνειν 250 a, 519 a, 600 b,
627 a, 761 b, 814 b
ἀνδραγαθίη 236 b
ἀνδρηίη 126 a
ἀνδριᾶς 247 a, 396 a
ἀνεθέλητος 111 b, 175 a
ἀνειν 29 b, 467 b
ἀνελεῖν 201 b
ἀνεμος 545 a
ἀνευ 582 a
ἀνέχειν (-εσθαι) 155 a, 186 a,
368 b, 392 b
ἀνεψιός 608 b
ἀνήκειν 26 a, 350 b, 535 b
ἀνηκέστος 396 b
ἀνηκουστέειν 27 a
ἀνήρ 78 a, 115 b, 125 b,
135 a, 181 b, 192 b, 275 a,
313 b, 444 a, 462 a, 521 a,
528 a, 540 a, 625 b, 694 a,
746 b, 817 a, 823 b
ἀνθρωπος 15 a, 58 b, 78 a,
177 a, 184 a, 248 a, 313 b,
398 a, 413 a, 437 b, 455 a,
528 b, 585 b, 596 b, 615 a,
622 a, 625 a, 687 b, 694 a,
720 a, 736 b, 744 b
ἀνέναι (-εimi) 354 a
ἀνισοῦν 132 b
ἀνιστάναι 751 a
ἄνοδος 440 a
ἄνοπλος 730 a
ἄνδσιος 529 a, 759 a
ἀνταποκτείνειν 179 b
ἀντέχειν (-εσθαι) 379 b,
581 b, 631 b, 715 b
ἀντί 35 a, 44 a, 244 b,
398 a, 586 a, 814 b
ἀντία 660 a, 694 b
ἀντικατῆσθαι 679 b
ἀντιλογίη 482 a, 774 b,
775 b
ἀντίστος 70 a, 205 b, 285 a,
322 b, 546 b
ἀντίος, 729 a
ἀντιπόλεμος 462 a
ἀντιτάσσειν (-εσθαι) 658 b,
630 b
ἀντιτείνειν 323 b
ἀντιτινέναι 447 a
ἀντιχαρίζεσθαι 145 a
ἀντιχρᾶν, 276 a
ἀντρον 410 a, 786 b
ἀνύειν 735 b
ἀνωρίη 538 a
ἀνωτέρω 559 a
(ἀξιοθέτητος lxix note)
ἀξιόμαχος 349 a
ἀξιόνικος 276 b
ἄξιος 637 a, 743 b, 757 b,
765 a, 814 b
ἀπάγειν 83 b, 542 a, 714 b
ἀπαγής 83 b
ἀπαγορεύειν 203 a, 544 a,
735 b
ἀπαείρειν 444 b, 447 a,
805 a
ἀπαθής 271 b
ἀπαις 306 b
ἀπαλλαγή 309 b, 414 b
ἀπάλλαξις 614 b
ἀπαλλάσσειν 539 b, 705 b,
808 a
ἀπαρτίλογίη 44 a
ἀπάτη 582 a
ἀπειλέειν 669 b
ἀπειλητήριος 536 a
ἀπειπα 604 a
ἀπέιπασθαι 23 a
ἀπείρητος 15 a
ἀπειρος, 720 b
ἀπελάυνειν 306 b, 315 a,
518 b, 530 b
ἀπέργειν 140 a, 407 b, 739 b
ἀπεστραμμένος 223 b
ἀπεστῶ 771 b

- ἀπέχειν (-εσθαι) 565 a, 570 a
 ἀπηλιώτης 278 a
 ἀπιέναι (-ιημι) 153 b, 416 b, 434 a, 776 a, 791 b
 ἀπιέναι (-ειμι) 448 b
 ἀπικνέσθαι 439 a, 599 b, 607 b, 779 b, 824 b
 ἀπιξις 624 a, 757 a
 ἀπιστάναί 635 a
 ἀπίστασθαι 554 b, 782 a, 810 a
 ἀπιστή 387 b
 ἀπιστος 387 a
 ἀπλετος 374 b, 513 b, 815 a
 ἀπό 89 b, 151 a, 170 a, 229 b, 238 b, 248 a, 250 a, 343 a, 374 b, 378 a, 388 a, 415 a, 436 a, 441 a, 442 b, 455 a, 496 a, 506 a (*bis*), 540 b, 603 b, 621 a, 730 b, 735 b, 736 b, 773 b, 781 a, 786 b
 ἀπό, τά 506 a
 ἀπό, τό 604 a
 ἀπο- (in Comp.) 534 a, 657 b
 ἀποβάθρη 795 b
 ἀποβαίνειν 343 b, 363 a, 493 a, 508 a, 797 a
 ἀποβλέπειν 728 a
 ἀπογιγασθαι 740 a
 ἀπογράφειν 127 b
 ἀποδεικνύναι 149 a, 185 a, 409 a, 497 b, 738 b, 762 b
 ἀπόδεξις 517 a
 ἀποδιδόναι 217 b, 603 b, 760 a, 827 a
 ἀποδοκέειν 534 a
 ἀποθέειν 443 b
 ἀποθήκη 531 a, b
 ἀποθρῶσκειν 269 b
 ἀποθωμάζειν 455 a, 817 b
 ἀποικος 98 a, 99 a, 119 b
 ἀποινα, τά 826 b
 ἀποίχεσθαι 719 a
 ἀποκαλέειν 630 a
 ἀποκηδεύειν 657 b
 ἀποκληίειν 699 a
 ἀποκοιμᾶν 479 b
 ἀπολαμβάνειν 510 a, 676 b, 704 b, 820 a
 ἀπολις 133 b, 449 a
 ἀπολλύναι 818 a
 ἀπολύνειν 446 b, 775 a
 ἀπομαστιγοῦν 529 b
 ἀπομάχεσθαι 179 a
 ἀπονοστέειν 413 a
 ἀπόπειρα 371 a
 ἀποπειρᾶν 461 b, 567 b, 631 b
 ἀποπέμπειν 698 b, 725 b
 ἀποπέτεσθαι 22 b
 ἀποπλέειν 791 b, 807 a
 ἀπορᾶν 410 b, 741 a
 ἀπορίη 439 b, 795 b
 ἀπορος 696 a
 ἀπόρρητος 688 a, 788 b
 ἀπορρίπτειν 503 a
 ἀποσείειν 633 a
 ἀποστείχειν 714 b
 ἀποστήναι 805 b, 806 a, 830 b
 ἀποστροφή 532 a
 ἀποσχίζειν (-εσθαι) 342 a, 727 a
 ἀποτάμνειν 351 b, 546 a, 818 b
 ἀποφαίνειν 127 a
 ἀποσχρᾶν 202 b, 695 b, 761 b, 789 a
 ἀπροσδόκητος 306 b
 ἄπτειν (-εσθαι) 439 a, 762 a
 ἄρα 20 a, 25 b, 26 b, 50 a, 169 a, 210 a, 368 b, 444 b, 505 a, 515 b, 532 a, 534 b, 570 a, 573 b, 605 b, 607 a, 628 a, 664 b, 689 a, 693 b, 720 b, 725 b, 772 b, 782 a, 806 a, 813 a
 ἄρα 648 b
 ἀραιρημένος 786 a
 ἀρᾶσθαι 506 b
 ἀρέσκειν 318 b, 736 a
 ἀρετή 6 a, 350 b, 358 a, 392 b, 589 b, 631 b, 651 a, 678 b, 679 a, 743 a, 746 b
 ἀρθμος 129 b, 607 a, 674 b
 ἀρίδηνος 455 b, 456 b
 ἀριθμος 107 b, 130 b, 308 a, 368 a
 ἀριστεύειν 752 b, 765 a, 806 b
 ἀριστήιον 373 b, 549 b, 550 a
 ἀρκέεσθαι 668 a
 ἄρμα 60 b, 110 a, 187 b, 272 b, 543 a
 ἀρμάμαξα 61 a, 108 a, 755 b
 ἀρμόζειν 813 b
 ἀρπάζειν 811 b
 ἀρρωδίη 253 b, 409 a, 802 a
 ἀρτᾶν 12 a, 739 a
 ἀρτέεσθαι 12 a
 ἀρτιος 649 b, 694 b, 708 a
 ἀρτοκόπος 766 b
 ἄρτος 576 a
 ἀρύειν 577 a
 ἀρχαῖον 688 b
 ἀρχαῖος 224 a, 272 a, 693 a
 ἀρχεῖν (-εσθαι) 105 a, 219 b, 228 b, 237 a, 343 a, 644 b, 672 a, 805 b, 829 b, 830 b
 ἀρχηγέτης 773 b
 ἀρχήθεν 133 a, 387 a, 585 a
 ἀρχήν 322 b, 349 a, 350 a, 555 b, 565 a, 631 a, 716 a, 725 a, 763 a, 808 b
 ἄρχων 437 a, 723 a
 ἄσυνής 544 a, 601 a
 ἀσκέειν 666 a
 ἀσκός 41 a
 ἄσμενος 522 b
 ἀσπαίρειν 364 b, 826 a
 ἀσπίς 96 a
 ἀστός 217 b, 245 b, 429 b
 ἄστνυ 217 b, 343 b, 437 a, 721 a
 ἀστυγείτων 829 b
 ἀσφάλειν 824 b
 ἀτάρ 70 b, 589 a
 ἀτάσθαλος 529 a, 759 b, 822 a
 ἄτε 277 a, 314 a, 463 b, 710 a, 763 a
 ἀτέειν 331 a
 ἀτελετή 752 a
 ἀτιμῖη 340 a
 ἀτιμοῦν 340 a, 341 a
 ἀτραπός 257 a, 316 a
 ἀτρεκής 768 b
 ἀτρέμας 711 a
 ἀτρεμίζειν 10 b, 28 a, 753 b
 ἀτρντος 705 a
 ἀτυχεῖν 816 b
 αὐλίζεσθαι 674 a
 αὐλῶν 163 b, 167 b
 αὐξειν 661 a
 αὐτεπάγγελτος 43 b
 αὐτίκα 325 a, 387 a, 393 a, 488 b, 505 a, 525 a, 607 b, 772 b, 784 a (αὐτ. κατ' ἀρχάς 735 b, 805 a; αὐτ. μετὰ ταῦτα 757 b, 787 a, 790 a, 819 a)
 αὐτις 449 a, 533 a, 590 b
 αὐτόθεν 303 b
 αὐτόθι 569 b
 αὐτοκελής 601 b
 αὐτόματος 578 a
 αὐτομολέειν 486 a
 αὐτόμολος 323 a
 αὐτόπτης 484 a, 485 a
 αὐτός 12 a, 16 b, 19 a, 23 b, 44 a, 58 b, 68 b, 71 a, 120 a, 208 b, 324 b (*bis*), 355 b, 361 a, 367 b (*bis*), 375 b, 379 b, 398 a, 409 b (*bis*), 438 a, 485 a, 495 a b, 611 a, 716 b, 730 b
 αὐτοῦ 19 b, 85 b, 150 a, 161 b, 189 b, 335 b, 436 a, 447 a, 452 b, 517 a, 548 b, 558 b, 596 a, 610 a, 716 a, 821 a
 αὐτως 385 a, 693 a
 αὐχὴν 329 b
 ἀφαιρεῖσθαι 133 b)

- ἀφανίζω 236 b, 768 b
 ἀφαιτός 281 b
 ἀφειδέως 678 a, 728 a
 ἀφή 319 a
 ἀφθονος 281 b
 ἀφύκτως 824 a
 ἀχαρις 71 b, 111 b, 183 a,
 282 a, 375 b, 589 a
 ἀχάριτος 218 a
 ἀχθεσθαι 795 a
 ἀχρηστος 536 a, 817 b

 βάδην 716 b
 βαίνειν 229 a
 βάλλειν (-εσθαι) 322 b,
 384 a, 463 a, 528 a, 600 b
 βάρβαρος 49 b, 87 a, 237 a,
 287 b, 399 a, 416 a, 486 b,
 495 b, 501 b, 521 b, 530 b,
 587 a, 605 a, 695 a, 761 a,
 782 a, 804 a
 βαρύς 447 b
 βασανίζω 198 b
 βασίλευειν 529 a
 βασιλεύς 6 b, 224 b, 234 b,
 425 a, 543 b, 575 a, 576 a,
 603 b, 668 a, 669 a, 737 b,
 756 a, 816 a
 βιάζεσθαι 682 b
 βίη 756 b
 βίος 133 b, 391 a, 514 b,
 522 b
 βιοτή 68 b
 βλαστάνειν 217 a
 βλαστός 443 a
 βοᾶν 502 b, 551 a
 βοή 412 a, 513 b, 723 b
 βοηθέειν 251 a, 309 a, 468 a,
 726 a
 βοιωτάρχης 617 a
 βόσκειν 785 b
 βουλεύειν (-εσθαι) 381 a,
 444 b, 476 b, 514 a, 525 a,
 635 a, 680 a, 772 b
 βούλευμα 345 b
 βουλευτήριον 202 a
 βουλή 599 b
 βύβλιος 384 a
 βωμός 530 a, 764 a

 γαμέειν 817 b
 γάμος 215 b
 γάμος 813 b
 γάρ 393 a, 665 b, 688 b,
 722 b, 748 b
 γάρ ὦν 797 b
 γε 20 a, 716 a
 γελᾶν 541 a
 γελοῖος 311 b, 390 a
 γέλως 312 a, 767 a
 γενέσθαι 570 a
 γενέτωρ 574 a
 γενναῖος 392 a
 γένος 273 b, 293 b, 310 b,
 384 b, 432 a b, 507 b,
 519 b, 555 a, 567 a, 688 b,
 756 b, 786 a
 γέρας 133 b, 212 b, 552 b,
 644 a
 γέρον 84 a, 727 b, 799 a,
 803 a
 γένειν 68 a
 γέφυρα 17 a, 810 a, 827 b
 γεωπείνης 535 b
 γῆ 388 a, 389 a, 823 b,
 829 a
 γηγενής 441 b
 γηοχέειν 281 b
 γί(γ)νεσθαι 13 a, 44 b, 135 a,
 153 a, 272 b, 296 a, 452 b,
 548 b, 572 b, 579 b, 679 b,
 728 a, 746 b, 748 a, 816 a
 γι(γ)νώσκειν 596 b, 667 b,
 755 b
 γλίχεσθαι 587 b
 γλύφειν 93 b
 γλυφίς 555 b
 γλώσση 571 b
 γνώμα 73 b
 γνώμη 323 b, 392 a, 416 a,
 434 b, 526 a, 599 a, 600 a,
 621 b, 682 a
 γνωσимаχέειν 169 b, 397 a
 γόης 283 a
 γομφίος 768 a
 γόνος 306 b, 666 a
 γόνυ 755 b
 γράμμα 386 a
 γραμματιστής 127 b
 γράφειν 318 b, 571 b
 γυμνάζειν 311 a
 γυνή 125 b, 576 a, 601 a,
 630 a, 731 b, 765 b, 810 b,
 813 a, 814 a
 γύψος 94 a
 γυψοῦν 395 b
 γωνίη 549 b

 δαίμωνιος 28 a, 68 b, 490 a
 δαίμων 756 a
 δαίνυμι 621 b
 δάκρυμα 241 b
 δαπάνη 380 b
 δέ 441 a, 461 b, 503 b, 515 b,
 584 b, 586 a, 693 b, 814 b;
 (displaced) 190 b; (with-
 out μέν) 447 b, 674 a;
 (emphatic) 8 a, 19 b,
 803 b; (in Apodosis) 72 a,
 131 b, 220 a, 223 b, 278 b,
 386 b, 542 b, 601 b, 695 b,
 731 b, 742 b, 771 b; (re-
 sumptive, with subject)
 22 b, 40 a, 160 a, 216 b,
 278 b, 311 a, 323 a, 331 b,
 355 a, 416 b, 446 b, 460 b,
 523 b, 542 b, 601 b, 695 b,
 706 a, 725 b, 806 a, 815 b,
 817 a; δέ αὖ 258 b; δέ
 γε 446 b; δέ ὦν 175 a,
 196 b, 410 a, 688 b (δ'
 ὦν 211 b, 281 a, 691 b,
 693 b, 761 a)
 δεδεγμένος 600 b
 δέδογμα 26 a
 δεδογμένος 22 a, 532 a
 δεδόκημαι 26 a
 δέδομαι 175 b
 δέειν 239 a, 439 b, 485 a,
 673 a, 720 a, 753 a, 814 b
 δέεσθαι 58 a, 220 b, 361 a,
 363 a, 386 b, 391 a, 415 b,
 446 a, 485 a, 587 b, 606 a,
 669 b, 774 b, 816 b, 818 a
 δεῖ 622 a
 δεῖμα 183 a
 δειμαίνειν 751 b
 δέιλη 365 a, 370 b, 801 a
 δειλίη 392 b
 δεινός 816 a, 822 a
 δεινότερα 1 b
 δεινῶς 669 b
 δειπνῶν 150 a
 δεκάμηρος 598 b
 δεκατεῦεν 173 a
 δεκάτη 395 b, 763 a
 δέκεσθαι 258 b, 397 a, 540 a,
 560 a, 577 a, 600 b, 605 a,
 735 a, 783 a, 818 a
 δελτίον 355 a
 δέλτος, ἡ 571 b
 δέμειν 300 a
 δένδρος 794 b
 δέννος 810 b
 δεξιός 350 a, 407 b
 δεξιότης 557 b
 δεσπότης 5 b
 δεύτερα 27 b, 42 b, 74 a,
 142 a, 200 b, 372 b, 412 a,
 550 b, 598 a, 797 a
 δεύτερα, τά 519 b
 δευτερεία 551 a
 δεύτερον, τό 248 b, 249 b,
 285 a, 289 a, 599 a, 806 a
 δεύτερος 8 b, 441 a, 442 b,
 664 b, 768 b
 δῆ 276 b, 319 a, 365 a, 381 a,
 572 a, 600 b, 625 b, 693 b,
 721 b, 797 a, 806 a, 818 a
 δῆθεν 363 b, 366 a, 737 b,
 763 a
 δηλέεσθαι 731 b
 δηλοῦν 663 b
 δημοεργός 46 a
 δῆμος 191 a, 218 a, 600 b,
 750 a, 751 a

διά 108 a, 464 a, 498 a, 522 a, 570 a, 598 a διαβαίνειν 45 b, 320 b, 436 a, 450 b, 721 b, 780 a διάβασις 436 a διαβάλλειν 387 a, 532 a, 823 b διαδοτέσθαι 327 a διαδεικνύναι 249 b, 720 a διαδέκεσθαι 584 b διαδέξις 267 b διαδιδρῆσκειν 447 a, 720 a, 724 a διάδοχος 631 b διαίρειν (-εσθαι) 70 b, 131 a, 765 a, 769 b διαίρεσις 550 a διακεῖσθαι (-έεσθαι) 643 a διακελεύειν 485 a, 490 a, 601 a διακρίνειν 324 a, 381 a, 405 a, 720 a διακρούεσθαι 240 b διαλέγειν 523 b, 539 b διαλυμαίνεσθαι 818 b διαμάχεσθαι 738 b διαμείβεσθαι 814 a διανανμαχεῖν 452 b διανέειν 497 b διανέμειν 550 a διάνοια 511 a, 689 b διὰ πάντων 412 a, 584 b διαπασσαλεύειν 48 a διαπέμπειν 681 b διαπορθμύειν 599 a διαπρήσσειν 681 b διασκεδαννύναι 324 a διάστασις 168 b διαστήναι 380 b διασφάζ 299 b, 319 b διάταξις 641 a διατάσσειν 264 b, 406 b, 465 a, 638 a διατρέβειν 151 a, 436 a, 678 a διαφέρειν 338 b διαφθείρειν 397 a, 404 b, 498 a, 819 a διαφώσκειν 688 b διαχέειν 445 a διαχοῦν 510 a διδόμενον, τό 540 a διδόμενος 818 a διδόναι 577 a, 817 a ; (δίκην) 514 a, 515 a ; (δίκας) 721 b διέκπλοος 53 a, 371 a διεκπλοῦν 152 b, 485 b διεξέρχεσθαι 512 b, 624 b διεξιέναι 351 a, 389 b διέξοδος 345 b διέπειν 755 b διεργάζεσθαι 331 a	διέρχεσθαι 800 a διεστάναι 512 a δέχειν 153 a, 701 a δίξηναι 131 b, 191 a, 237 a, 674 a, 687 a διήκονος 767 a δυστάναι 597 a δικαιοσύνη 231 b δικαιοῦν 627 b, 641 b, 682 b δικαστήριον 787 a δικαστής 288 b δίκη 481 b, 514 a, 731 b, 823 b δίξος 306 b, 585 b, 752 b δίοδος 301 a, 798 b διούρυσσεν 674 a δῖος 481 b διότι 536 b, 604 b, 606 a διπλήσις 576 a διωθέειν 775 b, 803 a διώκειν 187 b, 413 b, 533 b, 723 a, 758 a (δῖς) διώρυξ 147 a, 152 b δοίην 178 a δοκέειν 22 a, 253 b, 274 b, 387 a, 416 a, 444 b, 452 b, 453 a (δῖς), 458 b, 467 a, 518 a, 519 a, 522 b, 538 a, 556 b, 560 a, 567 b, 584 a, 607 a, 637 b, 643 b, 688 b, 699 a, 716 a, 724 b, 734 b, 753 a, 772 b, 774 a, 775 b, 817 b, 819 b, 820 b δόκησις 273 a δόκιμος 471 a, 624 b, 786 a δόλος 582 a, 783 a δονέεσθαι 2 b δόξη 565 a δοξοῦν 178 a, 695 a δοριάλωτος 473 b, 599 b δόρυ 113 b δουλοσύνη 756 a δουλοῦν 724 a δραχμή 504 a δρησμός 363 a, 381 a, 387 b, 476 b, 510 a, 514 a δρόμω 721 b δρῦς, ἡ 322 a δύναμις 13 b, 211 b, 798 b, 826 b δυνασθαι 606 b, 688 b δυναστεύειν 597 a δυνατόν 816 b δυσεντερία 542 b δυσθανάτειν 749 b δύτης 368 b εἶναι 449 a, 463 b, 517 a, 596 a, 682 a, 736 a εἶαρ 56 b ἐγγράφειν 486 b ἐγείρειν 560 a	ἐγκάρσιος 55 a ἐγκατακοιμᾶν 570 a ἐγκαταλείπειν 446 b ἐγκείσθαι 220 a ἐγκέχρημένοι 196 b ἐγκοτος 397 a, 815 b ἐγκρατής 808 a ἐγκυρέειν 311 a ἐγχειρίδιον 84 b ἐγχερίμπτειν 795 b ἐγώ 772 a ἐδρη 320 b, 680 a ἐξεσθαι 386 b ἐθελοκακέειν 386 b, 737 b ἐθελοντής 321 b, 644 a ἐθνος 12 b, 105 b, 127 b, 140 a, 315 b, 469 a, 526 b, 539 b, 639 a, 664 b, 808 b εἰ 76 b, 280 b, 369 a, 435 a, 626 a, 683 b, 712 a, 777 b ; εἰ δὲ μή 386 b ; εἰ μή 25 b ; εἰ οὐ(κ) 19 b, 26 a ; with Infinitive 339 b ; with Subjunctive 70 b, 451 a εἰδέναι (χάριν) 762 a : εἶδον 719 a εἶδος 94 b, 521 a, 539 b εἰκεν 379 b εἰκελος 369 a εἰκώ 94 a εἴλωτος 338 b, 389 b, 762 a εἶμα 89 b εἶναι 213 b, 387 b, 399 a, 441 b, 543 b, 604 a, 679 a, 817 a εἶνεκα 308 a, 408 a, 415 b, 761 a, 771 b, 774 a εἵνεκεν 783 a, 816 b εἰπεῖν 290 b, 560 a εἴρεσθαι 168 b εἰρίνεος 115 a εἰρωτᾶν 683 b εἰς 384 a εἰς 593 a εἰς τις 391 a εἴτε 444 b, 600 b ἐκ 33 b, 48 a, 93 b, 104 b, 226 a, 241 b, 278 a, 306 b, 319 a, 331 a, 375 b, 384 b, 386 b, 457 b, 487 b, 495 a, 511 a, 514 a, 515 b, 524 a, 548 b, 553 b, 600 b, 774 b, 786 a, 789 a, 747 b, 754 a, 774 a, 786 b ἐκάς 494 b, 786 b ἐκαστέρω 596 a ἐκαστος 2 a ἐκαστος 178 a ἐκατοστός 67 b ἐκβάλλειν 244 a ἐκβολή 164 a, 269 a, 676 a b
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- ἐκβράσσειν 279 a
 ἐκγίνεσθαι 5 a, 11 a, 635 a
 ἐκγονος 136 a
 ἐκδεξις 4 b
 ἐκδύσις 515 b
 ἐκδωριεύειν 472 a
 ἐκείνη 522 b
 ἐκείσε 354 a
 ἐκκαλέεσθαι 483 b
 ἐκκόπτειν 794 b
 ἐκλαμβάνειν 790 b
 ἐκλείπειν 57 a, 107 b, 184 a, 354 a, 631 b
 ἐκμανθάνειν 582 a
 ἐκπαγλέεσθαι 268 b, 502 b, 694 a
 ἐκπίπτειν 246 b
 ἐκπληροῦν 493 b
 ἐκπλήσσειν 766 b
 ἐκπωμα 762 a
 ἐκρηγνύειν 473 b
 ἐκτάμνειν 818 b
 ἐκτυφλοῦν 787 a
 ἐκτύφλωσις 789 b
 ἐκφέρειν 147 a, 278 b, 374 b, 435 a, 565 a, 600 b, 749 a
 ἐκχωρέειν 470 b
 ἐκὼν εἶναι (τε εἶναι) 133 b, 229 a, 543 b, 604 a, 710 a
 ἐλαίη 392 a, 442 a
 ἐλαίνειν 382 a, 634 a, 822 a
 ἐλεύθερος 582 a
 ἐλευθεροῦν 219 b
 ἐλευθέρως 472 b
 ἐλευθέρους 689 b
 ἐλυνέειν 78 a, 467 b
 ἐλκύειν 237 b
 ἐλλάμπτεται 473 a
 Ἑλλάς 130 a, 219 a, 571 b, 688 b, 725 a, 827 b
 Ἑλλήν 625 b
 Ἑλληνικόν, τό 590 b
 ἔλος 160 a
 ἔλπεσθαι 350 a, 819 a
 ἐλπίζειν 285 a, 371 b, 473 a, 508 a, 525 a, 815 b
 ἐλπὶς 728 b
 ἐμβάλλειν 494 b, 498 b
 ἐμμάχεσθαι 638 a
 ἐμμένειν 810 a
 ἐμπαλάσσειν 109 b
 ἐμπαλῶν 79 a; τὰ ἔμπ. 643 b, 714 b
 ἐμπιμπράναι 404 a
 ἐμπίπλημι 544 b
 ἐμπίπρωμι 529 a, 614 a, 735 a
 ἐμπίπτειν 412 b
 ἐμποδῶν 270 a, 309 a
 ἐμπολαῖον 808 b
 ἐμπορῶν 101 b
 ἐμπρέπειν 108 a
 ἐμπρησις 442 b
 ἐμπροσθε 161 a, 194 a, 259 a, 440 a, 494 a
 ἐμφυτος 790 a
 ἐν 47 a, 258 b (ἐνεστι), 340 b, 342 a, 407 b, 412 a, 446 a, 455 a, 502 a, 515 b, 604 b, 622 a (bis), 691 b, 694 b, 739 b, 741 b, 755 b
 ἐναμμένος 93 b
 ἐναντίος 731 a
 ἐναποδείκνυσθαι 720 a
 ἐναύειν 340 b
 ἐναυλίζεσθαι 617 b
 ἐνδέειν 622 a
 ἐνδείκνυσθαι 584 b
 ἐνδέκεσθαι 72 a, 482 a, 584 b
 ἐνδοιαστῶς 255 a
 ἐνεργός 391 a
 ἐνέχειν (-εσθαι) 165 b, 439 b, 674 a
 ἐνθα 267 a
 ἐνθαῦτα 56 b, 183 b, 323 b, 821 b
 ἐνθεύειν 368 b, 763 a
 ἐνθύμιος (-ον) 441 b
 ἐνιαυτός 5 a
 ἐνιοι 443 b
 ἐννοοῦσθαι 309 b
 ἐνορᾶν 315 b, 582 b
 ἐνορχις 521 b
 ἐνστάζειν 597 b
 ἐνοστρατοπεδεύεσθαι 638 a
 ἐντάμνειν 386 a
 ἐντέλλειν 713 b
 ἐντεταμένως 74 b, 555 b
 ἐντόλη 491 b
 ἐντομος 282 b
 ἐντός 68 b, 430 b
 ἐξ 140 a, 540 a
 ἐξαγγέλλειν 265 b
 ἐξαγωγή 217 b
 ἐξαιρείν 811 b
 ἐξαιρέειν 135 b, 763 a, 773 b, 824 b
 ἐξαιτέειν 773 a
 ἐξαίφνης 689 b
 ἐξαλείφειν 325 a
 ἐξανάγειν 287 b, 489 b
 ἐξανιστάναι 245 a, 555 a, 808 b
 ἐξανύειν 271 a
 ἐξαπατᾶν 789 b, 822 b
 ἐξαριθμέεσθαι 273 a
 ἐξείναι 472 b, 569 b
 ἐξέλασις 270 b
 ἐξελαύνειν 109 a
 ἐξ ἐναντίας 367 b
 ἐξεπίστασθαι 314 b, 736 b
 ἐξεργάζεσθαι 757 a
 ἐξέργειν 120 b, 183 b, 816 b
 ἐξέρχεσθαι 673 b
 ἐξευρίσκειν 149 b, 438 a, 511 b
 ἐξηγέεσθαι 8 a, 349 b, 737 a, 828 b
 ἐξήλυσιν 169 a
 ἐξιλάσκεσθαι 189 b
 ἐξιστορέειν 290 a
 ἐξοδος 329 b, 439 b, 606 b, 642 a
 ἐξοκέλλειν 269 a
 ἐξοπλίζειν 128 b
 ἐξορμᾶσθαι 703 a
 ἐξορύσσειν 544 a
 ἐξω 79 a, 170 a, 337 a, 422 a, 748 b, 818 a
 ἐξωθεν 367 a, 600 b
 ἐόν, τό 311 b, 350 a, 611 b
 ἐπαγγέλλειν (-εσθαι) 2 a, 42 a, 170 a, 206 a, 389 a, 398 a, 536 a
 ἐπαίρειν 28 b, 57 b, 695 b
 ἐπαίτειν 786 b
 ἐπαυέειν 721 a
 ἐπαινος 760 a
 ἐπάσιτος 198 b
 ἐπαλξίς 603 a
 ἐπαμᾶσθαι 389 a
 ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα 185 a, 387 a
 ἐπανάγειν (-εσθαι) 795 b
 ἐπαναπλέειν 379 a
 ἐπανίεναι 182 a
 ἐπάπτειν 521 a
 ἐπασκέειν 806 b
 ἐπαύρησις 221 b
 ἐπαυρίσκεισθαι 268 a
 ἐπεάν 796 a
 ἐπεὶ 239 a, 762 b
 ἐπειδὴ 748 b
 ἐπεῖναι 169 b
 ἐπειρέεσθαι 712 a
 ἐπειρωτᾶν 611 b
 ἐπειρώτησις 686 b
 ἐπέιτε 807 a
 ἐπελαύνειν 270 a
 ἐπεξιέναι 329 b, 588 b
 ἐπέπειν 10 b
 ἐπέρχεσθαι 202 a, 603 b, 781 b
 ἐπεσέρχεσθαι 513 b
 ἐπεσθαι 620 a, 714 b
 ἐπεστεῶς 50 a, 147 a, 149 a
 ἐπεστραμμένος 450 b
 ἐπέτειος 527 a
 ἐπευρίσκειν 815 a
 ἐπέχειν 184 a, 329 a, 363 b, 387 b, 402 b, 407 b, 458 a, 659 a, 695 b, 722 a, 784 a
 ἐπήβολος 535 b, 789 a
 ἐπί 250 b, 386 b, 439 b, 483 b, 518 a, 524 b, 604 a, 620 a, 759 b, 777 b, 790 b, 795 b, 811 a: with Ac-

- cusative, 243 b, 277 a, 457 b: with Dative 17 b, 73 b, 112 b, 200 b, 211 a, 261 b, 277 a, 329 b, 333 b, 382 b, 397 b, 506 b, 673 a, 757 a, 767 a, 775 a: with Genitive 17 b, 47 b, 66 b, 79 a, 79 b, 98 b, 107 b, 115 b, 206 a, 277 a, 287 a, 424 a, 457 b, 528 a, 611 a, 624 b, 675 b, 768 a: Adverbial 89 b, 503 b, 670 a: in Composition 26 b
- ἐπιβαίνειν 743 a
ἐπιβάλλειν 389 a
ἐπιβατεύειν 119 b, 268 a, 272 a, 558 b, 790 a
ἐπιβάτης 487 a
ἐπιβοᾶν 634 b
ἐπιβοηθεῖν 377 a
ἐπιγινέσθαι 296 a, 771 b, 824 a
ἐπιγινώσκειν 522 a
ἐπιζέειν 23 a
ἐπικαλέειν 453 b, 728 b
ἐπικάριος 51 a
ἐπικαταβαίνειν 412 b, 638 a
ἐπικάυτος 95 a
ἐπικεῖσθαι (-έεσθαι) 488 b
ἐπικερτομέειν 503 a
ἐπικέσθαι 13 a, 49 a
ἐπικινδύναται 188 a
ἐπικλητος 9 b, 303 a, 516 b, 683 b
ἐπικρατέειν 381 a
ἐπιλαμβάνειν 798 b
ἐπιλάμπτειν 377 a, 558 b
ἐπιλαύειν 15 a
ἐπιλέγειν (-εσθαι) 198 b, 203 a, 307 a, 327 a, 349 b, 356 a, 385 b, 435 a (*bis*), 572 a, 795 a
ἐπιλείπειν 79 b, 163 a
ἐπιλογίζεσθαι 264 a
ἐπιλοιπος 620 b
ἐπίμαχος 631 a
ἐπιμέλεσθαι 530 a
ἐπιμέμφεσθαι 241 b
ἐπιμήνιος 418 a
ἐπιμνησέσθαι 460 a
ἐπιπλέειν 123 b, 495 a
ἐπίπλεος 322 a
ἐπιρρέειν 675 b
ἐπίσημον 496 a
ἐπιστιγίζεσθαι 264 a, 698 b
ἐπίστασθαι 14 a, 250 b, 312 b, 314 b, 322 b, 331 a, 372 a, 389 b, 408 b, 496 b, 497 a, 511 a, 565 a, 573 b, 711 b, 813 a
ἐπιστέλλειν 329 a, 356 a
ἐπιστήναι 34 a
ἐπιτάσσειν 352 a
ἐπιτελέειν (44 a), 418 a
ἐπιτήδεος 672 b
ἐπιτηδέως 605 a
ἐπιτήδης 584 a
ἐπιτήκειν 355 a
ἐπιτιθέναι 805 b, 826 b
ἐπιτρεπτός 721 b
ἐπίτροπος 246 a, 608 b
ἐπιτυγχάνειν 517 b, 519 a
ἐπιφανής 552 b
ἐπιφθονέειν 761 a
ἐπιφθονος 183 b
ἐπιφουτῶν 350 a
ἐπιφράζεσθαι 355 b
ἐπιχειρήσις 565 a
ἐπίχρυσος 762 a
ἐπιχώριος 88 b, 91 a, 120 b, 292 a, 301 b, 557 a, 822 a, 825 b
ἐπιψηφίζειν 449 a
ἐποδιάζειν 797 b
ἐπονομάζειν 148 a
ἐποποιός 225 b
ἐπορμῶν 788 a
ἐπορμέειν 485 b
ἐπος 73 a, 150 b, 384 a, 453 a, 457 b, 487 b
ἐποτρύνειν 243 b
ἐρᾶν 813 a, 814 a
ἐργάζεσθαι 689 b
ἐργεσθαι 294 a, 813 b
ἐργον 6 b, 34 a, 70 b, 185 a, 215 a, 386 b, 486 b, 496 a, 497 b, 499 a, 502 a, 518 a, 522 b, 523 b, 543 b, 581 b, 647 a, 648 a, 678 a, 753 b, 760 b, 790 b, 803 a
ἐρδεν 589 a, 805 a
ἐρέπειν 743 a
ἐρετμός 509 b
ἐρημος 719 a
ἐρημοῦν 247 b, 248 b, 255 a
ἐρκος 109 b, 794 b, 799 a
ἐρμα 270 a
ἐρρωμένος 742 b
ἐρσην 306 b
ἐρύκειν 697 b
ἐρυμα 330 a, 618 b, 793 a
ἐρχεσθαι (ἐς λόγους) 680 a, 687 a
ἐς 44 a, 251 b, 354 b (*αρχαῖ*), 357 b, 374 b, 382 b, 385 a, 395 b, 531 b, 605 a (*bis*), 732 b, 760 b: ἐς δ 268 a, 789 a: ἐς πάντας 392 b: ἐς πρώτους 192 b
ἐσακούειν 607 a, 726 a
ἐσβαίνειν 444 a, 488 a
ἐσβάλλειν 291 a, 400 b, 677 b
ἐσβολή 250 b, 251 b, 256 a, 321 b, 396 b
ἐσέχειν 576 b
ἐσθής 147 b
ἐσκον 679 a
ἐσοςδος 261 a
ἐσπέτεσθαι 799 a
ἐσπίπτειν 330 b, 443 b, 502 a
ἐσσοῦν 474 a, 830 b
ἐστάλατο 113 b
ἐστ' ἄν 450 a, 586 b, 587 b, 593 a
ἐστάναι 651 b
ἐστε 164 a, 189 b
ἐστι 165 b (= ἐξεστι), 347 b, 441 b, 569 b, 570 b, 753 b
ἐστιν ὦν 276 a
ἐσφάειν 681 b, 744 a
ἐσω 35 a, 460 a
ἐτεραλκίως 374 a
ἐτεραλκής 805 a
ἐτεροιοῦν 803 a
ἐτερος 327 a, 436 b, 641 b
ἐτησίαι, οἱ 240 a
ἐτι 365 a, 368 b, 378 a, 444 b, 464 a, 494 a, 495 a, 801 a (καὶ ἐς ἡμέας 414 b)
ἐτος 5 a, 8 b, 29 b, 827 b
εὐβουλος 532 a
εὐδοκιμέειν 335 b, 749 b
εὐεργέτης 492 b, 573 a
εὐήθεια 26 a
εὐκρινής 685 a
εὐνόη 582 a
εὐνοος 371 b
εὐνούχος 275 b, 519 b, 521 b
εὐπετής 782 b
εὐπρόσωπος 239 a
εὐρημα 215 b, 528 b
εὐρσκεν 271 b, 276 a, 315 b, 398 a, 437 b, 522 a, 528 b, 643 a, 651 b, 694 b, 807 a
εὐσύμβλητος 78 a
εὐτε 312 a
εὐφρόνη 22 a, 278 a, 366 a, 374 b, 674 a
εὐχεσθαι 285 a, 453 b
ἐφορος 603 b, 757 a
ἐχειν 13 b, 64 b, 166 a, 193 a, 208 a, 229 b, 242 a, 312 a, 326 b, 340 a, 441 a, 462 a, 494 a, 506 b, 524 a, 533 b, 571 b, 597 a, 610 a, 621 b, 626 a, 633 a, 641 b, 683 a, 705 b, 733 a, 736 b, 756 b, 759 a b, 760 a, 790 a, 798 a, 813 a, 815 b, 825 a: ἔχειν ἐν 387 b, 787 a: ἔχειν ἐς 170 a, 210 a, 685 a: ἔχειν γνώ-

- μην 349 b: *ελασσον* 803 a:
λογον 752 b: *πλέον*
 742 b: *σπουδήν* 203 a:
φάτιν 769 b: with Ad-
 verb 530 a, 581 a, 590 b,
 644 b, 645 b, 647 a, 678 a,
 711 a, 723 b, 787 a:
 = *εἶναι* 278 b, 319 b,
 320 b, 451 a, 457 b:
 = *κεῖσθαι* 302 a: = *γνώ-*
ναι 345 b: = *δύνασθαι*
 264 a, 280 b, 311 b, 354 b,
 355 b, 492 a, 493 b, 537 a,
 567 b, 606 a, 768 b:
ἔχειν (strong) 213 a,
 249 a, 343 b, 388 a, 498 b,
 613 a, 829 a: (to have
 to wife) 85 b, 93 b, 280 a,
 307 a, 572 b, 817 b
ἔχεσθαι 7 a, 137 b (geogr.),
 179 a, 339 b, 342 a, 351 a,
 447 a, 527 b, 571 b (*ἐν*),
 586 a, 618 b, 651 b, 673 b,
 795 b, 803 a
ἔχθος 398 b
ἔχθρη 387 a
- ζέειν* 278 a
ζειρά 92 b, 99 b
ζεινυγύναι 50 a, 144 a
ζεῦγος 49 a
ζημοῦν 757 b
ζημῶσσαι 59 a
ζήτησις 242 b
ζῶη 521 a
ζῶον 384 a
ζῶνη 547 b
- ῥ* 386 b, 504 a, 544 a, 688 a:
 (ῥ . . ῥ 325 b)
ῥγέεσθαι 304 b, 595 b
ῥγεμονεύειν 126 b, 360 a
ῥγεμονίη 111 b, 203 b,
 223 b, 608 b, 828 b
ῥγεμών 86 b, 330 b, 399 a,
 407 a, 643 b, 758 a
ῥδη 220 a, 258 b, 434 a,
 520 b, 522 b, 620 b, 729 b,
 803 a
ῥθος 19 a, 516 a, 517 a,
 592 b
ῥών 508 b
ῥκειν 219 a, 390 b, 486 a,
 758 b: *εἶ* 535 a
ῥλικίη 27 b
ῥλιος 387 b, 785 a
ῥμαρ 686 a
ῥμείς 694 a, 695 a
ῥ μέν 783 b
ῥμέρη 377 a, 390 b
- ῥμεροδρόμος* 612 a
ῥμερος 794 b
ῥμεροσκόπος 270 a, 284 a,
 323 a
ῥμίπλεθρον 259 a
ῥμισυς 302 b, 704 a
ῥν 385 a, 581 a, 689 a
ῥπειρος 302 a, 422 a, 439 b,
 524 a, 700 b, 795 b
ῥσθαι 718 a
ῥχώ 635 b
- θάλασσα* 76 b, 442 a
θάπτειν 147 a, 769 b
θέειν 472 b, 582 a, 687 b
θέη 637 a, 743 b, 814 b
θεῖος 413 a, 800 a
θέλειν 18 a, 551 a
θεοπρόπιον 148 a, 293 b,
 295 b, 786 b, 789 a b
θεόπρωπος 186 b
θεός 756 a, 825 b
θεραπήη 274 b
θερμός 261 a
θέσθαι 707 a
θεωρέειν 391 b
θήκη 767 b, 770 a
θηλυδρίης 212 b
θησαυρός 404 a, 807 a
θητεύειν 575 b
θολήν 767 a
θολερός 50 a:
θόρυβος 443 b, 494 a, 502 a
θρόνος 315 a
θυγατήρ 817 a
θύειν 148 a, 238 b, 825 b
θυμίαμα 75 b
θυμός 73 a, 223 b, 463 a,
 560 a
θυμοῦν 313 b
θύρη 438 a
θυσίη 266 b, 592 a
θῶκος 788 b
θῶμα 411 b, 570 a, 571 b,
 611 b, 734 a
θωμάζειν 369 a
θωμάσιος 354 b
θωρηκοφόρος 539 a
θῶρηξ 112 b
- ιακχάζειν* 457 b
ιακχος 455 b
ἰδη 141 a
ἰδιοβουλεύειν 13 a
ἰδμεν 29 b, 245 b, 318 a,
 520 b
ἰδρύειν 161 b, 469 b, 718 a,
 794 a
ἰδρυμα 592 a
ἰδρώς 188 a
- ἰέναι* 445 b, 596 a, 669 a,
 699 b, 708 a
ἰέναι 759 a
ἰζειν (-*εσθαι*) 624 b
ἰθέη τέχνη 716 b
ἰθεος 674 b
ἰθύ 267 a, 412 b, 779 a
ἰθύνειν 11 a
ἰθύτριξ 94 b
ικανός 409 b
ικετηρή 189 a
ικέτις 756 a
ικνέεσθαι 644 b
ιλάσκεσθαι 266 b, 537 b
ιμάς 109 b
ἱμερος 64 b
ἱνα 621 b: *ἱνα μή* 389 a,
 689 b: locative 38 a,
 542 b, 649 b, 711 b, 751 a
ἱππαγωγός 33 a
ἱππαρχέειν 629 b, 741 a
ἱππαρχος 111 a
ἱππάσιμος 615 a
ἱππεύς 310 b, 577 a, 712 a,
 724 a
ἱππόδρομος 222 a
ἱππος, ἡ 252 a, 291 b,
 539 a, 629 b, 631 a, 664 a,
 695 b, 715 b, 718 b, 725 a,
 739 b
ἱππος, ὁ 397 a, 630 a, 730 b
ἱπποσύνη 190 b
ἱππότης 60 a
ἱπποτοξότης 696 b
ἱρά 456 a
ἱρήν 770 b
ἱρόν 175 b, 211 b, 258 b,
 281 a, 292 b, 293 b, 404 a,
 407 a, 411 a, 437 b,
 441 a b, 443 a, 505 a,
 717 a, 735 a
ἱρός 785 a
ἱροφάντης 211 b
ἱσθμός 290 a
ἱσος 695 a
ἱστάναι 633 b
ἱστασθαι 633 a
ἱστιᾶν 177 b
ἱστιών 443 b, 505 a
ἱστορίη 120 b
ἱσχυρόν, τό 596 b
ἱτυς 112 b
ἰνγή 686 a
ἰωνίη 72 b
- καθαρμός* 295 a
καθαρός 270 a
καθώς (anom.) 766 b
καί 48 a (*etiam*), 71 a, 73 b
 (vel), 138 a, 179 a (vel),
 185 a (*etiam*), 388 b,

- 389 b, 390 a, 393 a, 439 a, 468 b (καίπερ), 515 b (advers.), 535 a, 551 b, 573 b, 593 a, 596 b, 600 b, 693 b, 731 a, 738 a, 761 a, 772 a, 777 b: καὶ . . . καὶ 528 a, 642 a, 691 b, 760 b, 802 b, 803 b: καὶ δὴ 275 a, 506 b, 584 a, 601 b, 604 b, 611 a, 694 a, 737 b, 749 a, (775 b), 777 b, 803 a: καὶ δὴ καὶ 16 b, 565 a, 568 b, 821 b, 827 b: καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ 390 a: καὶ μὴ 132 a: καὶ μὴν 448 a: καίτοι 440 b, 466 b, 537 a
- καίειν 298 b
κάκιον 361 a
κακολογίη 351 a
κακόν 824 b
κακός 208 b, 271 b, 528 b
κακότης 188 a, 240 b
κακῶς 377 a, 782 b, 814 b
καλάμινος 88 b, 91 a
καλέειν 522 a, 620 a, 629 b, 719 a, 777 b
καλλιερῆειν (-εσθαι) 143 b, 176 a, 627 b, 675 b, 784 b, 790 b
καλλιστεῖν 551 b
κάλλος 589 b, (748 b), 759 b
κάματος 780 a
κάμηλος 108 a, 110 b, 272 b, 766 a
κάμπτειν 153 b
καπνοδόκη 576 b
καταδοκέειν 228 b, 239 b, 460 b
καρπός 542 a, 585 b
κάρτα 371 b, 446 a, 534 a: τὸ κ. 25 b, 393 a
καρτερός 375 b
κατὰ 201 a, 221 b, 367 a, 373 b, 376 a, 398 b, 411 a, 493 b, 567 a, 576 b, 778 a: with Acc. 51 b, 76 b, 178 a, 182 a, 202 b: locative 244 a, 296 a: temporal 4 a, 180 a, 244 a, 251 b: distributive 184 b, 539 b, 804 a: with Genitive 8 a: in Comp. 22 a
κατ' ἀρχάς 329 b
καταβαίνειν 254 a, 460 b, 521 b, 568 a, 629 a, 789 a
καταβάλλειν 480 b, 529 a, 760 b
κατάβασις 329 a
κατάγεσθαι 362 b
καταγίγειν 237 b
- καταδοκέειν 464 a, 716 a, 798 b
καταδουλοῦν 347 a, 589 b
καταείδειν 283 a
καταθύνειν 383 a
καταθύμιος 688 b
καταυρῆειν 604 a
καταιρῆειν (-εσθαι) 71 a, 486 b, 823 b
κατακοιμᾶν 569 a, 786 b
κατακοντίζειν 625 a
κατακόπτειν 780 a
κατακρουγγεῖν 268 a
καταλαμβάνειν 14 b, 314 b, 340 a, 366 a, 385 a, 540 b, 596 a, 695 b, 785 a, 807 a, 825 b
καταλαμφθεῖς 721 b
καταλέγειν 126 b, 140 b, 157 b, 445 b, 522 a, 748 a
καταλείπειν 246 a, 793 a
καταλείναι 601 a
καταλύειν (-εσθαι) 610 a
καταμαργεῖν 552 b
κατανάσσειν 54 b
κατανεύειν 817 b
καταντίον 47 b, 438 b
καταπατέσθαι 253 a
κατὰ περ 141 b, 429 a, 512 b
καταπλήσσειν 556 b
καταπρίναι 54 b
καταπροιδόναι 506 b
καταπροῖεσθαι 27 a
κατάπτειν 458 a
καταρρωδέειν 265 a, 269 b, 309 b, 476 b, 606 a, 689 a
κατασκάπτειν 175 a, 217 b
κατασκήπτειν 456 b
κατάσκοπος 197 b, 384 b
κατασπᾶν 286 a
κατάστασις 584 a
καταστήναι 173 a, 183 a
καταστορεννύναι 741 a
καταστρέφειν 137 a
καταστρωννύναι 441 a, 755 a
κατασφάζειν 555 a
κατασχεῖν 81 b
κατὰ τάχος 309 a
κατατείνειν 400 a, 618 b
κατατιθέναι 265 b, 327 a, 759 b
καταφοιτέειν 160 a
καταφρονέειν 371 b
καταχρᾶν 95 a (-ᾶσθαι 827 a)
κατεικάειν 815 a
κατειλέειν 395 b, 661 a, 744 a, 810 b
κατειλίσσειν 101 a, 268 b
κατειρύνειν, 508 a
κατελκύειν 128 a
κατεπείγειν 554 a
κατεργάζεσθαι 10 b, 807 a
- κατερείκειν 513 b
κατεστάναι 307 a, 409 a
κατεστηκέναι 674 b, 742 b
κατέχειν 277 a, 445 a, 450 a, 478 b, 541 a, 544 b, 635 b
κατηγέσθαι 168 b, 678 b, 737 b
κατηγεμών 165 b, 292 a
κατηγορέειν 308 a, 447 a
κατήκειν 133 a, 169 a, 382 b, 416 a, 518 a
κατήρης 384 b
κατηρημένως 736 b
κατήσθαι 714 a, 749 a, 781 a
κατιέναι (-ίημι) 529 b
κατιθύ 702 a
κατιστάναι 521 a
κατοικέειν 230 b
κατορύσσειν 144 a
κατότι 3 b
κατύπερθε 164 a, 382 a, 574 a, 732 b
κατυπνοῦν 22 a
κάτω 251 b, 321 b, (-τέρω) 566 b
κείνος 710 b, 783 a
κεινός 170 b, 355 a, 719 a
κείρειν 454 b
κείσθαι (-έεσθαι) 263 b
κελεύειν 792 b, 829 b
κέλευσμα 24 a
κέλης 110 a, 505 b
κεραίζειν 160 a, 492 b, 502 a
κέρας 490 b, 641 b, 650 a
κεραυνός 412 a
κερδάλεος 604 a
κευθμών 190 a
κεφαλῇ 202 a, 351 b, 546 a, 816 a
κεχρησμένος 188 b
κη 455 a
κήδεσθαι 324 b
κήδος 280 a
κήπος 577 b
κηρός 355 a
κήρυγμα 176 b, 417 a
κηρυκήν 175 b
κηρυκίον 799 a
κήρυξ 46 b, 170 b, 612 a, 796 a
κιθών 84 a, 99 b, 184 b
κινέειν 706 a, 712 a
κλέος 327 a, 694 b, 759 b
κλέπτειν (-εσθαι) 70 a
κληδών 783 a, 802 a
κληρός 789 a
κλίμαξ 55 a
κλίνειν 621 a
κλισιάδες 607 a
κνᾶν 356 a
κοῖλος 113 b, 546 b
κοινόν, τό 774 a

- κοινός 445 b, 592 a, 642 a, 782 b
κόλπος 145 b, 153 a, 297 a, 785 a
κολωνός 333 b, 714 b
κομιδή 383 a, 526 b, 810 b
κομιδήν 339 b
κομίζων 524 b, 636 a, 750 b, 821 b
κοινοτός 455 a
κοπάειν 283 b
κορμός 54 b
κόρυμβος 322 b
κορυφή 401 a, 410 a, 414 a, 798 b
κοσμέειν 659 a
κόσμος 108 a, 448 b, 493 a, 584 b, 723 b, 733 b, 737 b, 740 a
κοτέ 729 a
κου 22 a, 818 a
κράνος 95 b, 103 b, 115 a
κρατέειν 623 a
κράτος 276 b, 683 a
κρήνη 639 b, 696 b, 700 b
κρησφύγετον 438 b, 618 b, 793 a
κρητήρ 762 a
κρίνειν 550 b
κτενίζειν 311 a
κτηνός 275 b
κτίζειν 211 a
κτιστός 794 b
κυκλοῦν 371 b, 379 a, 478 a (κυμαινῶν 9. 100. 3)
κυνέη 102 a
κυρβάση 88 b
κυρέειν 823 b
κυροῦν 444 a
κύων 275 b
κω 135 b
κώμη 300 b
- λαγχάνειν 74 b
λαισήιον 115 a
Λακεδαιμόνων 344 a
λάκκος 149 b
λαμβάνειν 355 a, 373 b, 381 a, 607 b, 755 b, 765 a, 826 a
λαμπαδηφορία 512 b
λαμπρός 753 b
λάμψεσθαι 813 b
λανθάνειν 474 a, 485 b, 509 a, 511 a, 522 b, 633 b
λάξεσθαι 194 b
λάχσεις 686 a
λααίνειν 586 b
λέβης 762 a
λέγων 326 a, 336 a, 386 a, 413 a b, 452 a, 512 a, 572 a, 580 b, 602 a
- λείος 741 a
λείπειν (-εσθαι) 291 b, 325 a, 408 b, 423 a, 627 b
λεπτός 524 a
λέσχη 747 a
λευκός 730 b
λεχεποῖς 686 a
λέων 326 b
λεωσφέτερος 665 b
λήγειν 320 a, 705 a
λήϊη 550 a, 762 a, 807 a
λήϊον 294 a
λήμα 126 a, 730 a
λίθος 386 a, 467 b, 794 b
λιμήν 786 a
λίμνη 570 b
λίμος 780 a
λίνεος 112 b
λιπαρέειν 494 a, 689 a, 816 b
λιπαρή 631 b, 743 a
λιπαρός 481 b
λιποψυχέειν 339 a
λογάς 552 a, 632 a, 730 b
λογίζεσθαι 43 a, 67 b, 264 a, 308 a
λόγιμος 620 a, 732 b
λόγιον 448 b, 452 a, 583 a, 684 b
λόγος 117 b, 119 a, 120 b, 131 b, 138 a, 149 a, 165 b, 182 a, 199 a, 206 a, 210 a, 215 a, 222 b, 223 b, 224 a, 228 a, 247 b, 279 a b, 292 a, 298 b, 314 b, 317 a b, 322 b, 328 b, 330 b, 338 b, 342 a, 348 a, 354 a, 365 a, 399 a, 435 a, 442 a, 446 a, 457 b, 463 a, 473 a, 518 b, 523 b, 534 a (δῖς), 599 a, 607 a, 673 b, 710 a, 721 a, 741 b, 759 a b, 762 b, 789 a b
λοιπός 302 b, 309 a, 382 a, 517 a, 589 a, 656 b, 765 a, 804 b
λουτρόν 261 a
λοχηγέειν 708 b
λόχος 709 a
λυγρός 673 b
λύειν 533 b, 547 b, 810 a
λυκιοεργής 100 b
λύκος 786 b, 788 a
λυμαίνειν 396 b
λύπη 210 b
λυπρός 830 b
λυσσάν 747 b
λύχνος, ὁ 319 a
- μαζός 818 b
μάλα 21 a, 274 b, 679 a
μαλερός 188 a
- μάλιστα 33 b, 344 a, 455 a, 757 a : μ. μὲν 386 b : τὰ μ. 726 a
μανθάνειν 321 b, 509 b, 628 b, 818 a
μαντεύεσθαι 409 b, 665 b, 675 a, 784 b
μαντήιον 141 b, 438 a
μαντική 790 a
μάντις 323 a, 337 a, 395 b
μαρτύριον 327 a, 442 b, 547 a
μάστιξ 132 b
μάχαιρα 104 a, 333 b, 577 a
μαχαροφόρος 662 b
μάχεσθαι 738 a
μάχη 371 a, 645 a, 691 a
μάχιμος 274 b, 662 a
μέγα 589 b
μέγαθος 759 b
μεγαλοφροσύνη 179 a
μεγάλως 620 a, 678 b
μελεδωνός 58 a
μέλειν 457 b, 468 b
μέλεος 187 a
μέλι 46 a
μελιτόεις (-εσσα) 418 a
μέλλειν 493 a, 571 b
μεμετιμένος 338 b
μεμνήσθαι 744 a
μὲν without δέ 64 b, 167 a : followed by δέ 8 a, 10 b, 46 a, 137 b, 178 a, 183 a, 304 a, 313 b, 356 b, 374 b, 384 b, 416 b, 438 a, 465 b, 482 a, 488 a, 522 a, 570 b, 594 a, 601 b, 604 a, 605 a, 684 a, 721 a, 731 a, 742 b, 746 b : followed by μέντοι 555 b, 767 b
μέντοι 494 a, 555 b, 593 a, 767 b, 769 b
μέρος 542 a
μέσαι νύκτες 477 b
μεσαμβρία 299 b
μεσόγαια 140 b, 779 b
μέσον 393 a, (8. 27. 1) : ἡμέρης 378 a, 387 b
μέσον, ἐς 13 a, 229 b, 371 b
μέσον, τό 21 a, 138 a, 152 b, 166 a, 386 b, 472 b, 473 b, 566 b, 767 a
μέσος 811 b
μετά 186 a, 240 a, 612 a, 737 b : μέτα 219 a
μεταβαίνειν 363 b
μεταβάλλειν 73 a, 231 a, 244 b, 387 a, 527 b, 544 b, 602 a
μεταβουλεύειν 445 a
μεταίτεειν 206 a
μέταλλον 142 b, 754 b

μεταναστῆναι 701 b, 829 a
 μεταπέμπειν (-εσθαι) 129 a,
 683 b, 824 b
 μεταξύ, τό 300 a
 μετάρσιος 278 b
 μεταρσιούν 457 b
 μετεξέτερος 369 a
 μετεστηκέναι 486 a
 μετιέναι (-ιημι) 580 b, 622 a,
 667 b, 729 a
 μετιστάναι (-σθαι) 516 b,
 720 a
 μετορμίζειν 269 b
 μετωπηδόν 128 b
 μέχρη 141 a, 146 b, 151 b,
 271 a, 361 a, 387 b,
 678 a b, 679 a
 μή 18 b, 20 a, 129 b, 130 a,
 203 a (*ter*), 226 b (οὐ),
 318 b, 322 b, 397 a, 445 a
 (οὐ), 509 b, 544 a, 587 b,
 606 a, 607 a, 689 a, 759 b,
 774 a, 802 a, 803 a, 808 a
 μηδαμῶς 818 a
 μηδέν, τό 522 b, 760 b
 μηδίζειν 249 b, 255 a, 399 a,
 405 b, 472 b, 536 b, 589 b,
 738 a, 773 a, 808 b
 Μῆδος 429 a, 757 b
 μήν 436 a b, 801 a
 μηνίειν 241 b, 339 b, 605 a
 μήνις 175 a, 296 a, 339 b
 μνηοειδής 379 a
 μητροπάτωρ 572 b
 μητρόπολις 72 b, 400 a
 μηχανάσθαι 293 a, 355 a,
 522 b
 μίλτος 94 a
 μιμέσθαι 668 a
 μισθός 498 a, 544 a, 575 b
 μισθοῦν 675 b
 μισηφόρος 86 a
 μνημόσυνον 621 b
 μνήσασθαι 58 b
 μνησικακέειν 398 a
 μνήστις 221 b
 μόγις 239 a, 565 a
 μοι (*me iudice*) 570 a
 μόδρα 388 a, 725 b, 734 a
 μόρος 293 a, 686 a
 μούναρχος 232 b
 μουννομαχέειν 643 a
 μούνος 422 b
 μουνούν 550 b, 726 b
 μυρίκη 46 a
 μυρίνη 513 b
 μυστικός 455 b

ναυαρχέειν 225 a
 ναύαρχος 128 b, 560 b
 ναυηγέειν 348 b

ναυηγή 368 b
 ναυήγιον 374 b, 381 a
 ναυλοχέειν 280 b
 ναυμαχέειν 433 b, 444 b
 ναυμαχίη 375 b
 ναύμαχος 113 b
 νεβρός 100 a
 νέειν 497 a
 νεηνίης 126 a
 νείκος 333 a, 495 a, 713 a
 νεκρός 381 a, 637 a, 768 a b
 νέμειν (-εσθαι) 248 b, 522 a,
 604 a, 824 a
 νεοάλωτος 826 a
 νέον 642 a
 νεότης 23 a, 613 a
 νεοχμός 798 b, 806 a
 νέφος 518 b
 νεωστί 192 b, 201 a
 νεώτερον 584 b
 νεώτερος 385 a
 νημελίη 278 a, 322 a
 νηός 410 b
 νησιώτης 118 b, 427 a,
 429 a, 809 b
 νῆσος 699 b, 700 b, 802 b
 νικᾶν 256 a, 370 a, 435 a,
 695 b, 739 b, 755 a
 νίκη 695 b, 732 a, 801 a
 νικηφόρος 512 a
 νοέειν 239 a, 361 a, 387 a
 νομίζειν 186 b, 205 a, 495 b,
 718 a
 νομιζόμενα, τά 813 b
 νόμιμος 179 a
 νόμος 10 a, 497 a, 523 a,
 682 b, 694 a, 816 b, 822 a
 νόος 381 a, 493 a, 577 a,
 796 b, 817 b, 827 a
 νοσέειν 542 b
 νύν 129 a, 517 a
 νυνί 339 b
 νύν ὦν 774 a
 νυκτός 395 b
 νύξ 374 a, 375 b

ξείνια 177 b, 620 a, 777 b
 ξεινίζειν 177 b, 779 a
 ξεινίη 146 b
 ξείνος 350 b, 606 b, 710 a,
 757 a
 ξίφος 331 a, 333 b
 ξύλινος 674 b
 ξύλον 55 a, 467 b, 514 b,
 794 b

ὄδε 545 a
 ὀδοιπορίη 545 a
 ὀδός 164 a, 165 a, 227 a,
 292 a, 333 a, 367 b, 399 a,

467 a, 512 a, 557 b, 587 b,
 741 a, 779 b, 780 a
 ὀδοφύλαξ 355 b
 ὀδόνη 622 a
 οἶα 446 a
 οἶδα 39 b, 318 a, 352 a,
 686 a
 οἰζυρός 767 b
 οἰκέειν 246 b, 661 b, 830 b
 οἰκέτης 246 a, 363 a, 423 a,
 451 a, 522 b, 530 a, 533 a,
 586 a, 593 b
 οἰκήος 380 b
 οἰκῆμα 590 a
 οἰκησις 789 a
 οἰκῆτωρ 193 b, 211 a, 212 b,
 326 a
 οἰκίζειν 245 a
 οἰκίη 296 a, 563 b, 601 b
 οἰκοδομέειν 467 b
 οἶκος 133 b, 288 b, 332 b,
 810 b
 οἰκός, τό 354 b, 371 b
 οἰκοφθορέειν 586 a
 οἶός τε εἶναι 526 b, 567 b
 οἴχεσθαι 336 a
 οἰωνός 783 a
 ὀκέλλειν 489 b
 ὀκη 200 a, 560 a, 808 a
 (οὐδὲ)
 ὀκοῖος 613 b
 ὀκόσος 402 b
 ὀκου 148 a, 434 a, 516 a,
 595 a
 ὀκως 61 a, 130 b, 223 b,
 314 b, 376 b, 439 a, 456 a,
 736 b, 803 a: 8 a (tem-
 poral), 28 b (with
 future), 826 a (compara-
 tive): with ἄν 494 a,
 587 b, 610 a: with μή,
 10 b, 378 b
 ὀλβιος 475 b
 ὀλίγοις, ἐν 680 a
 ὀλίγον 825 b
 ὀλκός 38 a, 282 a
 ὀλοῖτροχος 439 b
 ὀμαιχυμή 582 a
 ὀμηρος 328 b, 591 a
 ὀμιλέειν 40 a
 ὀμιλος 723 b, 738 b, 741 b
 ὀμόγλωσσος 591 b
 ὀμοια (adv.) 151 a
 ὀμοιος 345 b, 397 a, 760 a,
 792 a
 ὀμοίως 110 a, 399 a
 ὀμολογέειν 775 a
 ὀμολογίη 185 a, 583 a
 ὀμοσιτέειν 150 a (cp. l. 146)
 ὀμόσπονδος 621 b
 ὀμοσπάρεος 621 b
 ὀμότροπος 592 b

- ὁμοφρονέειν 338 b, 361 a,
 596 b
 ἔμως 439 a
 ὀνειδίξειν 502 b
 ὀνειδος 340 a
 ὀνειρον 25 b
 ὀνομάζειν 687 b
 ὀνομαστός 81 a, 123 b, 748 a
 ὄνος 53 b
 ὀπέων 698 b
 ὄπισ 588 b, 756 a
 ὀπισθε 259 a, 260 b, 317 a,
 440 a, 825 a
 ὀπίσω 367 b, 554 a, τὰ ὀπ.
 526 b
 ὀπλίτης 302 b, 507 b
 ὀπλον 37 b, 151 b, 638 b,
 707 a, 708 a, 827 b
 ὀποδαπός 322 b, 621 b
 ὀρᾶν 312 a, 371 a, 389 b,
 413 a, 621 b, 627 b, 667 a,
 669 a, 707 b, 710 a, 712 b,
 720 a, 737 b
 ὀρθός 633 a
 ὀρθοῦν 131 b (*bis*)
 ὀρθρος, ὁ 278 a
 ὀρθῶς 801 a
 ὀρκιον 172 a, 643 b, 810 a
 ὀρμᾶν (-ᾶσθαι) 4 b, 28 b,
 267 a, 277 a, 280 a, 312 a,
 375 b, 407 a, 421 a, 528 a,
 579 a, 582 a, 595 a, 723 a,
 725 a, 726 a, 804 a, 820 a,
 825 b: ὀρμᾶσθαι ἐκ 48 a,
 266 b, 661 a
 ὀρμέειν 277 a, 820 a
 ὀρμή 28 a
 ὀρμησαι 506 b
 ὀρμος 278 b, 287 b
 ὀρος 63 a (w. Gen.), 170 a,
 499 a, 543 b, 786 a
 ὀροσάγγης 492 b
 ὀρτάζειν 309 a
 ὀρτή 456 b
 ὀρυγμα 147 b
 ὀρύσσειν 35 a, 389 a
 ὀρχηδόν 194 b
 ὄς 48 a, 763 a (relative):
 321 b, 444 a (demonstra-
 tive): 747 b (= *ὅστις*)
 ὄσιος 411 a
 ὄσον ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν 141 a
 ὄσον τε 443 a, 635 a
 ὄσος 349 b, 361 a
 ὄστις 585 b, 769 b
 ὄταν 384 a
 ὅτι 605 a
 ὅτι μή 615 a
 οὐ(κ) 19 b, 67 b, 251 a,
 587 b
 οὐδαμῶς 81 b, 197 b, 720 b
 (pl.): οὐδαμὰ 716 a
 οὐδέ 457 b, 571 b
 οὐδεῖς 23 a, 444 b
 οὐδέν 384 a, 389 a
 οὐδένες 720 a
 οὐκέτι 385 a
 οὐκῶν 622 a
 οὐ μέν οὐδέ 604 a
 οὐ μή 74 b
 οὐνομα 182 b, 192 b, 790 a
 οὐρίζειν 158 a
 οὖρος 190 a, 326 b
 οὐσίη 42 b
 οὗτις 801 b
 οὗτος 524 a, 685 b: = *ὅδε*
 108 b, 637 b
 οὕτω 150 a, 176 b, 245 b,
 278 a, 312 a, 327 a, 343 b,
 402 b, 494 a, 498 a, 502 b,
 511 b, 519 a, 576 b, 587 b,
 610 a, 633 a, 689 b, 700 b,
 752 b, 753 b, 774 a (= *ὅδε*),
 818 a, 829 b, (9.
 109, 13)
 οὕτω δὴ 354 b, (602 a),
 633 b, 698 a, 726 b, 731 b,
 809 a, 814 a, 824 b
 ὀφθαλμῶν 338 b
 ὀφθαλμός 544 a
 ὀφλισκάνειν 392 b
 ὄχθος 715 b, 722 b
 ὄχος 551 b
 ὄψιος 370 b
 ὄψις 198 b, 787 a,
 ὄψοποιός 766 b
 παγκράτιον 806 b
 πάγος 438 b
 πάθημα 574 a
 πάθος 501 a, 509 b, 516 a,
 532 a, 546 b, 789 a
 παιδοφόνος 282 a
 παίειν 633 b
 παίζειν 610 a
 παῖς 719 b, 759 a, 790 a
 πάλαι, τό 750 b
 παλαιόν, τό 262 a
 πάλαισμα 666 a
 παλάμη 382 b
 παλέειν 384 b
 παλίντονος 93 a
 παλλακή 108 a, 275 b, 755 a
 πάλλεσθαι 826 a
 πᾶν, τό 398 a
 πανδημί 309 a, 468 a, 674 a
 πανημερόν 271 a
 πανοικίη 522 b, 814 b
 πανστρατιῇ 303 a
 πάντα 814 b, 5 a (τά), 765 b
 (δέκα)
 πανταχόθεν 485 b
 παντελέως 441 a, 530 b
 παντοῖος 6 a, 17 a, 75 b,
 782 a, 815 a
 παντοῖως 315 a
 παρά (w. Acc.) 67 b, 666 a,
 22 b, 228 b
 παραβαίνειν 61 a
 παραβάλλειν (-εσθαι) 19 a,
 267 a
 παράβολος 689 b
 παραγγέλλειν 464 a, 707 b
 παραγίνεσθαι 332 b, 511 a,
 528 a, 710 a, 747 b
 παραγορέεσθαι 713 a
 παραγυμνοῦν 382 b, 687 b
 παραδέκεσθαι 228 b, 679 a
 παραδιδόναι 216 a, 389 a,
 682 a, 759 b
 παραθαλάσσιος 177 a
 παραθήκη 688 a
 παραινεῖν 383 a, 829 b
 παραινέεσθαι 84 b
 παρακελεύειν (-εσθαι) 378 a,
 504 a, 803 a
 παρακρίνειν 465 a, 795 b
 παραλαμβάνειν 218 b, 238 b,
 240 a, 241 a, 595 a, 601 a
 παραλίη 274 a
 πάραλος 225 a
 παραμιμνήσκεσθαι 120 b
 παρανομέειν 352 a
 παραπίπτειν 495 b
 παραπλήσιος 379 a: -ίως
 149 a
 παραρτᾶν 656 b
 παραρτέεσθαι 192 a, 480 a,
 486 a, 525 a
 παρασκευάζειν 465 b
 παρατρίβειν 16 a
 παρατυγχάνειν 348 a
 παραφέρειν 642 a
 παραχρᾶσθαι 331 a, 383 b
 πάρεδρος 200 a, 577 a, 789 a
 παρεῖναι 354 b, 713 b, 727 a,
 744 b, 747 b, 755 b,
 757 a
 παρενθήκη 247 b
 πάρεξ 73 b, 359 b, 433 a,
 472 b
 παρεξίεναι 313 a
 παρέον, τό 605 a
 παρέρχεσθαι 485 a b, 786 b
 παρέχειν 150 b, 368 b, 399 a,
 625 b, 774 b
 παρηγορέεσθαι 23 a
 παρήκειν 618 b
 παρίζειν 445 b
 πάροικος 347 a
 πάρος 596 b
 πᾶς 824 b: πᾶς τις 625 b,
 656 b
 πᾶσχειν 340 a
 πατήρ 386 b

- πάτρι 755 b, 760 b
 πατρίς 444 b, 449 a
 πατρώθεν 401 a
 πάτρω 760 b
 παύειν 75 b (w. Infin.), 286 a
 πέδη 49 a, 529 b
 πέδιλον 96 a, 100 a
 πέδιον 677 b, 701 a
 πεζός 79 a, 81 b, 105 a, 106 a, 152 b, 159 a, 396 b, 517 a
 πείθειν 597 b
 πειράσθαι (w. Infin.) 510 a : (w. Particip.) 14 a, 184 b, 201 a, 251 a, 642 a, 667 a, 711 a
 πέλαγος 49 a, 76 b, 168 a, 258 a, 375 b
 πελάζειν 190 a
 πέλειν 187 b
 πέλγη 100 a
 πέμπειν 241 b, 511 a, 549 a, 778 b
 πένης 437 b
 πένθος 635 a
 πενήνη 535 b
 πεντάεθλον 666 a, 754 a
 πεντηκόντερος 227 b, 432 a, 433 a
 πεποιημένοι 360 b (middle)
 πέποιθα 775 b
 περ 375 b, 440 b, 701 a, 714 a
 περσικός 423 a
 πέργαμον 64 b
 πέργνη 409 b
 περί 186 b, 196 a, 250 b, 268 b, 365 a, 367 a, 385 a, 392 b, 396 a, 444 b, 472 b, 473 b, 482 a, 527 b, 534 b, 603 a : w. Accus. 270 a, 284 b, 513 b : w. Dat. 513 b, 751 b, 802 a : w. Genit. 58 b, 78 b, 513 b : locative 525 a : temporal 319 a
 περί 383 a, 409 b, 639 b
 περιβάλλειν (-εσθαι) 281 b, 282 b, 368 b, 678 a
 περιγίγνεσθαι 558 a, 596 b
 περιγράφειν 83 a
 περιεῖναι 289 a, 448 b, 508 a, 518 a, 731 a
 περιέπειν 204 b, 268 b, 314 a, 381 a, 395 b
 περιέρχασθαι (-ελθεῖν) 111 b, 334 a, 523 a
 περιέχειν (-εσθαι) 372 a, 485 b (bis), 716 a
 περιηγέσθαι 318 a
 περιημεκτέων 528 a, 680 a
 περικατῆσθαι 534 a, 753 b
 περικληῖν 299 b
 περικτιόνες 201 b
 περικυκλοῦν 482 a
 περιλαμβάνειν 522 b
 περίοδος 329 a
 περίοικος 301 b
 περιορᾶν 602 a, 604 b, 682 a
 περιπετής 384 a
 περιπίπτειν 111 b, 279 a, 505 b
 περιπλέειν 349 a
 περιποιέειν 268 b
 περισπερχέειν 310 a
 περισταδόν 334 a
 περιστέλλειν 724 b
 περιστεφανοῦν 169 a
 περιστήναι 600 b
 περιστρωφᾶσθαι 570 a
 περισχίζειν 703 b
 περιχαρής 695 b
 περιχεύειν 826 b
 περιψιλοῦν 768 a
 Περσίδης 326 a
 περσιστί 492 b
 πέτρη 297 a
 πέτρος 713 b
 πηγὴ 543 a
 πημαίνειν 613 b
 πείζειν 725 b, 728 a, 731 a
 πῆλος 83 b, 116 b
 πίπτειν 228 b, 335 b, 379 b, 633 b, 727 b, 731 b, 738 a, 744 a
 πιστεύειν 532 b
 πίστις 521 b, 810 a
 πιστός 546 a, 587 a
 πλατάνιστος 42 a, 46 a
 πλέειν 782 b
 πλέθρον 128 b, 299 a
 πλέκειν 95 b, 109 b
 πλέον (φέρεισθαι) 397 b
 πλεονεκτέειν 535 b
 πλεονέκτης 220 a
 πλευρόν 749 a
 πλέων 829 b
 πλῆθος 132 b, 404 b, 405 b, 412 b, 581 b, 634 b
 πληθώρα 329 a
 πλημμυρίς 557 a
 πλην 243 b, 410 a, 563 b, 656 a, 739 b
 πλήρης 29 b
 πληροῦν 450 a
 πλησίον 639 b
 πλησιόχωρος 719 b
 πλινθος 467 b
 πλοῖον 384 b, 387 a, 780 a
 πλοῦτος 763 a, 786 a
 ποδεών 400 a
 ποθέειν 634 a
 ποιέειν 71 a, 127 b, 272 b, 275 a, 282 b, 475 b, 522 b, 584 a, 601 b, 633 b, 710 b, 789 b, 817 a
 ποιέσθαι 1 b, 48 b, 62 a, 78 a, 81 b, 182 b, 206 a, 227 a, 267 b, 268 b, 322 b, 328 b, 363 b, 368 a, 371 a, 376 b, 378 a, 379 b, 384 a, 385 a, 389 a, 417 a, 445 b, 473 a, 504 a, 529 a, 570 a, 604 b, 635 a, 667 b (bis), 684 a, 685 a, 688 a, 699 a, 710 b, 757 b, 758 b, 786 b, 809 b, 811 a, 816 a, 817 b
 ποιεύμενον, τό 710 a, 815 b
 ποιή 542 b
 ποίημα 109 a
 ποιητέος 415 b
 ποικίλος 84 a, 99 b, 141 b
 ποιυή 179 a
 πολέμαρχος 252 a
 πολέμιος 200 a, 825 a
 πολυήτης 350 a, 429 b
 πολυηγή 668 a
 πολιορκέειν 396 b, 435 a, 721 a, 733 b, 824 a
 πόλις 2 a, 12 b, 344 a
 πολιτικός 131 a
 πολλόν 375 b
 πολλός 220 a, 446 a, 783 a, 811 a
 πολυμηκάς 384 a
 πομπή (θείη) 505 b
 πόνος 281 a, 331 b, 472 b, 497 a, 620 a, 647 b, 705 a
 πορεύειν 290 b, 385 b, 436 a, 541 a
 πορθμήιον 38 a
 πορθμός 502 a
 πόρος 258 a, 379 a, 534 a, 541 b, 544 b, 553 b
 πορσύνειν 603 a
 πόντιμος 385 b
 πόντια 793 b
 πούς 674 b
 πρέπειν 541 a, 761 a
 πρεσβεύειν 3 b
 πρήγμα 22 a, 169 b, 185 b, 199 a, 206 a, 207 a, 363 a, 372 a, 382 b, 384 a, 416 a, 422 b, 443 b, 480 b, 494 a, 518 a, 521 b, 526 b, 713 b, 739 a, 800 a
 πρήσσειν 79 a, 377 a, 384 b, 813 b, 815 a, 818 a
 πρηγήριον 36 b
 πρὶν 815 a : πρὶν ἢ 180 b, 446 a, 613 b (bis), 824 b
 πρὸ 4 b, 169 a, 176 b, 182 b, 185 a, 210 a, 220 a, 250 b

- (bis), 280 b, 363 b, 391 a, 410 b, 435 a, 440 a, 444 a, 473 b, 632 b, 673 b, 700 b, 707 a, 749 b: in Composition 66 b, 267 a, 285 a, 448 a, 483 b
- προάγειν 565 a
προβαίνειν 460 a, 462 a
προβάλλειν 188 b
πρόβατον 382 a, 785 a, 787 a
πρόβολος 100 b, 202 a
πρόβουλος 250 a
προδέκτωρ 56 b
προδιδόναι 184 b, 276 a, 439 a, 604 b, 724 a
προδοσίη 556 b
προδότης 399 a
πρόδρομος 615 b
προεδρή 752 a
προειδέναι 682 a
προεῖδον 593 b
προεῖπαι 602 a
προειπεῖν 146 b, 149 a, 156 b, 158 a, 204 b, 748 a
προεκαίνειν 686 b
προεξάγειν 807 a
προεκαίσειν 730 b
προεξαναστήναι 729 a
προεξανίστασθαι 446 a
προεξέδρη 66 a
προεστάναι 681 b
προέχειν 599 a, 632 b, 647 b
προθυμέσθαι 672 a
προθυμή 358 a
προθυμός 255 a, 555 b
προιδεῖν 188 a
προῖναι (-ειμι) 814 a
προΐσθαι 461 a
προΐσχειν 534 a
προκαλέσθαι 694 b
πρόκατε 455 a, 571 b
προκατῆσθαι 409 b, 808 a
προκεῖσθαι 443 b, 724 a, 802 b
πρόκλησις 754 a
προκρίνειν 644 a
πρόκροστος 277 a
προλλέγειν 574 a
προμηθέσθαι 813 a
προνοίη 495 a, 593 b
πρόξεινος 573 a, 589 a
προορᾶν 760 b
πρόπειρα 694 a
πρός w. Accus. 75 b, 197 a, 210 a, 214 b, 218 b, 341 b, 422 b, [446 b], 448 a, 790 b: w. Dative 177 a, 215 a, 413 a, 448 a, 790 b: w. Genit. 28 a, 53 a, 184 a, 207 b, 236 a, 386 b, 448 a, 490 b, 739 b, 808 a: adverbial 236 a, 438 a, (8. 29. 7)
προσάγειν 784 a
προσαιρέειν 609 a
προσάντης 224 a
προσάττειν 383 b
προσβάλλειν 501 a
προσδέεσθαι 494 b
προσέρχασθαι 194 a
προσεσάγειν 383 b
προσέχειν 797 a
προσεχῆς 651 a, 802 b, 803 a
πρόσθιος 768 a
προσκέπτεσθαι 264 a
προσκήδης 572 b
προσκύνειν 178 b, 545 b
προσκύνησις 23 a
προσμίσγειν 239 a
πρόσοδος 315 a, 802 a
προσορέγασθαι 7 a
προσπέμπειν 813 a
προσποιέσθαι 674 b
προσπταίνειν 245 a
προστάσειν 805 b
πρὸς ταῦτα 445 a
προστιθῆναι 272 b, 667 b
προσφέρειν (-εσθαι) 560 a, 696 a, 746 b, 828 b
πρόσχημα 219 a, 774 a
προσχωρεῖν 448 b
πρὸς w. 350 b, 686 b, 697 a, 777 b
προσωφελέειν 805 a
προτεινέσθαι 669 a
προτερέειν 716 a, 737 b
προτιθέναι (-εσθαι) 177 b, 446 a, 816 a
προτράπειν 782 b
πρόφαντος 787 b
πρόφανσις 339 b
προφέρειν 552 b, (600 a)
προφήτης 410 b (bis)
προφυλάσσειν 799 a
προχέειν 285 a
πρύμνη 489 b
πρωί 801 a
πρώιος 365 a, 558 b
πρώρα 128 b
πρώτα 46 a: πρ. μέν 64 b: πρ. τά 23 a, 621 a, 759 a: πρώτοις, ἐν 342 a: πρῶτος 24 a, 277 a, 497 b, 655 b, 712 b, 720 a, 738 a, 743 a, 773 b
πταίνειν 802 a
πτώσειν 694 b
πυκάζειν 295 a
πύλαι 439 b, 440 a
πυνθάνεσθαι 331 b, 413 a, 719 a, 815 b
πύργος 742 a
πυρόν 383 a
πυρός 46 a
πυροῦν 518 b
πυρπολέεσθαι 435 b
πυρσός 269 b, 598 a
πυρφόρος 366 a
ραπίζειν 49 b, 446 b
ράπτειν 625 b
ραφή 768 a
ρέεθρον 701 a
ρέειν 657 b
ρεοῦμενοι 188 a
ρέπειν 185 b
ρήμα 480 b
ρήχιν 56 b, 557 b
ρήχος 191 b
ρόδον 578 a
ρόπαλον 87 b, 94 a
ρύεσθαι 20 a, 295 b, 321 b, 756 a, 759 b, 782 b
ρώμη 540 a, 730 a
σανίς 55 a
σάρξ 768 a
σάττειν 86 b, 95 a
σειρή 109 b
σημαίνειν 284 b, 317 a, 369 a, 372 b, 450 b, 477 a, 484 b, 534 a, 714 b
σημάντωρ 105 b
σημήιον 502 b, 723 a
σιγᾶν 392 b, 532 b
σιγή 350 b: σιγῇ 473 a, 479 b, 787 a
σιδήριον 27 a, 673 b
σιδηρόδετος 673 b
σίδηρος 87 b
συναμωρέειν 407 b
σίνεσθαι 199 a, 400 b, 613 b, 696 a
σίνος 455 b, 456 a
σιτοποῖός 275 b
σίτος 36 a, 681 b
σκέλος 397 a
σκέπη 250 b
σκευάζειν 83 b, 112 b, 113 b
σκηνή 128 a, 743 b
σκήψις 240 a
σκιδνασθαι 190 b, 387 b, 762 a
(σκῆρος) 505 a
σκληρός 374 b
σκόλοψ 794 b
σμάν 816 a
σμίρνη 268 b
σόςος 414 b
σοφίζεσθαι 395 b
σοφίη 551 b
σοφός 169 a, 532 a
σπάθη 93 b
σπᾶν 811 a
σπάνιος 389 a

Σπαρτιάτης 667 b, 668 a
 σπείρειν 824 a
 σπεύδειν 417 b, 802 a
 σπονδή 329 a: σπονδαί 75 b,
 (203 a)
 σπόρος 530 a
 σπουδή 203 a: σπουδή
 759 a
 σταθμέσθαι 673 b
 σταθμεύεσθαι 559 b
 σταθμός 150 a
 στασιάζειν 484 a, 649 b
 στάσις 631 a, 694 a
 στασιώτης 564 b, 597 a
 στεινός 400 a, 669 b
 στείχειν 611 a, 726 a
 στέμμα 295 a
 στέργειν 133 a, 824 b
 στερέειν 787 a
 στέρεσθαι 586 a
 στέφανος 392 a
 στήλη 45 b, 565 a
 στήναι 483 b
 στίβος 722 a
 στιγείς 49 b
 στίγμα 342 b
 στίζειν 342 b
 στίφος 716 b, 744 a
 στόλος 29 b
 στόμα 56 b, 373 b
 στρατάρχης 426 a
 στρατεύεσθαι 87 a, 420 a,
 462 a, 504 a, 805 a,
 823 b
 στρατευμα 521 b
 στρατηγείν 106 a, 107 a,
 121 b, 122 b, 152 b, 319 a,
 343 b, 754 a
 στρατηγίς 502 b
 στρατηγός 177 a, 359 b,
 363 b, 378 a, 433 b, 476 b,
 498 a, 523 b, 539 a, 550 a,
 555 b, 560 b, 687 a, b
 στρατηλασίη 182 b, 581 b
 στρατιή 170 b, 387 b, 456 b,
 457 b, 727 a, 776 a
 στρατιωτής 375 a, 380 a
 στρατοπεδεύειν (-εσθαι)
 638 a, 700 b
 στρατόπεδον 348 b, 372 a,
 373 b, 389 a, 419 a, 475 a,
 490 a, 506 b, 618 b, 625 a,
 643 a, 704 a, 711 a, 712 a,
 733 b, 759 a, 762 a, 805 a
 στρατός 127 b, 271 b, 779 b,
 815 a
 στρεπτός 762 b
 στρεπτοφόρος 540 a
 στρωννύναι 286 a
 συγγινώσκειν 830 b
 συγγράφειν 191 a
 συγκαταίρειν 670 a

συγκατεργάζεσθαι 586 b
 συγκείσθαι 705 b
 συγκύπτειν 197 b
 συγκυρέειν 495 a, 502 a,
 780 b
 συγχέειν 179 a, 192 a, 513 b
 συγχούειν 467 a, 696 b
 συγχωρέειν 225 a, 670 a
 συλᾶν 404 a
 συλλέγειν 251 b, 382 b,
 446 a, 645 a
 σύλλογος 9 b, 17 b, 389 a,
 473 b, 487 a
 συλλυπέσθαι 789 a
 συμβαίνειν 801 a (*bis*)
 συμβάλλειν (-εσθαι) 192 a,
 193 a, 271 b, 276 b, 315 b,
 355 b, 398 a, 447 b, 506 a,
 682 a, 727 a, 733 a, 736 a
 συμβολή 236 b, 688 b, 690 b,
 699 a, 773 b, 800 b
 συμβουλεύειν 178 a, 345 b,
 350 b
 συμβουλίη 72 a
 συμβάχεσθαι 354 b
 συμμαχίη 556 b
 συμμαχικόν, τό 809 b
 σύμμαχος 218 b, 255 a,
 308 b, 382 b, 389 a, 463 a,
 497 a, 533 b, 586 a, 588 a,
 610 b, 663 b, 738 b, 783 b
 συμμίσγειν 412 b, 445 b,
 460 b, 483 b, 505 a, 694 a,
 701 a, 739 a, 796 a
 συμπίπτειν 206 a, 378 a,
 566 b, 584 a, 713 a, 800 b
 (*bis*)
 συμπληροῦν 358 a
 συμφέρειν 5 a, 174 b, 493 a,
 494 b, 496 b, 498 a, 675 a
 συμφορῇ 176 a, 188 b, 757 b
 συμφυλάσσειν 250 b
 σύν 332 b, 774 a: in
 Compos. 345 b
 συνάγγελος 340 a
 συνάγειν 36 a, 219 b, 258 a
 συναλίζειν 22 b
 συναμφότερος 69 a, 430 a
 (*pl.*)
 συνάπας 688 b
 συναποθνήσκειν 328 b
 συνάχθαι 585 b
 συνδέειν 826 a
 συνδιαχειρίζειν 804 b
 συνέδριον 446 a, 474 a,
 483 b
 συνειδέναι 721 a, 726 a
 συνεκπίπτειν 434 b, 550 b
 συνεκπρήσσεσθαι 241 b
 συνεπέσθαι 803 b
 συνεπι-σπόμενοι 803 b
 συνέρχεσθαι 821 b

συνεσβάλλειν 623 b
 συνεσπίπτειν 803 b
 συνεστάναι 191 b, 244 a,
 396 a
 συνεστηκέναι 332 b, 482 b
 συνηρεφής 141 a
 σύνθημα 367 b, 796 a
 συνιέναι (-ειμι) 191 a
 συνιέναι (-ιμι) 816 b
 συννάσσειν 83 a
 σύννοδος 645 a, 686 a
 συννοίκημα 218 a
 συντάμνειν 154 b
 συνταράσσειν 696 b, 703 a
 συντιθέναι 50 b, 604 b,
 708 a, 710 b
 συντυχίη 630 a, 783 a
 συνωμότης 200 b
 Συριηγενής 187 b
 σύστασις 237 b
 συστήναι 195 a, 472 b,
 586 b, 780 a
 συστρατεύεσθαι 328 a
 συστρέφειν 626 a
 συστροφή 13 b
 συχνός 175 a, 439 b, 803 b,
 804 b
 σφαγιάζεσθαι 727 a, 748 b
 σφάλλειν 192 a
 σφάλμα 607 a
 σφενδονήτης 222 a
 σφίσι 564 b (= ἀλλήλοις)
 σφόδρα 624 a
 σφρηγίς 93 b
 σχεδὴ 54 b
 σχίζειν (-εσθαι) 45 b, 323 b,
 405 a, 700 b
 σῶζειν 406 a
 σωτήρ 285 a b, 577 b

τά 409 b
 (ταγός) 7 a
 τάδε 529 a
 τάλαντον 765 b
 ταμίης 437 b
 τάμνειν 172 a, 643 b, 779 b
 ταξίαρχος 125 b, 461 a,
 683 b, 708 a
 τάξις 315 b, 493 a, 631 b,
 659 a, 723 b, 749 a
 ταραάσσειν 703 a
 τάριχος 826 a
 ταρσός 674 a
 τάσσειν 375 b, 379 a, 385 b
 ταῦρος 326 b
 ταῦτα 536 b
 ταύτη 142 a, 164 a, 165 a,
 261 a, 263 b, 316 a, 335 b,
 367 b, 375 a, 398 a, 400 a,
 407 a, 508 a, 582 a, 623 b,
 657 b, 731 a, 791 a, 800 b

- τάφος 389 a, 396 b
 τάχα 268 a, 574 a
 ταχίστην, τήν 69 a, 681 b, 682 a
 τάχος 524 a, 541 a, 605 a (adv.)
 ταχύτερον 802 a
 τε 720 a, 736 a, 739 a, 744 b, 762 a: without καί 519 a: τε καί 59 b, 61 a, 469 b, 517 a, 529 a, 814 a
 τειχομαχίη 742 a
 τείχος 603 a, 681 b, 744 a, 804 a, 825 a
 τελείω 148 b
 τελευταίος 655 b
 τελειῶν 35 a, 157 b, 248 a, 514 b
 τέλος 105 b, 111 a, 315 a, 330 b, 473 b, 604 b, 664 b, 683 b, 723 a, 675 a (és), 808 b: adverb. 555 b, 606 a, 803 b
 τέμενος 296 a, 413 b, 570 b, 640 b
 Τέμπεα, τά 251 b
 τέρας 78 a b, 395 b, 411 a, 576 b, 826 a
 τέχνη 716 b
 τέως 341 b, 473 a
 τη 228 b, 256 a, 259 a, 320 b, 335 b, 349 b, 631 a, 730 b, 737 a, 738 b
 τηδε 189 b, 406 b, 610 a, 694 a
 τηνικαῦτα 331 a
 τίδρα 83 b
 τί δὴ 177 b
 τήρη(ς) 547 a
 τιθέναι (-εσθαι) 312 a, 513 b, 526 a, 688 a
 τιμῶν 551 a, 761 b
 τιμή 133 b, 149 b, 651 a
 τίμιος 748 a
 τιμωρέιν (-εσθαι) 5 a, 11 a, 590 b, 601 b, 760 b, 761 b, 788 b
 τιμώρημα 241 b
 τιμωρή 456 b
 τιμωρός 6 a, 248 a
 τίνασθαι 826 b
 τίς 19 b, 351 a, 689 b
 τίς 198 b, 378 a, 496 a, 497 b, 521 b, 545 b, 576 b, 725 b, 759 b, 786 b, 796 a, 823 b
 τίς 479 b, 520 b, 523 a
 τιρώσκειν 381 a
 -ό 185 b, 190 b, 221 b, 270 a, 274 b, 354 a, 378 a, 388 a: τὸ ἀπό 679 a:
 τὸ μέχρι 141 a, 146 b: collective 331 a, 398 a (πάν), 581 a (ὁμέτερον), 590 b (Ἑλληνικόν)
 τόδε 547 a
 τοίγαρ 541 a
 τοιόσδε 135 a, 340 a, 606 b
 τοιοῦτος 698 a
 τοῖχος 674 a
 τόνος 51 b, 824 b
 τοξεύειν 439 a
 τόξευμα 555 b
 τόξον 88 b, 93 a, 102 a, 729 a
 τοξότης 222 a, 632 b, 725 b
 τόσος 319 a
 τοσόσδε 818 a
 τοσοῦτος 15 a, 16 b, 22 a, 26 a b, 205 a, 313 a, 382 b, 523 b, 553 a, 589 a, 626 b, 735 b, 739 b
 τοῦτο μέν (followed by τοῦτο δέ) 6 b, 318 a, 496 a, 518 a, 569 a, 603 b, 646 a, 797 b, 798 a, 816 a: without τοῦτο δέ 33 a, 257 b, 642 a: τοῦτο δέ without τοῦτο μέν 447 b
 τράπειν (-εσθαι) 60 a, 626 a, 668 a, 722 b, 731 b
 τρέμειν 340 b
 τρέχειν 78 b, 217 a, 666 a, 673 b
 τρηχύς 829 a: -έως 314 a, 381 a, 395 b
 τρίβος 582 b
 τριηκόντερον (-ς) 385 a
 τριηραρχέειν 268 a, 269 a
 τριήραρχος 492 a, 495 b, 504 a
 τριήρης 432 a
 τριξός 770 a
 τρίπους 396 a, 486 b
 τρίς 577 a
 τριταίος 291 a
 τριτημόριον 669 a
 τριτημορίς 170 a
 τρίχωμα 94 b
 τρόπος 348 a, 606 b
 τροχάζειν 737 b
 τροχοειδής 187 a
 τρώμα 350 a, 393 a, 485 a, 780 b, 800 b
 τυγχάνειν 133 a, 307 b, 461 b, 577 a, 730 b, 812 b, 814 a
 τυκτά 816 a
 τυλοῦν 87 b
 τυλωτός 94 a
 τυμβοχορέειν 147 a
 τύπτειν 633 b
 τυραννεύειν 822 a
 τυραννίς 74 a, 575 a, 576 a
 τύραννος 227 a, 289 a, 586 b
 τύχος 113 b
 τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν 29 b, 42 b, 147 a, 245 b, 352 a, 368 b, 520 b, 552 a, 673 b, 759 b
 ὕβρις 362 a, 751 a
 ὕδωρ 376 a, 385 b, 544 b
 ὕγιαίνειν 220 a
 ὁμέτερον, τό 581 a
 ὑπάγειν 787 a, 789 a
 ὑπαίρειν 769 b, 822 b
 ὑπαρπάζειν 783 a
 ὑπάρχειν 539 b
 ὑπαρχος 39 b, 48 a, 134 b, 135 b
 ὑπεκκομίζειν 602 a
 ὑπεκτιθέναι 363 a
 ὑπεκχωρέειν 614 a
 ὑπεξαιρέειν 12 b
 ὑπεξέχειν 565 a
 ὑπέρ 514 b, 578 b, 686 a, 825 b: in Compos. 26 b
 ὑπεραρρωδέειν 468 b
 ὑπερβάλλειν (-εσθαι) 226 b, 239 b, 240 b, 349 b, 389 a, 551 a, 575 b, 581 b, 746 b
 ὑπερβολή 537 a
 ὑπερήμιος 60 a, 217 b
 ὑπερμήκης 582 b
 ὑπεροικέειν 142 b
 ὑπερτίθεσθαι 28 b
 ὑπερφέρειν 578 a, 589 b
 ὑπερφύης 543 b, 759 b
 ὑπέσχετο 602 a
 ὑπέχειν 602 a
 ὑπιέναι 599 b
 ὑπίσχεσθαι 289 a
 ὑπισχνέσθαι 522 a
 ὑπό with Accus. 145 a, 233 a, 466 b, 503 a, 704 a, 719 a, 726 a, 787 a, 792 a: with Dative 128 a, 185 b, 322 a, 440 a, 499 a b: with Genitive 19 b, 77 b, 134 b, 179 a, 188 b, 216 a, 263 b, 240 a, 342 a, 358 a, 376 b, 379 b, 387 b, 404 b, 472 a, 483 b, 542 b, 555 a, 578 b, 673 b, 689 b, 698 a, 699 a, 722 b, 732 b, 738 a, 754 b, 760 a, 796 a, 816 b: adverb. 84 a: in Compos. 12 b
 ὑποβρυχίης 170 a
 ὑποδέεσθαι 321 b, 612 b, 632 a
 ὑποδέξιος 69 b
 ὑποδοχή 149 b
 ὑποζωννύναι 92 b

ὑποθήκη 445 a	φύλος 65 a, 412 b, 739 b	χρῆμα 279 a, 281 b (<i>bis</i>),
ὑποκρίναι (-εσθαι) 241 a,	φύσιν 93 b	379 b, 392 b, 396 a, 408 b,
516 b	φουίνισσιν 481 b	576 a, 597 a, 600 b, 767 b,
ὑπόκρισις 616 a	φουίναν 36 b	807 a, 827 b
ὑπολαμβάνειν 244 a, 375 b,	φουίταιν 160 b	χρησμολόγος 192 a
508 b, 789 b	φοναί 755 b	χρησμός 383 b, 686 b
ὑπολείπειν 444 a, 460 b,	φονεύειν 754 a	χρησμοσύνη 667 b
513 a	φορβή 71 b, 136 b, 150 a	χρηστηριάζεσθαι 186 b,
ὑπόλοιπος 248 b, 557 a	φορμός 467 b	569 a
ὑπομένειν 129 b, 782 a,	φραγμός 54 b	χρηστήριον 101 a, 417 b,
821 a	φράζειν (-εσθαι) 239 a, 811 a	540 a, 567 a, 570 a, 732 a
ὑπομνήσκων 249 a	φράσσειν 191 b, 437 b,	χρηστός 535 a, 727 b
ὑπονοέειν 776 a, 797 b	727 b, 742 a	χρόνος 13 a, 44 a, 557 a,
ὑποστήναι 501 b, 669 a,	φρενῆρης 713 b	581 b, 695 b, 714 a, 727 b,
789 a	φρήν 607 b	750 b, 808 a, 814 a: χρόνος
ὑποστρέφειν 615 b, 626 a	φρονέειν 130 b, 308 b, 322 b,	729 a, 732 b: χρόνον, ἐς
ὑποτιθέναι (-εσθαι) 355 b,	597 a, 622 a, 797 b	779 a
797 a	φρόνημα 711 b	χρυσάορος 481 b
ὑπουργέειν 533 b, 589 a,	φροντίζειν 409 b	χυτός 56 b
814 b	φροντίς 306 b	χῶμα 510 a
ὑπόψανσις 53 a	φρουρέειν 321 b	χωρέειν 455 a, 729 a, 755 b,
ὑποψίλη 798 a	φρύγειν 509 b	818 a
ὑπέρει 299 b, 629 a, 638 b	φυγή 804 a	χώρη 400 a, 469 b
ὑστερος 757 b	φυλακή 309 a, 387 b, 686 b,	χωρίον 301 b, 390 a
	687 a, 688 a, 702 b	χωρίς 108 a, 379 b, 621 a,
	φύλακος 788 a	664 a, 769 b
φαίνειν (-εσθαι) 455 b, 799 a	φύλαξ 687 a	χώρος 301 a, 717 a
φάναι 225 b, 454 a	φυλάσσειν 351 a, 371 a,	
φαντάζεσθαι 18 a, 24 a	377 b, 676 b, 759 b, 815 b	ψάμμος 467 b
φαρμακεύειν 144 a	φυλλάς 389 a	ψέλιον 762 b
φάρος 814 b	φύλλον 322 a, 578 a	ψελιοφόρος 540 a
φάσμα 56 b, 490 a	φύσις 413 a	ψεύδειν 416 a, 728 b
φάτις 4 a, 280 a, 504 b,	φωνή 94 b	ψεύστης 313 a
506 b		ψηφίζεσθαι 310 a
φείδεσθαι 681 b	χαίρειν 682 a, 808 a	ψηφός 550 a, 713 b
φέρε 829 a	χαρίζεσθαι 760 b	ψυλός 656 a
φερέγγυος 69 b	χάρις 493 b, 725 b, 762 a,	ψυχή 546 a, 761 b
φέρειν (-εσθαι) 19 a, 180 b,	811 b	ψυχρός 695 b
314 a, 367 b, 447 a, 451 a,	χειμάζειν 282 b, 538 a,	
494 b, 502 a, 514 b, 519 b,	567 a	ᾧδε 579 b, 601 b
599 a, 626 b, 661 a, 678 b,	χειμαίνειν 538 a, 545 b	ᾧθέειν 237 b
766 a, 803 b, 827 a: φ.	χειμερίζειν 56 b, 538 a,	ᾧθισμός 482 a, 641 b, 729 l
ἐς 164 a, 585 a, 667 a,	554 a, 558 a	ᾧμοβέος 115 a
798 b, 806 a: φ. ἐπὶ	χειμών 376 a, 578 b	ᾧμοβόωνος 100 b, 103 b
676 b	χείρ 29 b, 219 b, 497 a,	ᾧν 626 b, 697 a, 724 b
φεύγειν 177 b	582 b	ᾧρατε 11 a
φήμη 624 b, 799 a, 801 a	χειριδωτός 84 a	ᾧρη 606 a
φθάνειν 224 a, 226 a, 278 b,	χειροῦν 269 a	ᾧρη 71 b, 150 a, 374 l
742 a	χηλευτός 113 a	377 b, 383 a, 705 b
φθινόπωρον 824 a	χῆτος 610 a	ᾧς 2 b, 250 b, 359 a, 369 l
φθίσις 111 b	χίλιος 61 a	388 b, 397 a, 443 b, 485:
φθονέειν 463 b, 529 a	χόλος 393 a	516 b, 610 a, 802 b, 818 a
φθόνος 551 a, 552 b, 747 b	χολοῦσθαι 399 a	ᾧς ἂν 605 a, 634 a
φιάλη 762 a	χόρτος 681 b	ᾧσαύτως 350 a, 385:
φιλέειν 18 b, 556 a, 829 b	χράν 141 b, 325 a, 571 b	758 b, 766 a: ᾧς εἰπέ
φίλιος 223 a, 599 a	χράσθαι 176 a, 188 b, 237 a,	542 a: ᾧς ἕκαστοι 385 l
φίλος 501 a, 589 a	265 a, 348 a, 384 a, 672 b,	ᾧς τάχιστα 466 b: v
φλαῦρος 248 a	788 b	Particip. 821 b
φλοιός 542 b	χρεών 684 b	ᾧς 149 a, 626 b, 669 b
φλυτρείειν 132 b	χρηγίειν 74 a, 445 b, 566 b,	ᾧσπερ 702 a
φοβέεσθαι 715 b	816 b	ᾧστε 148 a (w. Indic.
φοβερός 186 a		

- 165 b (= *āre*), 255 a, 276 a, 281 b, 282 b, 342 b, 378 a, 386 b, 397 b, 445 a, 502 b, 508 b, 523 a, 566 b, 584 a, 611 b, 673 b, 675 b, 683 a, 696 a, 726 a, 742 b, 750 a, 752 b, 755 b, 762 b
ῶτακουστέιν 560 a
ῶφελίη 185 b, 221 b
- Abstract for Concrete 556 b, 731 b, 809 b
 Accusative 200 a, 227 a, 250 b, 460 a, 581 b, 740 a, 786 b: absolute 338 b, 340 a: adverbial 544 b: anomal. 185 b: cognate 18 a, 528 b, 611 b, 788 b: double 42 b, 133 b, 178 b, 223 b, 249 a, 526 a, 528 b, 805 a: with infinitive 78 a: of reference 64 b, 101 b, 143 a, 397 a, 633 a, 720 a, 749 a, 759 b, 760 b, 829 b: of time 71 b, 278 a, 329 a, 784 b
 Adjective, with *ἔχειν* 457 b: predicate 607 a: verbal 239 a
 Alternatives 16 b
 Anacoluthon 26 b, 178 b, 181 b, 198 b, 219 a, 264 a, 267 a, 271 b, 368 b, 494 b, 571 b, 602 a, 721 a, 759 b, 768 b, 775 b, 783 b
 Aorist 3 b, 170 b, 172 a, 173 a, 197 a, 246 b, 251 b, 262 a, 284 b, 286 a, 318 b, 322 b, 343 b, 359 b, 443 b, 493 b, 494 b, 514 a, 533 b, 551 b, 553 b, 570 a, 586 a, 611 b, 614 a, 621 b, 630 a, 694 b, 701 b, 703 a, 706 a, 711 b, 714 b, 743 a, 769 b, 787 a, 791 b: gnomic 18 b: narrative 28 a: participle 20 a
 Apposition 369 a, 458 a, 497 a, 578 a, 682 a
 Article 9 b, 12 a, 18 b, 128 a, 142 a, 146 b, 152 b, 161 b, 199 b, 218 a, 222 b, 223 b, 226 b, 228 b, 257 b, 258 b, 275 b, 376 a, 379 a, 380 a, 381 b, 384 b, 392 a (*bis*), 455 b, 478 b, 527 a, 578 a, 739 b, 756 a, 811 a, 816 a: demonstrative 35 a, 50 a, 288 a, 326 b, 494 a, 496 a, 519 a, 756 b: neuter 131 a: omitted 378 a, 387 b, 406 b: possessive 339 a, 384 a, 386 b: relative 13 a, 15 b, 21 b, 24 a, 25 b, 28 b, 35 a, 44 b, 50 a, 54 a, 58 a, 73 b, 76 a, 93 b, 94 a, 155 a, 319 a, 331 b, 343 a, 411 a, 413 b, 434 a, 497 a, 518 a, 548 b, 588 b, 741 a, 760 a, 761 b, 780 b
 Asyndeton 352 a, 552 a, 605 b, 736 a, 746 b, 818 b
 Atticisms 7 b, 695 a
 Attraction 11 a, 12 b, 73 b, 126 b, 197 b, 472 b, 518 a
 Brachylogy 4 b, 15 a, 32 b, 36 a, 47 a, 281 a, 314 a, 397 b, 404 a, 596 a, 682 a
 City (for land) 304 a, 623 b, 624 a, 632 b, 638 a, 657 b, 733 b, 776 b, 786 a, 789 a
 Collectives 726 b
 Comparative, construction 386 b: double 289 a
 Conditionals 12 b, 13 b, 18 b, 69 a, 131 b, 133 b, 161 a, 178 a, 185 a, 199 a, 207 b, 223 b, 226 a, 232 a, 240 a, 268 a, 275 b, 345 b, 350 b, 352 a, 360 a, 385 a, 435 a, 447 b, 450 b, 503 b, 546 b, 581 a, 614 b, 618 b, 648 a, 689 a, 695 b, 725 a, 760 a, 779 a, 798 b, 808 a, 819 a: participle 129 b, 672 a
 Conjunctive (sub-) 774 a
Constructio ad sensum 11 a, 115 b, 133 b, 396 b, 434 b, 556 a
 Co-ordination 642 a, 691 b, 724 a, 760 b
 Dative 132 b, 381 a, 449 a, 489 b, 497 b, 517 a, 581 b, 582 b, 798 b: of agent 815 a: double 318 a: ethical 160 a, 226 a, 241 b, 289 a, 363 a, 386 b, 461 b, 524 a, 732 b, 778 b, 826 b: instrument 136 b: particip. 372 a, 377 a: reference 136 b: time 772 a
 Dramatics 347 b
 Dual 188 a
 Ellipse 595 a, 613 b, 739 a, 776 a, 789 a
 Epexegetis 23 b, 445 b
 Euphemism 111 b, 282 a, 385 a, 589 a, 607 a, 682 a
 Finals 10 b, 130 a, 240 a, 324 b, 367 a, 376 b, 378 b, 389 a, 499 a, 605 a, 689 b, 701 b, 803 a
 Frequentatives 314 b
 Future 10 b, 70 a, 285 a, 349 b, 360 a, 368 a, 457 b
 Genitive 13 a, 63 a, 148 a, 225 a, 278 b, 311 a, 314 a, 351 a, 357 b, (411 a), 445 b, 448 a, 482 b, 528 a, 756 a, 779 a, 780 b: absolute 132 a, 315 b, 408 b, 463 b, 527 a, 582 b, 627 b, 635 a, 675 b, 702 a, 703 a, 790 a: w. adverb 494 b: attributive 104 b: double 58 a, 74 a, 494 b: partitive 363 b: place 434 a: price 194 b, 675 b: time 395 b
 Hapaxlegomena — *ἀδαήμων* 455 b, *ἀλέησις* 626 a, *ἀνωρίη* 538 a, *ἀπειλητήριος* 536 a, *ἀρίδης* 456 b, *ἀτέειν* 331 a, *αὐτοκελής* 601 b, *ἐκδεξις* 4 b, *ἐκτύφλωσις* 789 b, *ἐνέοι* 8 a, *ἐπίκωντος* 95 a, *κατεπείγειν* 554 a, *λύχνων* 319 a, *νυνί* 339 b, *ὀρχηδόν* 194 b, *πάρος* 596 b, (*Πειραιεύς*) 491 a, *πολυμηκός* 384 a, *πυρπολέεσθαι* 435 b, *σίνος* 456 a, *συνόκλημα* 218 a, *ὑποβρυχής* 170 a, *ὑποδέξις* 69 b, *ὑπόφανσις* 53 a
 Hendiadys 6 b, 604 a
 Idiomatic Comparative 289 a
 Imperatives 69 b, 349 b, 613 a, 725 b, 779 a, 796 b, 818 a, 829 a
 Imperfects 62 a, 107 b, 238 b, 310 a, 322 b (*bis*), 325 a, 363 a, 371 b, 372 a, 397 a, 438 a, 450 a, 454 b, 467 b, 516 b, 534 a, 560 a, 564 a, 566 b, 571 b, 589 a, 602 a, 614 b, 620 b (*bis*), 630 a, 635 a, 667 b, 672 a,

- 692a, 704a, 705a, 706a, 721a, 727b, 733b, 769b, 773b, 784b, 800a, 808b, 815a: descriptive 28a
- Impersonal construction 399a, 523b, 687a, 739a, 754a
- Indicatives 16b, 310b
- Infinitives 206a, 253b, 318b, 336b, 339b, 356a, 386b, 519a, 524a, 530a, 532a, 618b, 712a, 808b: consecutive 25a: epexegetic 548a, 555a, 573a, 688a: imperfect 461b, 464a
- Irony 58a, 71b, 134b, 534b
- Irregular construction 795a
- Iteration 48a, 385b, 393a, 758a, 817a
- Metaphors 217a, 226a, 227a, 528b, 599a, 625b, 666a, 802a
- Middle 9a, 37b, 44a, 149b, 242a, 289a, 314b, 345b, 389a, 435a, 437b, 443b, 452b, 483b, 506b, 514b, 793b
- Moods, change of 391b
- Negatives 13b, 32b, 76a, 226b, 365a, 587b: double 5b, 42b, 74b, 444b, 445a, 456a, 512b, 515b, 534a, 546b, 554a, 539b, 604a, 613a, 626a, 691b, 695b, 778a: idiomatic 26a
- Neuter, collective 274b, 382a: construct. 18a, 58a, 60a, 176a, 215a, 258a, 368b: plural 88b, 397b, 398a, 445b, 625a
- Nominative (idiomatic) 179b, 193b, 219b, 223b, 409b, 464a, 506b, 783a, 813b
- Oblique Oration 391b, 465b, 545b, 571a, 596a, 712a, 761a, 783b, 800a
- Optative 289a, 310b, 367a, 439a, 542b, 555b, 634a, 702a, 712a, 740a
- Parataxis 22a, 36a, 58b, 321b, 322b, 350a, 364b, 384b, 410b, 418a, 444a, 453a, 454a, 455a, 487a, 511a, 571b, 622a, 686b, 692a, 713a, 718b, 784a, 795b, 799a
- Participial constructions 24b, 75b, 105a, 127a, 177b, 184b, 201a, 207b, 251a, 307b, 318b, 327b, 372a, 377a, 392a, 437b, 446b, 448b, 449a, 517a, 521a, 528a, 532a, 535b, 545b, 547a, 560a, 567a, 577a, 587b, 613a, 620b, 638a, 642a, 667a, 691b, 711a, 712a, 730b, 742a, 771b, 803b, 810a, 812b, 813a, 817b, 818a, 825b, 828b, 830b
- Participle, adjectival 447b, 450b, 742b: with adjective 522b: ad- versative 24a: condi- tional 12b, 57b, 129b, 203a, 518b, 523b, 553a, 672a, 760a, 779a, 798b, 808a: imperfect 33b, 240a, 372a, 534a, 633a: predicative, *see* Predi- cation
- Passive, for middle 18a, 68b, 180a, 464a, 489b, 511a, 521a, 524b, 711a
- Patronymic 1a, 135b, 275a
- Perfect 175b, 312a, 360b, 439a, 483b, 586a, 688b, 695a, 711a, 724a, 801a, 819a
- Personal construction 725b, 757b
- Phrase repeated 757a
- Pleonasm 15b, 24a, 366b, 379b, 604a, 668a, 691b
- Pluperfect 56b, 60a, 66a, 86b, 89a, 95a, 101a, 107b, 128a, 137a, 148a, 150a, 170b, 210b, 218a, 240a, 246a, 250a, 262a, 284a, 286a, 289a, 291a, 308a, 309b, 315b, 324a, 325a, 338b, 341a, 352b, 364a, 374b, 385a, 409a, 412b, 435b, 450a, 460a, 466b, 483b, 498a, 504a, 508a, 519a, 528a, 532b, 538a, 554a, 556b, 539b, 580a, 606a, 624b, 633a, 656b, 659a, 664b, 679b, 681b, 687a, 704b, 705a, 739a, 795a, 803b, 804a, 805b, 814a, 821b, 824b
- Plural 2a, 10b, 15a, 25b (heteroclit), 53b, 65a, 74a (poetical), 81b, 105a (verb), 128b, 149b, 301b, 315b, 448a (polite), 493b, 551a, 621a, 641b, 679a, 687a, 723b, 749a, 763a, 765a, 769b, 788a, 817b
- Poetic words — *ἀδαήμων* 455b, *ἀκροθίνια* 548a, *ἀποστείχειν* 714b, *ἀπρυντος* 705a, *δαίνυμι* 621b, *ἐκπαγγέσθαι* 268b, *ἐρδεν* 805a, *εὐφρόνη* 366a, *θρόωσκειν* 269b, *κάματος* 780a, *καταναίειν* 817b, (*λήμα*) 126a, *λυγρός* 673b, *μηνίειν* 339b, *οἰζυρός* 767b, *πημαίνειν* 613b, *προσωφελείν* 805a, *ράπτειν* 625b, (*σπᾶν*) 811a, (*στείχειν*) 611a, *φοναί* 755b, *χειμαίνειν* 545b
- Poetical phraseology 589a
- Predication 28a, 218a, 485a, 537a, 563b, 788b: adjectival 607a, 729b, 811b, 817b: adverbial 263b, 278a, 801a: de- monstrative 283b: in- verted 822b: tertiary 3a: participial 184a, 258a, 282a, 321b, 340a (*bis*), 496b, 508a, 516b, 518a, 811b: sub- stantival 206a, 240b, 313b, 442b
- Pregnant construction 448a
- Present 317b (historic), 377a, 379b, 410b (graphic), 555a (his- toric), 610b, 690b, 722a, 823b
- Pronoun, use of 350a
- Relative 13a, 130a
- Reminiscences—Aischylos 12b, 14a: Homeric 43a, 222b
- Schema Pindaricum* 48b
- Singular, verb in 252a
- Style, defective 8b, 10a, 15b, 25a, 99a, 114a, 130a, 137a, 145a, 185b, 268b, 294a, 307a, 732b, 751b, 796b: inelegant

120a, 283b, 313b, 325a, 329a, 339a, 379b, 384b, 387a, 514b, 521a, 538a, 548a, 556b, 573a, 705b, 713a, 714a, 718a, 813a, 820a, 830b: redun- dancy of 347b, 363a, 441a, 485a, 493b, 729a	Subjunctive 75b, 322b, 324b, 435a, 701b, 773b, 795b Superlative 325a Tautology 186a, 304a, 450b Tenses, aor. with present	219a: cp. Present, Future Tmesis 18b, 23b, 187b, 188a, 217a, 232a, 322a, 327a, 402b, 481b, 497a, 601b Zeugma 416b, 621b, 797a
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INDEX III

NOMINUM

A. PERSONAL AND PLACE-NAMES

Αβαι 396 b, 404 a, 568 b	Αίολις 262 b	Ἀναξίλειος 235 b, 246 a, 561 a
Ἀβδηρα, τὰ 138 b, 161 a	Αἶολος 293 a, 295 b	Ἀνανα 44 a
Ἀβροκόμης 332 a	Αἶσα 157 a	Ἀνδρόβουλος 189 a
Ἀβρώνυχος 385 a	Αἰσχυραῖος 373 b	Ἀνδροδάμας 492 a, 781 b
Αβυδος 47 a b, 48 a, 199 b, 254 b, 820 b	Ἀκανθος 146 a, 151 a b	Ἀνδροκράτης 640 b
Ἀγαμέμνων 222 b	Ἀκήρατος 410 b	Ἀνδρομέδη 205 a
Αγαλαλος 124 a	Ἀκραιφίη 571 a	Ἀνδρος 525 a, 534 a
Ἀγήνωρ 115 b	Ἀλάβανδα, τὰ 289 a, 572 b	Ἀνήριστος 176 b
Ἀγλαυρος 440 a	Ἀλέξανδρος 252 b, 256 a, 572 a, 579 b, 687 a, 688 a, 690 a	Ἀνθήλη 260 b, 300 b
Ἀγορή 79 b	Ἀλευάδαι 6 b	Ἀννων 234 b
Ἀδείμαντος 182 a, 364 a, 504 b	Ἀλεύης 170 a, 719 b	Ἀνόπαια 320 a
Ἀδραμύττειον 63 b	Ἀλιάκμων 161 b	Ἀνταγίης 756 b
Ἀείμνηστος 732 b, 749 b	Ἀλκαμένης 305 b	Ἀντανδρος 64 a
Ἀέροπος 575 b, 579 b	Ἀλκέτης 579 b	Ἀντίδωρος 374 a
Ἀζάνης 91 a	Ἀλκιβιάδης 380 a	Ἀντικύρη 297 b, 317 a
Ἀθάμας 79 b, 293 a, 295 b	Ἄλος 291 b	Ἀντίχος 665 a
Ἀθηναγόρης 781 b	Ἀλπηροί 260 b, 263 b, 338 b	Ἀντίπατρος 148 b
Ἀθηνάδης 317 a	Ἀλπηρός 320 a	Ἀνυσος 123 b
Ἀθῆναι 11 a, 114 a, 269 b, 365 a, 460 a, 518 b, 552 a, 580 b, 603 b, 612 a, 623 b, 822 a	Ἀλύαττης 409 a	Ἀξιος 158 a, 160 a
Ἀθηναίη 65 a, 411 a, 442 a, 505 a, 743 b	Ἄλυσ 40 a	Ἀπιδανός 166 b
Ἀθως 34 a, 35 a, 152 b, 153 a, 280 b	Ἀλφεός 335 a	Ἀπόλλων 569 a, 570 b
Αἰακίδαι, οἱ 453 b	Ἀμεινίης 489 b	Ἀπολλωνίη 784 b, 786 a, 789 a
Αἴας 548 b	Ἀμεινοκλῆς 281 b	Ἀργαῖος 580 a
Αἰγαῖον, τό 53 a	Ἀμηστρις 84 b, 814 a	Ἀργίλος 145 a
Αἰγάλεως 499 a b	Ἀμίλκας 234 b	Ἀργιόπιος 717 a
Αἰγή 155 b	Ἀμομφάρετος 708 a, 718 b, 747 a	Ἀργος 197 a, 575 a
Αἰγνα 482 b, 564 a, 757 a	Ἀμπελος 153 b, 154 b	Ἄρης 101 a
Αἰγὸς ποταμοί 825 b	Ἀμύντης 252 b, 572 a, 687 a	Ἀριαβίγνης 122 a, 497 a
Αἰθιοπία 114 a	Ἀμύντης 572 b, 579 b	Ἀρίαξος 107 a
Αἴνεια 157 a	Ἀμφιάρεως 569 a	Ἀριαράμνης 501 b
Αἰνησίδημος 213 b, 232 a	Ἀμφίκαia 403 a	Ἀρίδωλις 289 a
Αἴνος 79 b	Ἀμφίλοχος 116 a	Ἀριόμαδος 91 a, 103 a
Αἰολιδέες 407 b	Ἀμφισσα 402 a, 410 a	Ἀρισταγόρης 11 b, 781 b
	Ἀναξανδρίδης 221 a, 304 b, 305 a, 466 b, 561 b	Ἀριστέας 182 a
	Ἀνᾶξανδρος 305 a	Ἀριστείδης 483 a, 485 b, 506 b, 655 b
		Ἀριστίδης 306 a, 338 a
		Ἀριστὶδῆμος 563 b

- 'Αριστομένης 186 b
 'Αρίστων 129 a, 311 b, 354 b
 'Αρίφρων 564 a
 'Αρκαδίη 114 a, 302 b (*bis*)
 'Αρμαμίδης 111 a
 'Αρματίδης 335 b
 'Αρμοκύδης 624 a
 'Αρσαμένης 92 b
 'Αρσάμης 94 a
 'Αρτάβαζος 90 b, 553 a, 680 a, 721 a, 735 b, 776 b
 'Αρτάβανος 15 b, 67 a, 91 a, 100 a, 106 a, 392 a
 'Αρταβάτης 89 b
 'Αρταίος 91 a
 'Αρτάνης 332 a
 'Αρταύκτης 47 b, 103 a, 822 a, 825 b
 'Αρταύνη 814 a
 'Αρταύνης 91 b, 559 b
 'Αρταφρένης 11 b, 99 a
 'Αρταφρένης 99 a
 'Αρταχαιίης 88 a, 147 a, 559 a
 'Αρτεμβάρης 828 b
 'Αρτεμης 258 b, 480 b
 'Αρτεμισίη 126 a, 461 b, 494 a
 'Αρτεμίσιον 257 a b (*bis*), 285 a, 415 a, 419 b
 'Αρτόντης 769 a
 'Αρτόχμης 98 b
 'Αρτυστωνή 94 a, 97 a
 'Αρτύφιος 91 a (*bis*)
 'Αρχέλεως 305 b
 'Αρχεστρατίδης 781 b
 'Αρχίδημος 561 a
 'Ασίνη 471 a
 'Ασπαθίνης 122 a
 'Αστυάγης 10 b, 828 b
 'Ασσα 153 a
 'Ασωνίδης 268 a
 'Ασωπόδωρος 741 a
 'Ασωπός 299 b, 320 b
 'Ασωπός 619 b, 628 b, 657 a b, 675 b, 678 a, 697 b, 699 a, 700 a, 721 b
 'Αταρνεύς 63 a, 522 a
 'Ατοσσα 106 b
 'Ατρείδαι 30 a
 'Ατταγίνος 620 a, 773 a
 'Αττική 434 a, 439 b, 448 a, 533 a, 612 a, 752 b
 'Ατυς 41 b, 98 b
 'Αυτόδικος 772 a
 'Αυτόνοος 413 b
 'Αφεταί 287 a, 365 a, 368 a, 374 b
 'Αφιδναι 751 b
 'Αφυτις 155 b
 'Αχαΐη 290 b, 291 b
 'Αχαΐη 409 b
 'Αχαμένης 9 a, 122 b, 347 b
 'Αχαιμένης (7. 11. 9)
 'Αχέρων 430 b
 Βαγαίος 105 a, 559 a
 Βάδρης 102 a
 Βάκισ 383 b, 482 a, 508 b, 685 b
 Βάκτρα 819 a
 Βασιληίδης 564 b
 Βασσάκης 100 a
 Βέρμιον 578 b
 Βίας 669 a
 Βισαλίη 145 b
 Βισάνθη 182 a
 Βόγης 136 a
 Βοιθής 167 b
 Βοιωτή 594 b, 604 b, 605 a, 623 b, 628 a, 774 a
 Βορέης 280 a, b
 Βορτιαίς 159 b
 Βουβάρης 572 b
 Βούλις 176 b
 Βυζάντιον 779 b
 Γαίσιον 793 b
 Γαληψός 154 a
 Γαργαφίη 639 b, 696 b
 Γανάνης 575 b
 Γέλη 211 a
 Γέλων 210 b, 213 a, 218 a, 221 b, 223 b (*bis*), 226 b, 228 b, 232 a
 Γεραστός 367 a
 Γέργης 107 a
 Γίγωνος 157 a
 Γλαύκων 754 a
 Γλίσας 686 b
 Γοβρύης 3 a, 5 b, 97 a, 106 a
 Γόννος 164 a b, 253 b
 Γόργος 124 b
 Γοργώ 355 b
 Γορδίης 577 b
 Γυγαίη 572 b
 Δαίδαλος 242 b
 Δαμασίθυμος 125 a, 494 b
 Δαρείος 1 a, 2 b, 29 b, 92 b, 94 a, 97 a, 98 b, 103 a, 106 b (*bis*), 122 a b, 134 b, 174 a, 275 a, 810 b, 817 a
 Δάρδανος 65 b
 Δαρείος 813 b
 Δάτις 11 b, 111 a
 Δάτον 754 a
 Δαύλιοι (-ίων πόλις) 407 b
 Δελφοί 141 b, 173 b, 186 a, 201 b, 228 a, 354 b, 407 a, 409 a, 540 a, 666 a, 763 b, 787 b
 Δεκελέη 616 b
 Δηίφονος 784 b
 Δήλος 565 a, 566 b, 781 a
 Δημάργητος 129 a, 311 b, 343 b, 354 b, 454 b, 458 a
 Δημήτηρ 190 b, 300 b, 717 a, 734 b, 794 a
 Δημόκριτος 429 b
 Δημόνοος 289 b
 Δημόφιλος 328 b
 Διαδρόμης 328 b
 Διηρέκης 334 b
 Διθύραμβος 335 b
 Δίκαια 138 b
 Δίκαιος 454 a
 Διόνυσος 141 b
 Διονυσοφάνης 769 b
 Διπαιέες 670 b
 Δορίσκος 38 b, 80 a, 134 b, 151 b
 Δόρυσος 305 b
 Δρυμός 402 b
 Δρυοπίς 400 a b, 421 b
 Δρυός κεφαλαί 677 a
 Δύρας 298 a
 Δωδώνη 787 b
 Δωριεύς 221 a, 306 b, 609 b
 Δωρίς 399 a, 400 a
 Δώτος 97 a
 'Εβρος 80 b
 'Ελαούς 33 b, 823 a, 826 b
 'Ελάτεια 403 b
 'Ελένη 750 b
 'Ελευσίς 455 a, 456 a, 490 b, 735 a
 'Ελλάς 424 a, 808 a, 827 b
 'Ελλη 79 b
 'Ελλησποντος 47 a, 48 b, 51 b, 79 a, 182 a, 227 a, 436 a, 524 a, 541 a, 802 b
 'Ελλοπίη 388 a
 'Ενριεύς 167 a
 'Επιδάτης 315 b, 329 a, 332 b
 'Επίδαυρος 427 b
 'Ερεχθεύς 280 a, 425 b, 441 b
 'Ερυνεύς 421 b
 'Ερμίων 471 a
 'Ερμόδουκος 806 b
 'Ερμότιμος 519 b, 523 a
 'Ερπυς 676 a
 'Ερυθραί 619 b, 628 a, 632 b
 'Ερωχος 403 a
 'Ευαίνετος 252 a
 'Ευβοίη 258 b, 365 a, 376 a
 'Ευήνιος 784 b, 790 a
 'Ευθονιος 806 b
 'Ευκλείδης 215 a
 'Ευμένης 503 b
 'Ευνομος 562 b
 'Ευρύναξ 609 b, 710 b

Κάμψα 157 a
 Καναστρατή 154 b
 Κανδαύλης 125 a
 Κάνη 63 a
 Καππαδοκίη 39 a
 Καρδαμύλη 471 a
 Καρδίη 79 b, 821 b
 Καρήνη 63 b
 Κάρνος 252 a
 Κασθανατή 271 a, 279 a
 Κασμένη 216 a
 Κασταλίη 414 a
 Καφηνές 367 a
 Κέκροψ 190 a, 425 a, 440 a
 Κελαιναί 40 a
 Κέος 478 a
 Κέρκωψ 320 b
 Κεφαλληνίη 654 b
 Κηφέας 644 a
 Κηφισός 266 b, 402 b
 Κιθαιρών 190 b, 629 a (*bis*),
 638 b, 676 a, 704 a b
 Κίλιξ 115 b
 Κλεάδης 772 a
 Κλέανδρος 212 b, 213 a
 Κλέανδρος 215 a
 Κλεωνής 380 a
 Κλεώδαιος 306 a
 Κλεόμβροτος 466 b, 608 a b,
 759 a
 Κλεομένης 306 b, 355 b
 Κόδρος 794 a
 Κοΐλα, τὰ 376 a
 Κολοσσαί 44 b
 Κόμψαντος 139 b
 Κόρινθος 776 b
 Κορυδαλλός 317 b
 Κρηστονική 159 b
 Κρήτη 116 b, 197 a, 248 b
 Κρητίνης 235 b, 281 b
 Κρίνιπτος 232 b
 Κριτάλλα 39 a
 Κριτόβουλος 555 a
 Κροΐσος 45 b, 409 a
 Κροσσάτη 157 b
 Κυβερνήσκος 124 b
 Κύδραρα 45 a
 Κύθηρα, τὰ 346 a
 Κύθος 114 a
 Κύμη 288 a, 558 a
 Κυνόσουρα 478 a
 Κύρνος 807 a
 Κύρος 3 b, 10 b, 72 b, 94 a,
 103 a, 828 b, 829 b
 Κυτίσσωρος 295 a
 Κωλιάς 508 b
 Κώμβρεια 157 a
 Κωπαις 570 b

 Λακεδαίμων 325 b, 326 b,
 344 a, 432 b, 602 a, 613 a

- Δάκμων 786 a
 Δάμπων 632 a
 Δάμπων 781 b
 Δάμπων 759 a
 Δαύρειον 194 a
 Δέαρος 754 a
 Δεβάδεια 568 a
 Δεκτόν 820 a
 Δεοντιάδης 308 a
 Δευκή άκτή 38 b
 Δευτυχίδης 560 b, 563 b, 781 a
 Δευτυχίδης 561 a
 Δεωβάτης 305 b
 Λέων 268 a
 Λέων 305 a
 Λεωνίδης 304 b, 308 b, 310 b, 327 b, 333 b, 355 b, 466 b, 608 b, 731 b, 760 a
 Λεωπρέπης 337 b
 Λίπαξος 157 a
 Λίσιος 138 a
 Λύγαμυς 126 a
 Λυδής 161 b
 Λυδός 98 b
 Λυκίδης 600 a, 601 b
 Λυκομήδης 373 b
 Λύκος 44 b
 Λυσικλής 385 a
 Λυσίμαχος 483 a, 655 b
 Λυσίστρατος 509 a

 Μαγνησίη 258 a, 286 a
 Μαϊάνδρος 45 b
 Μακεδονίη 39 a, 251 b, 253 b, 543 a, 554 a, 575 b, 577 b, 779 a
 Μακεδονίς 162 a
 Μακίστιος 629 b
 Μακτώριον 211 b
 Μαλέη 240 b
 Μαραθών 648 a, 691 a
 Μαροδόνιος 5 b, 106 a, 461 a, 511 a, 513 b, 514 a, 518 b, 538 a, 541 a, 553 b, 573 a, 595 a, 612 a, 613 a, 622 a, 658 b, 663 b, 680 a, 682 a, 684 a, 688 b, 693 a, 727 a, 730 b, 731 a, 743 b, 760 a, 820 a
 Μαροδόντης 105 a, 559 a, 804 a
 Μαροσύης 41 a
 Μάρων 335 a
 Μαρώνεια 138 b
 Μασίστης 106 b, 810 b, 813 a
 Μασίστιος 104 a, 629 b, 635 a
 Μασκάμης 134 b, 135 a
 Μασσάγης 95 b

 Ματτήν 124 a
 Μεγάβαζος 91 b, 122 a
 Μεγαβάτης 122 a
 Μεγάβυζος 107 a
 Μεγαδόστης 134 b
 Μεγακρέων 150 b
 Μέγαρο 615 b, 616 a
 Μεγάσιδρος 97 a
 Μεγιστής 323 a, 327 b
 Μελάμπους 668 a
 Μελάμπουργος 320 a
 Μέλας 79 b, 298 b
 Μελίβοια 279 a
 Μενάρης 560 b
 Μένδη 156 a
 Μενέλεως 241 a b, 248 a
 Μέρβαλος 124 a
 Μεσσήνη 231 a
 Μηδείη 85 b
 Μηκύβερνα 154 a
 Μηλίσ 296 b, 300 b
 Μίδης 577 b
 Μίκυθος 246 a
 Μίλητος 17 a, 794 a
 Μίνως 241 b, 242 a, 248 a
 Μνησίφιλος 444 a
 Μολόεις 716 b
 Μουνεχίη 478 b
 Μουρυχίδης 598 b
 Μουσαίος 7 a, 509 a, 686 a
 Μυγδονίη 157 b, 161 b
 Μυκάλη 105 a, 792 a, 795 b, 810 b, 820 a
 Μύρμηξ 270 a
 Μύς 567 a

 Νέη πόλις 155 b
 Νειλεύς 794 a
 Νεοκλής 252 b
 Νέστος 139 b
 Νέων 401 a, 403 a
 Νικανδρος 562 a
 Νικόλεως 176 b
 Νυμφόδωρος 181 b

 Ξάνθιππος 564 a, 821 a, 827 a
 Ξεναγόρης 811 a
 Ξέρξης 6 b, 15 a, 27 b, 39 b, 66 b, 128 a, 142 a, 152 b, 159 a, 161 b, 163 a, 179 a, 197 a, 199 b, 208 a, 275 a b, 296 a, 351 a, 378 a, 379 a, 460 b, 485 b, 496 a, 499 a, 513 b, 523 b, 537 b, 540 a, 558 a, 581 b, 593 a, 739 b, 760 a, 766 a, 792 b, 814 a
 Ξούθος 425 b

 Όάριζος 95 b

 Όθρυς 166 a
 Οινώνη 428 a
 Οιδόβαζος 92 b, 821 b
 Οίτη 261 a
 Όλυμπή 247 a, 764 b
 Όλυμπιόδωρος 632 a
 Όλυμπος 166 a
 Όλυθος 154 b, 554 b
 Όμηρος 225 b
 Όνήτης 317 b
 Όνομάκριτος 7 a
 Όνόχωνος 166 b, 291 b
 Όργεύς 148 b
 Όρέσθειον 611 a
 Όρσίφαντος 335 a
 Όσσα 166 a
 Ότάνης 61 a, 106 b
 Ότάνης 84 b
 Ότάσσης 88 a
 Όφρύνειον 65 b

 Παγασαί 286 b
 Πάγγαιον, τό 142 a, 146 a
 Παιονίη 543 a
 Παιονική 159 b
 Παλλήνη 156 b, 554 a
 Πάμμος 167 a
 Πάμμων 271 a
 Πανατίος 486 b
 Πανιώνιος 521 a
 Πανοπέτες 404 b, 407 b
 Παντάρης 212 b
 Παντίτης 341 a
 Παραποτάμιοι 403 b, 404 b
 Πάρμυς 103 a
 Παρνησός 395 b, 401 a (bis), 407 b, 410 a
 Παρνησός 661 a
 Πασυκλής 794 a
 Πάτακος 213 b
 Πανσανίης 362 a, 608 a, 612 a, 631 b, 688 a, 690 b, 707 b, 710 b, 716 a, 723 b, 728 a, 740 a, 748 b, 775 a
 Πεδιέες 403 a
 Πειραιεύς 491 a
 Πεισιστρατίδαι 7 a, 439 a
 Πέλλα 159 b
 Πελοπόννησος 302 b, 349 a, 435 a, 462 a, 466 a, 470 b, 515 a, 643 a, 698 b
 Πέλοψ 12 a, 21 b
 Πενθύλος 289 b
 Πέργαμος 142 a
 Περόδικης 574 b, 575 b, 580 a
 Περίλεως 804 b
 Περσείδης 326 a
 Πήλιον 166 a, 368 b, 374 b
 Πηνειός 164 a, 166 b, 269 a
 Πίγρης 125 a

Πιερίη 264 a	Σίγγος 153 b	Τήρης 181 b
Πίλωρος 153 a	Σιθωνίη 154 b	Τήριλλος 232 a b
Πίνδος 166 a	Σικανίη 243 a	Τιχαρόνης 85 b, 392 a, 793 a, 804 a
Πίστυρος 140 a	Σίκας 124 b	Τίθαιος 111 a
Πλάταια (8. 50. 8)	Σικελίη 197 a, 219 a, 232 a, 243 a, 306 a	Τιθορέα (<i>sic</i>) 401 a
Πλαταιαί 340 b, 623 b, 637 b, 638 a, 657 b, 670 a, 676 b, 679 b, 733 b, 755 a, 771 b, 777 a	Σίκυνος 475 b, 533 a	Τιμαγόρης 124 b
Πλείσταρχος 608 b	Σιληνός 41 a, 578 a	Τιμανδρος 741 a
Πλείστωρος 825 b	Σιμωνίδης 337 b	Τιμηγενίδης 676 a, 773 a
Πολιάδης 708 a	Σίνδος 158 a	Τιμόδημος 552 b
Πολύς 384 b	Σίρις 451 a	Τιμόξεινος 555 b, 556 b
Πολυδέκτης 562 b	Σίρις 543 a	Τίμων 189 a
Πολύδωρος 305 a	Σιρομίτρης 92 b, 104 a	Τιμώνας 124 b
Πολύκριτος 503 b	Σίριμος 124 a	Τιτακός 752 a
Πολυνείκης 646 a	Σισάμνης 90 a	Τορώνη 154 a
Πόντος 51 a, 119 a, 199 b	Σιτάκης 181 b	Τραύς 139 b
Ποσειδέων 285 a b, 442 a, 550 a	Σκάμανδρος 64 b	Τρέις κεφαλαί 677 a
Ποσειδώνιος 746 b	Σκιάθος 258 a, 267 a, 367 a	Τρηχυνίη 399 a
Ποσιδήιον 145 b	Σκιώνη 156 a	Τρηχίς 258 b, 259 a, 298 b, 299 b, 302 a, 304 a, 384 b
Ποτειδαίη 155 a	Σκολοπείς 793 b	Τριτανταίχμης 106 a
Πρηξάσπης 122 a	Σκύθης 227 b	Τριτέες 403 a
Πρηξίλειος 811 a	Σκυλλίης 368 b	Τροίξην 417 a
Πρηξίνος 267 a	Σκώλος 617 b	Τροφώνιος 568 a
Πρίαμος 64 b	Σμέρδης 103 a	Τύμνης 125 a
Πρόκλης 563 a	Σμερδομένης 106 b	Τυνδαρίδαι 750 b
Πρύτανις 562 b	Σμίλα 157 a	Τυρόδιζα 38 b
Πρωτεσίλειος 822 b	Σούσα 177 a, 207 a, 354 b, 513 a, 813 b	Ταμπεΐη 414 a
Πυθίης 268 a, 759 a	Σπάρτη 4 a, 203 b, 344 a, 540 b, 551 b, 612 a, 732 b, 745 a, 752 a, 756 a	Τάμπολις 396 b, 403 b
Πύθης 181 b	Σπερθίης 176 b	Τδάρνης 90 a, 314 a, 319 a (<i>bis</i>), 539 a, 545 a
Πύθιος 41 b, 57 b	Σπερχειός 297 b, 337 a	Τδάρνης 107 a
Πύλαι 301 b	Στάγιρος 145 b	Τδάρνης 107 a, 177 a, 178 b
Πύλος 239 a	Στενύκληρος 733 a	Τάλλος 306 a, 643 a
Πύγων 419 b	Στράττις 564 b	Τπεράνθης 332 a
Ρήγιον 246 a b	Στρώμη 137 b	Τρίη 244 a
Ροδόπη 543 b	Στρυμών 37 b, 39 a, 143 a, 144 a, 543 a, 545 a, 547 b	Τσιαί 619 b, 638 b
Ροίτιον 65 b	Σύαγρος 210 b, 222 b	Τστάνης 102 a
Σάβυλλος 213 a	Συέννεσις 124 a	Τστάσπης 1 a, 15 b
Σαλαμίς 114 a	Συλεύς 145 b	Τστάσπης 89 b
Σαλαμίς 190 b, 417 a, 419 b, 433 b (<i>bis</i>), 443 a, 457 b, 473 a, 478 a, 492 b, 497 b, 510 a, 548 a, 549 b, 598 a	Συρήκουσαι 217 a	Τσσέλδωρος 125 a
Σάλη 81 a	Σφενδαλέες 617 a	Φάγρης 142 a
Σάμος 559 a, 565 a, 781 a, 790 b	Σωσίμενης 486 b	Φάληρον 460 b, 501 b, 503 a, 504 a, 524 a, 525 a, 662 b
Σανδώκης 288 b	Σωφάνης 749 b	Φαναγόρης 317 b
Σάνη 156 a	Τάιναρον 239 a	Φαρανδάτης 104 a, 755 a
Σάρδιες 1 a, 197 a, 198 a, 521 b, 544 b, 812 b	Ταλθύβιος 175 a b	Φαρναζάθρης 89 b
Σάρπη 153 b	Τάναγρα 617 b, 671 b	Φαρνάκης 90 b, 553 a, 735 b, 776 b
Σερμύλη 154 a	Τεάσπις 104 a, 755 b	Φαρνούχης 111 a
Σέρρειον 81 a	Τεγέη 246 b, 670 a	Φαύλλος 431 b
Σηπιάς 271 a, 279 a, 281 b	Τεθρώνιον 403 a	Φερενδάτης 91 b
Σηστός 48 a, 821 a	Τεισάμενος 665 a, 669 b, 670 a	Φίλιππος 579 b
	Τελλίης 395 b	Φίλιππος 794 a
	Τέμπεα, τά 251 b	Φιλοκύν 746 a
	Τετράμνηστος 123 b	Φλέγρη 156 b
	Τήλεκλος 305 b	Φοινίκη 114 a
	Τηλίνης 211 b	Φοῖνιξ 260 b, 299 b (<i>bis</i>), 300 a
	Τήλος 211 a	

Φραταγούνη 332 a	Χαλκίς 280 b	Χῶν 785 b
Φρίξος 293 a, 295 a	Χαράδρα (<i>sic</i>) 402 b	Ψυττάλεια 508 a
Φρυγίη 572 b	Χαρίλεως 562 a	
Φρύωνων 620 a	Χείδωρος 159 b, 163 a	
Φύλακος 413 b, 492 a	Χέρσις 124 b	
Φυλλίς 143 a	Χερσόνησος 47 a, 821 a	Ῥερόη 701 b, 703 b
Φωκίς 400 b	Χίλεος 606 b	Ῥκυτος 364 a
	Χίλων 346 a	Ῥρικος 786 a
Χαλέστρη 158 a	Χύτροι 261 b	Ῥρομέδων 124 a

B. COLLECTIVE

Ἀβδηρῆται 547 a	Βάκτριαι 88 a, 110 a, 659 b	Ἑρμοῖνες 420 b, 421 b, 468 b, 653 b
Ἀθηναῖοι 11 a, 16 b, 47 b, 72 b, 174 b, 184 a, 186 a, 189 a, 192 b, 193 a, 224 a, 281 a, 357 b, 360 b, 363 b, 372 a, 415 b, 418 a, 422 a, 423 a, 424 a, 442 a, 490 a, 504 a, 504 b, 507 b, 573 b, 595 a, 599 a, 613 b, 641 b, 645 a, 655 b, 660 a, 688 a, 690 b, 694 a, 711 a, 714 b, 722 b, 724 a, 726 a, 743 a, 749 b, 750 b, 751 b, 754 a, 771 a, 803 a, 803 b, 806 b, 821 a	Βησσοί 141 b Βισάλται 543 b Βίστορες 140 a Βοιωτοί 303 a, 405 b (<i>bis</i>), 412 b, 660 b, 738 a, 800 a Βοττιαῖοι 273 b, 554 b Βρύγοι 273 b	Ἑδωνοί 140 b, 754 a Ἡλείοι 468 a, 758 b (<i>bis</i>) Ἡρακλεῖδαι 540 b, 642 a, 645 b, 667 a
Αἰγυῆται 194 b, 358 b, 427 a, 490 a, 501 b, 503 a, 655 a, 759 a, 761 a, 762 b, 772 a	Γανδάριοι 90 b Γελῶσι 217 b Γέργιθες 65 a	Θάσιοι 137 b, 148 a Θεσπιῖνες 328 a, 328 b, 334 a, 389 b, (475 b) Θέσπρωτοι 430 b
Αἰγυπτιοὶ 113 a, 122 b, 379 b, 662 a	Δαδίκαι 90 b Δεκελῆες 750 a, 752 a Δελφοί 265 a, 409 a, 413 b Δερσαῖοι 140 b Δόλοπες 171 a, 274 a Δρύοπες 421 b, 470 b Δωριῖνες 117 a, 119 b, 400 a, 427 b, 459 b, 470 b	Θέσσαλοι 168 a, 171 a, 249 a, 252 a, 263 a, 282 b, 342 b, 393 a, 397 a, 398 b, 399 a, 625 b, 777 b, 778 a Θηβαῖοι 172 a, 328 a (<i>bis</i>), 333 b, 341 a, 569 b, 570 a, 596 a, 618 a, 621 a, 678 a, 682 a, 738 a, 773 b Θρήκες 99 b, 141 a, 181 b, 273 a, 662 a, 780 a, 825 a
Αἰθίοπες 27 b, 93 a, 94 a, 662 a	Ἑγεσταῖοι 221 a Ἑγχελῆες 685 a Ἑλίσκοι 234 a	Ἰαμίδαι 665 b Ἰβηρες 233 a Ἰήπυγες 244 b Ἰλλυριοὶ 575 b, 685 a Ἰνδοὶ 89 b, 95 a, 110 a, 660 a
Αἰολῆες 822 a Αἰτωλοὶ 470 b Ἀκάνθιοι 148 a Ἀκραγαντῖνοι 232 b, 244 a Ἀλαρόδιοι 104 a Ἀλευάδαι 6 b Ἀμπρακιῶται 426 b, 654 a Ἀμύργοι 89 a Ἀμφικτύονες 337 a Ἀνακτόριοι 654 a Ἀνδριοὶ 460 a, 535 a Ἀράβιοι 92 b, 110 b Ἀργεῖοι 200 b, 207 a, 208 a, 208 b, 472 a, 612 a, 646 a Ἀριοὶ 85 b, 89 b Ἀρκάδες 246 b, 468 a, 470 a, 645 b, 651 b Ἀρμένιοι 98 a Ἀρταῖοι 85 a Ἀσσύριοι 87 a, 87 b Ἀσώπιοι 617 a Ἀτρεῖδαι 30 a Ἀχαιοὶ 171 b, 274 a, 293 b, 432 a, 470 a, 643 a Ἀψίνθιοι 825 a	Ἑλληνες 57 b, 136 a, 160 b, 172 a, 197 b, 200 b, 201 a, 220 a, 222 b, 226 b, 254 a, 255 a, 264 a, 264 b, 273 a, 279 b, 284 a, 301 a, 341 b, 357 a, 369 b, 415 a, 443 a, 465 b, 476 b, 487 a, 489 a, 490 a, 493 a, 497 a, 503 a, 509 a, 512 b, 518 a, 518 b, 524 b, 527 a, 536 a, 548 a, 551 a, 596 b, 604 a, 629 a, 629 b, 631 a, 636 a, 661 a, 689 b, 690 b, 695 b, 697 a, 698 a, 710 b, 720 a, 739 b, 744 a, 748 b, 761 a, 767 a, 774 a, 796 b, 797 b, 802 a, 802 b, (820 a), 826 a Ἐνιήνες 171 a, 274 a, 298 a Ἐορδοί 273 a Ἐπιδαύριοι 358 b, 420 b, 468 b, 652 b Ἐρετριῖνες 358 b, 428 b, 653 b	Ἰωνες 13 a, 119 b, 371 b, 424 a, 471 b, 498 a, 501 a, 564 a, 643 a, 782 a, 796 a, 805 a Καβηλῆες 101 a Καδμεῖοι 646 b Καλυνδῆες 494 b Καμαριναῖοι 217 a Καππαδόκται 96 b Κᾶρες 117 b, 125 a, 386 b Καρύστιοι 459 b, 536 b, 537 a Καρχηδόνιοι 234 b, 236 b, 237 a Κάσπιοι 91 a, 110 a (<i>bis</i>) Κεκροπίδαι 424 a Κερκυραῖοι (7. 168. 1)

- Κήμοι 359 a, 429 a
 Κηφῆνες 84 b
 Κίκορες 81 b, 138 a, 140 a
 Κίλικες 115 a, 516 a
 Κίσσιοι 86 a, 110 a, 313 b
 Κόλχοι 103 b
 Κορίνθιοι 290 a, 358 a, 420 b, 468 a, 505 a, 506 a, 651 b, 740 a, 790 a, 803 b, 807 a
 Κραναοί 424 a
 Κρήτες 240 b, 248 b
 Κροτονιῆται 431 a, 432 a
 Κύθιοι 430 a
 Κυλλῆριοι 216 a
 Κυναούριοι 470 a
 Κύπριοι 113 b, 114 b, 124 b
 Κύρριοι 234 a
 Κῶοι 228 b, 229 b
- Λακεδαιμόνιοι 175 a, 176 a, 180 a, 204 a, 218 b, 239 a, 311 a, 332 b, 337 a, 358 b, 420 b, 468 a, 540 b, 583 a, 586 a, 615 b, 626 b, 649 b, (650 a), 666 b, 674 b, 697 a, 707 b, 711 a, 711 b, 714 b, 742 a, 745 a, 746 b, 770 a, 803 a
 Λασόνιοι 101 a
 Λευκάδιοι 426 b, 654 a
 Λίβυες 95 a, 110 a, 233 a
 Λίγυες 96 a, 233 b
 Λήμνιοι 470 b
 Λοκροί 171 b, 303 a, 310 a, 359 a, 402 a, 459 b
 Λυδοί 98 b, 99 a
 Λύκιοι 116 a, 116 b
- Μάγνητες 171 b, 274 a
 Μάγοι 28 b, 143 b, 283 a
 Μακεδόνες 97 a, 164 a, 274 a, 555 a, 578 b, 661 b
 Μάκρωνες 102 b
 Μαντινέες 757 b, 758 b (*bis*)
 Μᾶρες 103 b
 Μαρνανδνοί 96 b
 Μασσαγέται 27 b
 Ματινηοί 96 a
 Μεγαράες 217 b, 358 a, 426 b, 630 a, 655 a, 741 a, 771 a
 Μεσσάπιοι 244 b
 Μεσσήνιοι 671 a
 Μῆδοι 85 b, 86 a, 110 a, 119 b, 176 b, 313 b, [354 b], 364 b, 429 a, 454 b, 475 a, 540 b, 558 b, 625 a, 659 b, 691 a, 691 b, 757 b
 Μηλιώτες 98 b, 101 a
- Μηλιέες 171 b, 319 a, 422 a, 459 b
 Μήλιοι 430 a, 432 b
 Μελήσιοι 805 a
 Μιλῆται 101 b
 Μοσσύνουκοι 102 b
 Μόσχοι 102 a
 Μυκηναῖοι 646 a, 653 a
 Μύκοι 91 b, 92 a
 Μυσοί 30 a, 99 a, 662 a
- Νάξιοι 429 a
- Ὀδόμαντοι 142 b
 Ὄζολαι 402 a
 Ὀλύνθιοι 554 b
 Ὀπούντιοι 303 a, 359 a
 Ὀρρεῖται 472 a
 Ὀρχομένιοι 651 b
 Οὔτιοι 91 b, 92 a
- Παίονες 142 b, 273 a, 662 a
 Παύπλαι 142 b
 Παῖται 140 a
 Πάκτυες 91 b, [110 a]
 Παλέες 614 b
 Πάμφυλοι 115 b
 Πάρθοι 90 a
 Παρικάνιοι 91 b, 92 a, 110 b
 Πάριοι 460 a, 536 b
 Παρωρεῖται 471 b
 Παφλαγόνες 95 b
 Πεισιστρατίδαι 7 a, 439 a
 Πελασγοί 424 a
 Πελοποννήσιοι 347 b, 416 a, 468 b, 643 b, 808 b
 Περραιβοί 164 a, 171 b, 253 b, 274 a
 Πέρσαι 9 b, 19 a, 22 a, 61 a, 74 a, 74 b, 83 b, 89 a, 109 a, 109 b, 119 b, 121 b, 135 b, 136 b, 331 a, 331 b, 440 b, 512 b, 513 b, 515 b, 516 a, 516 b, 517 a, 539 a (*bis*), 539 b, 546 a, 558 b, 611 a, 622 b, 658 b, 682 b, 685 a, 699 a, 720 b, 721 b, 727 b, 729 a, 730 b, 738 b, 741 b, 746 a, 805 b, 806 a, 808 a, (828 b)
 Περσεῖδαι 326 a
 [Πηδασέες] 520 a
 Πίερες 142 a, 273 b
 [Πισίδαι] 100 a
 Πιτανῆται 709 a
 Πλαταιέες 358 a, 655 a, 700 b, 706 a, 728 a
 Πολιχνῖται 243 b
 Ποσειδαῖται 557 a, 651 b
 Πραῖσιοι 243 b, 247 b
- Ῥηγῖνοι 245 b
- Σαγάρριοι 109 a, 110 b
 Σάκαι 88 b, 89 a (*bis*), 119 b, 660 a, 746 b
 Σάμοι 229 b, 783 b, 784 a, 797 b, 805 a
 Σαπαῖοι 140 a
 Σαράγγαι 91 a
 Σαρδόνιοι 234 a
 Σάσπειρες 104 a
 Σάτραι 140 b
 Σερίφιοι 430 a
 Σιδώνιοι 120 a, 126 b
 Σικυνῶνιοι 358 b, 420 b, 468 b, 652 a, 803 b, 807 a
 Σίφριοι 430 a
 Σκιωναῖοι 555 b, 556 b
 Σκύθαι 16 a, 27 b, 29 b, 88 b, 89 a
 Σόγδοι 90 b
 Σπαρτιῆται 133 a, 223 b, 324 b, 360 a, 540 b, 552 a, 607 b, 667 b, 671 b, 691 b
 Στυρές 358 b, 430 a, 653 b
 Συρηκόσιοι 223 b, 224 b
 Σύριοι 87 b, 96 b (*bis*)
 Σύροι 112 a
- Ταλθυβιάδαι 175 b
 Ταραντῖνοι 245 a
 Τεγεῖται 641 b, (650 a), 659 a, 743 a, 771 a
 Τερμίλαι 116 b
 Τευκροί 30 a, 65 b
 Τήνιοι 460 a, 486 a
 Τιβαρηνοί 102 b
 Τιρύνθιοι 653 a
 Τρηχῖνιοι 257 a, 321 a
 Τροίηνιοι 358 b, 420 b, 468 b, 652 b, 803 b, 807 a
 Τυνδαρίδαι 750 b
- [ἽΤεττές] 100 a
 Ὑπαχαῖοι 115 b
 Ὑρκάνιοι 86 b
- Φθιώται 171 b
 Φλειάσιοι 468 b, 653 b, 741 a, 771 a
 Φοίνικες 35 b, 112 a, 120 a, 233 a, 490 a, 497 b, 516 a, 791 b
 Φρύγες 97 a, 98 a, 662 a
 Φωκέες 262 a, 303 a, 310 a, 321 b, 393 a, (624 a), 661 a, 778 a
- Χαλδαῖοι 88 a
 Χαλκιδέες 358 a, 428 b, 654 a
 [Χάλυβες] 100 a b
 Χερσονησῖται 825 a, 826 a
 Χῖοι 522 a, 566 b
 Χορδάσμοι 90 a

INDEX IV

RERUM

For Proper Names compare Index III.

- Abydos 134 (Rendezvous)
 Achaïans 171 b, 262 b, 290 b, 293 b,
 432 a, 469 a, 470 a, 591 a, 643 a,
 661 b
 Achaimenes (b. of Xerxes) 9 a, 341 b
 Additions (to history of P. war) 25, 28,
 32, 41, 44, 49, 50, 51, 54, 66, 69, 75,
 77, 81, 84, 86, 87, 89, 92, 94, 97 ff.,
 110, 111, 117, 395
 Adramytteion, its legend 63 b f.
 AELIAN 113
 Afterthought (lxxviii), 573 a, 580 a,
 585 a, 588 a, 689 b, 751 b, 799 b, 822 b;
 100, 253, 269, 353, 385, 396
 Agamemnon 223 a
 Ahuramazda 60 b, 68 b, 77 a
 Aioliens 262 b, 293 a b, 822 a
 AISCHINES 38
 AISCHYLOS 476 a, 500 a, 507 a, 542 a,
 544 b, 598 a, 744 b, 813 a; 9, 290,
 302 ff.
 Akropolis, the 434 a (defence of), 435 b,
 437 a b, 438 a ff., 466 a, 515 a, 590 a
 (Restoration), 614 a, 633 b; 243, 288,
 289
 Alexander I. 373, 384
 Alexander the Great 572 b, 635 b, 661 b,
 699 b; 3, 12, 35, 39, 43, 52, 56, 61,
 64 (note), 111, 116, 118, 264
Allelu-jah 412 b
 Alliances 586 a, 587 a, 783 b, 784 a,
 809 b; 195, 218, 339. Cp. Leagues
 Altars 764 a; 6 note
 Amazons 504 a
 Amompharetos, story of 362, 372, 383
 Amphiktyonic League 170 b, 172 b,
 196 a, 300 b, 316 a b, 337 a b, 397 b,
 403 b (Phokian war), 404 b, 408 a,
 549 b; 218, 230, 233, 254
 Amphiktyony, Kalaorian 417 b, 428 a
 Animus 535 b, 678 b, 706 a, 761 a, 762 b;
 295
 Anachronisms 21 a, 21 b, 187 a, 201 a,
 348 b, 349 a, 362 b, 367 a, 391 b, 415 b,
 465 a, 477 a, 478 a, 512 a, 527 b, 534 b,
 542 a, 549 a b, 550 a, 563 a, 573 a, 585 a,
 586 a, 598 a, 603 b, 604 a, 607 b, 643 b,
 644 a, 673 a, 684 b, 751 a; 43 note,
 76 note, 90, 244, 330, 348
Anathemata 247 a, 393 b, 404 a, 548 a,
 549 a b, 763 b; 7 note
 ANDOKIDES 42
 Andros 146 a, 534 a ff.
 Anecdotes 199 b
 Animism 761 b
 Anopaia 319 a, 320 a, 329 a b
 Anthela 300 a
 Anthropology xciii, 94 b, 830 a
 Anthropomorphism 18 b
 Anti-patriotism 237
 ANTIPHON 42
 Aphaia 12
 Aphorisms 463 a
 Apollonia 784 b
 Apologetics 490 b, 540 a, 588 b, 684 a,
 688 b, 712 a, 736 a, 763 b; 224, 231,
 234, 261, 268, 383
 Apologue 534 b
 Apophthegms 220 a, 221 b, 334 b, 341 a,
 448 b, 561 a, 562 a; 90. Cp. Gnomes
 APPIAN 112
 Arbitration 214 b
 Archers 632 a b, 656 b, 725 b; 25
 (Kretan), 87 (Athenian)
 Areiopagos 438 b, 599 b, 647 a; 53
 Argives 612 a, 612 b; 197, 224, 231
 Arguments 526 b, 531 a, 547 a; 92
Aristeia 373 b, 380 a, 381 a, 427 a, 503 a,

- 549 b, 745 b, 746 b, 765 a; 14, 44, 73, 74, 80, 88, 331, 362, 374
 Aristides 483 a b, 486 a, 506 b, 589 b, 655 b, 687 b; 43, 48, 51, 59 note, 60, 85 (Plutarch), 202 (Archon), 211 (his policy), 341, 383, 396
 ARISTEIDES, AELIUS 103
 ARISTODEMOS 81 note
 ARISTOPHANES 14, 23 b
 ARISTOTLE 50
 Arkadians 114 a (Kypros), 302 b, 390 b, 469 a, 470 a, 652 a, 758 a
 Armature 167 ff. (17 types)
 Armour, defensive 179 ff.
 Army - lists, Greek 302 a, 468 a b, 650 a b ff.; 238, 352
 Persian 658 b ff., 663 a b, 155 ff.; 351
 ARRIAN 110
 Arrows 177
 Artabanos 15 b
 Artabazos 680 a, 683 a, 735 b, 776 b; 373, 384
 Artachaias, his funeral 147 a
 Artemisia lxxix, 125 b, 461 b, 494 a, 495 a; 92
 Artemision 257 b, 258 b; 250
 Arthmios, of Zela 597 b; 37, 38, 43, 87, 108
 Asia, 46
 Assyria 87 a; 171
 Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία 55, 199, 208, 210, 211, 212
 ATHENAIOS 114
 Athens 598 a (reoccupied); 8 (a monument), 20 (its decline), 30 f. (evacuation of), 62 (a University), 199 (490-481 B.C.). Cp. Empire, Institutions, 'Policy'
 Athletics 392 a
 Attaginos lxxvii
 Attidographs 53
 Atticism 261 b, 372 a, 386 a, 392 b, 398 b, 534 b, 582 a, 583 a, 593 b, 630 b, 631 b, 655 b, 691 a, 692 b, 693 b, 695 a, 709 b, 711 b, 715 b, 743 b, 746 a, 776 a; 43, 80, 101, 362
 AUGUSTAN HISTORY, the 116
 Authenticity, not truth 193
 Authorities, other than Hdt., Appendix I
 Autopsis 484 a. Cp. Sources.
 Babylon, Revolt of 812 b
 Bakchylides 14 note
 Bakis 383 b, 482 a, 508 b, 685 b; 101
 Banquets lxxvii, 620 a b, 767 a, 777 b; 115, 149, 356
 Barathron, the 174 b, 181 b
 Barbarians 108 a, 237 a, 287 b
 Barbarism 421 a, 521 b, 587 a, 635 b, 695 a, 756 b, 761 a; 18, 30, 46
 Barbarities 48 a, 50 a, 129 b, 144 b, 198 b, 288 b, 351 b, 404 b, 529 b, 594 a, 760 b, 818 b
 Battle-fields 596 a, 605 b; 243
 Baumcultus 46 a, 281 a
 Biography 62, 82
 Boats 384 b, 385 a, 387 a, 389 a, 505 b, 780 a
 Body politic, the 187 a, 202 a, 220 a
 Boiotarchs 617 a (add *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* v. 1908, p. 171)
 Boiotia 595 a (held by Makedonians), 596 a; 243
 Boiotian Confederacy 405 b. Cp. Leagues
 Bons Mots xxix, xxxix, lxxv, lxxvi, lxxx, lxxxv, xcii, 73 a, 150 b, 210 a, 218 a, 227 a, 334 b, 446 b, 453 a, 462 a, 496 b
 Boule, the 601 a. Cp. Institutions
 Bows 176
 Branding 49 a b
 Brennus 56 (at Thermopylai)
 Bribery 597 b, 600 b, 775 a, 775 b, 802 a; 357
 Bridges 37 b, 40 a (Halys), 45 b (Maiandros), 47 a (Hellespont), 48 a ff., 55 b (Roman), 76 b, 219 a, 384 a, 510 b (at Salamis), 526 a, 531 b, 533 a, 702 a, 722 a, 738 b, 779 b, 810 a; 140 ff., 340
 Bull 326 b, 796 b (Irish)
 Burial 335 b
 Byzantine Literature 117 f.
 Byzantion 779 b, 780 b
 Cables 827 b
 Caesar 61
 Caesarism 110
 Camels 108 a, 111 a, 160 a, 272 b, 766 a
 Camps 618 b, 628 b, 733 b, 742 a, 794 b; 367
 Canal 35 b, 56 b, 147 a, 152 b; 146
 Carthage 232 a, 234 b (constitution), 236 b; 186
 Causality of the war 122, 287, 348, 354 f.
 Causation 195 a, 263 b, 358 a, 387 a
 Causes of victory xc. See Victory
 Cavaliers 307 b (at Sparta)
 Cavalry 33 a, 60 a, 81 b, 105 a, 106 a, 108 b, 222 a, 252 a, 291 b, 310 b, 313 b, 399 b, 539 a, 614 b, 615 a, 624 b, 629 b, 630 a, 631 a, 632 a, 634 a, 650 a, 658 b, 661 a, 661 b, 664 a, 672 a, 676 b, 696 a, 699 a, 702 a, 712 a, 715 b, 718 b, 724 a, 725 a, 731 a, 739 b; 161 ff., 203, 345, 358, 370, 377, 379 f., 383
 Caves 410 a (Korykian), 440 a (Agaurian), 568 a (Trophonian), 571 a (Ptoan)
 Chariots 60 b, 61 a, 95 a, 110 a, 187 b, 272 b, 543 a, 551 b (in Sparta)
 Chestnut 271 a
 Choirilos, of Samos lxxv, 246 a; 5

- Christian Ethics 179 b
 Christian Fathers 116 note
 Chronology lxxiv (documents), xciii (excellence), 2 b, 5 a (*eros*), 8 b (invasion of Egypt), 29 b, 33 b, 47 a (winter 481-480 B.C.), 47 b (winter 479-478 B.C.), 56 b (winter 481-480 B.C.), 57 a (eclipse), 171 a (vow of vengeance), 172 a (*id.*), 175 a b (Spartan affairs), 177 a (mission of Sperthias and Boulis), 181 a (exploit of Aneristos), 186 a (Delphic Responses to Athens), 189 a b (*id.*), 190 b (*id.*), 193 b (*id.*), 194 a (naval reform), 198 a (Congress), 201 b, 202 a (oracle to Argos), 206 b (embassy of Kallias), 218 b (embassy to Gelon), 227 a (mission of Kadmos), 243 b (conventional), 245 b (Tarentino-Rhegian disaster), 270 b (Log of fleet), 291 a (Xerxes in Thessaly), 309 b (Ol. 75), 313 a (diary), 325 a b (oracles), 367 b (diary), 391 b (Ol. 75), 436 b (King's arrival in Athens), 437 a, 453 a, 455 b (diary of Salamis, q.v.), 466 a, 509 a, 540 a, 541 b, 564 a, 579 b f. (Makedonian), 580 b (winter, 480-479 B.C.), 585 b ('two harvests'), 592 a (Delphic *Agon*), *ibid.* (Olympian), 598 b (Mardonios in Athens), 602 b (*Hyakinthia*), 609 a (eclipse), 618 a (Mardonios retires), 627 a (Greek advance), 643 b (a century), 653 a (destruction of Mykenai, Tiryns), 666 b (Ol.), 675 a (arrest of Hegesistratos), 698 a (diary of Plataia, q.v.), 731 a (sequence), 740 b (incoherence), 757 a, 772 a, 784 a, 790 a, 797 b, 801 a b (date of Plataia-Mykale), 807 a, 820 a, 824 b (18 Sept. 479 B.C.), 827 b f., 828 a (winter 479-478 B.C.); 65, 72 note, 74 (Diodoros), 83 (Nepos), 89 (Plutarch), 114 (Aelian), 132 (winter 481-480 B.C.), 195, 232 (oracles to Athens), 236 (Pyth. 27), 241 (defective), 247 (expedition to Tempe), 264, 272 ff. (diary of Thermopylai, q.v.), 290 ff. (Salamis), 331, 346 ff. (Plataia), 369, 398 ff., 406 (*Crucis*). Cp. Appendix IX., Diary, etc.
 Cicerō 35 (and Demosthenes), 59, 60
 Circumcision 102 b
 Citizen, the good 35, 85 note, 209
 Citizen-soldiers 45
 City for country (*nominativum*) 623 b, 624 a, 624 b, 628 b, 632 b, 638 a, 657 b, 670 a, 679 b, 733 b, 755 a, 771 b, 777 a, 786 a
 City-state, the 404 b, 450 a, 591 a, 592 b, 830 a; 34 (its decay), 53 (prejudices of), 59, 61, 105
 Civilization 12 b
 Cleopatra 61
 Colonization 451 a b, 591 a, 651 b, 654 a, 790 a, 809 a
 Command, organization of 433 b. Cp. Organization
 Commerce 521 a (slaves). Cp. Trade
 Commissariat 698 b; 148, 355
 Composition, problems of 17 b, 23 b, 27 b, 28 b, 29 b, 46 b, 72 b, 80 b, 82 b, 83 b, 87 a, 107 a, 107 b, 116 b, 117 b, 118 a, 131 b, 134 b, 135 a, 135 b, 137 a, 143 a, 144 b, 156 b, 161 a, 182 b, 183 a, 195 a, 200 b, 208 a, 214 a, 228 a, 247 b, 265 b, 288 b, 300 b, 306 b, 317 a, 346 a b, 361 b, 362 a, 380 b, 409 a, 410 a, 421 a, 452 b, 466 b, 469 b, 471 a, 472 a, 502 a, 507 a, 511 b, 514 a, 554 b, 557 a, 559 a, 572 a, 585 a, 593 a, 616 b, 632 b, 633 b, 647 b, 654 b, 665 b, 668 a, 671 b, 694 a, 752 b, 761 a b, 763 a, 768 b, 779 b, 782 b, 787 b, 790 a, 792 a, 814 a; 77, 121, 125, 189, 361
 Confederacy (481 B.C.) 219
 Congress (Isthmian) 186 a, 196 a, 255 a, 264 b, 303 b, 308 b, 360 b, 419 b; 219, 247
 Consistency (not the test of truth) 192
 Constantinople, Herodotus in 117
Corvée 33 b
 Cosmopolitanism 62
 Council 9 b (Persian), 29 a, 172 b (Amphiktyonic, q.v.), 235 a (Carthaginian), 255 b (of war), 323 a, 410 a (Delphic), 434 a (of war), 443 a, 446 a, 461 a (King's), 580 b (Athenian), 637 b (of war), 680 a, 683 b, 698 a, 710 a, 772 b; 125 (Privy), 295 ff. (of war at Salamis)
Couvade 234 a
 Criticism 174 a b (story of Heralds)
 Criticism, modern 119, 242, 267, 345
 Crucifixion 288 b, 827 a
 Cuirass 633 a, 753 a; 180
 Cuirassiers 539 a
 Curiosities 768 a (at Plataia)
 Daidalos 242 b
 Dareik 43 b
 Dareios, Hystaspis 1 b (wrath of), 5 a (age), 85 b (an Arian), 174 a (vow)
 Dareios-vase 22 b
 Date of composition (q.v.) 298 b
 Dates. Cp. Chronology
 Dedications 764 b. Cp. *Anathemata*
 DEINARCHOS 42
 Delian League 316 a, 549 b, 554 b, 566 a, 590 b, 809 a, 810 a; 233
 Delphi lxxxiv, 41 b (connexion with Lydia), 173 b, 183 a, 186 a, 201 b, 228 a, 249 a (influence on historiography), 265 a, 279 b, 316 b, 325 b (Thermopylai), 398 b, 405 a, 407 a ff. (assault on), 415 a, 438 a, 518 b, 529 a,

- 540 a, 548 b, 567 b, 574 a, 590 b, 592 a,
616 a, 666 a, 684 a, 735 a, 763 b, 787 b;
25, 56 (Gauls), 99 (Themistokles),
216 (*id.*), 218, 220, 224, 229 ff., 289
- DEMADES 42
- Demaratos lxxviii (as Sage), 4 a (flight
of), 8 b (omitted), 129 a, 310 b, 311 b,
334 b, 343 b, 454 b, 595 b (disappears),
620 a, 720 a; 63 (anecdotes), 78, 92,
196, 197
- Demes 317 b, 417 a, 424 a, 489 b, 503 b,
552 b, 616 b, 617 a, 709 b, 750 a, 751 a,
751 b
- Democracy 6 a, 25 a, 202 a (at Argos),
215 b, 216 a, 218 a, 232 b, 406 a, 429 a,
597 a, 687 b, 711 b, 758 a, 758 b, 824 b,
827 a, 830 b; 46, 47, 54, 200, 253
- DEMOSTHENES 34
- Demotikon*, the 600 a
- Descent into Hell 568 a
- Devotio* 176 b, 237 b, 307 a, 324 a, 325 b,
393 b; 268
- Dharna* 189 b
- Dialectic of tradition 1, 108, 258, 385
- Diary of Artemision, 367 b, 370 a b,
377 a, 377 b, 378 a, 387 b, 390 b, 415 b,
458 a b; 272 ff.
- Diary of Plataia 624 a, 637 b, 664 b,
676 b, 678 a, 678 b, 679 a, 679 b, 685 a,
686 b, 688 b, 692 a, 696 a, 699 a, 705 a,
768 b, 773 b; 346 ff.
- Diary of Salamis 453 a, 455 b, 457 a,
458 b, 465 b, 474 a, 477 b, 479 b, 482 b,
487 a, 508 a, 523 b, 524 b, 537 b; 291 ff.
- Diary of Thermopylai 321 b, 323 a b,
324 a, 329 a, 313 a, 313 b, 319 a;
264, 273 ff.
- Dikaios lxxv (*Memoirs* of), 128 a, 439 b,
454 a
- DIO CHRYSOSTOM 101
- DIONOROS 65, 66 ff., 269, 290, 393, 408
(Chronology)
- Dionysios of Miletos lxxv, 206 b; 5
- Divination 323 a, 327 b, 665 a, 672 b,
675 b, 784 b, 790 a
- Diviners 395 b; 353
- Dodona 787 b
- Dog, the 275 b; 52
- Dorians 170 b, 202 a, 211 b, 214 b, 223 a,
232 b, 240 b, 242 a, 243 b, 245 a, 248 b,
262 b, 382 a, 400 a, 420 b, 426 a, 428 a,
432 b, 469 a, 470 b, 563 b, 583 b, 591 a,
642 a, 646 a, 733 a, 808 b
- Doris 421 b
- Doriskos 80 a; 136
- Dorism 472 a. Cp. HERODOTUS
- Doublets 370 a
- Drafts lxxvii (of the work)—
First 46 b, 137 a, 161 a, 183 b, 192 b,
201 a, 206 b, 208 a, 232 a, 239 b,
247 b, 256 a, 264 b, 297 a, 298 b,
301 b, 327 a, 346 b, 351 a, 354 a,
369 a, 430 b, 441 b, 483 a, 490 b,
504 b, 507 a, 519 a, 523 b, 554 b,
588 a, 593 b, 616 b, 620 a, 655 a,
709 b, 750 a, 769 a, 773 b, 786 a,
822 a; 190, 227
- Drafts—Second 48 a, 73 b, 134 b, 148 a,
168 a, 171 a, 172 b, 183 b, 186 a,
208 b, 210 b, 232 a, 247 b, 264 a,
282 b, 327 a, 327 b, 354 a, 396 b,
401 a, 408 b, 409 a, 417 b, 423 a,
431 a, 472 b, 480 b, 487 a, 508 b,
550 a, 569 a, 626 b, 666 a, 732 a,
739 a, 743 b, 750 a, 764 b, 767 b,
807 a; 227, 361
- Third 137 a, 143 a, 144 b, 146 b, 174 a,
183 a, 206 b, 247 b, 327 a, 343 a,
354 a, 423 b, 456 a, 480 b, 505 a,
750 a, 752 b, 767 b; 228
- Drama xlvii (influence of), lxxiv, 20 a,
74 a, 495 a, 513 a, 514 a
- Dreams lxxxvi, 22 b, 25 b, 27 b, 569 b
- Dryopians 653 b
- Dryopis 421 b, 470 b
- Duel 643 a, 754 a
- Earth 12 a (flat)
- Eclipses 57 b; 400, 409. Cp. Chrono-
logy
- Egnatian Way, the 151 b, 273 b, 575 b,
785 a
- Egypt 9 a (revolt)
- Egyptians 113 a, 662 a; 174
- Eleians 758 b
- Eleusinian mysteries 191 a
- Eleutheria*, the 64 note, 85, 89, 95, 362,
408
- Emblem 753 a
- Empedokles 333 a
- Empire, Athenian 589 b
Makedonian 56, 58, 61
Persian 10 a, 12 a, 122 f.
Roman 61, 112, 116
- Engineering 35 b, 37 a, 56 b
- Ensigns 496 a, 502 b
- Envy 552 b
- EPHOROS 26, 65, 74 f., 154, 269
- Epibatai* 152 b, 272 a, 375 a, 487 b, 516 a,
558 b; 173
- Epimachy* 220
- Epimikia* of Pindar 11
- Epitaphioi Logoi* 43, 44, 46, 68
- Eponym 751 a, 752 a
- Epos, the xlvii (influence of), 190 b
- Erechtheion, the 442 a
- Esther, story of 812 b
- Etruscans 234 a
- Europe 6 a (its excellence), 11 a (extent),
12 b, 526 b
- Exaggerations 183 a, 381 a, 595 b, 614 a,
624 b, 626 a, 648 b, 663 b, 711 a, 723 b,
756 a, 766 a, 804 b, 811 a; 324, 385
- Excommunication 243 b

- Factions 676 a
 Fallacies 422 a, 426 a, 537 b
 Fatalism 622 b, 814 b
 Festivals 308 b (Karneian), 309 b (Olympian), 391 b (*id.*), 469 a, 512 b, 602 a b (Hyakinthian)
 Fetters 49 a
 Feuds 196 b, 263 a b (Thessalo-Phokian), 393 a (*id.*), 399 a, 540 b (blood-), 625 b (Th.-Ph.), 674 b (Tegea-Spartan); 92, 101 (Th.-Ph.)
 Fictions 244 b, 444 b, 563 b, 600 a, 676 a, 691 a, 693 b; 126, 193, 226 f., 254, 382
 Finance 16
 Fleet 194 b (Athenian). Cp. Navy
 Flogging 34 a, 48 a (Hellespont), 330 b; 85
 Flood 168 a
 Forgeries 7 b, 241 a
 Fractions 669 b, 763 b, 765 a
 Frontiers 12 b (Persian), 32 b (Makedonian), 40 a (Phrygian), 45 b (Lydian), 190 a (Attic), 254 a (present Greek), 400 b (Phokian), 405 b (Boiotian), 592 a (linguistic), 602 a (Boiotian), 614 b (Persian), 617 b (Attic), 619 b (Theban), 627 b (*Diabateria*), 639 a, 640 a, 734 a (Theban); 122 (Persian), 243, 344 (Attic)
 Funeral 147 b (Artachaies); 43, 73 (Orations)
 Gardens 577 a ff.
 Gargaphia 696 b
 Gates 300 a
 Gauls, the 56, 101
 Gelon 222 a, 224 b, 227 b, 228 a b; 70 f., 226 ff.
 Gelon (of Thessaly) 393 b
 Gem-cutting 93 b
 Genealogy. See Pedigree
 Geography xcii (excellence), 34 a (Athos), 39 a (Kritalla), 40 a (Halys), 79 a (error), 88 b, 104 b (Erythraian sea), 143 a (errors), 151 a (Therme), 154 a (Torone), 161 a (the lion), 163 b (Thessaly), 164 a (Thessalian passes), 168 a (flood), 243 a (names of Sicily), 244 a (Iapygia), 250 b (Thessalian passes), 376 a (The Hollows), 400 a (Doris), 400 b ff. (Phokis), 402 a (Lokris), 407 a (Delphi), 426 b (Ambrakia), 427 a (Leukas), 430 b (Thesprotis), 477 a (Psyttaleia), 478 a b (Keos-Kynosura), 479 a (Munichia), 508 b (Kolias), 524 a (Zoster), 525 a (Andros), 543 a (Strymon), 543 b (Rhodope), 565 b (Gibraltar), 570 b (Kopaic lake), 572 b (Alabanda), 575 b (Lebaia), 578 b (Bermios), 611 a (Orestheion), 616 b (Dekeleia), 617 b (Tanagra), *ibid.* (Skolos), 619 b (Erythrai, Hysiai), *ibid.* (Asopos), 628 b (Erythrai), 629 a (Kithairon), 636 b ("The High Bastions"), 638 b (Hysiai), 639 a (Platais), 639 b (Gargaphia), 640 b (Androkrateion), 647 b (Thermodon), 699 b (The Island), 701 b (Oëroë), 716 b (Moloeis), 754 a (Daton), 785 a (Ionian Gulf), 785 b (Chaonia), 786 a (Lakmon), *ibid.* (Orikon), 792 a (Mykale), 793 b (Geison), 798 b (Mykale), 820 a (Lekton), 821 a (The Chersonese), 825 a (*id.*), 825 b (Aigospotamoi), 829 a (Persis), 830 a b (Physics and Politics); 263 (Thermopylai), 264 (Artemision), 290, 293 f. (Salamis), 349 f. (Plataia)
 Girdle 547 b
 Glosses 47 b, 58 b, 88 a, 88 b, 145 a, 146 a, 156 b, 181 a, 283 a, 285 b, 292 b, 400 a, 421 a, 472 a, 492 b, 498 a, 499 b, 511 b, 512 b, 611 b, 629 b, 632 b, 662 a, 663 b, 670 a, 678 a, 686 b, 796 b, 828 a b
 Gnomes 15 a, 18 a, 24 b, 58 b, 69 b, 130 a, 133 b, 209 b, 220 a, 223 b, 251 a, 350 b, 361 a, 391 a, 392 a, 392 b, 409 b, 535 b, 586 b
 Gold 41 b, 42 a, 130 b, 136 b, 281 b, 549 a, 630 a, 755 a, 762 a, 762 b, 763 a, 764 a
 Gonnos 164 b
 Gorgias 32 note
 Great Greece 432 a
 Greek name, the 591 a
 Haliartos 99
 Halikarnassos 267 b
 Harpalos (engineer) 142 a
 Hegemonia 203 b, 222 b, 223 b, 255 b, 264 b, 304 b, 359 b, 453 a, 491 a, 495 a, 608 b, 645 b; 221, 342
 Helen 750 b
 Hellas 14 b, 129 b, 197 b, 204 b, 219 a, 460 a, 591 a, 596 b, 597 a b, 688 b, 808 a, 827 b
 Hellebore 297 b
 Hellenism 89 a, 132 a, 173 a, 204 a, 294 a, 311 a, 348 a, 421 a, 424 b, 432 a, 497 a, 519 b, 521 b, 551 a, 590 b f., 592 b, 645 b, 756 b, 761 a; 18, 30, 53, 101, 237
 Hellenistic Literature 55 ff.
 Hellespont, passage of 135
 Helmet 179
 Helots 338 b, 389 b, 608 a, 650 b, 677 b, 728 a, 749 a, 763 a, 767 b
 Henotheism 74 b
 Herakleia 262 a, 298 b, 400 b
 Herakleian Pillars 565 b
 Herakleids, the 400 a (Return of), 563 b, 642 a, 645 b, 667 a
 Herakleion 500 a (opposite Salamis)

Herakles 422 a

Heralds 46 b

HERODOTUS—

Animus, q.v.

Artist 67 b, 131 a, 207 a, 347 b, 514 a, 516 a; 188

Atticism 361 a, 367 b, 573 b; 93.

Cf. sub v.

Bona fides lxxxvii, 184 a, 415 a, 518 b; 267

censured 91, 95

Completeness of his work xl ff., 317 a, 361 b, 828 a, 831 a b; 31, 77

Criticism 515 a, 546 a, 557 b

Defects lxxvii ff., 21 b, 183 a, 209 a, 327 a, 350 a

didactic 14 a

Dorism 117 a, 127 a, 130 b, 424 a

Education 623 b

Empiricism lxxxviii, 205 a, 208 a, 210 a, 221 a, 436 b, 683 b, 704 b; 241, 267

Errors 45 a, 79 a, 103 a, 164 b, 234 b, 238 b, 259 b, 276 a, 284 a, 299 b,

302 a, 307 b, 616 a, 618 a, 650 b, 770 b, 819 a; 264. Cp. Mistakes

Exaggeration. Cp. Numbers

Ignorance, confessions of 493 b, 555 b, 567 b, 606 a, 626 a, 768 b

Inconsequence 78 a, 119 a, 249 b. Cf. sub v.

Inconsistencies, q.v.

Incredulity 368 b, 496 a, 546 a

Insouciance 568 b, 593 a, 649 b, 695 a, 696 b, 711 b, 798 a, 822 a; 349.

Cp. Empiricism

Irony 16 b, 21 b, 133 a, 186 b, 218 a, 268 a, 292 a, 382 b, 463 a, 496 a,

498 a, 514 b, 518 b, 523 a. Cf. sub v.

Jests 60 b

Life 109

Literary quality 102

Logic 414 b, 721 a

Malice 253

Maxim 648 a

Merits lxxxvii ff.

Military shortcomings 236 b, 256 a, 257 a, 269 b, 323 b, 366 a, 367 a, 371 a, 436 a, 478 a, 486 a, 524 b, 565 a, 573 b, 623 b, 641 b, 737 a, 742 a, 797 a, 801 b; 241, 251, 262, 270, 367, 370

mistaken apologies for xciv

Mistakes 362 b, 376 a, 433 a, 563 b, 598 a, 656 a, 697 b, 710 a, 770 a

Motivation, q.v.

Namesakes 564 b, 741 a

Opinions 253 b, 274 b, 318 a, 325 a, 387 a, 452 b, 459 a, 483 b, 537 a,

557 b, 574 a, 587 a, 734 b, 746 b, 748 a, 800 a

Partiality 267

Philosophy 160 b, 209 b

HERODOTUS—

Political sagacity xci, 134 a

Popularity 65, 91, 96, 101, 109, 113, declining 111

Prejudice 532 a, 551 a, 553 b, 751 b, 805 b

Priority of Books 7, 8, 9, q.v.

Psychology 496 b

Public, his 469 a, 472 b, 487 a, 493 b, 502 b, 516 b, 773 a, 792 b

Rationalism lxxxix, 212 a, 265 a, 280 b, 298 b, 315 a, 318 a, 369 a

Redactions of his work lxi ff., lxiv (Periklean), 242 a. Cp. Drafts

Religious tone 529 b. Cp. Religion

Return to 81, 83, 91, 96

Rhetoric 32 b, 275 a

Roman interest in 64

Romancing 126

Scene-shifting xxv, 119 a, 284 a, 285 b, 286 a, 443 a, 465 b, 473 a, 537 b,

548 a, 558 a, 723 b; 188

Style I, lxxvi, 8 b, 10 a, 167 b, 175 a, 175 b, 184 a, 422 b, 514 a, 530 a,

558 b, 573 a, 621 a, 667 a, 670 a, 703 b, 705 b, 713 b, 718 a, 732 a b,

751 b

Stylometry I, 192 b

Superficiality 551 a

Traveller lxi, 40 b, 63 a, 64 b, 87 a, 264 a in Argos 201 b

Athens 772 a

Babylon 87 a, 106 a, 553 b

Boiotia 620 b

Byzantion 780 b

Delphi 265 a, 396 b, 408 b, 413 b, 550 a, 655 a, 686 a, 764 a

Dodona 787 b, 788 b

Egypt lxiii

Olympia 247 b, 655 a, 764 b

Plataia 697 b, 701 a, 707 a, 717 a, 722 b, 768 a; 360

Sicily 212 b, 244 a

Sparta 709 b

Thebes 569 a

Thermopylai 261 b, 264 a, 297 a, 299 b, 301 b, 320 a, 321 a,

322 a, 329 b, 333 a, 337 a

Thessaly 7 a, 163 a, 165 b, 167 b, 292 a, 294 b; 190

Unity of last three Books, q.v.

Wonder, 212 a, 734 a

Hero-worship 148 a, 175 b, 238 b, 261 b, 266 b, 289 b, 335 a, 529 a, 548 b, 588 a,

640 b, 822 b, 826 b

Himera, battle of 70 ff.

Horse, the 60 a (Nesaian), 111 b (sacri-
ficial), 143 b, 511 b, 543 a, 630 a, 637 a,

730 b, 766 a

House, the 576 b

HYPEREIDES 45

Hyrcania 86 b

- Iambics 306 b
 Iberians 233 a b
 Idols 453 b, 488 b
 Immortals 46 a, 61 a, 107 b, 177 a, 198 b, 314 a, 319 a, 332 b, 334 a, 516 b, 539 a, 540 a; 281, 282, 285
 Impiety 682 b, 759 a
 Improbabilities 610 b, 777 a, 788 a
 Inaccuracies 603 b
 Incoherence 247, 261, 265, 268, 295, 372
 Income-tax in Persian war, 16
 Inconsequence 11 b, 155 a, 162 a, 165 b, 169 b, 170 a, 180 b, 183 a, 189 b, 195 a, 203 b, 205 a, 259 a, 270 b, 294 a, 320 a, 363 b, 376 b, 421 a, 441 b, 449 b, 459 a, 473 a, 475 a, 525 b, 531 a, 533 a, 535 b (*bis*), 566 b, 593 a, 603 b, 649 a, 656 b, 658 b, 679 b, 689 b, 743 a, 828 b; 53 (Aristotle), 124, 189, 219, 331, 347, 348, 371
 Inconsistencies 370 a, 391 a, 407 b, 420 b, 436 a, 438 a, 525 a, 538 b, 540 a, 545 a, 547 b, 553 a, 563 a, 584 b, 600 b, 605 a, 615 b, 649 b, 660 a, 662 a, 670 a, 689 a, 744 b, 760 a, 788 b, 793 a, 819 a; 76, 235, 251, 285, 323
 Individualism 62
 Inscriptions 386 a, 592 a; 7 note
 Institutions 577 a (primitive), 830 a b (relativity of)
 Athenian 191 a b, 195 b, 203 a, 426 a b, 437 a, 437 b, 580 b, 599 b, 632 a, 656 a, 687 b, 824 b; 200 ff.
 Delphian 410 b
 Persian 9 b, 24 b, 29 a, 39 b, 74 a, 288 b (*bis*), 313 a, 492 b, 511 b, 516 b, 769 b, 812 a ff.
 Spartan 131 a, 175 b, 176 a b, 203 b, 252 a, 307 a, 312 a, 314 b, 340 a, 344 a ff., 358 b, 360 a, 366 b, 552 a, 603 b, 606 b, 608 a, 609 a, 609 b, 613 a, 670 a, 673 a, 707 b, 708 b, 745 a b, 747 a, 748 a, 752 a, 756 a, 757 a, 758 a, 767 a, 770 b, 776 a; 22
 Invasions 30 a, 97 b, 262 b (Molossian), 263 a (Boiotian)
 Invocation 453 b
 Ionia 72 b, 83 a, 229 b, 807 b, 809 a; 255, 339
 Ionians 67 a, 72 b, 73 b, 118 b, 120 a, 170 b, 205 a, 217 b (Chalkidic), 232 b, 233 a, 234 b, 235 b, 244 b, 273 b, 283 b, 371 b, 381 b, 386 b, 423 b, 425 b, 426 a, 432 a, 442 b, 451 a, 452 a, 470 a, 471 b, 491 b, 498 a, 516 a, 521 a, 564 a, 566 a, 643 a, 654 a, 769 b, 781 a, 785 a, 796 a, 797 a, 805 a
 Ionism 205
 Iron 577 a
 Irony 241 b, 311 b, 534 b, 541 a, 593 a, 694 a (*bis*), 721 a, 721 b, 760 b, 829 b; 109. Cp. HERODOTUS
 ISAIOS 42
 Islands 346 b (strategic use)
 ISOKRATES 29
 Isthmos-line of defence 310 a, 466 b; 242, 256, 288
 Japanese victories 518 a
 Jason of Pherai 222 b; 22, 255 note
 Jealousy, divine xc, 18 a, 67 a, 68 b, 552 b, 747 b, 752 a
 Jest 753 a
 Jews 112 b, 151 b, 418 a, 420 a
 JOSEPHUS 62
 Journal. Cp. Diary
 JULIAN 64 note, 116
 Jurisprudence 774 a, 775 a
 JUVENAL 62
 Kadmos, story of 228 a ff.
 Kelainai 40 a; 131
 Kimon 17 (his policy)
 Kissia 86 a
 Kleruchs 358 a, 374 a, 417 a, 428 b, 450 a, 599 a, 654 a
 Korkyra 228
 Kow-tow, the 178 b, 198 b
 Kretans 225
 Krete 241 a, 242 a (its cities)
 Kritalla 128
 KTESIAS 23, 235, 244, 319, 407
 Kyros 3 b, 10 b, 72 b, 828 b ff.
 Laagers. Cp. Camp
 Lakonism 18
 Lamia 297 b
 Lasso, the 109 b
 Law, International 179 a, 582 a, 601 a; of Empire 10 a, 28 a
 Leagues 617 b (Boiotian), 621 a, 775 a. Cp. Amphiktyonic, Delian, etc.
 Legends of—
 Alexander 251
 Amazons 647 a
 Delphi 234
 Herakleids 642 a
 Kodros 794 a
 Marathon 331 a, 423 a, 588 a, 631 a, 648 a, 659 a, 664 b, 691 a, 712 b, 726 b, 729 a, 746 a; 19, 43, 47, 108, 353, 386, 387
 Minos 242 a
 Mykale 338, 353, 387
 Persian war 590 b; 41, 43, 49, 56, 57, 77, 79, 91, 96, 107
 Plataia 632 b, 726 b, 727 a
 Salamis 353, 387
 Spartan (twins) 563 b
 Thebes (*Septem c.*) 646 a
 Themistokles lxxiv, lxxxviii, 531 b, 551 b, 584 a; 60, 99, 114, 115, 330
 Thermopylai 257 a, 307 a, 309 b, 311 a, 311 b (*bis*), 314 b, 325 b, 331 b, 631 b,

- 691 b, 694 a, 759 b; 63, 68, 84, 90,
92, 99, 108, 257, 268 ff.
Theseus 646 b, 647 a
Xerxes-flight 547 b
Leggings 180
Levée en masse 150
Light-armed troops 222 a, 302 b, 650 b,
656 b, 696 a, 698 b, 725 b, 731 b
Ligurians 96 a, 233 b
Lion, the 161 a, 326 b, 338 b (of
Leonidas)
Logic (of events) 263
Logoi, Assyrian xlii, 317 a
Egyptian lxiv, 317 a, 587 b, 662 a;
65 note
Libyan lxiii, 95 a
Lydian lxiii, 409 a
Skythian lxii, 17 b, 780 b
'The Sequel' 317 a
Lokrians 171 b, 303 a
Lot (at Athens) 201
LUCIAN 108
LYKOURGOS (of Athens) 39
Lykourgos (of Sparta) 305 b, 328 b
Lynch-law 600 b
- Magazines 38 b
Magi, Magians 28 b, 144 a; 49
Makedon lxxxiv (policy), 162 a (mon-
archy), 690 a: in the fourth century
32, 34, 61
Malignitate, de 91
Malignty 385 b, 398 b, 504 b, 505 a,
519 b, 534 a; 13, 14, 119, 266, 330,
360
Maps 161 a, 290 b
Marathon 423 a, 507 b. Cp. Legend
Marathonomachai 15
Mardonograph 598 a
Mardonios 5 b (evil genius), 6 a (ambi-
tion), 106 a (command), 461 a, 514 a,
518 b, 538 a, 541 a, 566 b, 581 b,
595 a ff., 612 a, 613 a, 629 a, 630 b,
672 a, 680 a, 682 a, 693 b, 719 a, 730 b,
760 a, 802 a; 235, 336, 354, 356, 361,
370
Mare clausum 566 a
Marvels. Cp. Miracles
Matiene 96 a
Measurements 299 a, 700 a, 701 a, 707 a
Medes 454 b, 540 b, 659 b, 691 a, 757 b;
15, 31
"Median" war, the 51, 55; cp. xv,
xli, xlii
Medicine 268 b, 338 b, 542 b, 544 b
Medicine-men 665 b, 674 a
Medism 476 b, 479 b, 531 b, 536 b, 583 b,
586 b, 597 a, 610 b, 612 a, 620 b, 661 a,
673 a, 690 b, 758 a, 774 b; 16, 21, 32,
36, 105, 108, 198, 208 f., 225, 229,
253, 254, 336, 344, 348
Medizers 170 b, 205 b, 209 b, 249 b, 298 a,
310 a, 390 b, 400 b, 406 a, 415 a, 525 a,
536 b, 549 a, 660 b, 663 b, 676 a, 694 b,
738 a, 773 a, 808 b; 339
Memoirs 5. Cp. Dikaioi
Mercenaries 222 b, 235 a
Messenian wars 562 a
Migrations 30 a b, 98 a, 578 a, 807 b,
829 b
Milesians 805 b
Miltiades, end of 205 f.
Mines 194 a
Miracles lxxxvi, 570 a, 572 a
Mole, at Salamis 510 a b; 94, 319
Monotheism 75 a
Month, the 801 a; 403
Monuments of the Persian war, list of
6, 7 note
Mosses 543 b
Mother-right 126 a, 495 a, 591 b
Motivation 11 a, 11 b, 24 a, 36 b, 229 b,
239 b, 243 b, 253 b, 308 a, 352 a, 371 a,
406 b, 415 b, 473 a, 477 a, 514 a,
531 a, 538 a, 551 a, 638 a, 690 b, 692 a,
701 b, 718 b, 722 a, 792 a; 146, 147,
198, 274, 290, 346, 352
Mourning 635 b
Mutability 648 a
Mykale, battle of 792 a ff.; 47, 95
Mykenanian tombs 646 b
Mysteries, the 455 b, 457 b
- Namesakes (of Hdt.) 741 a
Nature 25 a, 538 a
Navarch 527 b, 560 b
Navy-lists 121 b, 357 b, 419 b, 420 a ff.,
459 a, 463 b, 598 b; 150 ff. (Persian),
212 (Athenian), 337
Naxos 429 b
Negroes 93 a, 94 b
Nemesis (*φθῆνός κτλ.*) xc f., 29 a, 175 a,
180 a, 209 a, 268 a, 282 a, 289 a, 304 a,
326 a, 348 a b, 354 b, 520 b, 523 a,
529 a, 557 b, 731 b, 735 a, 826 b; 23,
324
Nemesis, the Comic 388 b, 390 a, 514 b,
541 a, 546 a, 767 a; 83, 103
Nicknames 332 a
Nomenclature 428 b, 611 a, 665 a, 750 a
Numbers lxxxi, 36 b, 82 a b, 110 b, 112 a,
132 a, 234 a, 245 b, 271 b, 275 a, 276 a,
281 a b, 299 a, 303 a b, 336 a, 358 a,
368 a, 388 b, 390 a, 412 b, 427 a b,
433 a, 459 a, 487 b, 516 b, 517 a, 538 b,
542 a, 553 b, 595 a b, 607 b, 624 a,
632 a, 650 a b, 656 a ff., 660 b, 663 a,
664 a, 681 b, 682 a, 696 a, 723 a, 726 b,
736 b, 744 b, 745 a, 771 a, 772 b, 778 b,
779 b, 793 a; 76, 78, 83, 151 ff.,
155 ff., 164 ff., 238, 258, 324, 351
- Oak, men of 422 a
Oak-leaves 322 a

- Oath 172 a
 Objective, the Persian 9 b; 183 ff., 217, 240
 Obscurities 329 b
 Oligarchy 235 a b
 Olympia 764 b
 Olympiads. Cp. Chronology
 Olympian list of Confederates 98
 Omens 672 b, 781 b, 783 a b, 784 b, 794 a.
 Cp. Portents
 Omissions 7 a, 11 a, 11 b, 34 a, 39 b, 40 b, 46 b, 65 b, 121 a, 125 b, 134 b, 135 a, 143 a, 155 a, 168 a, 172 b, 174 a, 174 b, 175 b, 178 b, 181 b, 205 b, 207 a, 216 b, 233 a, 250 a, 264 a, 267 b, 297 b, 319 b, 334 a, 380 b, 395 a, 397 b, 405 b, 408 a, 442 a, 444 a, 488 a, 495 a, 525 a, 553 a, 554 b, 555 a, 658 a, 745 b, 775 a, 791 b, 799 a; 99, 362, 374
 Onomakritos 7 a (a forger)
 'Open door,' the 607 a
 Ophthalmia 338 b
 Oracles lxxiii, lxxxvi, 101 a, 141 b, 293 b, 295 b, 326 a, 383 b, 404 a, 480 a, 509 a, 540 a, 567 a ff., 583 b, 684 b, 685 a b, 786 b, 788 a; 231 ff., 236, 289, 356
 Organisation of Persian Army 105 b, 111 a (cavalry), 151 b, 170 a b, 271 b, 399 b, 635 a, 683 b, 723 a, 793 a, 159 ff.: Navy 121 b ff., 288 a, 152 ff.: of Greek army 650 a b, 708 b, 740 a, 741 a. Cp. Army, Navy
 Orientalisms 5 b, 13 b, 19 a, 27 a, 49 a b, 75 b, 179 a, 288 b, 498 b, 580 b, 693 b; 3
 Ostrakisms 44 note, 87, 204, 207 f., 210
 Paintings 7 note
 Panhellenism 456 a, 457 b, 587 a, 604 a; 29, 33
 Panics 65 b, 310 a, 366 a, 375 b, 412 b, 443 b, 606 a; 100 note, 236
 Pankration, the 806 b
 Paradox 261
 PARIAN CHRONICLE, the 56
 Parikanians 92 a
 Passes 165 a (Thessalian), 250 b (*id.*), 254 a (*id.*), 256 b (*id.*), 258 b (Trachinian), 297 b (*Phurka*), 318 b (Trachinian), 319 b, 321 a (Ainianian), 319 b (Asopos), 396 b (Hyampolis), 399 b (Trachis), 605 b (Attic), 615 a (*id.*), 617 a, 639 a (Kithairon), 676 a, 677 a b, 798 a (Mykale); 212 (Thessalian), 271 f. (Central Greece)
 Pass-word 796 b
 Patronymic, use of lx, 1 a (*bis*), 3 a, 4 a, 5 b, 47 b, 84 b, 86 b, 91 a, 99 b, 103 a, 106 a, 125 a, 129 a, 177 a, 181 b, 189 a, 234 b, 235 b, 247 b, 252 b (*bis*), 275 a, 295 b, 305 a, 311 b, 327 b, 332 a, 334 b, 335 a b, 337 b, 338 a (*bis*), 364 a, 392 b, 406 b, 409 a, 429 b, 466 b, 483 a, 489 b, 501 a, 507 a, 560 b, 564 a, 572 a, 600 a, 620 a, 620 b, 624 a, 629 b, 632 b, 655 b, 668 b, 680 a, 687 a, 732 a, 735 b, 750 a b, 756 b, 773 a, 776 b, 781 b, 804 b
 PAUSANIAS 96
 Pausanias, the King 601 a
 Pausanias, 'the Regent' 608 a, 609 a; 354, 387: miscalled 'King' 601 a, 608 b, 756 a; 41, 83
 Pedigrees lvii, 20 a b, 85 a, 91 b, 125 a, 213 b, 293 a, 304 b, 306 a, 332 a, 425 b, 540 b, 560 b, 574 b, 579 b, 580 a, 591 a, 642 a, 644 a, 668 a, 781 a, 819 b
 Pelasgians 424 a
 Peloponnesians 527 a
 Peloponnesos 469 a (ethnography), 515 a (project of attacking)
 Pelta 100 a
 Penestai 253
Pentekontaeteris, History of the 36, 38, 42: references to xlii, li, lxv, xcvi, 432 a b
 Perikles 380 a, 439 b, 456 a, 529 b (first programme), 589 b, 590 a: censured? 209 b: Funeral Oration 43: his metaphor 226 a: his policy lxv, 16, 17, 36, 208, 211, 237: in the Pontos lxii
Persai of Aischylos 10, 15
Persai of Timotheos 29
 Persia 21 (its weakness), 115 (revival), 122 (Phil-hellenic)
 Persian Gulf, not recognized by Hdt. 104 b
 Persian Records 1, 24, 25 note, 102
 "Persian" war, the 50
 Persis 43 b, 85 b
 Pessimism 68 a, 578 a b, 622 b
 Philistines 112 b
 Phoenicians 35 b, 114 a, 120 a, 139 a, 213 b, 233 a, 498 a, 516 a, 566 a, 791 b
 Phokians 262 a (Hegemony), 263 a, 321 b, 398 b
 'Physics and Politics' 141 a, 829 b ff.
 Piety 769 a
 Pig, the 271 a
 Pillars 565 b
 Pillar-worship. Cp. Religion
 PINDAR 11, 59 (censured by Polybios)
 Pitanate cohort 64 a; 116
 Plan of campaign, Greek 253 b, 255 b, 256 a, 265 a, 346 b, 348 b, 415 b, 416 a, 417 a, 419 b, 422 b, 452 b, 468 b, 474 a, 509 b, 527 b, 530 b, 531 a, 594 b, 598 b, 628 a, 784 a b, 790 b, 795 b, 796 a; 222, 224, 240 ff., 245, 250, 252, 255, 256, 257, 260 f., 269, 286, 289, 326, 340, 343, 344, 388
 Plan of campaign, Persian. See Strategy
 Plataia, Battle of—first position 629 a,

- 630 b, 636 b, 637 b, 650 a, 692 b, 717 b, 719 a: second position 629 a, 630 b, 637 a, 639 b, 650 a, 657 a, 672 a, 692 b: third position 639 b, 707 b, 724 b, cp. 375 ff.: relation to Salamis 244, 288
- Plataians 422 b
- PLATO 46, 49 (on Plataia)
- PLUTARCH 65, 84, 290, 394, 408 (chronology)
- Polemarchy 252 a; 200 (at Athens)
- Policy of Argos 202 b, 207 b, 303 a
- of Athens 451 b, 452 a; 340
- of Gelon 217 a, 218 a, 219 b
- of Makedon 204 b, 253 a
- of Peisistratids 7 b
- of Peloponnesians 227 a
- of Persia lxxxiv, 8 b, 37 a
- of Sparta lxxxiv, 185 a, 252 a, 312 b, 347 a, 347 b; 195, 233, 335, 339
- of Thessalians 222, 247 ff.
- POLYAINOS 112
- POLYBIOS 48, 58
- Polytheism 548 a; 85
- Pony express, the 512 a
- Portents lxxxvi, 57 b, 78 a, 78 b, 411 b, 441 b, 443 a, 458 a, 490 a, 520 b, 576 b.
- Cp. Omens
- Postal service 441 a, 511 a
- Pragmatism 229 a, 364 a, 379 b, 411 b, 415 a, 421 a, 437 b, 438 a, 468 a b, 498 a, 570 a, 624 a, 648 b, 776 a; 261, 267, 340
- Prayer 280 b, 285 a, 728 b
- Predictions 7 b, 17 a, 20 a, 187 b, 683 b, 782 a
- Priesthood 212 a
- Primitive Athens 423 b, 425 a, 426 a
- Priority of Books 7, 8, 9: xlv, lxi, lxiv, 1 b, 2 b, 3 b, 4 a, 7 a, 9 a, 11 a, 11 b, 14 a, 15 b, 17 b, 29 a, 33 a b, 34 a, 56 a, 67 a, 69 b, 73 a, 76 a, 83 a, 86 b, 88 a, 89 b, 95 a, 98 b, 103 b, 107 a, 109 a, 112 a, 118 a, 118 b, 119 b, 122 a, 137 b, 141 a, 195 a, 201 a b, 205 b, 252 b, 297 a, 305 a, 306 b (*bis*), 337 b, 358 a, 404 a, 409 a, 421 a, 427 b, 430 b, 431 a, 460 b, 467 a, 472 a, 492 b, 502 a, 511 b, 520 b, 522 a, 560 b, 572 b, 574 a, 588 a, 608 b, 609 b, 646 b, 648 b, 652 b, 662 a, 753 b, 779 b, 780 b, 792 a, 798 a, 806 a b, 831 a b
- Prisoners 797 b (Athenian)
- Privileges 752 a
- Probouloi*, the 223 (met more than once)
- Proclamations 74 a (Xerxes), 303 b (Leonidas)
- Prophecy 509 a, 518 a
- Proxenia 589 a
- Psephisms 417 a, 772 b (of Aristeides), 212 ff. (of Themistokles)
- Psytaleia 317 (occupation of)
- Puns 481 b, 523 a, 666 a, 758 a
- Pylagoroi 316 b
- Pytho 409 a
- Race, notes of 519 b
- Rationalism 415 a; 74 (in Diodoros), 75 f., 83 (Nepos)
- References 117 b, 140 b, 157 b, 181 b, 228 a, 321 b, 340 b, 359 a, 409 a, 421 a, 460 a, 469 a, 472 b, 487 a, 491 b, 493 b, 494 a, 496 b, 502 b, 503 b, 504 a, 507 a, 513 b, 515 a, 516 b, 522 a, 533 a, 547 a, 553 b, 563 b, 663 b, 730 b, 732 a, 781 b, 792 b, 793 a, 801 a, 827 a
- Regatta 66 b (at Abydos)
- Religion 7 b (Orphic), 57 b (Persian), 60 b (*id.*), 65 a (*id.*), 65 a (Hellenic), 74 b (Persian), 75 a, 88 b, 97 a (Kappadokian), 141 b (sex in), 144 a (Persian), 172 a (oaths), 173 a (tithes), 178 b (kow-tow), 186 b (Delphic), 189 a (supplication), 190 a (intercession), 212 b (sex), 292 b ff. (human offerings), 295 a (purification), 383 b, 418 a ff. (serpent-worship), 441 a, 453 b, 509 b, 518 a, 529 b (Persians and Gk. R.), 548 a (Polytheism and Christianity), 555 a (Persian), 566 a (pillar-worship), 568 a b (Trophonios), 570 a (cult and myth), 588 b (Persians and Gk. R.), 590 a, 592 a (national), 622 b (Persian), 672 b, 682 b, 756 a, 782 b, 822 b; 49, 353
- Reminiscences 12 b (Aischylos), 43 a (Homer), 187 b, 201 a (Pindar), 222 b (Homer), 277 a b (Homer)
- Remission 581 a
- Rendezvous 134, 156
- Retort 553 a
- Reviews 66 a (Abydos), 81 a (Doriskos), 460 b
- Revisions 554 b
- Rhetoric 75, 80, 83, 108
- Rhetors, the 101
- Righteousness 227 b (Kadmos), 228 b, 229 b, 231 b, 246 b (Mikythos), 483 b (Aristeides)
- Rivers that failed, the 32 b, 64 b, 79 b, 138 a, 291 b, 292 a
- Roads 300 a, 405 b, 407 b, 466 b, 467 a, 519 a, 521 b, 537 b, 575 b, 619 a b, 636 a b, 738 b; 128, 130, 140, 270 f.
- Romance 578 b
- Rome 204 b, 232 b, 234 b, 830 b
- Roses 578 a b
- Route of Xerxes 62 a, 142 a, 146 b, 159 b, 200 a, 253 b, 292 a, 296 a b, 399 a, 403 b, 405 a b, 413 a, 435 b, 436 a, 524 a, 537 b, 554 a; 126 ff.
- Routes 253 b, 611 a, 617 a, 618 a, 779 a, 779 b

- Ruses 382 a, 390 a, 393 b, 395 b, 475 a, 511 a, 681 a, 789 b, 799 b; 40, 258, 289, 310, 314, 325, 341
- Sach-Kritik* 271 b, 371 a, 459 b, 478 a, 614 b; 158 note, 265, 381
- Sacrifice 237 b, 266 a, 267 b, 282 b, 292 b ff., 383 a, 418 a (bloodless), 507 a (human), 627 b, 664 b, 727 a, 761 b, 825 b; 86
- Saka 89 a
- Salamis, effects of battle 612 b, 616 a, 672 a; 244 (relation to Plataia), 288; 99 (Songs of)
- Samians 805 a
- Satrap 39 b, 177 a, 288 a, 553 a, 683 a, 776 b, 778 a b, 779 b, 811 a b, 819 a, 822 a; 84 (Mardonios)
- Satrapy 1 a (Lydian), 48 a (Thrake), 86 b (Babylon), 88 a (Baktria), 90 a (Aria), 90 b (Daskyleion), 91 a (Zarangia), 92 b (Arabia), 103 a (Moschian)
- Scandal 489 b, 504 b, 537 a, 762 b, 768 b, 772 a
- Scholasticism 50 (Aristotle's)
- Sea-power 573 b, 607 b, 830 b; 212, 241, 326, 336
- SENECA 63
- Seraglio, the 519 b
- Serpent-pillar, the 764 a. Cp. Religion
- Sex in Religion 141 b, 212 b, 568 a, 823 a
- Shields 180
- Ships 447 b, 515 a
- Shoes 180
- Siege-operations 742 b
- Signalling 367 b, 598 a, 723 a, 728 a, 796 a
- Signs 188 a, 418 a, 549 b, 665 a, 728 a, 790 b, 799 a, 826 b
- Sikeliotas 225 ff.
- Silenos 41 a
- SIMONIDES 337 b, 359 a, 429 a, 429 b; 12
- Siris 451 a
- Sjambok 33 b
- Slander 19 a
- Snake-cult 346 b, 418 a b. Cp. Religion
- Sophistry 19 a
- Sophokles 623 a, 646 b; 91
- Sources lxvii ff., 34 a, 41 a, 47 b, 77 b, 81 b, 82 b, 86 a, 87 a, 90 a, 97 a, 100 a, 105 b, 107 b, 112 a, 114 b, 121 b, 127 b, 147 a, 156 a, 157 a, 160 a, 166 b, 176 b, 177 a, 189 b, 224 a, 225 a, 228 a, 235 b, 237 a, 268 a, 274 a, 284 b, 290 a, 290 b, 291 b, 300 b, 311 b, 328 a, 329 a, 331 b, 332 a, 332 b, 334 b, 335 a, 357 b, 362 b, 392 b, 413 a, 428 b, 429 a, 433 b, 438 b, 440 b, 458 a, 461 b, 483 a, 486 b, 490 a, 491 a, 493 a, 495 a, 512 a, 532 b, 545 a, 547 a, 553 a, 555 b, 557 a, 561 a, 566 a, 570 a, 572 a, 575 b, 578 b, 611 a, 620 b, 625 a, 635 a, 651 a, 655 a, 655 b, 658 a, 658 b, 725 b, 726 a, 729 a, 735 b, 741 b, 749 b, 752 b, 759 a, 768 b, 773 b, 781 a, 803 a, 804 b, 826 a, 827 a, 829 a; 1, 93, 181 f., 265, 290, 358 ff., 363 f., 388
- Sources—Argive 204 a
- Asianic 370 a, 379 b, 479 b, 491 b, 492 a, 494 a; 279, 360
- Attic 281 a, 364 b, 436 b, 504 b, 573 b, 583 a, 597 b, 606 a, 655 b, 678 b, 687 a, 694 a, 695 b, 708 a (*bis*), 710 b, 711 a, 722 b, 724 a, 725 a, 741 a, 772 a, 803 a, 822 b; 268, 279, 302
- Autopsia* lxviii, 40 b, 45 b, 154 a, 157 b, 159 a, 163 b, 167 b, 168 b, 261 b, 286 a, 299 b, 301 b, 321 a, 333 b, 414 b, 431 a, 511 a, 556 a, 570 b, 633 b, 637 a, 743 b, 764 b, 768 a, 771 b, 814 b; 131 f., 133, 263, 264, 359, 362
- Delphian 265 a, 401 a, 408 b, 413 a, 413 b, 666 a, 732 a; 361
- Epigraphic 492 b; 6 f., 359
- Halikarnassian 811 b
- Literary lxxiii ff., 30 a, 107 b, 118 b, 127 b, 161 a, 167 b, 206 a, 207 a, 225 a, 241 a, 247 b, 248 a, 265 b, 279 b, 292 a b, 295 b, 317 b, 332 a, 334 b, 336 a b, 337 b, 343 a, 420 b, 423 b, 454 a b, 495 a, 500 b, 508 b, 509 b, 574 b, 629 b, 642 a b, 663 b, 750 b, 752 b, 765 b, 766 a, 794 b; 5 f., 358
- Makedonian 97 a; 361
- Median 86 a
- Medized 299 a, 351 b
- Oral xlix, lxx, 205 a, 232 a, 279 a, 296 a, 326 a, 454 a, 504 b, 567 b, 623 b, 747 b, 768 b, 769 b, 771 b, 790 a; 360
- Persian lxxv note, 1 ff., 360
- Samian 492 a
- Spartan 3 b, 180 a, 331 b, 770 b; 272, 361
- Thessalian 168 a b
- Western lxii, lxiii note, lxix note, 232 a
- Sparta, population of 344 a ff.; Policy, q.v.
- Spear, the 60 a; 178
- Speeches lxxvii, 67 a, 447 a, 448 b ff., 452 a, 461 b, 485 a, 487 b, 488 a, 516 a, 516 b, 525 b, 528 a, 529 b, 534 b, 580 b, 644 b, 645 a, 648 a, 649 a, 683 b, 684 a, 688 a, 690 b ff., 692 a, 695 a, 778 a, 782 a, 782 b; 125, 228
- Spies, mission of 198 a
- Spoils, 6 note
- Stasis* 484 a, 485 a, 584 b; 253
- Statues 549 a; 7 note

- Stigma 342 b
 Stories 228 b (Kadmos), 246 a (Mikythos), 320 b (Kerkopes), 520 b ff. (Hermotimos), 574 a ff. (Makedonian monarchy)
 Storms 284 b, 290 a, 315 b, 369 b, 374 b, 376 b, 377 b; 265, 273, 275, 277, 278
 STRABO 93
 Stratagems 394 a, 681 a; 112, 285
Strategia, at Athens 200 ff.
 Strategy, Persian lxxxiii, 366 b, 378 b, 462 b, 466 a, 514 b, 516 a, 538 a, 559 b, 560 a, 573 b, 613 a b, 614 b, 615 b, 628 a, 628 b, 629 a, 658 a, 672 a b, 676 a, 680 a ff., 791 b, 802 b; 100, 185 ff., 256, 257, 262, 287, 305 ff.
 Succession, in Persia 2 b, 4 b, 123: in Sparta 3 a, 4 b, 306 b f.
 Sun, the 587 b, 785 a b
 Supernatural, the lxxxvi f., 506 a, 588 a, 799 a; 353
 Susa 513 a (not a 'Persian' city)
 Sweetmeats 46 a
 Sword 37 (of Mardonios), 103, 178 f.
 Symbolism 577 a b
 Synchronisms 197 a, 220 b, 227 a, 232 a, 233 a, 236 a, 250 a, 254 b, 264 a, 282 b, 305 b, 313 a, 325 a, 357 a, 371 a, 377 b, 378 a b, 391 a b, 436 b, 466 b, 537 b, 612 a, 780 b, 799 b, 800 b, 801 b, 802 b, 808 a; 52, 186, 245, 263, 265, 272, 329, 347, 404 ff.
 Syndrion of *Strategoi* 255 b; 248
 Synoikismos 751 a
 Syria 87 b
- Tablets 571 b
 Taboo 293 b, 294 a, 569 b
 Tacitus, lost Books of xvi
 Tactics 372 b, 448 a, 464 b, 474 a, 478 a b, 484 a, 488 b, 490 a b, 499 a, 501 b, 507 b, 510 a, 534 a, 630 a, 634 a, 634 b, 665 a, 672 a, 692 a ff., 699 a b, 702 a b, 704 a b, 711 a, 714 a, 715 a b, 722 a, 724 b, 727 a b, 728 b, 730 b, 749 a, 799 a; 297 ff. (Salamis), 304 ff., 344 (Plataia), 374 ff., 534
 Tagos 596 a
 Talthybios, wrath of xxiii. Cp. Wrath
 Tanagra, battle of liii, lxxv, 671 b
 Telegraphs 269 b, 284 b
 Tempe 163 b, 164 a b, 165 a, 167 b
 Temples 411 a (Athene Pronaia), 437 b (on Akropolis), 441 b, 505 a (Athene Skiras), 570 b, 571 a (Ptoan), 706 b (Heraion), 717 a b (Demeter), 728 a (Heraion), 729 b (Demeter), 743 b (Athene Alea), 745 b (Athene, at Plataia), 791 a (Heraion), 793 b (Demeter); 6 note (various), 12 (Aphaia), 100 (ruined)
- Tenians v, 486 a (at Salamis)
 Teratology 411 a. Cp. Miracles, Portents, Signs
 Thalattocracy 536 b. Cp. Sea-power
 Thebans 341 a (at Thermopylai); 92 (at Tempe), 249, 357 (at Plataia)
 Themistokles 192 b (début), 252 b, 254 b (in Thessaly), 363 b, 381 b, 385 b, 416 a, 434 b, 438 a, 444 a, 446 a, 452 a, 474 a, 474 b, 484 b, 502 b, 509 b, 525 b, 527 b, 528 b, 531 a, 532 b, 533 a, 533 b, 535 b, 536 b, 537 a, 548 a, 549 a, 550 b, 552 b, 559 b, 583 b, 585 a, 588 a, 589 b, 670 a (in Argos), 671 a, 687 b, 766 b, 824 b; 9, 14, 17, 32, 36, 37, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 59 note, 60, 70, 72, 80, 85 (Plutarch), 89, 104 ff., 112, 117, 119, 208 ff. (character and policy), 220, 221, 232, 233, 236, 239, 249, 259, 267, 269, 289, 309, 325, 330, 331 (disappearance), 341, 388. Cp. Legend
 Theology 18 a, 28 a, 145 a, 173 b, 186 a, 190 a, 211 b, 223 a, 283 b, 285 b, 376 b, 441 b (Poseidon), 442 a, 453 b, 457 a (Demeter), 529 a, 548 a, 588 a, 592 b (Homeric), 604 a, 622 a b, 756 a, 764 b, 783 a, 800 a, 825 b
 THEOPOMPOS 26, 95
 Therme, pause at 139
 Thermopylai 259 b (described), 301 a b, 320 b, 330 a, 333 a; 56 (Gauls at), 98 (routes), 112 (Antiochos at), 245 (strategic line), 255
 Thersander of Orchomenos lxxvii, 567 b; 360
 Theseus 751 a
 Thespias 475 b (its history)
 Thespians 328 b (at Thermopylai), 333 b, 334 a
 Thessalians 249 a, 262 b (unknown to Homer), 342 b (Hegemony), 397 a (*id.*), 400 b, 413 b. Cp. Policy
 Throne 500 b (of Xerxes at Salamis)
 THUCYDIDES xv (*τὰ Μνημόνια*), xvii ('Books'), xl (incomplete), xliii (symmetry), lxxvi (not scientific), lxxx (speeches), 34 b (Athos), 162 a (Makedon), 180 a (2. 67), 230 b (Zankle), 231 a (*id.*), 243 a (a theorist), 424 b (Pelagians), 454 b (Theoklydes), 536 a (Themistokles), 551 b (*id.*), 576 a, 579 a (Makedon), 592 b (Hellenism), 640 b (at Plataia?), 707 a b, 709 a (Pitanate *Lochos*), 733 a (third Messenian war), 745 b, 751 a (Theseus), 752 b (invasions of Attica), 754 a (Drabeskos), 771 b, 820 b (siege of Sestos), 821 a, 830 a (Physics and Politics); 17 (a Periklean), 19 (acquainted with Hdt.'s work), 36, 93, 109, 110, 259, 340, 407

- Thurian Redaction lxiii. Cp. Second Draft
 Thuri 632 a
 TIMOKREON 13
 Tithes 173 a, 396 a, 763 b, 765 a
 Tombs 770 a (at Plataia); 6 note
 Topographers 93
 Torch-race 512 b
 Trade 64 b (timber), 160 b (horns), 199 b (corn), 218 a (slaves)
 Tradition 193 (not artless)
 Tragedies 282 a (domestic)
 Traitors 316 a
 Travel lxi (notes of). Cp. HERODOTUS
 Treasuries 409 b
 Treaties 643 b, 772 b
 Triarchy 269 a, 380 b, 504 a; 213
 Tripartition of Persian army 137. Cp. Organization
 Triremes 432 b
 Troogus 77 ff.
 Trojan war 30 a, 241 a, 248 a, 262 b, 647 b
 Trousers 84 a, 147 a; 180
 Truth, the 777 b; 193, 338
Tyrannis, the 229 a, 232 b, 492 a, 575 a, 586 b, 781 a, 812 a, 822 a; 253

 Uniformity of Nature 588 a
 Unity of Books 7, 8, 9, xv ff., 1 a, 357 a b, 594 b, 595 a
 Unity of Hellas 593 a, 596 b
 Universalism 62, 78, note, 82

 Vases 22 b, 279 b; 7 note
 Valkyries 266 b, 280 a
Via Egnatia 575 b. See Egnatian Way
 Viceroy, appointment of 2 b, 74 a
 Victory, Greek xc, 69 a, 314 a, 379 b, 493 a, 689 a, 730 a b, 831 a; 259, 355, 386
 Victory, Persian 622 b, 831 a
 Virtue rewarded 551 b. Cp. *Aristeia*
 Voting, method of 550 b
 Vows, of Dareios 174 a: against Medizers 172 a, 173 b, 525 b; 40, 191, 220, 233, 236: before Plataia 72, 408: against rebuilding temples 32, 40
Vox viva 572 a

 Walls 187 a (Athens), 191 b (Akropolis), 192 a (wooden), 216 b (Syracuse), 262 a, 319 a (Phokian), 330 a (*id.*), 333 b (*id.*), 437 b (Athens), 467 b (Isthmos), 558 a (Poteidaia), 603 a (Isthmos), 605 b, 608 b, 614 a (Athens), 615 a (Megara), 616 a (*id.*), 619 a (Persian camp), 681 b (Thebes), 743 a (wooden), 825 a (Chersonese); 21 (Athenian rebuilt), 341, 347 (Isthmos)
 Warfare 14 b, 264 a, 349 b, 404 b, 587 a, 695 b
 Wars 214 a (of Hippokrates), 221 a, 393 a ff. (Thessalo - Phokian), 397 b (first Sacred), 398 b (second Sacred), 403 b (third Sacred), 408 a, 562 a (Messenian), 573 a (Peloponnesian), 579 b (Messenian), 593 a b (Peloponnesian), 671 b (third Messenian), 733 a; 57 (enumerated on *Marmor Parium*)
 Watches (*Vigiliae*) 319 a, 702 b, 705 b
 Water-supply 696 b, 697 a
 West, the 451 b, 452 a, 565 b
 Wind, theory of 25 a, 240 a, 265 a, 266 a (cult), 278 a, 282 b, 285 a, 286 a
 Winds 545 a, 820 b
 Wine 156 a
 Witticisms 225 b, 566 a. Cp. *Bons mots*
 Women 601 a, 630 a, 755 a ff., 765 b, 787 a, 810 b, 824 a
 Wounded, treatment of 268 b
 Wrath 174 b (of Talthybios), 175 a, 241 b (of Minos), 296 a (of Zeus Laphystios), 352 a (of Xerxes), 789 a (of Evenios); 191 (of Talthybios)

 XENOPHON 21
 Xerxes lxxix, lxxxv, xci (character), 3 b (date of birth), 20 a, 23 a, 36 b, 67 b, 74 a b, 163 a (at Tempe), 179 a, 199 a, 264 b, 276 b, 291 b, 313 b, 379 a, 408 b (at Delphi?), 441 a (at Athens), 460 b, 464 a, 499 a b ff. (at Salamis), 513 b, 514 b, 519 a, 529 a, 542 b, 546 a, 622 a (in tears), 695 a, 760 a, 766 a, 780 a, 792 b, 812 a ff., 822 b; 49, 51, 63, 83, 90, 124, 237, 274, 322 f.

 Zenobia 116

INDEX V

AUCTORUM

- Abel 578 b (on the 'Rose-Garden')
- Adam, R. 481 b (Artemision)
- Agar, T. L. 178 a (*δοίηρε*)
- Arnold, T. 543 b (on Thrake), 708 b (Spartan army)
- Audrey, H. 397 (Plataia)
- Baehr 6 a, 7 b, 8 a
- Baiter - Sauppe 32, 43 (Gorgias), 42 (Demades, Deinarchos)
- Bauer xlv (on the order of Hdt.'s *Logoi*), lx; 51 (Plutarch's *Themistokles*), 52, 63 (omissions in his Plutarch's *Themistokles*)
- Baumeister 9 b (Dareios vase), cp. 22 b; 7 (Dareios vase), 419 a (snake-cult)
- Behistun Inscrip. 13 a, 20 a, 75 b, 92 a, 96 b, 109 b
- Beloch 203 a (population of Argos), 344 b (population of Lakonia), 452 a (on Athens in the West), 541 b (Agesilaos' march by Xerxes' route); 359 (army-list)
- Berger 565 b (Pillars of Herakles)
- Bergk 210 b, 216 b, 338 a, 421 b, 450 a, 451 a, 647 a (Theseis); 5 (Choirilos of Samos: Ion of Chios), 11, 12 (Pindar), 12 (Simonides), 13 (Timokreon), 29 (Timotheos)
- Bethe 569 b (Amphiaraos)
- Bevan 91 a (Zarangia), 92 b (Parikanioi)
- Binder, J. J. 194 a (on mines of Laureion)
- Blakesley xlv (on priority of Books 7-9); Commentary, *passim*; 299 (on Salamis), 342 (date of Plataia)
- Blass, F. 26 (Theopompos), 27 (Ephoros), 33, 43 (Gorgias), 42 (Isaios, Andokides), 45 (Hypereides)
- Blümner, H. 93 b (gem-cutting)
- Boeckh 173 a (*δεκαεὶς ἔτα*)
- Boehmer, E. 75 (Pindar)
- Bonitz 54 (error in his Aristot. *Index*)
- Bosanquet, B. 194 a
- Bosanquet, R. C. 85 (Artemis)
- Brinkley 178 b (Kow-tow)
- Broendsted 654 b (*Παλλέες*)
- Buchholz 262 b (Thessaly in Homer), 283 b (Nereids), 181 (boots)
- Buckle 830 b (Physics and Politics)
- Bunbury 565 b (Pillars of Herakles)
- Bürgel 316 b (Amphiktyonic League), 400 b (Amphiktyony)
- Bursian 279 a (the 'Ovens'), *ib.* (Meli-boia), 291 b (Alos), 293 a, 297 b (Antikyra), 298 a (Ainianes), *ib.* (Dyras), 298 b (Oita), *ib.* (Melas), 299 b (Asopos), *ib.* (Phoinix), 401 a (Tithora), 403 a (Erochos), 403 a (Pediéis), 414 a (Autonoos), 617 b (Sphendale)
- Bury 7 b, 114 a, 254 a (Xerxes in Thessaly), 262 b, 291 a (Achaian), 383 b (Bakis), 393 a (Thessaly *v.* Phokis: Phokian supremacy), 402 a (Amphissa), 432 a (Achaians), 483 a (Aristeides a *strategos* at Salamis), 591 a (on the names Hellas, Hellenes), 592 a (the Pythian games founded by Kleisthenes: the Olympian by Pheidon); 11 (on Pindar), 64 (Plataian *Eleutheria*)
- Busolt, G. lxii (on the history of Thurioi), 107 a, 114 a, 207 a (Lakkoploutos), 309 b, 337 b (Amphiktyony), 346 b, 374 a (Lemnos), 391 b (Olympiad), 398 b (sacred war), 426 b (Dorians), 451 b (Thurioi), 452 a (Athens in the West), 575 a (accession of Perdikkas), 591 a (on the 'Greek' name), 598 b (date of the second occupation of Athens), 602 b (Hyakinthia), 609 a (eclipse of Oct. 2, 480), 670 b (Tegean War), 671 a (b. of Dipaia), 671 b (on Text), 671 b (b. of Tanagra), 754 a b (b. of Datos), 801 b (dates of Plataia and Mykale), 807 a

- (Karystian war); 17 (date of Kimon's prosecution), 27, 28 (Ephoros), 66 (on Diodoros), 87 (Themistokles *Archon*), 219 (Ath. initiative), 223 (Synedrion), 321 (the Mole at Salamis), 347 (decades), 347 (date of Plataia)
Bywater 667 b (*χρησμοσύνη*)
- Canter 103 (Aristeides)
Carapanos 787 b (Dodona)
Cartault 432 b (triremes)
Caton, R. 358 b (Asklepios)
Cauer, P. 300 a b (Amphiktyons), 316 b (Pythagoroi), 428 a (tit. Aeginet.)
Christ 11, 12 (Pindar)
Cicero 7a, 188 b, 228 b, 264 b, 336 b, 377 a (supplicatio), 529 b (Persian religion), 578 a (myth of Silenos), 621 a, 783 b (omens)
Clinton 306 a, 344 a (Lakonian cities), 437 a (Kalliades), 579 b (on Makedonian chronology), 806 b (Pankration); 9 (the *Persai*), 10 (*Phoinissai*), 108 (Lucian), 211 (Aristeides Ostrak.)
Cobet, Apparatus *passim*
Collignon 6 (Aiginetan temple)
Cook, A. B. 133 b (unconscious iteration)
C. I. A. 154a, 155b, 157a, 437b (*ραψαί*), 632 b, 754 a, 780 b; 553 (Belbina)
C. I. G. 471 b (Paroreia), 710 a, 719 b, 741 b
Cousinéry 147 (canal of Xerxes)
Curtius, E. 300 a (Roads in Greece), 419 b (Pogon), 467 a (Skironis), 467 b (Isthmian wall), 590 b (Unity of Hellas), 671 a (Dipaia), 733 b (Stenykleros); 7 (mon. bull)
Curtius, G. 425 a (Kranaos), 762 a (etym.)
Curzon 829 a (Persis)
- Dakyns, H. G. 22 (on Xenophon)
Darmesteter 29 a (on Magi), 622 b (Avesta)
De Gobineau 2, 4 (early P. history), 158 (army-list)
Delbrück, H. 158 (army-list), 343 (Mardonios), 351 (Phyle-Skolos)
D'Herbelot 3, 4 (*Bibl. Orient.*)
Diels 142 (*Laterculi Alexandrini*)
Dieulafoy 94 b (Aithiopians)
Dindorf, L. 66 (Diodoros), 101, 102 (Dio Chrysostom)
Dionys. Halicar. 9 b (on Hdt.'s style)
Dittenberger 124 b, 207 a, 486 b (serpent column), 632 b, 652 b ('Troizen')
Doerpfeld, W. 64 b (on Troy)
Duncker 49 a (flogging the sea), 56 b (start from Sardis), 65 a (P. religion), 97 a (Kappadokians), 124 b (Hiram), 144 b (P. religion), 207 a (Peace of Kallias), 829 a (Persis); 17 (Perikles), 158 (army-list), 347 (date of Plataia)
- Ephemeris Archaeol.* 646 b (Myken. tombs at Eleusis)
Evans, A. J. 108 a (camel), 231 b (Zankle), 347 b (Snake-Goddess), 418 b (snake-cult)
- Farnell, L. R. 141 b, 212 b (sex in religion), 190 b (*Τριτογενής*), 292 b (human sacrifice), 442 b (Athene-Poseidon), 604 a (Zeus Hellenios)
Flaubert 237 b (human sacrifice)
Forbes, W. H. 325 (Thucydides)
Forbiger 31 b (on Lydians), 38 b (Hellespont), 153 a (Assa), 245 a, 564 b (cities of Chios), 754 a (Drabeskos)
Foucart 455 b (Iakchos)
France, Anatole 320 b (*les deux frères Cercopes*)
Frazer, J. G. 292 b (sacrifice), 403 a (Erochos), 403 a (Amphikaia), 403 a (Charadra), 407 a (Delphi), 411 a (Delphi), 411 b (Athene Pronoia), 414 a (Kastalia), 419 b (Pogon), 438 b (Areiopagos), 550 b (temple of Poseidon), 571 a (temple of Ptoan Apollo), 590 a (Xoanon of Athene), 735 a (on the Anaktoron), 764 a (serpent-column), 764 b (Olymp.), 766 b (tent of Xerxes), 770 a (graves of Plataia), 806 b (Hermolykos); 96, 97, 98 (on Pausanias)
Freeman, E. A. lxxv (on the embassy to Gelon), 212 b, 213 a b, 214 a b, 215 a, 216 a b, 217 a (on a metaphor), 217 b (site of Euboia), 219 b (Gelon's constitutional position), 221 a, 231 b (Messana), 232 a (Theron), 232 b (Akragas), 233 a (Himera), 234 a (Elisykians), 236 a (wrongly ignored), 238 b, 244 a, 246 a b (Mikythos), 247 a; 57 (Lykiskos), 60 (Cicero Historicus), 70, 71, 77 (Diodoros); 91, 226, 228 (Gelon)
Furtwaengler 437 b (Erechtheion), 633 b (death of Masistios); 6 (t. of Aphaia)
- Gardner, E. A. 437 b (Erechtheion), 439 b (Propylaia), 440 b (Aglaureion), 479 a (Attic harbours), 614 a (Athens a walled town), 647 b (Amazon battle), 766 b (tent of Xerxes); 6 (t. of Nike)
Geltzer 41 b (age of Gyges), 126 a
George, H. B. 67 b (Napoleon in Russia)
Gilbert, G. 202 a (Boule at Argos), 437 b (*ραψαί*), 617 a (Boiotarch), 756 a (Sp. const.), 709 a (Sp. army), 770 b (*ιπéρες*)
Gilmore 25 (Ktesias)
Giseke 97 b (Phrygo-Makedonians)
Goettling 677 b ('Three Heads')

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- Goodwin 481 b (Artemision), 490 b (theory of Salamis), 634 a (*ἐπὶ θέρῃ*); 299 (on Salamis)
- Grassberger (place-names) 139 a, 153 b, 155 b, 421 b, 428 b
- Grenfell, B. P. c (*Papyri*)
- Gresswell, E. 347 (date of Plataia)
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- Gutschmid, A. von xvi (division of Hdt.'s work), 306 a (credited with a correction of Clinton's), 433 a (navy-list for Salamis)
- Hagen, O. E. '*Keilschrifturkunden*' 20 b
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- Hauvette 163 a (Hdt. at Tempe); 216 b, 337 b, 338 a, 429 b, 741 b (Simonides); 7 (the Spartan Stoa), 12 (on Simonides), 73 (Diodoros), 125 (*souvenirs d'Eschyle*), 141 (sceptics), 146 (bridges), 147 (canal), 158 (army-list)
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- Heiligenstaedt (*de enunt. final. usu*) 10 b, 367 a
- Helbig 591 a (on the 'Greek' name)
- Henderson, B. W. 37 a (Isthmian Canal), 235 a (Constitution of Carthage)
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- Hicks ('Manual') 126 b, 388 a, 417 a, 430 a (*τράχης φ.*), 486 b (serpent column), 654 a, 655 a, 754 a, 758 b, 764 a (serpent c.); 7
- Hill, G. B. ('Sources') 136 a, 153 a, 154 a, 361 b, 460 a, 671 b (*bis*), 758 b, 780 b
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- Kopecky 432 b (triremes)
- Kraz 50 b (on bridges)
- Kretschmer 32 b, 97 b, 99 a b (on Teukrians), 97 a (Kappadokians), 125 b (Kandaules), 143 b (Paionians), 751 a, 825 b (-nt- -vd-)
- Krüger 352 b (unauthenticity of 7. 239), 767 b (9. 83-4), 796 b (9. 98. 17-21)
- Krumbacher 116 (Byzantine Lit.)

- Krumbholz 102 a (Satrap omitted), 177 b (satrapy of Hydarnes), 553 b (satraps of Daskyleion), 769 b (Mardonios), 777 a (Daskyleion)
- Kuehner 625 a (plural), 625 b (*πᾶς τις*), 635 a (Brachylogy), 798 b (dative)
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- Leake, W. M. 37 a (Xerxes' canal), 119 a (Nesiotes), 124 b (Gorgos), 153 a b, 154 a b, 155 b, 159 b, 161 b, 164 a, 167 a, 286 b (Pagasai), 321 a ('Trachinian' mountains), 329 a (Anopaia), 376 a (the Hollows), 403 a (Pedieis, Erochos), 403 b (Elateia, Hyampolis, Parapotamioi), 404 a (Abai), 464 b (tactics at Salamis), 480 b (Artemision), 482 a, 484 a, 486 a, 488 b, 499 b (theory of Salamis); 505 b (the Skiradion), 508 b (Kolias), 555 a, 578 b (ascent of Mt. Bermius), 614 a (difficulty of destruction), 617 a (Sphendale), 617 b (Tanagra), 619 b (Erythrai: Hysiai), 639 b (Gargaphia), 677 b (Dryos Kephala), 700 a (the 'Island'); 147 (canal), 298 (theory of Salamis)
- Lehmann, C. F. 812 b (revolt of Babylon); 5 (Dionysios of Miletos)
- Lenormant, F. 452 a (Siris)
- Lloyd, W. 75 (Pindar)
- Lolling 258 b (Artemision), 287 b (Aphetai), 291 b (Alos), 500 b (Throne of Xerxes)
- Lupus 216 b, 217 a (Gelon's additions to Syracuse)
- Lyall, Sir A. 823 a (Polytheism)
- Macan, T. 3, 4 (Sháh Náneh)
- Macaulay 15 a, 61 a, 70 a, 107 b, 141 b, 616 a, 716 a, 798 b
- Macdonald, G. 543 b (coins of Mosses), 181 (ancient boots)
- Madvig 6 a, 386 b (*ῥσρε*), 530 a (Gk. Syntax)
- Mahaffy, J. P. 653 a (on destruction of Mykenai)
- Maine, Sir H. S. 189 b (sitting dharna)
- Manso 308 b (Karneia)
- Marmor Parium* 215 b, 338 a, 794 a, 809 a
- Maspero 4 b, 88 b (on Persian religion)
- Meltzer, O. 234 a (Sardinians), 234 b (Mago), 235 a (constitution of Carthage), 238 b (Semitic religion)
- Meyer, Ed. lxiii (Hdt.'s visit to Egypt), 85 b (Arians), 97 a (Kappadokians), 114 a, 114 b (Kypros), 223 a (Agamemnon), 234 a (Sardinia), 305 b (on Spartan traditions), 562 a (King Pausanias' historical researches), 591 a (on the Greek name), 652 b (Hdt. 4. 148), 653 b (destruction of Tiryns), 812 b (revolt of Babylon), 831 b (Persis)
- Mezger 604 a (date of Pindar's *Nem.* 5)
- Michel 486 b (serpent-column), 632 a
- Milchhoeffer 317 b (Korydallos), 503 b (Anagyrous), 750 a (Dekeleia), 751 b (Aphidnai), 752 a (Titakos)
- Mommsen, A. 391 b (Olympiad), 457 a (Eleusinia); 64 (Eleutheria)
- Monro, D. B. 6 a, 11 a, 50 a (*ἀπα*), 166 a, 225 b, 308 b, 309 a, 799 b
- Montesquieu 830 b (Physics and Politics)
- Morris-Jones 233 b (Iberians)
- Mücke 147 b (hero-worship)
- Mülder, D. lxxv (on Choirilos of Samos); 5
- Müller, *Frag. H. G.* 25 (Ktesias), 26 (Theopompos), 26 (Ephoros), 81 (Aristodemos)
- Müller, F. Max 74 b (Henotheism)
- Müller, K. O. 203 b (Spartan Apella), 307 a, 320 b (Story of the Kerkopes), 400 a (Pindos), 400 b (Doris), 433 a (navy-list at Salamis), 455 a (on Hdt.), 472 a (Orneai), 502 b (Aiginetan admiral), 759 a (Lampon)
- Müller, W. Max 116 b (feather head-dress)
- Munro, J. A. R. 481 b (Artemision)
- Newman, F. L. 235 a (constitution of Carthage)
- Niebuhr, B. G. 5 (Choirilos of Samos), 77 (Trogus)
- Nilsson, M. P. 418 b (Snake-God)
- Nissen 233 b (Ligurians), 243 a (Siculi), 244 a b (Iapygia)
- Nöldeke 9 a (Eg. revolt)
- Oberhammer 138 a, 182 a, 293 a, 426 b (Amprakia)
- Oelenschläger 103, 113 (Philostratos)
- Orelli 60 (*Onomasticon*)
- Overbeck 7 (*Schriftquellen*)
- Pape-Benseler *passim*
- Pashley 243 b (Eteokretans)
- Payne-Gallwey, Sir R. 176 (bows)
- Pelham, H. F. 110 (Arrian)
- Perrot-Chipiez 83 b (Persian dress), 829 a (Persis); x, 168 (Apadana-frieze)
- Peschel, O. 234 a (couvade)
- Petersen 207 a (Kallias), 380 a (Kleinias)
- Pomtow, H. 410 b (Delphi)
- Radet 31 b 99 a (on Lydians), 41 b (Gyges), 45 a (topography), 63 b, 126 a (ius maternum), 126 b
- Ramsay, Sir W. M. 40 a (Asian topogr.),

- 44 b, 45 a, 46 a (*πρωτος*); 128, 129 (Asian geogr.), 130, 131
 Rawlinson 3 b, 7 a, 829 a (Persis), *et passim*
 Reclus 543 a (Seres), 829 a (Persis)
Records of the Past 20 a, 65 a, 85 b, 89 a; 3, 186 (Karka)
 Reiske, Apparatus *passim*
 Rennel 92 a (Utii), 94 b (Aithiopians)
 Richardson 2 (Persian war a figment), 3, 4
 Ridgeway, W. 432 a (Achaians)
 Roberts, E. S., *Gk. Epigr.* 428 a, 433 a; 26 (Dionysias H.)
 Rohde 266 b (wind-cult), 383 b (Bakis), 640 b (hero-cult)
 Rumpel (*Lexikon Pindar.*), 190 a b, 412 a, 755 b
 Schaefer, A. 287 a; 26 (Theopompos), 27 (Ephoros), 56 (Sources), 61 (Kleitarchos), 66 (Diodoros)
 Schiller, H. 115 (Parthian war)
 Schmid, W. 101 (Dio Chrysostom), 103
 Schmidt, J. H. H. 633 b (*ῥύττω, παλεῖν*)
 Schrader, O. 76 a (on *ἀκνάκης*)
 Schwartz, E. 66 (on Diodoros), 81 (Aristodemos), 112 (Appian)
 Schweighauser *passim*, 115 (Athenaios)
Shāh Nāmah 109 b (lasso); 3 (Alexander), 115 (old P. traditions)
 Sieglin, W. 47 a (on the Hellespont)
 Sittl, C. 179 a (Kow-tow), 756 a (supplication)
 Sitzler, Apparatus *passim*
 Stein, H., Apparatus and Commentary *passim*
 Stengel 266 b (wind-worship)
 Strachan-Davidson, J. L. 234 b (Rome and Carthage)
 Stuart Jones, H. 34 a (text of Thucydides), 279 b (chest of Kypselos)
 Suidas xlix (on Hdt.), lxix
 Susemihl 61 (Kleitarchos), 114 (Jason)
 Sykes 829 a (Persis)
 Telfy (*Corp. Iur. Att.*), 191 b
 Thirlwall 27 a (influence of Magi)
 Thraemer (on Mysians) 32 b, 63 a, 293 a
 Thucydides xv (Median War), xli (relation to Hdt.), cp. Index IV.
 "Times" 518 a (victory due to virtues of Mikado); 20 (on Japan)
Tituli Lyciae 117 a
 Toepffer 380 a (Kleinias)
 Tomaschek 88 b (Baktria), 89 a (Skyths), 90 b (Arians), 143 a (Thrakians)
 Torr, C. 227 b (Pentekonteres), 496 b (Flags); 144 (ship's beam)
 Tozer 151 b (Jews at Salonika), 155 b, 159 b, 160 a, 163 a, 164 a, 166 a, 791 a (Samian Heraion)
 Trautwein, P. lxxv (on the Dikaïos memoirs), 128 a, 454 a
 Tropea, G. 231 b (coins of Zankle)
 Tümpel 266 b (wind-cult)
 Twain, Mark (Dr. Clemens) 512 a (Pony Express)
 Tylor, E. B. 234 a (couvade)
 Ulrichs 401 a b (Tithora)
 Unger 391 b (Olympiad)
 Ulrichs 41 b (on Atys), 42 a (treasure of Kroisos)
 Usener 26 (Dionysios H.)
 Veitch 12 a
 Vischer 677 b (Dryos Kephalai), 716 b (Moloeis)
 Vogel, F. 66 (Diodoros)
 Wachsmuth 440 b (Aglaureion); 27, 28 (Ephoros), 66 (on Diodoros), 77 (Trogus), 82 (Aristodemos), 83, 84 (Nepos), 88 (Plutarch)
 Washington, H. S. 706 b (site of the Plataian Heraion)
 Wecklein 666 b (Pentathlon); 9 (Aischylos), 146 (Canal)
 Weir Smyth, Ionic 191 b, 194 b, 304 b (Leonides), 559 b, 561 a (Leutychides), 665 b (*ἄετος*), 794 b (nouns in -*τός*)
 Wells, J. lxxv (Zopyros-source); 197 (chronology of Kleomenes)
 Welzhofer 158 (army-list)
 Wernicke 668 b (Amythaon)
 Wheeler, B. I. 490 b (critique of Goodwin's theory of Salamis)
 Wide, S. 223 a (cult of Agamemnon), 602 b (Hyakinthia), 709 b (Artemis), 747 a (Poseidon)
 Wiedemann 9 a (Eg. revolt)
 Wieland 150 b (Abdera)
 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, H. von xxxix (Hdt.'s work unfinished), 532 b (Themistokles); 29 (*Persai* of Timotheos)
 Wilkinson, G. 38 a (Eg. ropes), 92 b (*ῥεπά*), 93 b (gem cutting), 94 a (clubs)
 Wilson, Sir C. 40 a, 44 b, 45 a, 63 a, 289 b; 130, 131 (Asian topography)
 Winckler 147 (hero-worship)
 Wissowa 84 (Nepos)
 Woodhouse, W. J. 640 b (Androkrateion); 397 (Plataia)
 Wordsworth 164 a (Tempe)
 Wright, H. B. 761 b; 397 (Plataia)

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